Apatheia in the teachings of Evagrius Ponticus by Tobon, M.
Page 1 of 268 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apatheia in the Teachings of Evagrius Ponticus 
 
 
 
Monica Tobon 
 
UCL 
 
PhD in Classics 
   Page 2 of 268 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I, Monica Tobon confirm that the work presented in this thesis is 
my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I 
confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 
   Page 3 of 268 
 
This thesis is to my knowledge the first full-length examination of Evagrian apatheia.  
 
Chapter One contextualises Evagrian apatheia by outlining Evagrius‘ cosmology and 
anthropology. Attention is drawn to the centrality within them of the distinction be-
tween unstable and stable movement and to Evagrius‘ characterisation of  apatheia and 
empatheia in these terms. Apatheia, as the stable movement of the soul, is noted to be 
the foundation for the transformative contemplation by means of which the fallen nous 
re-ascends to union with  God. The anthropology section describes Evagrius‘ under-
standing of the nous, soul, body and heart. 
 
Chapter Two examines the psychology and phenomenology of empatheia. Section One 
focuses upon the logismoi, discussing what Evagrius means by the term logismos, not-
ing the inherence of pathos to the logismoi, explaining his concept of the ‗matter‘ of the 
logismoi and discussing his eightfold classification of ‗most generic logismoi‘. Section 
Two focuses upon pathos, discussing the meaning of the term within Greek philosophy, 
how Origen understands it and how Evagrius himself understands it. It then discusses 
the cognitive ‗building blocks‘ of the logismoi, the empathē noēmata and the arousal of 
pathos. Section Three describes the phenomenology of empatheia.  
 
Chapter Three establishes that the subject of apatheia is the tripartite soul in its entirety, 
then adduces evidence for apatheia‘s being the stable movement of the soul. It then dis-
cusses Evagrius‘ spiritual characterisations of apatheia – first as death and resurrection 
and then as love and knowledge, the latter including practical moral knowledge as well 
as  knowledge  of  transcendent  realities.    The  holistic,  embodied  nature  of  spiritual 
knowledge as understood by Evagrius is emphasised, as is the inseparability of knowl-
edge from love. His understanding of apatheia is shown to be profoundly Christian, and 
in particular Pauline. Following a discussion of how apatheia is attained, the chapter 
concludes with a summary description of apatheia as understood by Evagrius. 
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Introduction 
 
(i)  Overview of thesis 
 
Apatheia is central to Evagrius‘ anthropology and so to his understanding of the human 
condition and the economy of salvation. Accordingly, in order fully to appreciate what 
he means by it, it is necessary to examine it not only from a psychological perspective 
but also in relation to his overall spiritual vision, and this is what this thesis aims to do.  
 
Chapter One contextualises apatheia by outlining Evagrius‘ cosmology and anthropol-
ogy. The cosmology section draws attention to the significance of movement within 
Evagrius‘ schema, and in particular to the centrality of the distinction between unstable 
and stable movement, unstable movement being movement away from God, and stable 
movement, movement toward him. It argues that the Fall was - and continues to be - an 
unstable movement precipitated by the initial movement of the rational beings‘ self-
determination away from God, while the re-ascent to God is a progressive stabilisation 
of the movements of the soul and nous effected by means of transformative contempla-
tion. It is noted that apatheia is the stable movement of the soul, and the foundation for, 
and a necessary condition of, the contemplative ascent. The anthropology section begins 
by focusing on the nous, discussing its intrinsic passibility in both epistemic and meta-
physical contexts (these being causally interdependent), and its true nature. It then de-
scribes the three parts of the soul by describing their action according to nature. Since 
apatheia is, for Evagrius, the natural state of the human being, this amounts to a de-
scription of the apathēs soul. There follows an account of Evagrius‘ understanding of 
the body in which it is argued that apatheia has a physical foundation in the form of the 
elimination of excess vital heat by means of dietary restriction, and that, accordingly, a 
distinction between ‗spiritual‘ and ‗profane‘ understandings of physical health is im-
plicit in Evagrius‘ thought. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what Evagrius 
means by the term ‗heart‘, since one of the ways in which he characterises apatheia is in 
terms of purity of heart. 
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Chapter Two turns to the psychology and phenomenology of empatheia on the basis 
that Evagrian apatheia is best understood by reference to his analysis of the condition 
that it replaces. The first section focuses upon the logismoi, the cognitive activity char-
acteristic of empatheia. It begins by discussing what Evagrius means by the term logis-
mos, then explains his concept of the ‗matter‘ of the logismoi. It then turns to his eight-
fold classification of ‗most generic logismoi‘, considering each logismos in turn and the 
rationale for the sequence. The second part of the chapter focuses upon his understand-
ing of pathos. It begins with an overview of how pathos was understood by Greek phi-
losophy, and also by Origen, before analysing Evagrius‘ own understanding of it, from 
which it emerges that his concept of a pathos has a far broader extension than the mod-
ern concept of an emotion or passion and that the fundamental spiritual significance 
with which he invests it derives from his understanding of pathos as a de facto valuation 
of something other than God over God himself; that is, as idolatry. It then looks at the 
cognitive ‗building blocks‘ of the logismoi, the empathē noēmata: what they consist in, 
how they come into existence, and how they are both symptoms of the immersion of the 
nous in sensible reality and contributors to its continuing immersion. The following sec-
tion focuses upon the arousal of  pathos and shows that Evagrius believes that even 
when the agent is in the throes of fresh pathos she retains the capacity to refrain from 
acting it out and so committing a sin. It is shown how, in responding to temptation, the 
agent either reverses or repeats, on the microcosmic level, her primordial deflection 
from God, since a choice to resist temptation is a movement of her self-determination 
toward God and brings her incrementally closer to him, while a choice to succumb to it 
is a movement of her self-determination away from God, resulting in a ‗fall‘ into pathos 
which further distances her from him and in so doing both echoes and continues the pre-
cosmic Fall. The chapter concludes by summarising the phenomenology of empatheia, 
the soul‘s unstable movement and consequently its pathology.  
 
The first two chapters having laid the groundwork necessary for an understanding of 
apatheia in terms of the different contexts within which it is situated, Chapter Three fo-
cuses upon apatheia itself. It begins by asking which part of the human person is its real 
subject, given that Evagrius predicates it of various anthropological entities, and con-
cludes that it is the tripartite soul as a whole. It then argues for the proposition that apa-
theia is the soul‘s stable movement. The following two sections discuss the principal Page 8 of 268 
 
ways in which Evagrius characterises apatheia in spiritual terms: first, as death and res-
urrection,  and  second,  as  love  and  knowledge,  the  latter  including  practical  moral 
knowledge as well as knowledge of transcendent realities. The holistic, embodied nature 
of spiritual knowledge as understood by Evagrius is emphasised, as is the inseparability 
of knowledge from love. His understanding of apatheia is revealed to be profoundly 
Christian, and in particular Pauline.  These two sections also show how Evagrius uses a 
variety of biblical expressions and concepts to refer to apatheia and thereby highlight its 
different dimensions, and how he exploits implicit allusions to biblical texts to expand 
upon the explicit content of his writings. The final section of the chapter completes the 
picture of apatheia by discussing how it is attained, with particular attention to the cul-
tivation  of  inner  watchfulness  and  discernment.  Then  Evagrius‘  distinction  between 
‗imperfect‘ and ‗perfect‘ apatheia is discussed, and finally it is noted that as well as be-
ing a manifestation of apatheia love is essential to its attainment The chapter concludes 
with a summary description of Evagrian apatheia. 
. 
In the conclusion to the thesis as a whole it is noted that far from devaluing the physical 
body, Evagrius values it extremely highly, as evidenced by the fundamental role his 
spirituality assigns to the training of the epithumētikon, and that the expectations he has 
of the body and the nature of the transformations his askēsis seeks to elicit from it re-
flect the difficulties inherent in seeking to reconcile a positive valuation of physicality 
with a Platonic anthropology. It is noted that the demands placed upon the body by 
Evagrian apatheia are not essential to it but arise from the attempt to include within the 
remit of the ‗spiritual body‘ the physical body understood in terms of a metaphysics that 
posits the material as fundamentally other than, and inferior to, the spiritual, and that 
accordingly the essential features of Evagrian apatheia could in principle be preserved 
while situating it within a more benign anthropology. Finally, the profound optimism of 
Evagrius‘ anthropology is noted, and also the fact that the emphasis placed by this thesis 
upon love as intrinsic both to spiritual knowledge and apatheia is aimed as a corrective 
to the view of some commentators that Evagrius prioritises knowledge over love.
1  
 
                                                 
1 See below, 3.3, n.231; also n.228. Page 9 of 268 
 
This thesis is, to my knowledge, the first full length examination of Evagrian apatheia, 
and as such builds upon the excellent introductory surveys by Guillaumont.
2 It analyses 
what precisely Evagrius means by apatheia by situating it within its broader cosmologi-
cal and anthropological context, by examining his anthropology and how he construes 
pathos and its relationship in the soul to reason, and also by taking account not only of 
Evagrian apatheia‘s unproblematic aspect as ‗emotional integration‘ and ‗freedom from 
[control by] the passions‘,
3 but its problematic aspects in the form of what exactly is en-
tailed by the establishment of virtue in the pathētikon part of the soul.
4 This thesis is 
also, to my knowledge, the first examination of Evagrius‘ metaphysics explicitly to take 
account of his methodology as a writer and therefore of how he should be read.
5 Finally, 
both in situating apatheia in its various contexts and in taking account of how Evagrius 
should be read, it demonstrates the thoroughgoing unity and coherence of his thought.
6  
 
This thesis does not attempt to situate Evagrian  apatheia within its broader theological 
context, nor does it include any consideration of his orthodoxy or the anathemas against 
him, although I note in passing my view that the question remains open as to whether it 
is correct to interpret any of his teachings as doctrinal.
7 Again, apart from certain spe-
cific points, no attempt has been made to note the philosophical or theological antec e-
dents of Evagrius‘ ascetic teachings since this has already been done to an exemplary 
standard by Antoine and Claire Guillaumont and Paul Géhin in the introductions to, and 
commentaries upon, their critical editions. Nor has any attempt been made to situate ei-
ther Evagrius  himself or  his contemplative teachings within  their  historical context, 
these questions having recently received careful attention from Konstantinovsky. Fi-
nally, I do not include any biographical details for Evagrius as again this material is 
covered by several recent studies.
8 
 
 
   
                                                 
2 Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 98-112; 2004: 267-77). 
3 Stewart (2001: 178), brackets his. 
4 Cf. Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 144). 
5 See below, section (ii). 
6 Pace, for example, Bamberger (1981: lxxii), in whose view Evagrius ‗made no successful attempt to 
integrate into a single whole the various traditions by which he was formed.‘ 
7 See below, 1.1.1, n.19, 34. 
8 Most notably Guillaumont (2004); Casiday (2006); Dysinger (2005); Sinkewicz (2003). Page 10 of 268 
 
(ii)  Reading Evagrius 
 
Evagrius is a careful and talented pedagogue who takes seriously the need to tailor 
instruction to the capacity of its recipient, thus in the Gnostikos, his manual for the 
spiritual teacher, he defines the remit of the contemplative form of justice as follows:  
 
δηθʱηνζύλεο δὲ πάιηλ,  ηὸ θʱη’ ἀμίʱλ ἑθάζηῳ ηνὺο ιόγνπο ἀπνδηδόλʱη, ηὰ κὲλ 
ζθνηεηλ῵ο  ἀπʱγγέιινπζʱλ,  ηὰ  δὲ  δη’  ʱἰληγκάησλ  ζεκʱίλνπζʱλ,  ηηλὰ  δὲ  θʱὶ 
θʱλεξνῦζʱλ πξὸο ὠθέιεηʱλ η῵λ ἁπινπζηέξσλ.
9 
 
And  as  for  justice,  its  role  is  to  expound  the  logoi  to  each  according  to  his 
worthiness, relating some things obscurely and indicating others by riddles, and 
revealing some things clearly for the benefit of the more simple. 
 
Again,  in  the  Prologue  to  the  trilogy  Praktikos-Gnostikos-Kephalaia  Gnostika  he 
describes his methodology in composing it as follows: 
 
θʱὶ ηὰ κὲλ ἐπηθξύςʱληεο, ηὰ δὲ ζπζθηάζʱληεο, ἵλʱ κὴ δ῵κελ ηὰ ἅγηʱ ηνỖο θπζὶ 
κεδὲ βάισκελ ηνὺο κʱξγʱξίηʱο ἔκπξνζζελ η῵λ ρνίξσλ. Ἔζηʱη δὲ ηʱῦηʱ ἐκθʱλ῅ 
ηνỖο ηὸ ʱὐηὸ ἴρλνο ʱὐηνỖο ἐκβεβεθόζηλ.
10  
 
We have kept some things hidden and have obscured others, so as ‘not to give 
what is holy to dogs nor throw pearls before swine.’
11 But these things will be 
clear to those who have embarked upon the same trail.
12 
 
What this means in practice is that while Evagrius does indeed ‘reveal some things 
clearly’, he tends not to present his teachings in the form of straightforward narrative 
expositions, although there are exceptions to this, most notably the treatises  On the 
                                                 
9 Gnost. 44.9-13. 
10 Prakt. Prol. 9. 
11 Matt. 7:6. Cf. Origen, Dialogue with Heraclides 12.20-15.24, where Origen wrestles with the dilemma 
of how  to address an audience that includes both the ‗worthy‘ and the ‗unworthy‘. 
12 As Casiday (2006: 32-3) points out, this claim ‗effectively indicates that Evagrius does not believe that 
some people are intrinsically unable to attain to the ―secret teachings‖; nor does he believe that scholarly 
research is required in order to understand the ―secret teachings.‖ In principle, the ―secret teachings‖ are 
available to anyone who undertakes the Christian life with diligence, attentiveness and understanding. 
Furthermore, we are not to seek the veiled and obscured teachings from some other source; rather, we are 
to follow Evagrius‘ ascetic instructions so that, setting out on the same path, we may come to understand 
the fullness that is veiled and obscured in the concise form of the chapters. For those with eyes to see, 
then, the trilogy of Praktikos, Gnostikos and Gnostic chapters contains all that is required for a full de-
scription of the ascetic and gnostic teachings of the desert fathers.‘ Page 11 of 268 
 
Foundations of the Monastic Life: A Presentatation of the Practice of Stillness,  To 
Eulogios:  On  the  Confession  of  Thoughts  and  Counsel  in  their  Regard,  and  On 
Thoughts.  Instead,  he  generally  favours  the  form  of  the  proverb  that  characterises 
biblical wisdom literature and which he defines as as follows: 
 
Πʱξνηκίʱ ἐζηὶλ ιόγνο δη’ ʱἰζζεη῵λ πξʱγκάησλ ζεκʱίλσλ πξάγκʱηʱ λνεηά.
13 
 
A proverb is a sentence that symbolises intelligible realities by means of sensible 
realities.  
 
This means that in reading Evagrius it is necessary to bear in mind that much of what he 
says can be presumed to have several layers of meaning,  some or most of it accessible 
only  through  sustained  meditation,  along  with,  perhaps,  recognition  of  implicit 
connections with Scripture, with other parts of the same text or with other Evagrian 
texts. Thus in the words of McGinn,  
 
[Evagrius’ aphorisms are] like the tips of mystical icebergs, revealing their true 
size and configuration only after prolonged meditation and extensive exploration 
beneath the surface.‘
14  
 
Returning to the passage quoted above from the Prologue to Evagrius’ great trilogy, the 
meanings of the word ἴρλνο include ‘track, footstep, trace, trail, track or route in the 
desert’, such that it suggests, as Dysinger notes, ‘a hunt for prey which leaves traces on 
a track or path, which are only visible to those who know what to look for’,
15  but also 
Evagrius’ own footsteps, both literal and metaphorical, through a desert both physical 
and spiritual. Evagrius thus cautions his readers that his meanings will be most fully 
disclosed to those who are prepared to follow their trail through his writings and who 
have in some sense followed in his footsteps through the desert. While he is referring 
specifically to the trilogy, this methodology can be discerned throughout his writings, as 
Driscoll’s  study  of  the  Ad  Monachos,  to  which  my  own  hermeneutic  is  indebted, 
                                                 
13 Sch. 1 on Prov. 1:1. 
14 McGinn (1991:146). Cf., e.g., Driscoll (2003: 171): ‗the proverbs of Ad Monachos were meant to be 
meditated on very slowly, perhaps a day at a time, a week at a time, even longer. It is in this kind of situa-
tion that we must take account of that reasoning by analogy which Ad Monachos employs.‘ 
15 Dysinger (2005: 205). Page 12 of 268 
 
demonstrates in relation to that particular text.
16 By this method Evagrius aims to elicit 
from, and guide his reader in, the practice of contemplation and, like Socrates with 
Meno’s slave boy,
17 to stimulate us in the recollection of what we already know but 
have forgotten - in this case God, knowledge of whom we originally possessed in virtue 
of our creation in his image.
18 Consequently, when it comes to reading Evagrius one 
must be prepared to follow trails throughout his writings and into S cripture, and, as far 
as possible, allow them to reveal their meanings in their own time. It follows that it is 
prudent to remain circumspect in assuming how much of his meaning one might have 
accessed at any one time and in expecting how much one might be  able to access, and 
accordingly I note this caveat with regard to the present work. 
 
 
(iii)  Additional notes 
 
I have chosen to leave a number of Greek terms untranslated since I do not consider 
them to have satisfactory English equivalents. I use these terms in transliterated form. 
Three are worthy of particular note at this point. The first is apatheia itself. This is nor-
mally translated in terms of freedom from emotion or passion, but Evagrian apatheia is 
partly constituted by love in the sense both of agapē and spiritual erôs,
19 and its attain-
ment enables the full manifestation in the soul of  agapē,
20 so it includes both emotion 
and passion as we understand them. The second term is  nous. This is normally trans-
lated as ‗mind‘ or ‗intellect‘, but the latter fails to convey the affectivity intrinsic to the 
Evagrian nous, while although ‗mind‘ can be understood as including emotion, it re-
mains for us weighted with post-Cartesian connotations.  The third term is thumos. This 
is generally translated as ‗irascibility‘, but for Evagrius it has a much wider scope, the 
thumos being, for example, the source within the soul of agapē.
21 
 
For the works of Evagrius included in Sinkewicz (2003) the translations I have used are 
his, sometimes with minor amendments, with the exception of the  Ad Monachos, for 
                                                 
16 Driscoll (2003). 
17 Cf. Plato, Meno 82b5 ff. 
18 See below, 1.1.1. 
19 See below, 1.2.2, 3.3, 4. 
20 See below, 3.3. 
21 See below, 1.2.2. Page 13 of 268 
 
which I have used that of Driscoll (2003). For Evagrius‘ Scholia on Psalms I have relied 
on a text kindly made available to me by Luke Dysinger, OSB, reconstructed according 
to the key of M-J Rondeau,
22 based on the MS  Vaticanus Graecus 754, and for the 
Kephalaia Gnostika I have relied almost exclusively on Dysinger‘s translation,
23 al-
though occasionally I have used those of Sinkewicz or Driscoll, in which case this is 
noted. For the Antirrhētikos I have used the translation of Brakke (2009), and am grate-
ful to him for making it available to me prior to publication. My thanks also to Robert 
Sinkewicz for supplying me with his working translation of the Antirrhētikos. Transla-
tions of the Gnostikos are mine from the Greek where available, and otherwise from the 
French  of  Guillaumont.  Those  of  the  Scholia  on  Proverbs  and  Ecclesiastes  and  the 
Chapters of the Disciples of Evagrius are my own. Translations of the Great Letter and 
Epistula Fidei are those of Casiday (2006), and those of other letters are credited in the 
footnotes. Translations of the Bible are from the New Revised Standard Version, usually 
with amendments, and those of other primary sources are either from the editions listed 
in the Bibliography or are credited in the footnotes.  
 
Some of Evagrius‘ works, most notably the majority of the Kephalaia Gnostika, along 
with the Antirrhêtikos and Letters, survive only in Syriac. Since my linguistic compe-
tence does not at present extend this far, I quote these in translation only. 
 
I have referenced Evagrius‘ biblical scholia by the somewhat cumbersome device of 
Sch. (n) on (Book n:n) in order to indicate both the numbering of the scholion according 
to Géhin‘s edition and the biblical text which it concerns. In referring to the Book of 
Psalms I have used the Septuagint numbering.  
 
Regrettably, Kevin Corrigan‘s perceptive study of Evagrian anthropology, Evagrius and 
Gregory: Mind, Soul and Body in the 4
th Century (London: 2009) was published too late 
for consideration in this thesis. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 M-J Rondeau, ―Le commentaire sur les Psaumes d‘Évagre le Pontique‖, Orientalia Christiana Peri-
odica 26 (1960), pp.307-48. 
23 At www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/02_Gno-Keph/.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Cosmology and Anthropology 
 
 
In order to understand the nature and significance of Evagrian apatheia it is necessary to 
start with his cosmology and anthropology. This chapter begins by describing his vision 
of the creation and fall of the logikoi and the nature and redemptive purpose of corpo-
real creation. It then considers in turn the principal components of the human being: the 
nous, the soul, the body and the heart. 
 
 
1.1  Cosmology 
 
The principal source for Evagrius‘ cosmology and some key aspects of his anthropology 
are the Kephalaia Gnostika, the study of which involves a number of serious herme-
neutical and textual difficulties. Regarding the former, one is faced with the question of 
how far, as a twenty-first century layperson, one might hope to understand a text aimed 
at advanced contemplatives within a particular strand of fourth century desert monasti-
cism, the author of which took care in its composition to ‗keep some things hidden and 
obscure others, so as ―not to give what is holy to dogs and throw pearls before swine‖‘.
1 
The textual problems associated with the Kephalaia derive from their having been taken 
to contain doctrines condemned as heretical, as a result of which they do not survive in 
Greek, meaning that one is at the mercy of a translator and that consequently it is im-
possible to determine with any certainty what technical vocabulary Evagrius used or 
how he used it.
2 Because of these considerations what follows must be considered tenta-
tive. 
 
Evagrius‘ use of two terms in the Kephalaia Gnostika, logikos and nous, needs some 
preliminary explanation.
3 Logikos, ‗rational‘, used as a substantive and almost always in 
                                                 
1 Prakt. Prol. 58-60. ‗These things‘, he continues, ‗will be clear to those who have embarked upon the 
same path.‘ 
2 Cf. Ousley (1979: 142-3). 
3 The following remarks are based upon Ousley (1979: 146-8).  
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the plural, is the term by which the Kephalaia generally denote the rational creatures 
who were God‘s first creation. It is common in the Kephalaia but rare elsewhere in 
Evagrius‘ works.
4 It emphasises the rational creatures as part of pre-lapsarian creation - 
as they were before the Fall
5 and will be following the apokatastasis.
6 It is also some-
times used ‗as a generic term for the rational creatures in whatever condition or state 
they may be‘
7 in which case it emphasises their identity as  ‗essentially rational crea-
tures of the first creation.‘
8 Before the Fall a nous was identical with a logikos, but it is 
the nous that falls, becomes part of corporeal creation and is eventually restored to un-
ion with God in the apokatastasis. Thus the term nous, rather than logikos, is generally 
used to refer to the fallen rational creatures.  
 
 
1.1.1  The creation and fall of the logikoi 
 
Evagrius‘ vision of the origin of humankind owes much to Origen,
9 but what in Origen 
is tentative and speculative becomes with Evagrius a thoroughgoing and highly inte-
grated  vision of reality.  According  to  it, God‘s first creation
10  was of  incorporeal
11 
logikoi, rational beings, created in his own image
12 to exist in knowledge of him:  
 
Πᾶζʱ θύζηο ινγηθὴ θηὶζηο λνεξὰ ἐζηὶ, ζεόο δε κὸλνο λνεηὸο ἐζηίλ.
13 
 
Every rational nature is a knowing creation,
14 and God alone is knowable. 
                                                 
4 The Thesaurus Linguae Grecae records only two occurrences in works attributed to Evagrius - Sch. 33 
on Prov. 3:19-20 and Sch. 275 on Prov. 24:22 - both of which use it in the plural and in the same sense as 
the Kephalaia Gnostika. The Scholia on Psalms contain a further four occurrences in the plural and used 
in this same sense. 
5 Cf., e.g. KG 2.19, 66; 6.75. 
6 Cf., e.g. KG 3.40. 
7 Ousley (1979: 146). 
8 Ousley (1979: 147). 
9 Evagrius is not, however, an uncritical disciple of Origen. For example, he amends Origen‘s Christology 
in an attempt to bring it into line with Nicene orthodoxy - cf. Kline (1985)  – and adopts the Platonic the-
ory of the tripartite soul, rejected by Origen; see below, 1.2. 
10 See below, n.21.  
11 E.g. KG 1:46; 2.61; 6.9, 20, 73. Cf. DP 1.7.1 (R). 
12 Cf. KG 3.32; 6.73. 
13 KG 1.3. Cf. KG 1.50, ‗Everything that has been created, has been created for the knowledge of God‘; 
KG 1.87: ‗All beings exist for the knowledge of God, but everything that exists for another is less than 
that for which it exists. Because of this, the knowledge of God is superior to all. 
14 That is, created to know, apprehend or conceptualise.  
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For Evagrius, for x to know y entails the participation of x in y, and in the case of God, 
participation becomes union since the image of God consists in the receptivity of the 
logikoi to knowledge of God: 
 
The image of God is not that which is susceptible of his wisdom, for corporeal 
nature would thus be the image of God. Rather, that which has become suscepti-
ble of the Unity – this is the Image of God.
15 
 
Since rational nature was created to exist in knowledge of God, the desire for know l-
edge is intrinsic to it and can only truly be satisfied by knowledge of God:  
 
All rational nature was naturally made in order to exist and to know,
16 and God is 
essential knowledge.
17 
 
God created the  logikoi self-determining (autexousioi),
18 and at some point (although 
the language of temporality is not, properly speaking, applicable since time did not yet 
                                                 
15 KG 3.32; cf. also Gt.Let. 16: ‗The mind is alone amongst all the creatures and orders in being ‗the true 
form that is receptive to the knowledge of the Father, for it is ―being renewed in knowledge according to 
the image of its creator.‖‘ (cf. Col. 3:10). 
16 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 980a21: ‗All men by nature desire to know‘ (πάληεο ἄλζξσπνη ηνῦ εἰδέλʱη 
ὀξέγνληʱη θύζεη). 
17 KG 1.89.1-2. Stewart (2001: 191) glosses ‗essential knowledge‘ as ‗knowledge without an object exte-
rior to the self. Although God is knowable, it does not follow that he can be understood, nor the nous 
made in his image; cf. KG 2.11: ‗Only our nous is incomprehensible for us, as well as God, its author. 
Indeed, it is not possible for us to understand what is a nature susceptible of the Blessed Trinity, nor to 
understand the Unity, essential knowledge.‘ Nor can God be known completely; cf. KG 1.71: ‗The end of 
natural knowledge is the holy Unity, but ignorance has no end, for as it is said, there is no limit to his 
greatness‘; cf. Ps. 144:3. Cf. also Prakt. 87: ‗The person making progress in praktikê diminishes the pa-
thē; the one progressing in contemplation diminishes ignorance. For the pathē there will one day be com-
plete destruction, but in the case of ignorance they say one form will have an end, the other will not‘ (὇ 
κὲλ πξνθόπησλ ἐλ πξʱθηηθῆ ηὰ πάζε κεηνỖ, ὁ δὲ ἐλ ζεσξίᾳ ηὴλ ἀγλσζίʱλ· θʱὶ η῵λ κὲλ πʱζ῵λ ἔζηʱη πνηὲ 
θʱὶ θζνξὰ πʱληειήο, η῅ο δὲ ἀγλσζίʱο η῅ο κὲλ εἶλʱη πέξʱο, η῅ο δὲ κὴ εἶλʱί θʱζη). Sinkewicz (2003: 259, 
n.88) notes that ‗the two forms of ignorance correspond to the two forms of knowledge, namely, knowl-
edge of beings and knowledge of God or theology. Full knowledge of beings is obtained with perfect im-
passibility, but the knowledge of God is without limit and can never be exhausted.‘ Cf. Sch. 2 on Ps. 
144:3 (‗Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised, and of his greatness there is no limit‘): ‗The contem-
plation of beings is limited; only the knowledge of the Holy Trinity is without limit, for it is essential 
wisdom.‘ See also below, 1.1.3.  
18 This is not stated explicitly but is implied by, e.g., Sch. 52.8-13 on Eccl. 6-10; Gt.Let. 26; KG 1.63. Cf. 
DP 2.9.2 (R), 6 (R).  
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exist),
19 their union with  God was disturbed by a movement  arising among them  in 
which they turned away from  him. The movement was an exercise  of their power of 
self-determination; that is, a choice or decision: in his Scholia on Ecclesiastes Evagrius 
defines ‗choice‘ as ‗a certain  movement of the  nous‘ (἟…πξνʱίξεζίο ἐζηη πνηὰ λνῦ 
θίλεζηο)
20 and in his Scholia on Proverbs he defines ‗decision‘ in the same way  (἟ 
βνπιὴ πνηὰ λνῦ θίλεζίο).
21 To all intents and purposes this movement was the Fall – or 
so it would seem. Certainly this is how Evagrius has often been understood.
22 But I 
                                                 
19 Driscoll (2003: 5-6) draws attention to the question of how Evagrius‘ doctrine of the creation of the 
logikoi should be interpreted. Referring to remarks by Bunge (1985: 156, n.19; 396: 52), he notes: ‗In 
general it is presumed that the Origenist theory of pre-existence of souls is shared by Evagrius and that 
this is to be understood as occurring within the temporal order [so Guillaumont, 1962: 103-4]. Bunge 
points out that the application of temporal sequence to the relation of mind, soul and body risks a serious 
misunderstanding of Evagrius, who, he claims, is attempting to speak of metahistorical realities with the 
language of space and time, that is, with the only language available to speak of such realities. Evagrius 
was aware of this difficulty and cautions that the mind in its relation to God admits in the strict sense the 
language of neither place nor names [the allusion is to Gt.Let 26]. Bunge would want a more sympathetic, 
because less obviously heterodox,  reading of Evagrius on these questions to which later generations (and 
many contemporaries) applied too literally the categories of space and time.‘ The publication in 2007 of 
the Chapters of the Disciples of Evagrius lends support to Bunge‘s view. The Chapters often seem to 
state directly doctrines which in Evagrius‘ own writings are merely implicit, and Chapter 25 reads: ‗Sim-
ple bodies are prior to composites, and the nous is not composite since it is not from matter, therefore it 
pre-exists the body, but not in time because time pertains to corporeal nature‘ (Τἀ ἁπιᾶ ζώκʱηʱ πξόηεξά 
εἰζη η῵λ ζπλζέησλ, ὁ δὲ λνῦο ἀζύλζεηόο ἐζηηλ, ἐπεὶ κὴ ἔζηηλ ἐμ ὕιεο, ἄξʱ πξνϋπάξρεη ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο, νὺ 
κὴλ ρξόλῳ· ὁ γὰξ ρξόλνο η῅ο ζσκʱηηθ῅ο θύζεώο ἐζηηλ). Cf. KG 2.87: ‗Temporal is the movement of bod-
ies, but timeless the transformation of the incorporeals.‘ See also Dysinger (2005: 31-32, n.98). In addi-
tion, it is my view that that the question remains open as to whether it is correct to interpret any of Eva-
grius‘ teachings as speculative or doctrinal. As Dysinger (2005: 206-7) notes, ‗The Kephalaia Gnostica is 
above all else a workbook for meditation…one would need to exercise great care in using texts from [it] 
to assess the orthodoxy of Evagrius‘ dogmatic theology. Nevertheless, this is precisely what theologians 
from Justinian down to the present have attempted to do.‘ 
20 Sch. 10.1-2 on Eccl. 2:11. Cf. also Disc. 118, quoted in n.24 below. 
21 Sch. 23.1 on Prov. 2:17. 
22 So, for example, Ousley, who speaks (1979: 118-19) of ‗the movement of the fall‘ and states that 
‗movement can be used as a term for the fall itself‘; Sinkewicz (2003: xxxviii): ‗As a result of an original 
negligence, a movement arose among them, distancing them from substantial knowledge and creating a 
disparity among them, for not all fell away from knowledge to the same degree‘; Dysinger (2005: 31): 
‗Evagrius believed that history and time began with the ‗movement‘ (θίλεζηο) or fall from primordial 
union with God of the intellects (λνỖ).’ Balthasar (1965: 184), maintains the distinction between ‗move-
ment‘ and ‗fall‘ -‗These spirits out of satiety (Origen) and carelessness (Evagrius) turned away in varying 
degrees from the unity that is God, and so ―fell out of unity‖‘, as does Driscoll (2003: 6): ‗By use of their 
free will these minds grew lax in their contemplation of essential knowledge, producing a rupture in the 
original unity and causing the minds to fall away from the essential knowledge or unity‘ - but neither 
draws out its implications. Kline (1985: 162-3) equates the movement with the Fall. O‘Laughlin (1987: 
123 ff) does not use the word ‗fall‘ in this context, but he translates kinēsis as ‗disturbance‘, so losing 
sight of the rich metaphysical connotations of the word ‗movement‘.  Stewart (2001: 176) speaks of the 
‗disruption of [the] primordial unity through distracted ―movement‖ away from contemplation, a possibil-
ity inherent in rational creatures endowed with free will‘, but does not (at least explicitly) equate the  
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think  there  is  an  important  distinction  between  the  two.  Consider,  first,  Kephalaia 
Gnostika 3.28:  
 
The soul is the nous which, through negligence, has fallen from the Unity; and 
through its carelessness has descended to the rank of praktikē.
23 
 
The fall of the soul was the result of negligence or carelessness. But what did it do 
negligently or carelessly that caused it to fall? 
 
The Monad was not moved in itself: rather, it is moved by the receptivity of the 
nous which through inattentiveness turns its face away, and which through this 
deprivation begets ignorance.
24 
 
The ‘inattentiveness of the nous’ is, I suggest, the same thing as the ‘negligence’ or 
‘carelessness’ of the soul, and what the nous or soul did thus was choose to turn away 
from God.
25 This inattentive, negligent and/or careless movement was the cause of the 
                                                                                                                                               
movement with the exercise of that free will. Rasmussen (2005: 149) notes that the logikoi fell as a result 
of a movement, but again does not consider the nature of the movement, or, therefore, how exactly it 
caused the Fall. Konstantinovsky notes  (2009: 124) that ‗the fall of the mind into the state of psyche 
is…conceived by Evagrius in terms of a pre-cosmic catastrophe that Evagrius refers to as ‗the Move-
ment‘. However, the only definition of ‗the Movement‘ that she cites is KG 3.22, ‗the first movement of 
the logikoi is the separation of the nous from the Unity that is in it‘, which states what the effect of the 
movement is but not that it constitutes a decision or choice. Therefore she does not identify the precise 
nature of the movement, nor, accordingly, its distinctness from, and causal relation to, the Fall. At (2009: 
156) she states that ―‗the Movement‘ is a wilful deviation of the created intellects from the life of con-
templation‘‖, which is essentially correct, but again there is no suggestion of a distinction between it and 
the Fall. 
23 KG 3.28. Cf. Gt.Let. 26: the mind, ‗falling at some point from its former rank through its free will, was 
called a soul‘; see below, 1.1.2. 
24 KG 1.49. 
25 There are similarities in Origen‘s description of the Fall but he does not seem to use the word ‗move-
ment‘ in this context in the same way that Evagrius does. At 1.3.8 (R) and 1.4.1(R) he speaks of a ‗loss or 
falling away‘ rather than of a ‗movement‘. At 2.9.2 (R) he uses the word ‗movement‘, but more loosely 
than Evagrius: ‗The cause of the withdrawal will lie in this, that the movements of their minds are not 
rightly and worthily directed. For the Creator granted to the minds created by him the power of free and 
voluntary movement, in order that the good that was in them might become their own, since it was pre-
served by their own free will; but sloth and weariness of taking trouble to preserve the good, coupled with 
disregard and neglect of better things, began the process of withdrawal from the good…And so each 
mind, neglecting the good either more or less in proportion to its own movements, was drawn to the op-
posite of good‘. DP 3.1.1-4 discusses the autexousion in terms of its being a movement of the hē-
gemonikon but does not apply this to what at 2.9.2 is called the ‗withdrawal‘. Thus while all the elements 
for Evagrius‘ understanding of the movement are present in Origen, to understand it as a specific choice 
or decision, defined as a movement of the nous, to turn away from God, would seem to be uniquely Eva-
grian  
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Fall. Accordingly, when Evagrius refers to the primal deflection of the logikoi from God 
he speaks in terms of the ‗movement‘ rather than of ‗the Fall‘, reserving the word ‗fall‘ 
for the consequences of the movement. These consequences might be in the form of the 
cosmic Fall, as in Kephalaia Gnostika 3.28, and, again the following: 
 
The ‗demon‘ is the reasoning nature which, because of an abundance of thumos, 
has fallen from the service of God.
26 
 
But they might also be in the form of the consequences of wrong moral choice - a mis-
use of our self-determination which itself echoes the primordial movement- namely a 
‗fall‘ into either pathos or sin: 
 
ὁ η῅ο ὑπεξεθʱλίʱο δʱίκσλ ρʱιεπσηάηεο πηώζεσο ηῆ ςπρῆ πξόμελνο γίλεηʱη.
27 
 
The demon of pride helps the soul to the harshest fall.
28 
 
νὐθ ἔζηη γὰξ ἐκπεζεỖλ εἰο ρεỖξʱο πλεύκʱηνο πνξλείʱο, κὴ ὑπὸ η῅ο γʱζηξηκʱξγίʱο 
θʱηʱπεζόληʱ.
29 
 
It is not possible to fall into the hands of the spirit of fornication, unless one has 
fallen under the influence of gluttony. 
 
For Evagrius, then, there is a substantive difference between a ‗movement‘ and a ‗fall‘ 
on both the cosmic and the psychological scales, such that a movement away from God, 
within either the cosmic or the psychological domain, causes a fall.
30 
                                                 
26 KG 3.34. 
27 Prakt. 14. 
28 Evagrius goes on to describe this ‗fall‘ as follows: ‗[The demon of pride] induces the soul to refuse to 
acknowledge that God is its helper and to think that it is itself the cause of its good actions, and to take a 
haughty view of its brothers as being unintelligent (ἀλνήησλ) because they do not all hold the same opin-
ion of it. Anger and sadness follow closely upon this as well as the ultimate evil, derangement of mind 
(ἔθζηʱζηο θξελ῵λ), madness, and the vision of a multitude of demons in the air.‘ 
29 Th. 1.6-8. 
30 For more uses by Evagrius of ‗fall‘, cf., e.g., Found. 6 : ‗Fear for a fall (ηὸ πηʱỖζκʱ) and be steadfast in 
your cell‘; Eul. 17.18: ‗Let him who has stumbled (ὁ πηʱίζʱο) not attempt to blame others or cause them 
to stumble (πηʱίεηλ κὴ ἐπηρεηξείησ) in order that he might not be the only one to fall into evil (ζπκπεζὼλ 
ηῶ θʱθῶ): this was also the work at the origin of the devil‘s fall (ὁ ἔθπησζηο ηνῦ δηʱβόινπ)’ AM 42: ‗one 
who hates his brother will fall a mighty fall (ὁ…κηζ῵λ ηὀλ ἀδειθὸλ ʱὐηνῦ πεζεỖηʱη πη῵κʱ ἐμʱίζηνλ)‘, 
AM 104: ‗Do not trip up (κὴ ὑπνζθειίζῃο) your brother and do not rejoice over a fall (πη῵κʱ) of his‘; KG 
4.10: ‗Among writers of true doctrines, some have plunged from the first contemplation of nature, others 
from the second, and still others are fallen from the Blessed Trinity.‘  
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Since the movement sundered the primal unity an initial expression of the Fall was the 
introduction of duality, and hence opposition, within the created order: 
 
And while opposed to reasoning nature there is non-existence, and [opposed] to 
knowledge there is evil and ignorance, there is in these no opposition to God.
31 
 
Thus arose the dualities of good and evil, knowledge and ignorance  and existence and 
non-existence, with good, knowledge and existence being properties of God,
32 and evil, 
ignorance and non-existence their deprivation among the fallen creatures.
33 
 
 
1.1.2  Corporeal creation 
 
Following the movement God created,
34 through Christ, according to his manifold wis-
dom,
35  a hierarchy of worlds characterised by increasing degrees of corporeality to  
                                                 
31 KG 1.89.2-4; cf. KG 1.1. 
32 For God as essentially good, cf. KG 1.1; as essential knowledge, KG 1.89. 
33 Although it is only ignorance that Evagrius states explicitly to be a deprivatio; cf. KG 1.49. For the 
movement as the cause of evil, cf. KG 1.51. That the origin of evil is the misuse by the logikoi of their 
self-determination is reiterated in the Chapters of the Disciples. Chapter 36 states, ‗And again: God has 
entrusted objects to us and asked us to use them with reason. It is therefore as a result of a use contrary to 
reason that we have made evil exist. Evil does not, therefore, exist naturally but through usage‘ (Κʱὶ 
πάιηλ πξάγκʱηʱ ἐλεπίζηεπζελ ἟κỖλ ό ζεὸο θʱὶ ρξ῅ζηλ εὔινγνλ ʱὐη῵λ ἟κᾶο ἀπʱηηεỖ· πʱξὰ ηὴλ ἄινγνλ νὖλ 
ρξ῅ζηλ ὑθηζηάλνκελ ηὴλ θʱθίʱλ· ὑθίζηʱηʱη νὖλ ἟ θʱθίʱ νὐ θπζηθ῵ο ἀιιὰ πʱξὰ ηὴλ ρξ῅ζηλ). Again, 
Chapter 118: ‗If noēmata of objects are evil, whoever created the nous in a certain way is responsible, and 
if objects were evil, whoever created them would be responsible himself. But plainly neither noēmata nor 
objects are evil, but it is the movement of our self-determination toward the worst.‘ (Δἰ ηὰ λνήκʱηʱ η῵λ 
πξʱγκάησλ θʱθίʱ εἰζίλ, ὁ ηνηνῦηνλ ηὸλ λνῦλ θʱηʱζθεπάζʱο ʱἴηηνο, θʱὶ εἰ ηὰ πξάγκʱηʱ θʱθίʱ ἤζʱλ, ὁ 
δεκηνπξγήζʱο ʱὐηὰ ʱὐηὸο ἂλ εἴε ʱἴηηνο· ἀιι’ νὔηε ηἀ λνήκʱηʱ νὔηε ηὰ πξάγκʱηʱ θʱθίʱ εἰζὶ δεινλόηη, 
ἀιι’ ἟ θίλεζηο ηνῦ ʱὐηεμνπζίνπ ἟ πξὸο ηὰ ρείξνλʱ.) 
34 Evagrius does not state directly that this was a second creation but it can be inferred from, e.g., KG 1.65 
(quoted below, 3.3) and 4.58: ‗God, when he created the logikoi, was not in anything; but, when he cre-
ates the corporeal nature and the worlds which arise from it, he is in his Christ‘. However, although I im-
plicitly refer here to two creations and explicitly referred above to ‗God‘s first creation‘ (see n.3), my 
intention is not to commit myself to a particular interpretation of this difficult aspect of Evagrius‘ thought. 
Dysinger (2005: 32, n.100) notes that ‗the question has been raised whether Evagrius can properly be said 
to have described the creation of the material world as a ―second creation‖‘ and briefly summarises the 
arguments against such a view. 
35 Cf. KG 1.43; 2.2, 21, 70; 3.11, 81; 4.7; 5.84; Eph. 3.10; also KG 1.14; 2.70; Ps. 103:24; also KG  1.14. 
Briefly put, the difference, for Evagrius, between knowledge and wisdom is that knowledge relates to 
unity and wisdom to multiplicity, thus knowledge to God and wisdom to corporeal creation and therefore 
to Christ; cf., e.g., KG 1.14: ‗Our Lord made everything with wisdom (Ps. 103:24)‘; KG 2.2: ‗In second  
Page 21 of 268 
 
function as a ladder
36 by which, through putting their power of self-determination at the 
service of the re-ascent to God, the  logikoi might make good their original misuse of 
that power – since they were created for union with God their choice to turn away from 
him was a misuse of it - and play an active role in their redemption.  
 
Corporeal creation comprises bodies and souls for the logikoi, worlds associated with 
the bodies,
37 and ages across which the process of redemption unfolds
38 until the apo-
katastasis or final consummation. Although created equal among themselves,
39 each 
logikos differed in the extent of its inattentiveness, negligence or carelessness, conse-
quently of its movement and consequently of its fall, and accordingly differentiation 
arose among them. The hierarchical structure of corporeal creation and its diversity of 
worlds, ages, souls and bodies reflect this differentiation.  
  
Corporeal creation, is, accordingly, characterised by multiplicity, movement and change, 
in contrast to the simplicity and stillness of the primal Unity.
40 Its multiplicity, move-
ment and mutability express both the Fall and the wisdom of God. But how can this be? 
How can they be both results of the Fall and aspects of God‘s providential design for the 
redemption of the logikoi?
41 The answer, I think, lies in the distinction between different 
kinds of movement. Underlying the Fall and, therefore, corporeal creation is the intro-
duction, by the logikoi, of movement into the created order; in the first instance it is the 
noes themselves that move, but as they fall they become souls and movement becomes 
intrinsic to soul.
42 Movement, though, can be either stable or unstable.  As we shall see, 
one of the principal ways in which Evagrius characterises apatheia and its opposite, em-
patheia, is in terms of the contrast between stable and unstable movement, apatheia be-
ing the stable movement of the soul. His doing so is, I suggest, an instance of two work-
ing principles that we can safely impute to him: first, that movement is part of the nature 
                                                                                                                                               
natural contemplation we see the manifold wisdom (Eph. 3:10) of Christ‘; KG 3.11: ‗Corporeal nature has 
received the manifold wisdom of Christ.‘ 
36 Cf. KG 4.43. 
37 Cf. KG 2.85; 3.26, 36, 78; 4.58; 5.4, 7. 
38 Cf. KG 1.11; 3.51. 
39 Cf. Gt.Let. 29; DP 2.9.6 (R).  
40 Cf., e.g., KG 1.65, quoted below, 3.3. 
41 For the same thing being at once the result of evil and the remedy for it, cf. KG. 1.51: ‗The movement 
is the cause of evil but virtue is destructive of evil. However, virtue is the daughter of names and modes 
and the cause of these is the movement.‘ 
42 See below, this section.  
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of soul, and, second, that stable movement is associated with proximity to God and un-
stable movement with distance from him. The primal movement of the logikoi was, as a 
deflection from God, unstable. It was also a change from a better state to a worse state. 
The change took the form of the introduction of opposition within the created order and 
differentiation among the logikoi, the twin bases for the multiplicity of corporeal crea-
tion. The primal movement in turn precipitated the further unstable movement in which 
the logikoi fell away from God. Then God intervened by creating the corporeal worlds, 
an imposition of stability upon chaos. Because stillness is found only in union with God, 
this means stability of movement rather than cessation of movement and is reflected in 
the ensoulment of the fallen logikoi. So the logikoi are the source of unstable movement, 
while God is the source of stable movement and stillness. Corporeal creation is God‘s 
stabilisation of the instability that was initiated by the logikoi, and it establishes a basis 
upon which they can progressively stabilise themselves and, in so doing, re-ascend to the 
stillness of union with him.  
 
In proposing this interpretation of Evagrian cosmology I am going beyond anything he 
says directly and so a brief digression to explain my grounds for doing so is in order. 
What he says directly is that (i) a choice or decision is a movement of the nous;
43 (ii) be-
fore the primordial movement the condition of the logikoi in union with God was one of 
peace;
44 (iii) pathos is a kind of movement;
45 (iv) empatheia is characterised by unstable 
movement;
46 (v) apatheia is characterised by stability and peace,
47 and (vi) the apathēs 
soul or nous moves toward God.
48 Also relevant is his reserving of the term ‗fall‘ for the 
consequence of a  movement away  from God.
49  These are the principal ‗lines‘ I am 
‗reading between‘ in my interpretation of the Fall as the unstable movement of the noes 
and corporeal creation as God‘s stabilisation of it. If correct, it has strong echoes of parts 
of Plato‘s Timaeus and Phaedrus. From the Timaeus comes the idea of the creation of 
                                                 
43 See above, this section. 
44 See below, n.47. 
45 See below, 2.2.2, 4. 
46 See below, 2.3, 3.1. 
47 See below, 3.1. 
48 See below, 3.1. 
49 See above, 1.1.1.  
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the world (θόζκνο)
50 as the imposition of order upon a universe characterised by diso r-
derly motion: 
 
βνπιεζεὶο…ὁ ζεὸο ἀγʱζὰ κὲλ πάληʱ…νὕησ δὴ πᾶλ ὅζνλ ἤλ ὁξʱηὸλ πʱξʱιʱβὼλ 
νὐρ  ἟ζπρίʱλ  ἄγνλ  ἀιιὰ  θηλνύκελνλ  πιεκκει῵ο  θʱὶ  ἀηάθησο,  εἰο  ηάμηλ  ʱὐηὸ 
ἢγʱγελ ἐθ η῅ο ἀηʱμίʱο.
51 
 
God…wishing that all things should be good…and finding the visible universe in 
a state not of rest but of inharmonious and disorderly motion, reduced it to order 
from disorder.
52 
 
The  word  ἟ζπρίʱ  can  be  noted:  ‘peace’  is,  for  Evagrius,  in  cosmological  terms  a 
characteristic of the pre-lapsarian unity and in psychological terms a characteristic of 
apatheia.
53 The association between movement and soul is found  in both the Timaeus 
and the Phaedrus,
54 and the association of unstable movement with distance from God in 
the Phaedrus.
55 According to the Timaeus each of the three parts of the soul has its own 
movements (θηλήζεηο),
56 and ‘the movements that are akin to the divine in us [sc. the 
rational part of the soul] are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe’ (ηῶ δ’ ἐλ ἟κỖλ 
ζεỖῳ ζπγγελεỖο εἰζηλ θηλήζεηο ʱἱ ηνῦ πʱληὸο δηʱλνήζεηο θʱὶ πεξηθνξʱί)
57 – that is, the 
movements proper to the rational part of the soul resemble the orderly and harmonious 
movements of the stars and planets, embodiments of cosmic nous.
58 Consequently, by 
observing and studying these we might learn to 
 
κηκνύκελνη  ηὰο  ηνῦ  ζενῦ  πάλησο  ἀπιʱλεỖο  νὔζʱο,  ηὰο  ἐλ  ἟κỖλ  πεπιʱλεκέλʱο 
θʱηʱζηεζʱίκεζʱ.
59 
                                                 
50 Tim. 29e4. 
51 Tim. 30a2-5. 
52 Translations of the Timaeus are those of Lee, amended. Cf. also the discussion, at Philebus 23c1ff, of 
the unlimited (ἄπεηξνλ) and limit (πέξʱο). 
53 E.g. KG 1.65, quoted below, 3.3; Prakt. 64, quoted below, 3.1. 
54 E.g. Tim. 37a5 ff; Phdr. 245c6 ff. However, there is a difference in that while the Phaedrus derives all 
movement from soul, the Timaeus appears to make chaotic, disorderly movement independent of soul; I 
am grateful to Bob Sharples for pointing this out to me. 
55 In the form of the contrast between the movement of the gods through the heavens and the movement 
of the other souls who, because their wings are broken, are unable to rise aloft and follow the gods; cf. 
Phdr. 246e5 ff; see below, 2.3. 
56 Tim. 89d5. 
57 Tim. 90c7-d1, 
58 Cf. Tim. 47b7: ‗the revolutions of nous in the heavens‘ (ηὰο ἐλ νὐξʱλῶ ηνῦ λνῦ θʱηηδόληεο πεξηόδνπο). 
59 Tim. 47c2-4.  
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correct the disorder of our own revolutions by imitating the invariability of those 
of God. 
 
A person will only find respite from change and suffering when he helps the ‗motion of 
the Same and Uniform‘ (ηῆ ηʱὐηνῦ θʱὶ ὁκνίνπ πεξηόδῳ) within the soul to 
 
ζπλεπηζπώκελνο ηὸλ πνιὺλ ὄρινλ θʱὶ ὕζηεξνλ πξνζθύληʱ ἐθ ππξὸο θʱὶ ὕδʱηνο 
θʱὶ ἀέξνο θʱὶ γ῅ο, ζνξπβώδε θʱὶ ἄινγνλ ὄληʱ.
60 
 
draw in its train all that multitude of riotous and irrational [feelings] which have 
clung to it as a result of its association with fire, water, air and earth. 
 
until, having subdued them by reason (ιόγῳ θξʱηήζʱο), he might return to the form of 
his first and best state (εἰο ηὸ η῅ο πξώηεο θʱὶ ἀξίζηεο ἀθίθνηην εἶδνο ἕμεσο.).
61 
 
In the Timaeus, then, the type of movement proper to the rational part of the soul is or-
derly, harmonious and stable, like the orbits of the heavenly bodies. It is, however, dis-
rupted by embodiment and must be re-established by giving the rational part of the soul 
its ‗proper nourishment and movements‘ (ηὰο νἰθείʱο…ηξνθὰο θʱὶ θηλήζεηο),
62 which 
means by living a rational life (θʱηὰ ιόγνλ δῶε)
63 rather than a life centred upon the 
lower parts of the soul.
64 This ‗return of the rational soul-part to its own original nature‘ 
is the homoiôsis theôi, ‗likeness to God‘, under its cosmological description.
65 So for 
both Plato and Evagrius we have within us something that resembles the divine. The 
natural condition of that ‗something‘ is stability but it suffers destabilisation in relation 
to embodiment, as a result of which its resemblance to the divine is damaged. It must be 
re-stabilised by living in the right sort of way, and this restores its resemblance to the 
divine. This structural similarity in their respective accounts of the loss and restoration 
of our ‗likeness to God‘,
66 along with the six points listed above, makes it likely, I sug-
                                                 
60 Tim. 42 c5-d1. 
61 Tim. 42 d1. 
62 Tim. 90c7. 
63 Tim. 89d4. 
64 Cf. Tim. 90b1 ff.  
65 Cf. Sedley, at Fine (1999: 320-1). 
66 Although of course the Christian imago Dei is construed in fundamentally different terms from the  
Platonic homoiôsis theôi.  
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gest, that Evagrius understands the Fall as unstable movement and the corporeal worlds 
as God‘s re-introduction of stability to the created order. However, in proposing that 
something  like  Plato‘s  understanding  of  the  cosmological  and  psychological  role  of 
movement underlies his thinking I am not relying on the possibility that he was actually 
working from the Timaeus and Phaedrus or even that he had necessarily read them - al-
though given his erudition and his intellectual milieu prior to his move to the desert
67 
there seems no reason to doubt that he had – but rather on the fact (as I take it to be) that 
this sort of view would have been part and parcel of philosophical cosmology and psy-
chology in Late Antiquity.  
 
The creation of the logikoi in the image of God means, for Evagrius, in the image of the 
Triune God, such that the nous is itself triune. As it falls it fragments
68 into its aspects, 
the sundering of its unity with God being ipso facto that of its internal unity: 
 
The first movement of the logikoi is the separation of the nous from the Unity 
that is in it.
69  
 
[The mind] is one in nature, person and rank. Falling at some point from its fo r-
mer rank through its free will, it wa s called a soul. And it descended again and 
was named a body.
70 
 
In the second of these passages there are again echoes of the Timaeus, where the Demi-
urge is said, ‗in fashioning the universe‘ (ηὸ πᾶλ ζπλεηεθηʱίλεην) to have ‗implanted 
nous in soul and soul in body‘ (λνῦλ κὲλ ἐλ ςπρῆ, ςπρὴλ δ’ ἐλ ζώκʱηη ζπληζηάο).
71 But 
                                                 
67 See above, Introduction. 
68 Driscoll, following Bunge, prefers the term ‗disintegration‘, explaining (2003: 7, n.20), ‗Disintegration 
is a word that Bunge prefers to use in an attempt to avoid words with strong temporal overtones. It has the 
advantage of showing the continuity of mind as the fundamental reality while at the same time showing 
that the present human condition does not represent a perfect manifestation of God‘s intentions in crea-
tion‘s regard.‘ Cf. Bunge (1986: 118). My own use of the present tense here is, likewise, an attempt to 
avoid temporal overtones. 
69 KG 3.22. 
70 Gt.Let. 26. Cf. also  DP 2.7.3 (R): ‗Mind when it fell was made soul.‘ Regarding man‘s constitution of 
nous, soul and body, cf. I Thess. 5:23: ‗May your spirit (πλεῦκʱ) and soul (ςπρή) and body (ζ῵κʱ) be 
kept sound‘. In anthropological terms Evagrius equates the nous with spirit. 
71 Tim. 30b4-5.  
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although the nous in falling from God becomes colder and heavier,
72 Evagrius‘ assertion 
that it was first ‗called a soul‘ and then ‗named a body‘ should not be understood as 
meaning simply that ‗the actual ―substance‖ of both body and soul is mind‘.
73 On the 
contrary, Evagrius acknowledges the existence of matter independently of the nous and 
soul, and, in the form of the four elements, constitutive of bodies.
74 So he should, rather, 
be understood as meaning that in becoming colder and heavier the nous becomes a soul 
which is then joined to a material body
75 whose elemental constitution depends on how 
far that nous has fallen.
76 Nonetheless there is a real sense in which the embodied  nous 
has, indeed, become corporeal, hence Evagrius‘ speaking of its being ‗named a body‘; 
as Konstantinovsky notes, Evagrius ‗appears to uphold a Cratylean theory of referential 
language whereby, far from being purely conventional…names reveal what things truly 
are‘.
77 The nous ‗becomes a body‘ in virtue of its thoroughgoing immersion in, and at-
tachment to, the sensible world; an immersion and attachment that result from the dis-
tancing of  the  nous  from  God and  include the ‗excessive  love‘ of the  nous  for the 
body.
78 Corporeality is, however, unnatural to the  nous and inimical to knowledge of 
God,
79 and so a fundamental part of praktikē is the attempt, through diet, to modify the 
body‘s krasis, its physiological constitution,
80 in order to render it, and ipso facto the 
nous, in effect less corporeal, in a process that Evagrius speaks of as ‗liberating the 
body from its attributes‘
81 and equates with metaphorical death and that involves the 
                                                 
72 That the nous becomes colder in falling from God recalls Origen‘s suggestion (DP 2.8.3 (R)) of an 
etymological relationship between psychesthai, ‗to cool‘, and psyche, ‗soul‘. However Evagrius does not 
take this up. 
73 Rasmussen (2005: 149). Thus Balthasar is incorrect when, having proposed (1965: 189) that ‗[we must] 
take quite literally the statement that bodies are themselves only a fallen condition of souls, quite as soul 
is merely the fallen condition of spirit‘, he goes on to state  that ‗Evagrius comes to formulate a radical 
idealism‘ (ibid.); see below, n.56. 
74 E.g. KG 1.29: ‗Also as with bodies go colours, forms and numbers, thus also among the four elements 
matter is destroyed; for with them it possesses this, that it did not exist and it was made‘; KG 1.47: ‗Noth-
ing in power in the soul is able to leave it through action and then to subsist independently, for [the soul] 
was by its nature made to exist in bodies‘; KG 1.48: ‗Everything attached to bodies accompanies those by 
whom they are engendered, but nothing of this is attached to soul‘. Also KG 2.18, which contrasts ‗the 
nature of bodies‘ with ‗the reasoning nature‘. 
75 E.g. KG 1.58: ‗―Mortal‖ [means] one who is by nature made to be freed from the body to which he is 
joined…All who have been joined to bodies will necessarily be liberated from them.‘ 
76 See below, this section. 
77 Konstantinovsky (2009: 131). 
78 Cf. Disc. 130. 
79 See below, 1.2.1.3. 
80 Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 281, n.49). 
81 Cf. Gt.Let. 46.  
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progressive detachment of the nous from the sensible world.
82 So the body, for Eva-
grius, is functionally part of the  nous even though it is distinct in terms of its physical 
constitution.
83 Because his interest lies with  the functional relation of the body to the 
nous I shall follow his example in speaking of the body as being an aspect of the nous. 
 
The soul in turn fragments into three parts, the Platonic triad of logistikon, thumos and 
epithumêtikon.
84 The logistikon is the least fallen and so highest, while in humans at 
least, the epithumētikon is the part of the soul most closely related to the body and there-
fore the lowest and most fallen.
85 However, although all three parts of the soul were in 
this sense latent in the pre-lapsarian nous, what became the thumos and epithumêtikon 
only took that form as a result of the Fall: 
 
If all the powers that we and the beasts have in common belong to corporeal na-
ture, it is evident that thumos and epithumia do not seem to have been created 
with the rational nature before the movement.
86 
 
Evagrius understands the process by which   part  of  the  nous  becomes  thumos  and 
epithumētikon, as its renouncing the image of God and willingly becoming the image of 
animals‘,
87 and elsewhere  he speaks of the  thumos and epithumētikon being ‗yoked‘ 
(ζπδεύμʱο) to the human person.
88 
 
                                                 
82 See below, 1.2.3; 2.1.3.1; 3.2. 
83 Apposite here is Burnyeat‘s point that only when Descartes ‗put subjective knowledge at the centre of 
epistemology – and thereby made idealism a possible position for a modern philosopher to take‘ did it 
become possible to ask whether anything other than mind exists, and, accordingly, for ‗one‘s own body 
[to] become for philosophy a part of the external world‘. In particular he cautions that ‗Platonic soul-body 
dualism is not to the point here since it puts no epistemological barrier between soul and body. The body 
is part of the material or sensible world, which is not at all the same as being part of ―the external world‖ 
in the modern sense‘; cf. Burnyeat (1982: 33, 32; 30, n.39). For Evagrius the point at issue is precisely the 
lack of an epistemological barrier between the body and the soul, the body‘s claims upon our awareness 
competing directly with God‘s claim. It is in virtue of the strength of the epistemological connection be-
tween body and soul and its consequences for the nous that the body can be said to be functionally part of 
the nous, or, alternatively, the nous to be ‗named a body‘. 
84 Cf., e.g., Prakt. 86, 89. Evagrius differs from Origen in accepting the Platonic tripartition of the soul, 
the validity of which Origen doubts on the grounds that it lacks scriptural authority; cf. DP 3.4.1 (R). 
85 There are grounds for supposing that in demons the thumos is the most fallen part of the soul; see be-
low, n.102. 
86 KG 6.85. 
87 Cf. Gt.Let. 46; Rom. 1:23; see below, 1.2.2. 
88 Cf. Th. 17.4.  
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It follows from Evagrius‘ view of the soul and body as fallen nous that, strictly speak-
ing, the term nous does not refer to any single aspect of the human person, but, rather, 
encompasses within its scope the person in her entirety. Moreover, it refers not only to 
the human person but, equally, to angels and demons. Concomitantly, the part of the 
human person (or angel or demon) that we would normally think of as its mind is the 
logistikon. In practice, however, Evagrius almost always uses the term nous in prefer-
ence to logistikon, and as a result nous in his usage, and consequently in mine, must be 
understood as having two main senses, that in which it refers to the human person as a 
whole and that in which it refers specifically to the human logistikon or mind.
89 
 
At the apokatastasis fall and fragmentation will be reversed as body and soul are re-
assimilated to the incorporeal nous, thereby restoring the image of God and with it both 
the internal unity of the noes and the unity of the noes with God: 
 
Now it will happen that the names and numbers of ‗body‘, ‗soul‘ and ‗mind‘ will 
pass away since they will be raised to the order of the mind...The mind‘s nature 
will be united to the nature of the Father in that it is his body; likewise, the names 
‗soul‘ and ‗body‘ will be absorbed into the hypostases of the Son and the Spirit, 
and the one nature, three persons of God and of his image will endlessly re-
main.
90 
 
Although allowing in principle for an open-ended number of worlds,
91 Evagrius focuses 
on three, and accordingly on three orders of beings: angels, humans and demons. What 
determines which world and order of being a given nous is assigned to is the extent of its 
fall: angels are those who fell the least, demon those who fell the most and humans those 
in between.
92 The order of demons is in turn subdivided into terre strial and infernal de-
                                                 
89 Other senses being those relating to angels or demons or to the rational beings generically. 
90 Gt.Let. 22-3. Cf. DP 2.7.3 (R): ‗Mind when it fell was made soul, and soul in its turn when furnished 
with the virtues will become mind.‘ It can be noted that in view of the relation between the psychological 
triad of epithumētikon, thumos and logistikon and the anthropological triad of body, soul and mind, and of 
the relation between the latter and the Persons of the Trinity, we can surmise (a) that the body in some 
way corresponds to the Holy Spirit, the thumos to the Son and the logistikon to the Father, and (b) that the 
internal relations of both the psychological and the anthropological triad in some way mirror – and so in 
turn might shed light upon – the relations between the Persons of the Trinity.             
91 Particularly at KG 2.65, where he speaks of ‗a multitude of worlds‘, but cf. also, e.g., KG 1.11, 65, 75; 
2.85; 4.39; 5.7, 81; 6.67, 77. 
92 Cf. Sch. 16 on Prov. 1:32; KG 4.13.  
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mons,
93 while above the angels are the archangels.
94 The constitution of the bodies and 
souls assigned to the noes is matched to their epistemic, spiritual and ontological, condi-
tion – for Evagrius these amount to the same thing - in a process that he identifies with 
the judgment of God.
95 In the case of bodies spiritual condition determines which of the 
four elements – fire, air, water or earth – predominates.  
 
Ψπρὴ ςπρῆ ὁκννύζηνλ θʱὶ ζ῵κʱ ζώκʱηη, ἟ δὲ θξᾶζηο νὐθ ἟ ʱὐηή, ηνῦην δὲ ἐθ 
ηνῦ ἐθ’ ἟κỖλ πξὸο ηνῦ δεκηνπξγνῦ γέγνλελ· ἟ γὰξ θξᾶζηο θʱηὰ πιενλʱζκὸλ η῵λ 
ζηνηρείσλ ἠ θʱη’ ἔιιεηςηλ γίλεηʱη, η῅ζδε ἠ η῅ζδε η῅ο ἀξεη῅ο· δηὸ θʱὶ πνιινὶ 
κʱθʱξηζκνί, ἐπεὶ θʱὶ πνιιʱὶ θʱηʱζηάζεηο· κʱθάξηνη νὖλ νἱ ηνηάλδε θʱηάζηʱζηλ 
ἔρνληεο, ὅηη ηνηόλδε ράξηζκʱ ἠ ηνηάλδε ράξηλ ιήςνληʱη.
96 
 
A soul is consubstantial with a soul and a body with a body, but the constitution 
is  not  the  same:  for  that  has  come  from  the  Creator  as  a  result  of  our  self-
determination. For krasis varies according to the abundance or lack of elements, 
of this or that virtue. That is why there are many beatitudes:
97 because there are 
many states. Blessed are those who have a such -and-such a state, because they 
will receive that charism or that grace. 
 
In the case of the soul,  the spiritual condition of the nous again determines which part 
predominates: 
 
The judgment of God is the creation of the world, in which he provides, propor-
tionately measured for each one of the logikoi, a body.
98  
 
In angels nous and fire predominate, but in human beings epithumia and earth, 
and among demons thumos and air.
99  
 
The souls of angels consist primarily of  nous and their bodies of fire; the souls of hu-
mans consist primarily of epithumia
100 and their bodies of earth, and the souls of de-
                                                 
93 Cf. Sch. 2 on Ps. 134:6; 9 on Ps.70:20; 13 on Ps.76:17; 1 on Ps. 55:3, 5 on Ps. 61:11; KG 3.79; Géhin 
(1987: 129). 
94 Cf. KG 2.68; 5.4; also 5.11. 
95 See below, 1.1.3. 
96 Disc. 113.9 
97 Cf. Matt. 5:3-10. 
98 KG 3.38. 
99 KG 1.68.  
100 So Plato, who at Rep. 442a5-6 declares the epithumêtikon to be ‗the greater part of each person‘s soul‘ 
(πιεỖζηνλ η῅ο ςπρ῅ο ἐλ ἑθάζηῳ).  
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mons consist primarily of thumos and their bodies of air. I take it that the reason why 
Evagrius speaks of nous rather than the logistikon predominating in angels is that their 
fall is so slight that they are barely ensouled. Also, it should be noted that although an-
gels are embodied, Evagrius speaks of ‗incorporeal beings‘ in a way that suggests he is 
referring to angels; for example he speaks of the apathês nous ‗[attaining] the company 
of incorporeal [beings] who fulfil all its spiritual desires.‘
101 So I take it that he refers to 
them as incorporeal because their bodies are so much more rarefied than our own.
102 
Humans are dominated by the epithumêtikon and demons by the thumos.
103 
 
As the nous falls from God it becomes progressively heavier: 
 
It is said that they are on high those who possess light bodies, and below (those 
who possess) heavy (bodies); and above the first those who are lighter than they; 
but below the second those who are heavier than they.
104 
 
I take this to mean that angels have light bodies  and archangels even lighter ones; de-
mons heavy  bodies and infernal demons even heavier ones.  Distance from God also 
causes the  noes to become colder: demons‘ bodies are ‗very cold, similar to ice‘.
105  
‗Heaviness‘ and ‗coldness‘ seem to relate to bodies alone; although that it is a conse-
quence of this account that bodies comprised of air are ‗heavier‘ and ‗thicker‘ than bod-
ies comprised of earth, demons being more fallen than humans, indicates that their ref-
erence is not necessarily physical in any obvious sense. Two additional properties, also 
indexed to distance from God, can relate to body, soul or nous, namely ‗thickness‘ and 
                                                 
101 KG 1.85; cf. KG 1.27, 45, 70; 4.62; 5.32; 6.5. 
102 Cf. Dysinger (2005: 41): ‗In certain texts [Evagrius] makes it clear that by ―incorporeals‖ he means 
angels and perhaps other celestial beings such as stars. Yet he also teaches that all the logikoi have been 
united to bodies since the fall, and that none are therefore fully incorporeal. Thus in regard to the contem-
plation of angels Evagrius often uses the term ―incorporeals‖ in a rather loose way to refer to beings 
whose bodies are less coarse and material than our own.‘  
103 Cf. KG 3.34: ‗The demon is the rational nature which, because of an abundance of thumos, has fallen 
from the service of God‘; also KG 5.11: ‗a demon is that which, because of an abundance of thumos, has 
fallen from the praktikê.‘ Since demons are lower in the spiritual hierarchy than humans this implies a 
departure from the traditional, Platonic evaluation of the three parts of the soul according to which the 
epithumêtikon is the lowest part and the thumos the middle.  
104 KG 2.68. 
105 KG 6.25.  
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‗darkness‘, thus Evagrius speaks of ‗thickened body‘,
106 of ‗bodies that are very heavy 
and darkened‘
107 and of the nous being thickened
108 and the soul darkened.
109  
 
The question arises of how the constitutions of the souls and bodies of the  noes, along 
with the other properties considered above, relate to  the understanding of corporeal 
creation as the stabilisation of the Fall. Are heaviness, coldness, thickness and darkness, 
or a psychic predominance of, say, epithumia and physical predominance of earth, in-
herent in the instability of the noes or do they pertain instead to stability? The answer of 
course must be the latter since all of them relate to form and it is only with corporeal 
creation that the instability of the noes is given form. So in the case of humans, for ex-
ample, a psychic preponderance of epithumia and a physical preponderance of earth are 
the most potentially effective form of stabilisation. In other words,  my psychic and 
physical constitution were not inherent in the degree of fall or instability of the nous that 
is my essence, but, rather, are God‘s response to it. 
 
Finally, it can be noted that the fact that the three parts of the soul are aspects of the 
nous distinguishes Evagrius‘ psychology from its philosophical antecedents. For both 
Platonists and Aristotelians reason and pathos are distinct and pathos is non-rational.
110 
The orthodox Stoics, on the other hand,  regard the human soul as wholly rational and 
understand pathos in terms of impaired rationality (that is, as irrational in the sense of 
contrary to right reason). Accordingly, they do not partition the soul. Evagrius‘ view, 
according to which the soul is partitioned into areas of more or less impaired rationality, 
therefore effectively combines Platonic tripartition with Stoic monism, while his view 
of pathos resembles that of the Stoics. The implications of his view in terms of empa-
                                                 
106 Cf. KG 3.68.  
107 Cf. KG 3.50. 
108 Cf. Pry. 50. 
109 Cf. Prakt. 23; also Sch. 7 on Ps. 30:10,  ‗My eye was disturbed with anger‘: ‗Nothing so darkens the 
dianoia as a disturbance in the thumos‘ (νὐδὲλ νὕησ ζθνηεỖ δηάλνηʱλ ὡο ζπκὸο ηʱξʱηηόκελνο). Cf. Eph. 
4:18, ‗They are darkened in their dianoia, alienated from the life of God because of their ignorance and 
hardness of heart‘ (ἐζθνησκέλνη ηῆ δηʱλνίᾳ ὄληεο, ἀπειινηξησκέλνη η῅ο δσ῅ο ηνῦ ζενῦ δηὰ ηὴλ ἄγλνηʱλ 
ηὴλ νὖζʱλ ἐλ ʱὐηνỖο, δηὰ ηὴλ πώξσζηλ η῅ο θʱξδίʱο ʱὐη῵λ); Rom. 1.21 ‗their senseless heart was darkened‘ 
(ἐζθνηίζζε ἟ ἀζύλεηνο ʱὐη῵λ θʱξδίʱ). 
110 Although Aristotle alludes at De Anima 3.5 to nous pathētikos; see below, 1.2.1.  
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theia and apatheia are examined below.
111 Meanwhile it should be borne in mind when 
interpreting his and my references to the nous, soul, body or pathētikon part of the soul. 
 
 
1.1.3  The therapeutic nature of corporeal creation 
 
At the heart of Evagrius‘ understanding of the process of redemption is the graded ascent 
of the fallen noes back to union with God. This ascent is effected through contemplation: 
corresponding to each world is a level of contemplation, mastery of which brings par-
ticipation in that world and the possibility of proceeding to the next.  
 
Evagrius defines ‗contemplation‘ as follows: 
 
Contemplation is spiritual knowledge of things which have been and will be, 
which causes the nous to ascend to its first rank.
112 
 
The contemplation relating to a world consists in the acquisition of spiritual understand-
ing concerning it; understanding, that is, of the aspect of God‘s wisdom that it embod-
ies. This understanding is, however, no mere detached intellectual exercise but involves, 
as Dysinger points out, ‗participation in the realities perceived‘.
113 It ‗causes the nous to 
ascend to its first rank‘ because it leads to knowledge of God and so to a return to union 
with him.  
 
God in his love has fashioned creation as an intermediary [between himself and 
the fallen logikoi]. It exists like a letter: through his power and his wisdom (that 
is, by his Son and his Spirit),
114 he made known abroad his love for them so that 
they might be aware of it and drawn near. Through creation, they become aware 
                                                 
111 See below, section 2.2.4. For an excellent discussion of how emotions can be states of reason see 
Nussbaum (1994: 366-86). 
112 KG 3.42. 
113 Dysinger (2005: 37). 
114 Evagrius adduces scriptural support for the comparison on the basis of an identification of the ‗hand‘ 
and ‗finger‘ of God – hand and finger being among the things used for writing – with the power and wis-
dom of God, and thus his Son and Spirit; cf. Gt.Let. 7 ff. It can be noted that he appears here to relate 
power and wisdom to Son and Spirit interchangeably, for example in paragraph 7 he asks ‗How can the 
hand and finger stand for the wisdom and power – or rather, the Son and the Spirit?‘, suggesting that it is 
wisdom that equates with the Son, but then he says ‗the ―power‖ [is] the Son‘ and ‗the ―wisdom [is] the 
Spirit of God‘. Then in paragraph 12, ‗Just as the Wisdom and Power (that is, the Son and the Spirit)...‘  
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not only of God the Father‘s love for them, but also of his power and wisdom. In 
reading a letter, one becomes aware through its beauty of the power and intelli-
gence of the hand and finger that wrote it, as well as of the intention of the writer; 
likewise, one who contemplates creation with understanding becomes aware of 
the Creator‘s hand and finger, as well as of his intention – that is, his love.
115 
 
The visible and material creation is the sign of intelligible and immaterial creation, and 
visible things are types of invisible things.
116 Thus corporeal creation points beyond it-
self, directing the contemplative nous to the spiritual realities that lie behind and above 
it. Signification and typification obtain across all metaphysical levels, culminating in, 
and so pointing toward, God himself: 
 
The body by its actions reveals the soul that inhabits it, and in turn the soul by its 
movements proclaims the mind – which is its head; it is just the same with the 
mind – which is the body of the Spirit and the Word. Like the body with the soul, 
[the mind] reveals the one inhabiting it [that is, the mind‘s soul]; [the mind‘s] 
soul in turn reveals its mind – which is the Father.
117 
 
Because the knowability of God to the  nous derives from the image of God, it is com-
promised by the loss of it:  
 
It is clear that there are some things that ink and paper cannot relate – and like-
wise creation, which is like a letter, may be unable to convey its Author‘s com-
plete intention ... to those who are far away, since they are not all according to his 
image.
118 
 
                                                 
115 Gt.Let. 5-6. Cf. Prakt. 92: ‗One of the sages of that time came to Antony the just and said: Father, how 
can you endure being deprived of the comfort of books? And he said: My book, philosopher, is the nature 
of beings (἟ θύζις η῵ν γεγʿνόηων), and it is there when I want to read the logoi of God.‘ Also Sch. 8 on 
Ps. 138:16: ‗The book of God is the contemplation of corporeals and incorporeals in which the pure nous 
comes to be written through knowledge (βιβλίʿν Θεʿῦ ἐζηιν ἟ θεωρίʱ ζωμάηων κʱὶ ἀζωμάηων ἐν ᾧ 
πέθσκε διὰ η῅ς γνώζεως γράθεζθʱι νʿῦς κʱθʱρός). For in this book are written the logoi of providence 
and judgment, through which too, God is known as creator, wise, provident and judging: creator through 
things that have come from non-being into being; wise through his concealed logoi, provident through 
what is accomplished for our virtue and knowledge; and again judge through the various bodies of the 
logikoi and through the multiform (πνηθίινπο ) worlds and the ages they contain.‘ 
116 Gt.Let. 12. 
117 Gt.Let. 15. 
118 Gt.Let. 18.  
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However, by ‗reading the letter‘ of corporeal creation the nous can regain both knowl-
edge, and image, of God
119 since because of the interconnectedness of the epistemic and 
the ontological, or, to put it another way, because contemplation involves participation 
in the realities perceived, contemplation changes the nous: 
 
ὥζπεξ ʱἱ ʱἰζζήζεηο ἀιινηνῦληʱη δηʱθόξσλ ἀληηιʱκβʱλόκελʱη πνηνηήησλ, νὕησ 
θʱὶ ὁ λνῦο ἀιινηνῦληʱη πνηθίιʱηο ζεσξίʱηο ἀλʱηελίδσλ ἀεί.
120 
 
Just as the senses are changed through being receptive of different qualities, so 
also the nous is changed through constantly gazing in diverse contemplations. 
 
Contemplative ascent is thus a process of transformation effected on the ‗ladder‘ of cor-
poreal creation.
121 Since the soul and body are aspects of the  nous they are included in 
this process, with participation in a world leading in due course to the acquisition of a 
soul and body belonging to that world, such that associated with epistemic transforma-
tion and ascent of the intelligible hierarchy is physical transformation and ascent of the 
corporeal hierarchy,
122  these changes being progressive stabilisations of the movements 
of the body, soul and nous.  
 
Contemplation requires detachment from the sensible world, which Evagrius calls sepa-
rating the soul from the body
123 and equates with apatheia.
124 Accordingly, apatheia is 
the foundation for, and a necessary condition of, the contemplative ascent. Attaining it is 
the goal of asceticism, praktikē. Angels are sufficiently pure for contemplation to be 
their characteristic state and so do not need to practice asceticism, while demons are so 
impure that they cannot as yet practice it but are instead subject to an even harsher form 
of purification: 
 
                                                 
119 Cf. Gt.Let. 16, quoted above, n.21. 
120 KG 2.83.  
121 KG 4.43 expresses the ubiquity of the symbol of the ladder in relation to this ascent: the ladder sym-
bolises corporeal creation as a whole, being ‗the symbol of all worlds‘, but also ‗the path of praktikê‘, that 
is, the spiritual labours and experiences of the monk making the ascent. Cf. Gen. 28:12-13. 
122 Cf. KG 3.20: ‗The change of the organa is the passage from bodies to bodies, according to the degree 
of the order of those who are joined to them.‘ 
123 Cf. Prakt. 52. 
124 See below, 3.2, 3.  
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Two among the worlds purify the passible part of the soul, one of them by prak-
tikê, and the other by cruel torment.
125  
 
Consequently the practice of asceticism is specific to the human condition, leading Eva-
grius to refer to the human body as a praktikê body.
126 
 
Both angels and demons take an interest in human salvation, angels seeking to assist, 
and demons to hinder, it: 
 
From the rational nature that is ―beneath heaven‖,
127 part of it fights; part assists 
the one who fights; and part contends with the one who fights, strenuously rising 
up and making war against him.  The fighters are human beings; those assisting 
them are God‘s angels; and their opponents are the foul demons.
128 
 
Movement upon the ‗ladder‘ of corporeal creation can be in either direction: 
 
That which advances to knowledge approaches the excellent change of bodies; 
but that which [advances] to ignorance advances to the bad change.
129  
 
Accordingly, humans can become demons as well as angels. Likewise demons can as-
cend, and angels fall, to the  human estate. All of the logikoi – demons and angels as 
well as humans - are involved in the ascent since all are capable of salvation; the de-
mons are not intrinsically evil since none of the logikoi were created vicious: 
 
When we were created in the beginning, the seeds of virtue were found naturally 
in us, but of vice not.
130 
                                                 
125 KG 5.5. Cf. KG 3.18: ‗Torment is the fiery suffering which purifies the passible part of the soul.‘ 
126 Cf. KG 3.48, 50; Sch. 8 on Ps. 1:5; all quoted below in this section. 
127 Eccl. 1:13. 
128 Ant. Prol. 1. 
129 KG 2.79; cf. also KG 2.73; 3.48; 3.50; 5.11; 6.57.1-3. 
130 KG 1.39. Cf. Th. 31; Disc. 128, 149, 171, 178. Also KG 1.40: ‗There was a time when evil did not 
exist, and there will be a time when it no longer exists; but there was never a time when virtue did not 
exist and there will never be a time when it does not exist: for the seeds of virtue are indestructible. And I 
am convinced by the rich man who was condemned to hell because of his evil and who felt pity for his 
brothers (Luke 16:19-31). For to have pity is a very beautiful seed of virtue.‘ Dysinger, at Wiles and Yar-
nold (2001: 467-8) notes the uniqueness of this exegesis of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, 
which Evagrius repeats at Th. 31, Let. 43, Let. 59 and  Sch. 62 on Prov. 5:14. He adds: ‗Evagrius suggests 
in this text that it is possible for the sufferings of hell to bring to fruition the imperishable ―seeds of vir-
tue‖ which were originally implanted within the soul at its creation. He was aware that this exegesis of the  
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Evagrius assigns great importance to what he calls ‗the logoi of providence and judg-
ment‘ as providing the key by which the redemptive nature of corporeal creation can be 
understood and so consciously participated in: 
 
Τνὺο πεξὶ πξνλνίʱο θʱὶ θξίζεσο θʱηὰ ζʱπηὸλ ἀεὶ γύκλʱδε ιόγνπο, θεζὶλ ὁ κέγʱο 
θʱὶ  γλσζηηθὸο  δηδάζθʱινο  Γίδπκνο,  θʱὶ  ηνύησλ  ηὰο  ὕιʱο  δηὰ  κλήκεο  θέξεηλ 
πεηξάζεηη·  ἅπʱληεο  γὰξ  ζρεδὸλ  ἐλ  ηνύηνηο  πξνζπηʱίνπζη.  Κʱὶ  ηνὺο  κὲλ  πεξὶ 
θξίζεσο ιόγνπο ἐλ ηῆ δηʱθνξᾷ η῵λ ζσκάησλ θʱὶ η῵λ θόζκσλ εὑξήζεηο· ηνὺο δὲ 
πεξὶ πξνλνίʱο ἐλ ηνỖο ηξόπνηο ηνỖο ἀπὸ θʱθίʱο θʱὶ ἀγλσζίʱο ἐπὶ ηὴλ ἀξεηὴλ ἠ ἐπὶ 
γλ῵ζηλ ἟κᾶο ἐπʱλάγνπζη.
131 
 
‗Exercise yourself continuously in the logoi of providence and judgment‘ said the 
great and gnostikos teacher Didymus, ‗and strive to bear in your memory their 
material [expressions]; for nearly all are brought to stumbling through this. And 
you will discover the logoi of judgment in the diversity of worlds and bodies, and 
those of providence in the means by which we return from vice and ignorance to 
virtue or knowledge.‘
132  
 
The first knowledge that is in the logikoi is that of the Blessed Trinity; then there 
took place the  movement of  freedom,  the beneficial providence and the non-
abandonment,  and  then  the  judgment,  and  again  the  movement  of  freedom, 
providence, the judgment, and that up to the Blessed Trinity. Thus a judgment is 
interposed between the movement of freedom and the providence of God.
133 
  
God‘s first judgment is his creation of the corporeal worlds and subsequent judgments 
occur at the end of each age: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
parable of the rich man and Lazarus is very different from the considerably more pessimistic interpreta-
tion familiar to most of his contemporaries; nevertheless, Evagrius appears not only to have been con-
vinced by (πείζεη δέ κε), but also deeply committed to, this interpretation, since he repeats it with only 
minor variations in five different places in his writings.‘  
131 Gnost. 48. 
132 Trans. Dysinger (2005: 175), who notes that although Evagrius attributes the formula ‗the logoi of 
providence and judgment‘ to Didymus the Blind, it is not found in any of Didymus‘ extant writings, and 
the phrase seems to be unique to Evagrius, to the extent that Balthasar regarded its appearance in a text as 
a reliable indication of Evagrian authorship. Dysinger notes (ibid.) that it is also found  in ten chapters of 
the Kephalaia Gnostica, in Evagrius‘ first, sixth and seventh Letters, and in his scholia on Psalms, Prov-
erbs and Ecclesiastes. 
133 KG 6.75.  
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Ὥζπεξ  ηὰ  λήπηʱ  κεηʱμὺ  δηθʱίσλ  θʱὶ  ἀδίθσλ  ἐζηίλ,  νὕησο  θʱὶ  πάληεο  νἱ 
ἄλζξσπνη  κεηʱμὺ  ἀγγέισλ  ηε  θʱὶ  δʱηκόλσλ  εἰζίλ,  κήηε  δʱίκνλεο  ὄληεο,  κήηε 
ἄγγεινη ρξεκʱηίδνληεο κέρξη η῅ο ζπληειείʱο ηνῦ ʱἰ῵λνο.
134 
 
Just as infants are between justice and injustice, so all humans are between the 
angels and the demons, neither being demons, nor having the name of angels un-
til the completion of the age. 
 
Κξίζηο  ἐζηὶ  δηθʱίσλ  κὲλ  ἟  ἀπὸ  πξʱθηηθνῦ  ζώκʱηνο  ἐπὶ  ἀγγειηθὰ  κεηάβʱζηο· 
ἀζεβ῵λ  δὲ  ἀπὸ  πρʱκηικʿῦ  ζώκʱηνο  ἐπὶ  ζθνηεηλὰ  θʱὶ  δνθεξὰ  κεηάζεζηο 
ζώκʱηʱ.
135 
 
Judgment is for the just the passage from a praktikê body to angelic things: but 
for the ungodly it is the change from a praktikê body to darkened and gloomy 
bodies.
136 
 
Just as the body and soul are transformed when the  nous is transformed, so changing 
their constitution changes that of the nous. That of the body is changed by the physical 
disciplines of asceticism, and in particular, as we shall see, by dietary restriction;
137 that 
of the soul, by the cultivation of  virtue. Both of these aspects of  praktikē stabilise the 
movements of their respective objects and consequently those of the nous, or, to express 
it another way, both contribute to the freeing of the nous from the thraldom to external 
things that is empatheia. Given that the body and soul not only express the spiritual state 
of the nous but are means for changing it, they amount to remedial devices calibrated to 
its spiritual needs, such that the judgment of God is an exact prescription for each nous. 
Accordingly I think that Dysinger is correct to discern the medical sense of krisis in this 
aspect of Evagrius‘ use of the term: 
 
Throughout  his writings  Evagrius  makes extensive use of  medical-therapeutic 
analogies to explain his model of spiritual progress; and it is possible that his use 
of the term krisis, ―judgment‖, reflects the ancient medical understanding of this 
term, rather than its legal use...The term krisis was used in classical medicine to 
describe a ―critical period‖ which precedes or accompanies a significant turning 
                                                 
134 Sch.16 on Prov. 1:32: cf. Matt. 28:20. 
135 Sch. 8 on Ps. 1:5. Cf. KG 2.59: ‗―The just judgment‖ (2 Th. 1:5) of our Christ, is known by the fact of 
the transformation of bodies, of regions and of worlds; his forbearance, (makes known) those who strug-
gle against virtue, and his mercy, especially those who are objects of his providence, without their being 
deserving.‘   
136Trans. Dysinger.   
137 See below, 1.6; 2.1.3.1.  
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point in an illness. The krisis heralds a change in the patient‘s condition; a ―criti-
cal moment‖ of transformation in the patient‘s course which necessarily leads ei-
ther to improvement or deterioration in the patient‘s condition. Evagrius similarly 
employs the term krisis to describe a fundamental transformation which facili-
tates the soul‘s movement either upwards towards virtue or downwards into vice 
and ignorance.
138 
 
When, at the apokatatastasis, the nous re-attains to its ‗first rank‘, the soul is reabsorbed 
into it as, regaining its pre-lapsarian unity, it becomes once more triune nous rather tri-
partite soul, but what happens to the body? How can an embodied nous be fully reunited 
to an incorporeal God? In fact Evagrius appears to leave open the question of the ulti-
mate fate of the physical body;
139 what is, however, certain is that the experience by the 
incarnate nous of knowledge of God involves the experience of incorporeality:
140 
 
If the perfection of the nous is immaterial knowledge, as it is said, and if immate-
rial knowledge is the Trinity only, it is evident that in perfection there will not 
remain anything of matter. And if that is so, the nous, henceforth naked, will be-
come a seer of the Trinity.
141 
 
What is certain is that if the final consummation involves any sort of body, it will have 
none of the features that we associate with corporeality, body and soul being ‗raised to 
the order of the nous‘ and the nous being once more the undamaged image of the incor-
poreal God. 
 
                                                 
138 Dysinger (2005: 177). For discussion of Evagrius‘ use of medical language and theory see Dysinger 
(2005: 115-23). Cf. also Disc. 201-4; 33Ch. 1-16. 
139 Cf. KG 6.58: ‗Of those bodies that have been stable in the series of changes it is said that they will 
depart spiritual bodies. But whether that will happen at the end from matter or from organa which will 
have come to be – you, too, [should] examine [this].‘ Dysinger questions whether this means ‗at the end 
by separation from matter. Thus it is difficult to know what to make of aphorisms such as KG 1.26: ‗If 
the human body is a part of this world, but the form of this world is passing, it is also evident that the 
form of the body will pass‘ (cf. 1 Cor. 7:31); KG 1.58: ‗all who have been joined to bodies will necessar-
ily be liberated from them‘; KG  2.77: ‗In the last judgment it is not the transformation of bodies that will 
be made manifest; rather , it will make known their destruction.‘ Cf. also KG 2.17; 3.15, 38, 40, 66; 
Prakt. 49. 
140 See below, 3.2. 
141 KG 3.15. Cf. 2.62: ‗When the noes will have received the contemplation that concerns them, then also 
the entire nature of the body will be withdrawn‘; 4.86: ‗The nous that possesses a body does not see the 
incorporeals, and when it will be incorporeal it will not see the bodies‘. However, at KG 6.58 he appears 
to allow that spiritual bodies might come into existence not by separation from matter but ‗from organa 
which will have come to be.‘ Cf. also n.138 above.  
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1.1.4  Summary 
 
Human beings, along with angels and demons, were originally created as undifferenti-
ated logikoi to exist in contemplative union with God. This primal condition was rup-
tured by a movement of their self-determination in which they chose to turn away from 
him. As a deflection from God this movement was unstable. It initiated the further un-
stable movement of the Fall and brought opposition into the created order. It also en-
gendered differentiation among the logikoi based on the degree of movement exercised 
by each one.  
 
God‘s  response  was  to create,  through  Christ,  the  corporeal  worlds,  in  order  to  re-
introduce stability to creation and provide the logikoi with a means of re-ascent. This 
involved furnishing the logikoi  with souls and bodies whose constitution depends on 
extent of movement and consequent fall and therefore on spiritual state. In that way the 
three orders of angels, humans and demons came into being.  
 
Created in the image of the triune God the nous, which prior to the Fall was identical 
with the logikos, is itself triune. As a result of the Fall it fragmented into its three as-
pects, becoming, in a process of progressive condensation as it fell ever further from 
God, the trichotomy of nous, soul and body. The soul comprises the Platonic triad of 
logistikon, thumos and epithumētikon. In humans these are the progressive stages of the 
ensoulment of the nous, the logistikon being the least fallen part and the epithumētikon 
the most fallen and so closest to the body. In angels the logistikon predominates, in de-
mons the thumos and in humans epithumia.  
 
In contrast to the simplicity and stillness of the primal Unity, corporeal creation is char-
acterised by multiplicity, movement and change. Stable movement is associated with 
proximity to God, unstable movement with distance from him. In epistemological terms 
corporeal creation is a ‗letter‘ from God to the fallen logikoi, by ‗reading‘ which they 
are able to re-attain to knowledge of him. In metaphysical terms it is a ‗ladder‘, by as-
cending which they can return to union with him. ‗Reading‘ and ‗ascent‘ are effected by 
contemplation, which, due to the interconnectedness of the epistemic and the ontologi-
cal, transforms the nous, soul and body and culminates, at the apokatastasis, with soul  
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and body being once more ‗raised to the order of mind‘ as the unity of the nous with 
God and ipso facto its internal unity is restored.   
 
 
1.2  Anthropology 
 
In the hierarchy of corporeal creation humankind occupies a place intermediate between 
the angels and the demons. The spiritual task distinctive to the human condition is to 
overcome our vulnerability to demonic influence. Success in it is marked by the attain-
ment of apatheia, the state natural to human beings,
142 and achieved by means of prak-
tikē, asceticism.  Thus both praktikē and apatheia are central to Evagrius‘ understanding 
of what it is to be human: the human body is a body for praktikē
143 and apatheia the 
health of the soul.
144  
 
 
1.2.1  The nous 
 
The importance that Evagrius attaches to the nous is evident from the frequency with 
which he uses the term.
145 As already noted, it has two distinct senses in his usage.
146 In 
its primary sense it refers to the person in her entirety, and also to the other rational be-
ings, since soul and body are but the progressively fallen aspects of the fragmented tr i-
une nous. This is the sense in which, prior to the movement, a given nous was identical 
with a given logikos, and in which it is the bearer of the image of God and the constant 
term in the successive transformations that will lead it back to union with God: 
 
Only  the  nous,  the  image  of  God  and  the  core  of  personal  identity,  persists 
throughout successive judgments: everything else compounded of the four ele-
ments – body, emotions, aptitudes, and the world in which these gifts are exer-
cised – reflects the most recent judgment received by each reasoning being.
147 
 
                                                 
142 Cf. Th. 8, Disc. 140; see below, 2.2.1. 
143 Cf. KG 3.48, 50; Sch. 8 on Ps. 1:5; all quoted above, 1.1.3. 
144 Cf. Prakt. 56. 
145 According to the TLG and including the Epistula Fidei there are three hundred and twenty-three occur-
rences of the word nous in Evagrius‘ Greek corpus. 
146 See above, 1.1.2. 
147 Dysinger (2005: 177-8).  
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In its second sense the word nous refers to the part of the fallen rational being that we 
would normally think of as its mind. Strictly speaking this is the logistikon, but in prac-
tice Evagrius prefers the term nous, thereby keeping his focus upon our true nature, 
prior to, above and beyond our present, ensouled condition. 
 
The idea of the nous as subject to change and passible is central to Evagrius‘ anthropol-
ogy and constitutes a radical departure from the Neoplatonism so evident in his thought. 
For the Neoplatonists, that the nous could in any way be subject to pathos was unthink-
able,
148 and Plotinus in particular goes to considerable lengths to insulate not only the 
nous but the soul from any suggestion of passibility.
149 Aristotle allows the nous to be 
passible in relation to cognition,
150 but Evagrius goes much further in the mutability that 
he ascribes to the nous.  
 
First and foremost the Evagrian nous, both pre- and post-lapsarian, is receptive to the 
essential knowledge that is God, and it is in this receptivity that the image of God con-
sists.
151 It is also receptive in relation to contemplation, ‗the knowledge that comes from 
men‘
152 and sense-perception. In addition, the power of self-determination is, for Eva-
grius, a form of receptivity - presumably because the ability to turn away from God is a 
receptivity to that which is other than God – and it is this aspect of the receptivity of the 
nous that occasioned the movement and Fall: 
 
The Monad was not moved in itself: rather, it is moved by the receptivity of the 
nous which through inattentiveness turns its face away, and which through this 
deprivation begets ignorance.
153 
 
Because of the interconnectedness of the epistemic and metaphysical, the epistemic re-
ceptivity of the nous is reflected in a sweeping metaphysical passibility in virtue of 
which the nous is changed by whatever it receives. In the case of God the change in the 
                                                 
148 See, e.g., Blumenthal (1991: 192 ff). 
149 Cf. in particular Enn. 3.5, ―On the apatheia of things without body‖. 
150 And alludes specifically - albeit only once, at the end of DA 3.5 - to nous pathētikos, but this is by im-
plication in opposition to the active nous or nous poiētikos; Aristotle never actually uses the latter term 
but, as Blumenthal (1991: 192) notes, ‗its derivation from De anim. 430a11-12 is an easy step.‘ 
151 See above, 1.1.1. 
152 Cf. Gnost. 45. 
153 KG 1.49; see above, 1.1.1.  
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nous is a return to its own true nature of simplicity and incorporeality. In relation to 
contemplation  it  involves  progression  toward  these.  In  relation  to  sense-perception, 
conversely, it involves the ‗imprinting‘ of the nous by the noēmata it receives and con-
sequently the perpetuation of its immersion in corporeality. 
 
The following sections will discuss the passibility of the Evagrian nous in relation to 
sense-perception, its ability to range between incorporeality and corporeality and its true 
nature as apathēs and ‗the place of God‘.
154 
 
1.2.1.1 The epistemic passibility of the Evagrian nous 
 
The susceptibility of the Evagrian nous to imprinting by certain sorts of noēmata is cen-
tral to Evagrius‘ spirituality and to the importance he attaches to apatheia. In this sec-
tion I shall outline its nature and significance, then in Chapter Two I shall explain how 
pathos becomes implicated in it and to what effect.
155 
 
Noēmata
156 are the basic elements of cognition; they are ‗the way the mind functions... 
its currency‘.
157 They are not intrinsic to the nous but are received by it: 
 
Τέζζʱξεο ηξόπνη εἰζὶλ δη’ ὧλ ὁ λνῦο ιʱκβάλεη λνήκʱηʱ· θʱὶ πξ῵ηνο κὲλ ηξόπνο, 
ὁ δηὰ η῵λ ὀθζʱικ῵λ· δεύηεξνο, ὁ δηὰ η῅ο ἀθν῅ο· ηξίηνο, ὁ δηὰ η῅ο κλήκεο· θʱὶ 
ηέηʱξηνο, ὁ δηὰ η῅ο θξάζεσο·
158  
 
There are four ways by which the nous grasps noēmata: the first way is through 
the eyes, the second through hearing, the third through memory, and the fourth 
through krasis.  
 
                                                 
154 Th. 39.4; 40.9; Rfl. 25; Let. 39. 
155 See below, 2.2.3. 
156 Guillaumont (1998: 24) notes that the term noēma is of Aristotelian provenance, but that Evagrius‘ use 
of it corresponds to the Stoic concept of a phantasia insofar as he uses it to denote ―pour désigner l‘image 
provoquée par la perception d‘un object sensible.‖ Inwood (1985: 56-7) describes a Stoic phantasia as an 
imprint or alteration of the hegemonikon; ‗a representational image in the mind… which resembles as an 
eikōn its correlate in the world and refers to it‘; as we shall see, this corresponds exactly to an Evagrian 
noēma, although the understanding of the hēgemonikon would differ in each case. 
157 Stewart (2001: 187). 
158 Rfl. 17.  
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Although this seems to exclude sensory modalities other than sight and hearing, Eva-
grius elsewhere allows that the other senses also give rise to noēmata.
159 Krasis, the 
body‘s physiological constitution,
160 can be manipulated by the demo ns to introduce 
noēmata to the nous; Evagrius gives the example of a demon who, by touching a place 
in the brain and causing palpitations in the blood vessels,
161 ‗alters the light around the 
nous‘, thereby giving rise to ‗some form associated with the senses‘ or causing a logis-
mos to form in the nous.
162  
 
Noēmata can be of either sensible or intelligible objects and can be divided into those 
that ‗leave a form‘ upon the nous and those that do not: 
θʱὶ  δηὰ  κὲλ  η῵λ  ὀθζʱικ῵λ,  κνξθνῦληʱ  κόλνλ  ιʱκβάλεη  λνήκʱηʱ·  δηὰ  δὲ  η῅ο 
ἀθν῅ο, θʱὶ κνξθνῦληʱ θʱὶ κὴ κνξθνῦληʱ, ηῶ ηὸλ ιόγνλ ζεκʱίλεηλ θʱὶ πξάγκʱηʱ 
ʱἰζζεηὰ θʱὶ ζεσξεηά· ἟ δὲ κλήκε θʱὶ ἟ θξάζηο ἀθνινπζνῦζη ηῆ ἀθνῆ· ἑθάηεξʱ 
γὰξ κνξθνῦζη ηὸλ λνῦλ θʱὶ νὐ κνξθνῦζη κηκνύκελʱ ηὴλ ἀθνήλ.
163 
Through the eyes the nous grasps only noēmata that leave a form; through hearing 
it grasps both those that leave a form and those that do not, since speech signifies 
both sensible and intelligible objects; memory and temperament follow upon hear-
ing, for both leave a form or do not leave a form upon the nous in imitation of 
hearing. 
 
What Evagrius here calls ‗leaving a form‘ he elsewhere calls ‗imprinting the  nous‘. 
Only noēmata of sensible objects  imprint the nous: 
 
ὁ  λνῦο  πάλησλ  η῵λ  ʱἰζζεη῵λ  πξʱγκάησλ  πέθπθε  δέρεζζʱη  ηὰ  λνήκʱηʱ  θʱὶ 
ηππνῦζζʱη θʱη’ ʱὐηὰ δηὰ ηνῦ ὀξγʱληθνῦ ζώκʱηνο ηνύηνπ· ὁπνίʱ γὰξ ἂλ εἴε ηνῦ 
πξάγκʱηνο ἟ κνξθή, ηνηʱύηελ ἀλάγθε θʱὶ ηὸλ λνῦλ δέμʱζζʱη ηὴλ εἰθόλʱ· ὅζελ 
θʱὶ  ὁκνη῵κʱηʱ  ιέγεηʱη  ηὰ  λνήκʱηʱ  η῵λ  πξʱγκάησλ  ηῶ  ηὴλ  ʱὐηὴλ  ἐθείλνηο 
δηʱζῶδεηλ κνξθήλ.
164 
 
                                                 
159 Cf. Rfl. 55; Th. 4.4; Pry. 61; also the discussion below of whether ‗images‘ are necessarily visual. 
160 Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 281, n.49). 
161 Cf. Pry. 72. 
162 Pry. 73; cf. Pry. 63: demons who ‗through alteration in the body instil in the nous (δηὰ η῅ο ἀιινηώζεσο 
ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο ἐκπνηνῦζη ηῶ λῶ) logismoi or noēmata or contemplations (ζεσξήκʱηʱ). 
163 Rfl. 17. 
164 Thoughts 25.8-14. Cf. Disc. 77: ‗The nous can receive only noēmata, and it takes the form of each 
noêma, like the eye when it sees itself in mirrors‘ (ὁ λνῦο κόλσλ λνεκάησλ ἐζηὶ δεθηηθὸο θʱὶ κνξθνῦηʱη 
πξὸο ἕθʱζηνλ λόεκʱ ὡο κνξθνῦηʱη ὀθζʱικὸο ἐλ ἐζόπηξνηο ὀπηʱλόκελνο); also Disc. 85.  
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The nous receives naturally the noēmata of all sensible objects and an imprint
165 
conforming to them through th is  instrumental body.
166  Whatever may be the 
form of the object, such is necessarily the image that the  nous receives, whence 
the noēmata are called likenesses of objects
167 because they preserve the same 
form as them.  
 
The perception of a sensible object, then, gives rise to the presence in the  nous of a 
noēma which is a likeness of that object, and which imprints the nous with its form. 
This imprinting, it should be noted, is not related to the storage of the noēma in mem-
ory, since noēmata of intelligibles, which leave no imprint, are nonetheless stored in 
memory. Rather, when Evagrius speaks of noēmata imprinting the nous with a form, 
what he is referring to is simply the formation of mental images.
168  
                                                 
165 The term is of Stoic origin; cf. Guillaumont (1998: 24-5). 
166 Cf. Aristotle, DA 412b5-6, where the soul is defined as ‗the first actuality of a natural instrumental 
body (ζώκʱηνο θπζηθνῦ ὀξγʱληθνῦ)‘; Guillaumont (1998: 240, n.2). 
167 Cf. Aristotle, De Interpretatione 16a6-8, where affections (πʱζήκʱηʱ) of the soul are described as 
ὁκνηώκʱηʱ of πξάγκʱηʱ; also Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 8:8.23.1, where noēmata are defined as 
likenesses (ὁκνηώκʱηʱ) and imprints (ἐθηππώκʱηʱ) of objects (πξάγκʱηʱ); Guillaumont (1998: 241). 
168 That Evagrius speaks of such noēmata as ‗images‘ or ‗likenesses‘ of their objects raises anew the 
question of which sensory modalities can give rise to them since it suggests that they must be visual in 
nature - that is, mental pictures - and so derive from visible objects. Indeed, at Rfl. 55 Evagrius himself 
says as much: ‗Among logismoi, some give form to the dianoia, some do not give form. Those that derive 
from sight give form, while those that come upon us from the remaining senses do not give form‘ (Τ῵λ 
ινγζηζκ῵λ νἱ κὲλ κνξθνῦζη ηὴλ δηάλνηʱλ, νἱ δὲ νὐ κνξθνῦζη· θʱὶ κνξθνῦζη κὲλ, ὅζνη ἐμ ὁξάζεσο· νὐ 
κνξθνῦζη δὲ, ὅζνη ἐθ η῵λ ινηπ῵λ ʱἰζζήζεσλ ἟κỖλ ἐπηζπκβʱίλνπζη). But does he really mean to deny that 
noēmata of non-visible sensibles imprint the λνῦο with their likeness? Would he consider the noēma 
comprising my memory of the scent of a rose to be an imprint or form (at Th. 41 he uses these terms 
synonymously) and a likeness of the original, and accordingly an image, or only the visual image of the 
rose that my memory of the scent evokes? Th. 4.3-4 suggests that he would indeed regard the noēma of 
the scent as an imprint or form, a likeness and an image. Imprints and forms, he says there, ‘appear to 
occur in the nous either when it sees through the eyes, or hears through hearing, or through whatever 
sense faculty’ (ἔνηθε ζπκβʱίλεηλ ηῶ λῶ ἠ δη’ ὀθζʱικ῵λ ὁξ῵ληη ἠ δη’ ἀθν῅ο ἀθνύληη ἠ δη’ ʱἰζζήζεσο 
πνηᾶο). This seems to contradict Rfl. 25, so what are we to make of it? Does the apparent inconsistency 
represent an oversight, equivocation, change of mind, or simply an emphasis upon the visual so overarch-
ing that it threatens to become exclusive? The latter, I suggest, is the answer. There can be no doubt that 
Evagrius is above all concerned with visual images, first and foremost because of the Second Command-
ment: ‗Do not make for yourself an idol, nor likeness of anything, whatever are in the heaven above, and 
whatever are in the earth below, and whatever are in the waters underneath the earth‘ (Οὐ πνηήζεηο 
ζεʱπηῶ εἴδσινλ, νὐδὲ πʱληὸο ὁκνίσκʱ, ὅζʱ ἐλ ηῶ νὐξʱλῶ ἄλσ, θʱὶ ὅζʱ ἐλ ηῆ γῆ θάησ, θʱὶ ὅζʱ ἐλ ηνỖο 
ὕδʱζηλ ὑπνθάησ η῅ο γ῅ο - Exod. 20:4; cf. Deut. 5:8). That for him noēmata of sensible objects can fall 
within the scope of this proscription is suggested by the fact that he sometimes refers to them as eidôla 
(e.g. at Th. 4.16, 16.28, 25.55, 36.17; Prakt. 23.6, 55.2), and also by Th. 37:23-5: ‘you troubled the nous 
at the time of prayer by constantly imagining the face of your enemy and deifying him, for certainly what 
the nous sees while praying is worthy of being called a god.’ (ηὸλ λνῦλ θʱηὰ ηὸλ θʱηξὸλ η῅ο πξνζεπρ῅ο 
ἐμεηάξʱζζεο, ηνῦ ἐρζξνῦ ζνπ ηὸ πξόζσπνλ ἀεὶ θʱληʱδόκελνο θʱὶ ηνῦην ζενπνη῵λ· ὁ γʱξ βιέπεη πάλησο 
ὁ λνῦο πξνζεπρόκελνο, ηνῦην θʱὶ ζεὸλ ἄμηνλ ἐζηὶλ ὁκνινγεỖλ). This passage strikes to the heart of Eva- 
Page 45 of 268 
 
Sometimes the scriptures use sensible imagery to convey spiritual truths. Evagrius dis-
cusses such cases using the example of the following phrase from Isa. 6:1:  
 
εἶδνλ ηὸλ θύξηνλ θʱζήκελνλ ἐπὶ ζξόλνπ ὑςεινῦ θʱὶ ἐπεξκέλνπ. 
 
I saw the Lord seated on a high and lofty throne.  
 
He begins by splitting it into two parts. The first, ‗I saw the Lord‘, seems to imprint the 
nous but in fact does not since, because God is incorporeal, no expression that signifies 
him can imprint the nous. On the other hand the predicate, ‗seated on a high and lofty 
throne‘ could, since it describes a sensible object, imprint the nous. However its spiri-
tual significance, which is its true meaning, does not imprint it: ‗the key is to move be-
yond a literal reading of the text, for there was no physical throne in Isaiah‘s vision.‘
169 
In other words, if  understood as referring to a physical throne then the noēma of a 
physical ‗high and lofty throne‘ will imprint the nous, whereas if it is understood that 
the whole phrase is in fact a noēma of God, since ‗God is said to be seated there where 
he is known; for this reason the pure nous is called a throne of God‘ (ἐθεỖ γὰξ ιέγεηʱη 
                                                                                                                                               
grius‘ interest in noēmata that imprint the nous. They lead it far away from God (cf. Pry. 56) for three 
reasons. First, they distract it (this can be providential when it is the demons that they distract it from; cf. 
Sch. 15 on Eccl. 10-13). Second, they focus the nous toward the sensible world. And third, the fact that 
they imprint the nous makes them hard to expunge from it. It is easy to see why Evagrius would regard 
such noēmata as falling within the scope of Exod. 20:4: they are likenesses of sensible things and, be-
cause of their capacity to occupy the nous, are liable to appear before it while it is trying to pray, therefore 
becoming in effect de facto idols (cf. Let. 7.1). But his preoccupation with the visual does not rest solely 
upon a literal reading of Scripture. Not only does he hold sight to be more powerful (θξείηησλ) than any 
of the other senses (cf. Prayer 150; Gt.Let. 4; also Casiday (2006: 213, n.7)); it is also clear that his own 
experience of troublesome noēmata is dominated by visual images. Nor should we forget the possibility 
of philosophical influences at work here; for example, his assimilation of sensible objects to visible ones 
and his contrast between the visible and the intelligible echoes Plato‘s distinction at Rep. 507b9-10 be-
tween objects of sight and objects of intelligence, while the priority of sight in relation to the other senses 
is affirmed by both Plato and Aristotle (cf. Phdr. 250d3-4; DA 429a2-3). Thus Evagrius has compelling 
theological, philosophical and psychological reasons for emphasising the visual in his discussions of 
noēmata of sensible objects.  Nonetheless he seems to allow that such noēmata can be non-visual, and so 
while his primary concern is undoubtedly with the visual image of the rose, he would, I think, consider 
the noēma of the scent to be an image too. So noēmata of sensible objects imprint the nous with an image 
of that object which is its likeness, and depending on the sensory modality involved this ‗image‘ and 
‗likeness‘ can be either visual or non-visual in nature. Either way, it has the potential to impinge upon the 
nous at the time of prayer and as such to be a de facto idol. 
169 Stewart (2001: 200).  
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θʱζέδεζζʱη ὁ ζεὸο ἔλζʱ γηλώζθεηʱη· δηὸ θʱὶ ζξόλνο ιέγεηʱη ζενῦ λνῦο θʱζʱξόο), then 
the nous will not be imprinted.
170  
 
Generalising from this example, when a sensible object is presented to the nous through 
the medium of language and in a context where the expression in which it appears is 
susceptible of either literal or spiritual interpretation, the noēma to which it gives rise 
will only imprint the nous if the expression is understood literally. So rather than being 
a mechanistic process, the imprinting of the nous depends upon the attribution of sig-
nificance and thus upon the agent. 
 
What about expressions involving sensible imagery not susceptible of spiritual interpre-
tation, and what about sensible objects themselves? Is the imprinting of the nous agent-
dependent in either of these cases? I shall begin with the latter. In the case of objects, 
what is at issue is the distinction between the objects themselves and what Evagrius 
calls their logoi. Objects have no intrinsic value; rather, their value resides in their role 
as intermediaries between the contemplative and God: 
 
νὐθ  ἔζηη  ηὰ  πξάγκʱηʱ  ἀγʱζά,  ἀιι’  νἱ  ιόγνη  η῵λ  πξʱγκάησλ,  ἐθ’  νἷο  θʱὶ 
εὐθξʱίλεζζʱη πέθπθελ ἟ θύζηο ἟ ινγηθὴ θʱὶ ἐξγάδεζζʱη ηὸ ἀγʱζόλ· νὐδὲλ γὰξ 
νὕησ ηξέθεη θʱὶ πνηίδεη ηὸλ λνῦλ ὡο ἀξεηὴ θʱὶ γλ῵ζηο ζενῦ.
171 
 
it is not objects that are good, but the logoi of objects, by which rational nature is 
gladdened and does good, for nothing so nourishes and refreshes the nous as vir-
tue and the knowledge of God. 
 
On the basis of Evagrius‘ exegesis of Isa. 6:1 we might suppose that if the objects them-
selves are the focus of attention then their noēmata will imprint the nous, whereas if the 
focus is upon their logoi then the noēmata of the objects will not imprint the nous (nor 
of course will the noēmata of the logoi, being noēmata of intelligibles). This, I take it, is 
what Evagrius has in mind when, in his fifteenth scholion on Ecclesiastes, he distin-
guishes between ‗perceiving in a sensible manner by means of the senses that which is 
sensible‘ (ηνỖο ʱἰζζεηνỖο δηὰ η῵λ ʱἰζζήζεσλ ἐπηβάιισλ ʱἰζζεη῵ο) and the ‗observation 
of objects by means of the senses‘ (἟ δηὰ η῵λ ʱἰζζήζεσλ θʱηʱλόεζηο η῵λ πξʱγκάησλ), 
                                                 
170 Th. 41.13-15. 
171 Sch. 15.22-5 on Eccl. 10-13.  
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affirming that while the former imprints the nous, the latter can be practised by the pure 
as well as by the impure. However,  Prayer 56 complicates this picture: 
 
Οὐθ ἂλ ὅηε κὴ ἐγρξνλίδῃ ὁ λνῦο ἐλ ηνỖο ςηινỖο λνήκʱζη η῵λ πξʱγκάησλ, ἢδε θʱὶ 
πξνζεπρ῅ο θʱηείιεθε ηόπνλ· δύλʱηʱη γὰξ ἐλ ηῆ ζεσξίᾳ εἶλʱη η῵λ πξʱγκάησλ, θʱὶ 
ἐλ  ηνỖο  ιόγνηο  ʱὐη῵λ  ἀδνιεζρεỖλ,  ἅπεξ,  θʱὶ  εἰ  ςηιὰ  ῥήκʱηά  εἰζηλ,  ἀιι'  ὡο 
πξʱγκάησλ  ὄληʱ  ζεσξήκʱηʱ,  ηππνῦζη  ηὸλ  λνῦλ,  θʱὶ  κʱθξὰλ  ἀπάγνπζηλ  ἀπὸ 
ʘενῦ. 
 
Even when the nous does not delay among the simple noēmata of objects, it has 
not yet attained the place of prayer; for it can remain in the contemplation of ob-
jects and be engaged in meditation on their logoi, which, even though they in-
volve simple expressions, nevertheless, insofar as they are contemplations of ob-
jects, imprint the nous and lead it far from God. 
 
Does this mean that, after all, contemplation also involves the imprinting of the nous? 
Dysinger reads Kephalaia Gnostika 2.83
172 to mean that the change effected in the nous 
by contemplation is the result of its being imprinted,
173 but I don‘t think this is correct 
since, as I understand Evagrius, the imprinting of the nous makes it increasingly corpo-
real whereas contemplation involves a move away from corporeality; accordingly, I un-
derstand the change effected in the nous by contemplation to be in the order of a dis-
solving of existing imprints rather than the acquisition of new ones. Consequently I 
think that the above passage is most naturally read as meaning that, while in theory at-
tention can be focused either on objects qua sensible or on their logoi, in practice some 
part of the person‘s attention is likely to remain focused on the objects qua sensible 
even if the greater part is focused on their logoi. Indeed, I shall argue below that the ex-
tent to which she can focus her attention on logoi to the exclusion of the sensible world 
depends upon the extent to which she has attained apatheia. 
 
All sensible objects, then, have logoi and are therefore susceptible of spiritual interpre-
tation; they are the individual characters of the ‗letter from God‘ that is corporeal crea-
tion.  In order to ‗read‘ this ‗letter‘ it is necessary to abstract from the objects to their 
spiritual significance, and insofar as this is done their noēmata will not imprint the nous. 
                                                 
172 Quoted above, 1.1.3. 
173 Cf. Dysinger (2005: 38).  
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The ability to discern such logoi is sometimes referred to by Evagrius, following Ori-
gen,
174 as a spiritual sense,
175 and requires that the nous be apathēs: 
 
Just as each of the arts has need of a sharpened sense that conforms to its matter, 
so also the nous needs a spiritual sense in order to distinguish spiritual things.
176 
 
κεηὰ γὰξ ηὴλ θάζʱξζηλ νὐθ ἔηη ὡο πεξηζπ῵ληʱ ηὸλ λνῦλ ʱὐηνῦ κόλνλ ὁ θʱζʱξὸο 
ηὰ ʱἰζζεηὰ πξάγκʱηʱ θʱζνξᾷ, ἀιι’ ὡο ἐγθείκελʱ ʱὐηῶ πξὸο ηὴλ πλεπκʱηηθὴλ 
ζεσξίʱλ.
177 
 
after purification the one who has been purified no longer considers sensible ob-
jects only as diversions for his nous but as means placed in him to bring him to 
spiritual contemplation.  
 
Spiritual sensation is apatheia of the reasoning soul, produced by the grace of 
God.
178 
 
With sensible objects, then, as with sensible imagery, it is possible to avoid the imprint-
ing of the nous. What about expressions involving sensible imagery not susceptible of 
spiritual interpretation? Here it would seem that the only way to avoid imprinting of the 
nous is to withhold attention from them, and indeed this is what Evagrius recommends 
that a person does when faced with demonic suggestion.
179  
 
In sum, all cognition of objects external to the  nous – that is, all cognition other than  
knowledge of God - involves the reception by the nous of noēmata. If these are of sen-
                                                 
174 Cf. DP 1.1.9 (R). 
175 Katz (2000: 132) notes, ‗As far as scholars can determine, the creation of the doctrine of the spiritual 
senses originated with Origen. Although there is some anticipation of the doctrine in the ideas of Philo, of 
Clement of Alexandria, and of Tertullian, Origen‘s development of the doctrine of the spiritual senses 
flows out of his interest in psychology and principally out of his monumental work in scripture and in a 
special way from his own mystical interpretation of the Song of Songs.‘ Cf., e.g., Origen, C.Cant., Prol. 
2; DP 1.1.9 (R); Dialogue with Heraclides 16 ff. 
176 KG 1.33; cf. KG 2.35: ‗The nous also possesses five spiritual senses, with which it senses the sub-
stances presented to it.  Vision shows it intelligible objects  [hazily? heavenly?] ; with hearing it receives 
the logoi which concern them; the odour that is a stranger to deceit delights the nose, and the mouth re-
ceives the flavour of the latter; by the manner of touching it is confirmed, by grasping the exact demon-
stration of objects.‘ 
177 Sch. 15.4-7 on Eccl. 10-13. 
178 KG 1.37.  
179 To be precise, Evagrius warns against allowing demonic logismoi to linger in one‘s awareness; cf. 
Prakt. 6; see below, 2.2.4.  
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sible objects or imagery perceived without regard for their spiritual significance  then 
they imprint the nous, but if, although the perception is through the senses, the focus of 
attention is the logoi of the objects or imagery, then the resulting noēmata will not im-
print the nous. Evagrius refers to the latter mode of cognition as ‗spiritual sensation‘ and 
a prerequisite of it is apatheia.   
 
1.2.1.2 The metaphysical passibility of the Evagrian nous 
 
In metaphysical terms the changeability of the Evagrian nous is rooted in its power of 
self-determination, an exercise of which – that is, a choice or decision - is a movement 
of the nous (λνῦ θίλεζηο).
180 That movement is susceptible of degree and can be either 
toward or away from God and, accordingly, stable or unstable. If stable it tends toward 
stillness in the sense that movement toward God would, if uninterrupted, culminate in 
union with him. If unstable this, along with its distance from God, will tend to increase, 
since any stability must come from God. In other words, the nous, in virtue of its power 
of self-determination, is intrinsically capable of, and potentially susceptible to, infinite 
instability, and once it has turned away from God only his intervention can prevent it 
from spinning off into chaos.  
 
By means of the corporeal worlds God re-introduced stability to the created order and 
made it possible for the noes to re-ascend to him. In virtue of the movement and Fall 
they had already undergone change, but so far the form this took, namely increasingly 
unstable  movement,  happened  without  further  input  from God.  Their assumption of 
souls and bodies, on the other hand, although the actualisation of a potential already in 
them,
181 did require such input and so a further creation.
182  
 
Embodiment contains, but does not eliminate, the instability of the  nous. The human 
nous experiences its instability through its susceptibility to imprinting by noēmata of 
sensible objects and to the changing emotions and mental states characteristic of our 
daily lives, most – but not all - of which are unstable movements and affections of the 
                                                 
180 Cf. Sch. 10 on Eccl. 2:11; Sch. 23 on Prov. 2:17; see above, 1.1.2. 
181 Cf. KG 2.29: ‗Just as fire potentially possesses its body, so also the nous potentially possesses the soul, 
when it is entirely mixed with the light of the Blessed Trinity.‘ 
182 But see above, n.34.  
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nous;
183 in other words, pathē.
184 The two - the imprinting of the nous and the experi-
ence of pathos - are connected:  ‗appetite‘, Evagrius tells us, ‗is the source of every 
pleasure, and sensation gives birth to appetite.‘
185 Conversely, apatheia is the initial sta-
bilisation of the nous that enables it to contemplate and thereby increase its stability and 
move closer to God. Contemplation does not involve the imprinting of the nous but 
nonetheless changes it as much as pathos.
186 But whereas the changes wrought in the 
nous by pathos are a sickening, those wrought by contemplation are healing. They are 
reflected in changes to the constitution of the body
187 - that is, to the aspect of the nous 
that is ‗named a body‘
188 - in the gradual process whereby it, along with the soul, is 
‗raised to the order of the mind.‘
189 
 
1.2.1.3 The true nature of the nous 
 
Just as God is beyond all representation and sense perception (ὑπὲξ πᾶζʱλ ἔλλνηʱλ θʱὶ 
ʱἴζζεζηλ);
190  immaterial  (ἄϋινο)
191  and  without  quantity  or  shape  ( ἄπνζνο  θʱὶ 
ἀζρεκάηηζηνο)
192 or form (κνξθε),
193 so the true nature of the nous is to be without form 
or matter.
194 That which was created to be receptive to the immaterial, for mless God is 
itself immaterial and formless. God‘s response to the Fall was to provide the noes with 
souls and bodies to enable them to re-ascend to him, and that in the first instance means 
overcoming their susceptibility to  pathos; in other words, attaining apatheia. But al-
though apatheia is part of the true nature of the nous, it is not the whole story and its at-
tainment does not yet suffice for the nous fully to realise its true nature: 
 
                                                 
183 Not all emotions, desires and so forth are unstable movements, only those that lead us away from God. 
For discussion of unstable affects – that is, pathē – see Chapter Two, and for stable affects, Chapter 
Three. 
184 Chapter Two focuses  in detail upon Evagrius‘ understanding of pathos and its effect upon us. 
185 Prakt. 4.2-3; see below, 2.2.2. 
186 See above, 1.1.3. 
187 The body and its transformations are discussed below, 1.4. 
188 Gt.Let. 26; see above, 1.1.2. 
189 Gt.Let. 22; see above, 1.1.2. 
190 Pry. 4. 
191 Pry. 66. 
192 Pry. 67. 
193 Cf. Pry. 114. 
194 Cf. KG 3.31: ‗Of the unity of the nous it is possible to speak, but its nature cannot be described be-
cause it has been constituted neither of form nor of matter (such that) there is no knowledge of quality.‘  
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Οὐθ ὁ ἀπʱζείʱο ηεηπρεθὼο, ἢδε θʱὶ πξνζεύρεηʱη ἀιεζ῵ο· δύλʱηʱη γὰξ ἐλ ηνỖο 
ςηινỖο  λνήκʱζη  εἶλʱη  θʱὶ  ἐλ  ηʱỖο  ἱζηνξίʱηο  ʱὐη῵λ  πεξηζπᾶζζʱη,  θʱὶ  κʱθξὰλ 
ἀπέρεηλ ἀπὸ ʘενῦ.
195 
 
One who has attained apatheia has not already found true prayer as well, for one 
can be among simple intellections and be distracted by the information they pro-
vide, and so be far from God. 
 
By  ‗simple  intellections‘  Evagrius  means  the  logoi  of  bodies  and  incorporeals  and 
judgment and providence. These relate to the various levels of contemplation and  of the 
metaphysical hierarchy by means of which the nous ascends to God, but while an inte-
gral part of the ascent they too must be transcended if it is to be receptive to God him-
self. ‗True prayer‘, which Evagrius also calls ‗pure prayer‘,
196 is the highest level of 
contemplation.
197 It is both the immediate goal of the spiritual life and the route to  its 
ultimate goal, the eschatological restoration of the  logikoi to God, for which the nous 
must become naked, not only of noēmata but of soul and body:  
 
The naked nous is that which, by the contemplation which concerns it, is united 
to knowledge of the Trinity.
198  
 
Being without form or matter, the nous has no qualities and so its nature cannot be de-
scribed.
199 It does, however, have a light associated with it,
200 and Evagrius journeyed to 
John of Lycopolis to ask him about this:
201 
 
                                                 
195 Pry. 55; cf. Pry. 57: ‗Even if the nous has transcended the contemplation of corporeal nature, it has not 
yet beheld perfectly the place of God, for it can be occupied with the knowledge of intelligible objects 
and so be involved with its multiplicity‘ (Κἂλ ὑπὲξ ηὴλ ζεσξίʱλ η῅ο ζσκʱηηθ῅ο θύζεσο ὁ λνῦο γέλεηʱη, 
νὕπσ ηέιενλ ηὸλ ηνῦ ʘενῦ ηόπνλ ἐζεάζʱην· δύλʱηʱη γὰξ ἐλ ηῆ η῵λ λνεη῵λ εἴλʱη γλώζεη, θʱὶ 
πνηθίιιεζζʱη πξὸο ʱὐηήλ); also Let. 58.4: ‗When the mind has attained [knowledge of the Holy Trinity], it 
leaves all the intellections associated with objects.‘ Trans. Sinkewicz (2003: 285,n.3). 
196 Cf., e.g., Pry. 70, 72. 
197 For ‗true prayer‘ cf., e.g., Pry. 53, 55, 59, 60, 64; for ‗pure prayer‘, e.g. Pry. 70, 72. 
198 KG 3.6; cf. KG 1.65; 3.15. 
199 Cf. KG 3.31. 
200 Cf., e.g., Prakt. 64, quoted below, 3.1; Disc. 78, quoted below, 3.3; KG 1.74: ‗The light of the nous is 
divided into three: knowledge of the adorable and holy Trinity, of the incorporeal nature that has been 
created by it, and of the contemplation of beings. This light can be manipulated by both demons and an-
gels; at Pry. 73 Evagrius speaks of ‗the light around the nous‘ being manipulated by the demon of vain-
glory, and at Pry. 74 of ‗the angel of God [moving] the light of the nous to an unerring activity.‘ 
201 Palladius (HL 35.4) reports that it took him, Palladius, eighteen days to make the same journey, ‗partly 
on foot, partly by sailing along the river‘.  
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Concerning [the holy light in the eyes of the mind at the time of prayer], I and 
God‘s servant Ammonius wanted to know where it comes from, and we asked 
the holy John, the seer of Thebes, whether it is the nature of the mind to be lumi-
nous and thus it pours forth the light from itself or whether [the light] appears 
from something else outside and illumines [the mind]; but he answered us and 
said, ―No human being is able to explain this, and indeed, apart from the grace of 
God the mind cannot be illumined in prayer by being set free from the many 
cruel enemies that are endeavouring to destroy it.
202 
 
Evagrius evidently concluded that as well as having a light of its own  the nous can be 
illuminated from without: 
 
Δἴ ηηο βνύινηην ἰδεỖλ ηὴλ ηνῦ λνῦ θʱηάζηʱζηλ, ζηεξεζάησ ἑʱπηὸλ πάλησλ η῵λ 
λνεκάησλ,  θʱὶ  ηόηε  ὄςεηʱη  ʱὐηὸλ  ζʱπθείξῳ  ἠ  νὐξʱλίῳ  ρξώκʱηη  πʱξεκθεξ῅· 
ηνῦην  πνη῅ζʱη  ἄλεπ  ἀπʱζείʱο,  η῵λ  ἀδπλάησλ  ἐζηίλ·  ʘενῦ  γὰξ  ρξείʱ 
ζπλεξγνῦληνο ηνῦ ἀλʱπλένληνο ʱὐηῶ ηὸ ζπγγελὲο θ῵ο.
203 
 
If someone should want to behold the state of his nous, let him deprive himself of 
all noēmata and then he shall behold himself resembling sapphire or the colour of 
heaven.
204 It is impossible to achieve this without apatheia, for he will need God 
to collaborate with him and breathe into him the connatural light.
205 
 
This is ‗that light which at the time of prayer leaves an imprint of the place of God (ηνῦ 
θσηὸο  ἐθείλνπ ηνῦ  θʱηὰ ηὸλ θʱηξὸλ η῅ο πξνζεπρ῅ο ἐθηππνῦληνο ηὸλ ηόπνλ ηὸλ  ηνῦ 
ζενῦ).‘
206 But if only noēmata of sensible objects imprint the nous and if, moreover, 
such imprinting is inimical to prayer, what does Evagrius mean by this? In the very next 
chapter he states explicitly, in relation to Isa. 6:1, that the noēma of God does not im-
print the nous.
207 The answer, I suggest, is that  it  is partly deliberate oxymoron and 
partly metaphor, both intended to emphasise the singular and ineffable nature of the e x-
perience in question. As metaphor it compares it to our ordinary experience of the sensi-
ble world and declares it to be no less vivid; as oxymoron it reminds us that, unlike cog-
                                                 
202 Ant. 6.16; cf. HL 35. 
203 Rfl. 2.9. 
204 Cf. Exod. 24:9-11. 
205 Cf. Rfl. 23: ‗[The nous] will lay aside the pathē through the virtues, and simple thoughts through spiri-
tual contemplation; and this in turn it will lay aside when there appears to it the light;‘ Rfl. 27: ‗Prayer is a 
state (katastasis) of the nous that arises under the influence of the unique light of the Holy Trinity.‘ 
206 Th. 40.8-9. 
207 Cf. Th. 41.17-19.  
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nition of sensible objects, that of God does not rely for its vividness upon the imprinting 
of the nous. 
 
Evagrius understands the expression ‗the throne of God‘ in Isa. 6:1 as referring to the 
pure nous, since ‗God is said to be seated there where he is known‘.
208 He also speaks of 
the nous as ‗the place of God‘, as in the following: 
 
Ὅηʱλ ὁ λνῦο ηὸλ πʱιʱηὸλ ἄλζξσπνλ ἀπνδπζάκελνο ηὸλ ἐθ ράξηηνο ἐπελδύζεηʱη, 
ηόηε  θʱὶ  ηὴλ  ἑʱπηνῦ  θʱηάζηʱζηλ  ὄςεηʱη  θʱηὰ  ηὸλ  θʱηξὸλ  η῅ο  πξνζεπρ῅ο 
ζʱπθείξῳ  ἠ  νὐξʱλίῳ  ρξώκʱηη  πʱξεκθεξ῅,  ἣληηλʱ  θʱὶ  ηόπνλ  ζενῦ  ἟  γξʱθὴ 
ὀλνκάδεη ὑπὸ η῵λ πξεζβπηέξσλ ὀθζέληʱ ἐπὶ ηνῦ ὄξνπο Σηλᾶ.
209 
 
When the nous has put off the old self and shall put on the one born of grace,
210 
then it will see its own state in the time of prayer resembling sapphire or the co l-
our of heaven; this state scripture calls the place of God that was seen by the eld-
ers on Mount Sinai.
211 
 
For Evagrius it is the nous that is the object of Paul‘s injunction and the subject of the 
transformation from ‗old‘ to ‗new‘ self; as we shall see, he identifies the Pauline ‗new 
self‘ with the person who has attained apatheia. The nous is the ‗place of God‘ because 
it was created to  know him.
212  
 
The nous, then, is naturally incorporeal and has its own light. What about its relation-
ship to movement? Is the true nature of the nous to be in stillness or in motion? I said 
above that stillness is found only in union with God and that corporeal creation is char-
                                                 
208 Th. 41.14-15; see above, 1.2.1.1. 
209 Th. 39, repeated almost verbatim in Let 39; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 273, n.61). Cf. also Rfl. 2.9, quoted 
above; Th. 40. 
210 Cf. Col. 3:9-10. 
211 Cf. Exod. 24:9-11. 
212 That the ‗place of God‘ is said to be located on a mountain reflects, for Evagrius, the fact that the re-
turn to God is an ascent; cf. Let. 58: ‗[T]he intelligible mountain is the knowledge of the Holy Trinity 
erected on a height difficult of access‘ (trans. Sinkewicz (2003: 285, n.3)); also cf. KG 5.40: ‗The intelli-
gible mountain is spiritual contemplation which is placed at a great height which it is difficult to ap-
proach; when the nous will have reached it, it will become a seer of all the noēmata of the objects below.‘ 
Cf. Rfl. 25.3-6: ‗[T]he place of God is the rational soul, and his dwelling the luminous nous that has re-
nounced worldly appetites and been taught to observe the logoi of (that which is on) the earth‘ (ηόπνο ἐζηὶ 
ηνίλπλ ʘενῦ, ςπρὴ ινγηθή· θʱηνηθεηήξηνλ δὲ, λνῦο θσηνεηδὴο ηὰο θνζκηθὰο ἐπηζπκίʱο ἀξλεζάκελνο, ηνὺο 
η῅ο ςπρ῅ο ιόγνπο ἀπνζθνπεύεηλ δεδηδʱγκέλνο); Sch. 2 on Ps. 75:3: ‗Place of God, the pure soul; dwelling 
of God, the contemplating nous‘ (ηόπνο ʘενῦ ςπρὴ θάζʱξʱ. θʱηνηθεηήξηνλ ʘενῦ, λνῦο ζεσξεηηθόο).  
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acterised by stability of movement as opposed to its cessation.
213 But at Praktikos 48 
Evagrius describes the nous as ‗a thing easily set in motion and difficult to check in its 
tendencies towards unlawful fantasies (εὐθίλεηνλ γάξ ηη πξᾶγκʱ ὁ λνῦο θʱὶ πξὸο ηὰο 
ἀλόκνπο θʱληʱζίʱο δπζθάζεθηνλ).
214 So what exactly does he mean by this? Clearly he 
means that the nous is easily destabilised, since he is referring in particular to its ‗ten-
dency towards unlawful fantasies‘. But should we take this to mean that the natural state 
of the nous is stillness? Given that stillness was, along with incorporeality, the pre-
lapsarian condition of the logikoi, the answer is clearly yes. What about the nous in cor-
poreal creation? Can it ever experience stillness? I think the answer again is yes: that 
when, during prayer, it attains to knowledge of God, it enjoys stillness, along with ef-
fective incorporeality,
215 but as soon as it  begins to descend it is once more identical 
with the logistikon and so, as part of corporeal creation, in motion, although insofar as it 
remains apathēs that motion will be stable. 
216 
 
1.2.1.4 Summary 
 
The mutability and passibility of the nous are central to Evagrius‘ anthropology. The 
receptivity of the nous spans the entire cognitive spectrum from God to the sensible 
world. The image of God consists in its receptivity to knowledge of God.  
 
Cognition of objects external to the nous involves the reception by it of noēmata of 
those objects. Noēmata of sensible objects imprint the nous but those of intelligibles do 
not. Whether or not imprinting occurs is agent-dependent: if scriptural passages that use 
sensible imagery to convey spiritual truths are understood in terms of their literal mean-
ing then the noēmata of that imagery will imprint the nous, but if they are understood in 
terms of their spiritual meaning then the nous will not be imprinted. Similarly, if per-
ception of sensible objects focuses upon the objects themselves then their noēmata will 
imprint the nous, but if the focus is upon the objects‘ logoi – that is, if it is contempla-
tive - then the nous will not be imprinted. Evagrius refers to this as ‗spiritual sensation‘ 
and a prerequisite of it is apatheia. 
                                                 
213 See above, 1.1.2. 
214 Prakt. 48.7-8. 
215 See below, 3.3. 
216 Apatheia is normally experienced as a temporary condition; see below, 3.4.  
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Just as the epistemic changeability of the nous is rooted in its receptivity to knowledge 
of God, so its metaphysical changeability is rooted in its power of self-determination, an 
exercise of which is a movement of the nous. If that movement is away from God it is 
unstable, if toward him, stable, since stability comes from God. In turning away from 
God the logikoi introduced instability to the created order, and God responded by re-
introducing stability by means of corporeal creation. The furnishing of the noes with 
souls and bodies was the actualisation of a potential already present within them. It con-
tains but does not eliminate the instability of the noes. As humans we experience that 
instability in the plasticity of the nous in relation to the sensible world and in our related 
vulnerability to pathos. Acquiring apatheia stabilises the nous and enables it to shift its 
cognitive focus from sensible objects to their spiritual significance. Like pathos, the 
practice of contemplation or spiritual sensation changes the nous (including the soul and 
body) but whereas the changes effected by pathos increase its sickliness, those effected 
by contemplation restore it to health. 
 
Attainment of apatheia is the starting point for the restoration of the nous to its true na-
ture of formlessness, incorporeality and stillness but it is not sufficient for it. The apa-
thēs nous has lost its susceptibility to imprinting by noēmata of sensible objects but re-
mains subject to multiplicity, which, although now of intelligibles rather than sensibles 
is nonetheless, qua multiplicity, ‗far from God‘. To be receptive to God as essential 
knowledge rather than as mediated through corporeal creation it must transcend the cor-
poreal worlds, becoming naked of body and soul and also of all noēmata. As it does so, 
‗putting off the old self and putting on the one born of grace‘, it will become aware of its 
light and of itself as the ‗place of God‘. 
 
 
 
1.2.2  The soul 
 
Evagrius uses the word ‗soul‘ even more frequently than the word nous.
217 The reason, I 
suspect, lies in the therapeutic focus of his writings, for while the nous is the agent and 
                                                 
217 According to the TLG and including the Epistula Fidei there are four-hundred and ninety-one occur-
rences of the word ‗soul‘ in Evagrius‘ Greek corpus.  
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subject of redemption, the soul is the form it assumes as a result of the Fall and in which 
it must act to achieve redemption. 
 
To begin with, a point of clarification. Evagrius sometimes speaks as if the soul com-
prised only the thumos and epithumêtikon, so implying the identity of nous and lo-
gistikon.
218 His doing so follows naturally from his tendency to assimilate the logistikon 
to the nous and preference for speaking in terms of the latter. Accordingly it should be 
borne in mind that just as the term nous can refer either to the triune entity or the ra-
tional part of the soul, so ‗soul‘ might denote either the fallen entity in its entirety or its 
pathêtikon part alone. 
 
This section will focus upon the nature of the three parts of the soul, and this can best be 
gleaned from Evagrius‘ assignment of virtues to them. But first, from a modern perspec-
tive the fact that a discussion of the virtues should fall within a chapter on anthropology 
rather than ethics bears a word of explanation. Whereas we think of ethics and psychol-
ogy as necessarily distinct, the one prescriptive, the other descriptive, in antiquity the 
assumption was rather of their connectedness and mutual coherence. As Brennan notes, 
ancient theories of ethics are rooted in naturalism; that is, they start from considerations 
of what is natural for a human being. Consequently, unlike modern theories they ‗tend 
to begin their ethical theorizing along with their psychology, not prior to it‘,
219 and to 
suppose that ‗the perfectly representative human psyche belongs to the perfectly ethical 
human agent. Violations of ethical standards always reflect lapses in psychological hy-
giene.‘
220 Evagrius‘ anthropology fits this pattern exactly, being premissed upon our 
creation in God‘s image and loss of it through our own choice. For Evagrius the per-
fectly virtuous human agent would indeed have the perfectly healthy soul, and the pur-
pose of praktikê is to regain and, as far as possible, preserve that health. To the objec-
tion that a person cannot be obliged to do anything that she is unable to do, that ‗ought‘ 
implies ‗can‘, Evagrius would reply that any gap between what we can do and what we 
ought to do is itself a result of poor psychological health and, as such, something that in 
principle we can, with God‘s help, remedy.  
 
                                                 
218 Cf., e.g., Sch. 2 on Ps. 107:3, Sch. 230 on Prov. 21:23, Sch. 258 on Prov. 23.22. 
219 Brennan, at Inwood (2003: 258). 
220 Brennan, at Inwood (2003: 259).  
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Evagrius distinguishes between the ‗practical‘ and the ‗contemplative‘ virtues. The for-
mer are constitutive of apatheia and are cultivated by means of praktikē, while the latter 
are the preserve of the gnostikos and are cultivated following attainment of apatheia.  
Concise descriptions of the virtuous, and so apathēs, soul are given in both the Prak-
tikos and the Kephalaia Gnostika. Praktikos 86 reads: 
 
Κʱηὰ θύζηλ ἐλεξγεỖ ςπρὴ ινγηθὴ ὅηʱλ  ηὸ κὲλ ἐπηζπκεηηθὸλ ʱὐη῅ο κέξνο η῅ο 
ἀξεη῅ο ἐθίεηʱη, ηὸ δὲ ζπκηθὸλ ὑπὲξ ʱὐη῅ο ἀγσλίδεηʱη, ηὸ δὲ ινγηζηηθὸλ ἐπηβάιιεη 
ηῆ ζεσξίᾳ η῵λ γεγνλόησλ.
221 
 
The rational soul acts according to nature when the epithumetic part of it longs 
for virtue, the thumos struggles on (the soul‘s) behalf, and the logistikon attains 
the contemplation of beings. 
 
Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73 describes the virtuous – and so apathēs - person as  
 
one in whom the nous always attends to the Lord, in whom the thumikos is full of 
humility following the memory of God, and in whom epithumia is completely 
oriented toward the Lord.
222 
 
While both of these chapters assume the ability, bestowed by apatheia, to practise con-
templation, the fact that Praktikos 86 focuses upon the role of the thumos in the ‗war-
fare of the pathē‘,
223 while in Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73 all three parts of the soul are di-
rectly attentive to God, reveals that they deal with less and more advanced levels of 
spiritual attainment respectively. We see this too in the degree of unity that each attrib-
utes to the soul: in the Praktikos her three parts are operating in harmony with one an-
other  but  their  respective  functions  are  quite  distinct,  whereas  in  the  Kephalaia 
Gnostika, although the differentiation remains they are unified not just by mutual con-
cord but by direct orientation toward God.
224 The contrasting functions that these two 
chapters assign to the thumos will be considered below.  
                                                 
221 Prakt. 86; cf. Disc. 96. 
222 KG 4.73. 
223 Cf. Prakt. 83. 
224 Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31. It is worth noting the contrast with Plotinus‘ understanding of the ‗civic‘ 
and ‗purificatory‘ virtues. For Plotinus, the civic virtues involve all three parts of the soul and bestow 
metriopatheia, while apatheia is acquired by means of the purificatory virtues, which concern the separa-
tion of the rational part of the soul from the body and do not involve the epithumētikon or thumos; cf. 
Enn. 1.2; also Baltzly (2004: 301-3). For Evagrius, both the practical and the contemplative virtues in- 
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Praktikos 89 comprises a more detailed assignment of virtues to the parts of the soul: 
 
Since the rational soul is tripartite according to our wise teacher,
225 when virtue 
(ἀξεηή) arises in the logistikon it is called prudence (θξόλεζηο), understanding 
(ζύλεζηο), and wisdom (ζνθίʱ); when in the epithumêtikon it is called temper-
ance (ζσθξνζύλε), love (ἀγάπε), and self-control (ἐγθξάηεηʱ);
226 when in the 
thumos it is called courage (ἀλδξείʱ) and perseverance (ὑπνκνλή); and when in 
the entire soul it is called justice (δηθʱηνζύλε).
227 The work (ἔξγνλ) of prudence 
is  to  lead  in  the  war  against  the  opposing  powers  (ηὸ  ζηξʱηεγεỖλ  πξὸο  ηὰο 
ἀληηθεηκέλʱο δπλάκεηο) and to defend the virtues (η῵λ ἀξεη῵λ ὑπεξʱζπίδεηλ) and 
to draw the battle lines against the vices (πξὸο ηὰο θʱθίʱο πʱξʱηάηηεζζʱη) and to 
manage indifferent matters according to the circumstances (ηὰ κέζʱ πξὸο ηνὺο 
θʱηξνὺο δηνηθεỖλ). The work of understanding involves the harmonious arrange-
ment of all things  that contribute to the attainment of our  goal (ηὸ πάληʱ ηὰ 
ζπληεινῦληʱ ἟κỖλ πξὸο ηὸλ ζθνπὸλ ἁξκνδίσο νἰθνλνκεỖλ). The work of wisdom 
is  contemplation  of  the  logoi  of  bodies  and  incorporeals  (ηὸ  ζεσξεỖλ  ιόγνπο 
ζσκάησλ θʱὶ ἀζσκάησλ). The work of temperance is to look without  pathos 
upon  objects  that  set  in  motion  its  irrational  fantasies  (βιέπεηλ  ἀπʱζ῵ο  ηὰ 
πξάγκʱηʱ ηὰ θηλνῦληʱ ἐλ ἟κỖλ θʱληʱζίʱο ἀιόγνπο). The work of love is to con-
duct itself towards every image of God in much the same way as it would to-
wards the archetype (ηὸ πάζῆ εἰθόλη ηνῦ ʘενῦ ηνηʱύηελ ἑʱπηὴλ ἐκπʱξέρεηλ νἵʱλ 
θʱὶ ηῶ πξσηνηύπῳ ζρεδόλ), even when the demons attempt to defile it (κηʱίλεηλ 
ʱὐηὰο ἐπηρεηξ῵ζηλ νἱ δʱίκνλεο). The work of self-control is to throw off joyfully 
every  pleasure  of  the  gullet  (ηὸ  πᾶζʱλ  ἟δνλὴλ  ηνῦ  θάξπγγνο  κεηὰ  ρʱξᾶο 
ἀπνζείεζζʱη). It belongs to perseverance and courage to be unafraid of enemies 
(κὴ δεδηέλʱη δὲ ηνὺο πνιεκίνπο) and to hold out valiantly in the midst of dangers 
                                                                                                                                               
volve all three parts of the soul, but it is the former that, by ‗separating soul from body‘ (cf. Prakt. 52) 
constitute apatheia. The cultivation of metriopatheia is, for Evagrius as for Plotinus, a precursor to that of 
apatheia, but again he differs from Plotinus in that it does not involve different virtues; see below, 3.4. 
225 Guillaumont (1971: 683) notes that the expression ‗our wise teacher‘, which Evagrius has substituted 
for the name of Plato, designates Gregory of Nazianzus. Likewise, Sinkewicz (2003: 260, n.91) notes that 
‗the teacher in question is most likely Gregory Nazianzen‘. 
226 Guillaumont and Sinkewicz translate ἐγθξάηεηʱ as ‗abstinence‘, but while I agree that abstinence is the 
form that ἐγθξάηεηʱ takes as regards the epithumētikon, I prefer the translation ‗self-control‘ because in 
addition to being a more literal rendering of ἐγθξάηεηʱ, it more clearly suggests the cognitive aspect of 
abstinence in its Evagrian sense and therefore makes more explicit its link with the inner watchfulness 
that is so central to praktikē (for discussion of inner watchfulness, see below, 3.4). 
227 In speaking of virtue as a single entity that assumes different forms Evagrius evokes the doctrine, Stoic 
in origin, of the unity of the virtues. Cf., e.g., Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 440e, LS 61B: ‗Menedemus of 
Eretria eliminated the plurality and differentiation of the virtues, holding that there is a single one, called 
by many names; for it is the same thing that is called moderation and courage and justice ... Aristo of 
Chios also made virtue essentially one thing, which he called ―health‖.‘ Cf. also Prakt. 98, quoted below, 
this section.  
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(πξνζύκσο ἐγθʱξηεξεỖλ ηνỖο δεηλνỖο). The role of justice is to cultivate concord 
and harmony between the parts of the soul (ηὸ ζπκθσλίʱλ ηηλὰ θʱὶ ἁξκνλίʱλ η῵λ 
η῅ο ςπρ῅ο κεξ῵λ θʱηεξγάδεζζʱη).
228 
 
These virtues are a mixture of the practical and the contemplative: prudence and under-
standing are primarily practical, while wisdom is certainly a contemplative virtue. That 
Evagrius speaks of  it rather than knowledge in relation to the  logistikon is worth re-
marking. Since wisdom relates to corporeal creation and knowledge to God himself,
229 
it reflects the status of the logistikon as the ensouled nous; that is, the nous in relation to 
corporeal creation. In turn it makes more noteworthy Evagrius‘ references to knowledge 
of God being attainable by the nous during human life since it highlights the ability of 
the embodied nous to transcend the corporeal worlds. Self-control is a practical virtue, 
but temperance as described here is contemplative, and we know from the Prologue to 
the Praktikos that love (agapē) only truly becomes possible with the attainment of apa-
theia,
230 making it, too, a contemplative virtue. On the other hand, the virtues here a s-
cribed to the  thumos, perseverance and courage, are above all practical. The role as-
signed to justice, which we can take to be both practical and contemplative, recalls that 
assigned to it in Plato‘s Republic, where it is the condition of the soul in all of whose 
parts virtue has been realised,
231 but whereas for Plato it emerges from the correct op-
eration of the parts of the soul,
232 Evagrius makes it active in the cultivation of ‗concord 
and harmony‘ between them.
233 
 
Praktikos 86 and 89, on the one hand, and Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73 on the other, assign 
very different functions to the thumos, the former that of struggling on behalf of the 
                                                 
228 As Sinkewicz (2003: 260, n.91) notes, Evagrius here draws upon a school text such as the anonymous 
On the Virtues and the Vices 1-2, which names Plato as the source of the teaching, but adapts it to his own 
teaching and adds virtues with strong scriptural associations: understanding and wisdom (cf. Col. 1:9); 
charity and self-control (cf. I Tim. 2:15; 2 Pet. 1:6), and perseverance (e.g. Rom. 5:23). Cf. also Guillau-
mont (1971: 681 ff). 
229 See above, n.35. 
230 Cf. Prakt. Prol. 49-50; also Prakt. 81, 84. 
231 Cf. Rep. 441d ff. 
232 Ibid. 
233 If he was working from On the Virtues and the Vices (see above, n.187), this is one of the respects in 
which he departs from it, since it defines justice as ‗the virtue of the soul that distributes proportionately‘, 
a view associated with Aristotle and the Stoics as opposed to Plato. Evagrius himself evokes the latter 
sense of justice in his description of the contemplative virtues at Gnost. 44 (quoted above in part 2 of the 
Introduction). Cf. Disc. 7, quoted below, 3.3, at  n.258.  
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soul; the latter, observation of humility in memory of God. Unlike the other parts of the 
soul, the thumos is the source of two contrasting sets of virtues, detailed by Evagrius in 
the following passage from the Eulogios: 
 
The usage of thumos lies in this, namely, in fighting against the serpent with en-
mity,
234 but with gentleness and mildness exercising patience with love  (θʱηὰ ηὸ 
πξᾶνλ θʱὶ ἐπηεηθὲο θʱηὰ ηὴλ ἀγάπελ κʱθξνζπκεỖλ) toward one‘s brother while 
doing battle with the logismos. Let the gentle person then be a fighter (ὁ πξʱὺο 
νὖλ ἔζησ κʱρεηήο), with his gentleness divorced from murderous logismoi, just 
as his fighting is separated from those of his natural kindred (η῅ο κάρεο ἐθ η῵λ 
η῅ο θύζεσο ὁκνγελ῵λ). Do not turn the usage of thumos instead to one that is 
contrary to nature (κὴ ἀληηζηξέςῃο ηνῦ ζπκνῦ ηὴλ ρξ῅ζηλ εἰο ηὴλ πʱξὰ θύζηλ), so 
as to use thumos with your brother by becoming like the serpent on the one hand 
and on the other hand to form a friendship with the serpent by consenting to lo-
gismoi. The gentle person, even if he suffers terrible things, does not abandon 
love, for it is because of this that he exercises patience and forbearance, kindness 
and perseverance (θἂλ πάζρῃ ηὰ δεηλά, η῅ο ἀγάπεο νὐθ ἐμίζηʱηʱη, ἕλεθελ γὰξ 
ηʱύηεο κʱθξνζπκεỖ θʱὶ ζηέγεη, ρξεζηεύεηʱί ηε θʱὶ ὑπνκέλεη.).
235 If indeed the 
exercise of patience belongs to love  (η῅ο ἀγάπεο ηὸ κʱθξνζπκεỖλ), contention 
arising from the thumos has nothing to do with love, for thumos rouses hatred, 
jealousy and wrath (κỖζνο θʱὶ θζόλνλ θʱὶ κ῅ληλ ἐγείξεη), but love hates the three 
of them (ἀγάπε δὲ ηὰ ηξίʱ κηζεη). If you have a firm foundation in love, pay more 
attention to this than to the person who trips you up (἖η πʱγίʱλ ἔρεηο ἐλ ηῆ ἀγάπῃ 
ηὴλ βάζηλ, κᾶιινλ πξόζερε ηʱύηῃ, ἢπεξ ηῶ πηʱίνληί ζε) .
236 
 
As this description makes clear, the thumos is the source not only of the virtues relating 
to aggression, such as anger towards the demons and courage in the face of demonic 
attack, but of the virtues opposed to it, for example patience, perseverance, gentleness 
and mildness; it is, accordingly, the psychic locus of restraint, tolerance and empathy as 
well as of combativeness. 
 
It will have been noticed that this passage appears to assign love in the sense of agapē 
to  the  thumos,
237  whereas  Praktikos  89  assigned  it  to  the  epithumētikon.  The  latter 
would appear to be the exception. To begin with, Praktikos 38, although not explicitly 
assigning it to the thumos, is most naturally read as doing so: 
                                                 
234 Cf. Gen. 3:15. 
235 Cf. I Cor. 13:3-7. 
236 Eul. 11.10. 
237 At Eul. 13.12 agapē is again linked with perseverance and patience.  
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Ὑπὸ η῵λ ʱἰζζήζεσλ πέθπθε θηλεỖζζʱη ηὰ πάζε· θʱὶ πʱξνύζεο κὲλ ἀγάπεο θʱὶ 
ἐγθξʱηείʱο  νὐ  θηλεζήζεηʱη,  ἀπνύζεο  δὲ  θηλεζήζεηʱη·  πιεηόλσλ  δὲ  πʱξὰ  ηὴλ 
ἐπηζπκίʱλ ὁ ζπκὸο δεỖηʱη θʱξκάθσλ, θʱὶ δηὰ ηνῦην κεγάιε ιέγεηʱη ἟ ἀγάπε ὅηη 
ρʱιηλόο ἐζηη ηνῦ ζπκνῦ.
238 
 
The pathē are naturally set in motion by the senses. When love and self-control 
are present they will not be set in motion; when they are absent, they will be set 
in motion. The thumos requires more remedies than the epithumētikon, and for 
this reason love is said to be great, for it is the bridle of anger.  
 
The Kephalaia Gnostika also implies the derivation of agapē from the thumos: 
 
Knowledge and ignorance are united in the nous, while epithumia is receptive of 
self-control and luxury and love and hate normally occur to thumos.
239 
 
Knowledge heals the nous, love thumos and chastity epithumia.
240 
 
We have, then, one explicit assignment of  agapē to the epithumētikon (Praktikos 89); 
one very strongly implied assignment of it to the thumos (Eulogios 11.10), and three 
strongly implied assignments of it to the thumos, one of which is in the Praktikos. It is 
difficult to know what to make of this apparent inconsistency, but it seems clear that for 
the most part Evagrius associates agapē with the thumos rather than the epithumētikon, 
as would make sense given that agapē does not involve desire.
241 
 
Conversely, there can be no doubt that erôs in its spiritual as well as its physical sense 
derives, like desire in general, from the epithumētikon. Erôs is not a word Evagrius uses 
often: whereas agapē and its cognates occur one hundred and four times in his Greek 
corpus, erôs occurs only seven times. Of these, two, both in the Eulogios, are negative 
in tone. In one, Evagrius speaks of the person who has a desire (ὄξεμηο) for, and is in 
                                                 
238 Prakt. 1-5. 
239 KG 1.84. My assumption that the love in question here is agapē is based upon Frankenberg‘s Greek 
retroversion of the Syriac manuscript S1. 
240 KG 3.35. In this case a Greek fragment survives that confirms the use of agapē.  
241 Were it not for this consideration, which seems to me decisive, Rfl. 37 - ‗Desire (epithumia) is a power 
of the soul that is destructive of anger‘ – could be taken as additional grounds for attributing agapē to the 
epithumētikon, given that agapē heals anger.  
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love with (ἐξ῵λ), honour.
242 In the other he declares that the person who slanders and 
the person who listens to slander are ‗in love with one another for the ruin of the heart‘ 
(ἐξ῵ζηλ ἀιιήισλ εἰο ιύκελ θʱξδίʱο).
243  
 
His other five positive uses of erôs are all in the Chapters on Prayer; the first two in the 
Prologue. Evagrius tells his correspondent:
244 
 
ζʱπκάδσ  δέ  ζε,  θʱὶ  ιίʱλ  δει῵  η῅ο  ἀξίζηεο  πξνζέζεσο  η῵λ  πεξὶ  πξνζεπρ῅ο 
ἐξ῵ληʱ θεθʱιʱίσλ. Οὐ γὰξ ἁπι῵ο ηνύησλ ἐξᾷο η῵λ ὑπὸ ρεηξ῵λ, θʱὶ ἐλ ράξηῃ δηὰ 
κέιʱλνο  ηὸ  εἶλʱη  ἐρόλησλ,  ἀιιὰ  η῵λ  ἐλ  λῶ  ἱδξπκέλσλ  δη’  ἀγάπεο  θʱὶ 
ἀκλεζηθʱθίʱο.
245  
 
I hold you in admiration and envy greatly your excellent intention expressed in 
your desire for the chapters on prayer. For you desire to have them not only in 
hand and in ink upon the page, but established in your nous through love and 
freedom from resentment. 
 
This shows how Evagrius distinguishes between erôs and agapē, and also exemplifies 
some of the virtues of the pathētikon part of the soul in action: desire – specifically 
characterised as loving – for the good, on the part of the epithumētikon; on that of the 
thumos, love and freedom from resentment. It is also a thumbnail sketch of the apathēs 
soul or nous, not only because the virtuous soul is apathēs by definition but because 
Evagrius acknowledges his correspondent as having not only received Leah – that is, 
completed the work of praktikē – but performed his seven years‘ further service for Ra-
chel, who for Evagrius symbolises the fruits of contemplation.
246  
 
The other three references to erôs are in the treatise itself: Evagrius speaks of the Holy 
Spirit urging the nous on to love for spiritual prayer (πξνηξεπόκελνλ [ηὸλ λνῦλ] εἰο 
ἔξσλ πλεπκʱηηθ῅ο πξνζεπρ῅ο),
247 and of the  person who loves (ἐξ῵λ) true prayer,
248 
and, at Prayer 52, expresses even more directly than in the Prologue the compatibility 
                                                 
242 Cf. Eul. 3.3. 
243 Eul. 16.16. 
244 Probably Rufinus; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 184). 
245 Pry. Prol. 23-27. 
246 Cf. Pry. Prol. 1-16; Gen. 29:20-30; Sinkewicz (2003: 184). 
247 Pry. 62, according to the text used by Sinkewicz (that of the Philokalia, supplemented by other manu-
scripts) and Stewart (2001: 192); Migne has ἔξγʱ instead of ἔξσλ. 
248 Pry. 64.  
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of spiritual erôs with apatheia, recalling Plato‘s definition of Eros as a daimôn who me-
diates between the divine and the human:
249 
 
Κʱηάζηʱζίο  ἐζηη  πξνζεπρ῅ο  ἕμηο  ἀπʱζὴο,  ἔξσηη  ἀθξνηάηῳ  εἰο  ὕςνο  λνεηὸλ 
ἁξπάδνπζʱ ηὸλ θηιόζνθνλ, θʱὶ πλεπκʱηηθὸλ λνῦλ.
250 
 
The state of prayer is an apathēs habit, which by means of a supreme love carries 
off to the intelligible height the nous which loves wisdom and is spiritual.  
 
Finally, it was noted above that although all three parts of the soul were in this sense 
latent in the pre-lapsarian nous, what became the thumos and epithumêtikon only took 
that form as a result of it, and that Evagrius understands this as the nous renouncing the 
image of God and willingly becoming the image of animals‘,
251 and as the thumos and 
epithumētikon being ‗yoked‘ (ζπδεύμʱο) to the human person.
252 It is now possible to 
clarify how these two parts of the soul can be aspects of the fallen  nous and so, ulti-
mately, of the image of God, and at the same time ‗powers that we and the beasts have 
in common‘ that ‗belong to corporeal nature‘ and therefore were evidently not ‗created 
with  the  rational  nature  before  the  movement.‘
253  In  the  soul  of  the  praktikos,  the 
epithumētikon ‗longs for virtue‘, the thumos ‗struggles on the soul‘s behalf‘ and the lo-
gistikon ‗perceives the contemplation of beings‘
254 (this state of affairs being constitu-
tive of apatheia), while Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73 describes the soul of the contempla-
tive as that in which the nous ‗always attends to the Lord‘, the thumos is ‗full of humil-
ity following the memory of God‘ and epithumia is ‗completely oriented toward the 
Lord.‘ Thus there is a progression in the unity of function among the three parts of the 
soul from the level of the praktikos to that of the contemplative. In the unified nous vir-
tue will itself be unitary: 
 
κίʱλ κὲλ εἶλʱη ηῆ θύζεη ηὴλ ὰξεηήλ, εἰδνπνηεỖζζʱη δὲ ʱὐηὴλ ἐλ ηʱỖο δπλάκεζη η῅ο 
ςπρ῅ο·  θʱὶ  γὰξ  ηὸ  θ῵ο  ηὼ  ἟ιηʱθὸλ  ἀζρεκάηηζηνλ  κέλ  ἐζηη…ηʱỖο  δἐ  δη’  ὧλ 
εἰζβάιιεη ζπξίζη ζπζρεκʱηίδεζζʱη πέθπθελ.
255 
                                                 
249 Cf. Symp. 202d ff. 
250 Pry. 52. 
251 See above, 1.1.2. 
252 Cf. Th. 17.4; see above, 1.1.2. 
253 Cf. KG 6.85. 
254 Cf. Prakt. 86. 
255 Prakt. 98.7-10.  
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Virtue is by nature unitary, but it takes specific forms in the powers of the soul, 
for the light of the sun…is without form but naturally takes the form of the win-
dows through which it enters. 
 
Nonetheless, that which becomes the thumos will contain the seeds of ‗humility follow-
ing the memory of God‘ and ‗struggling on the soul‘s behalf‘, and that which becomes 
the epithumētikon, the seeds of ‗complete orientation toward the Lord‘ and ‗longing for 
virtue‘.
256 These are the movements of these aspects of the soul toward God, but if they 
move away from him the longing for virtue becomes simply a longing for the suste-
nance, furtherance and pleasure of the entity experienced as isolated from  God and 
therefore unable to draw them from him. Likewise, the impetus to struggle on the soul‘s 
behalf becomes aggression in relation to other creatures of its kind.
257 These are ‗the 
powers that we and the beasts have in common‘ that, ‗belonging to corporeal nature‘, 
were not created with rational nature before the movement.‘ 
 
In sum, the logistikon is the locus of the soul‘s rational functions: on the one hand con-
templation, and on the other, the management of practical affairs so as to facilitate it. 
The thumos is the source of anger to be used against the demons and of the martial vir-
tues of courage and perseverance, as well virtues such as love, patience, gentleness, 
mildness and humility. The epithumêtikon is the source of desire, including spiritual 
erôs.  It is assigned control of the bodily appetites through the practical virtues of self-
control and chastity, and, in temperance, the preservation of apatheia in the face of ob-
jects that would otherwise move the soul to irrational fantasies and pathos. Insofar as 
the virtues are manifested, they indicate the presence of apatheia.
258 
 
 
1.2.3  The body 
 
The body is the most fallen, thickened part of the nous and in humans is constituted 
primarily of earth. The part of the soul most closely associated with it in humans is the 
epithumētikon, meaning that we experience the body above all as a source of desires. 
                                                 
256 Since according to KG 1.39 ‗we had the seeds of virtue [within us] when we were made‘. 
257 E.g. Eul. 11.10; see above, 1.2.2. 
258 Attainment of apatheia is gradual; see below, 3.4.  
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The epithumētikon is also the dominant part of our soul, meaning that we experience 
ourselves primarily as embodied, desiring beings. 
 
Despite Evagrius‘ belief that the body is a fallen condition of the nous, a condition that 
is not part of our true nature and will not survive the apokatastasis, he has a high esti-
mation of its value and is clear that it is not evil: 
 
Τῆ  πξʱθηηθῆ  ὑπόθεηληʱη  ὗιʱη  πξάγκʱηʱ  πέληε,  ζ῵κʱ,  ἄλζξσπνη,  βξώκʱηʱ, 
ρξήκʱηʱ,  θηήκʱηʱ·  πάλησλ  δὲ  ηηκηώηʱηνλ  ηὸ  ζ῵κʱ·  δηὸ  θʱὶ  νἱ  ηνύηνπ 
θʱηʱθξνλήζʱληεο κάξηπξεο εἰζηλ. Ἔιεγελ νὖλ ὅηη δηὰ ηνῦην ὁ δηάβνινο θʱὶ νἱ 
θʱη’  ʱὐηὸλ  ὑπνβάιινπζη  πνλεξνὺο  ινγηζκνὺο  ἟κỖλ  θʱὶ  θηλνῦζηλ  ἟κᾶο  πξὸο 
γʱζηξηκʱξγίʱλ θʱὶ πνξλείʱλ, ἵλʱ ἐλ ηῶ πξώηῳ θʱὶ ηηκησηάηῳ δνζέληη ἟κỖλ πʱξὰ 
ζενῦ κηʱλζ῵κελ.
259 
 
Five objects serve as the material substratum of praktikê: the body, men, food, 
riches, goods, but the body is the most precious of all; this is why those who have 
despised it are martyrs. [Evagrius] said that the devil and those under him sug-
gest evil thoughts to us and move us toward gluttony and fornication so that we 
might be defiled in the first and most precious of God‘s gifts to us. 
 
Whoever has become receptive of the knowledge of God [but] honours ignorance 
more than this knowledge – he is said to be evil. Now there is no corporeal nature 
receptive of knowledge. None of the bodies can, therefore, properly be said to be 
bad.
260 
 
The body plays an essential role in the healing of the  fallen nous. During this process 
the constitution of the body is progressively refined such that it becomes less ‗thick‘: 
 
Ὥζπεξ ηῶ πάζρνληη ὀθζʱικὸλ θʱηὰ θύζηλ ἐζηὶ ηὸ θνιιύξηνλ <κᾶιινλ> ἢπεξ ηῶ 
ὑγηʱίλνληη νὕησο ηῆ ςπρῆ θʱηὰ θύζηλ ἐζηὶ ηὸ ζ῵κʱ· ʱἱ δ' ἐλ ηῆ η῅ο κνλάδνο 
νὖζʱη ὑγείᾳ ηʱύηεο η῅ο ὑιώδνπο πʱρύηεηνο νὐ ρξείʱλ ἔρνπζηλ.
261 
 
Just as for someone who suffers in the eyes an eye-salve is more natural than for 
a healthy person, so the body is natural for the soul, but [the souls] who are in the 
health of unity have no need of this thick material. 
 
                                                 
259 Disc. 15. 
260 KG 3.53. 
261 Disc. 8.  
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The soul for which the body is ‗natural‘ is the fallen, fragmented soul: just as, on the 
cosmic scale, corporeal creation is the remedy for the Fall, so for each nous its body is 
the means by which it can, with God‘s help, remedy its spiritual sickness. ‗The souls in 
the health of unity‘ are those that have attained apatheia.  
 
The therapeutic utility of the body has three aspects. First the body is required for cer-
tain sorts of contemplation; a requirement that is, however, eventually transcended: 
 
It is necessary for the nous to be instructed concerning incorporeal [beings], con-
cerning bodies, or even simply to see objects: for there, indeed, is its life. But it 
will not see incorporeal [beings] if it be impure in its will, nor bodies, if it should 
be deprived of the organon that shows it sensible things. What, then, will they 
give to the dead soul for contemplation, those who despise the Creator and also 
malign our body here?
262 
 
It is not said to all, Flee from prison, my soul,
263 but to those empowered by pu-
rity of soul to give themselves over, apart from this body, to the contemplation of 
what has come to be.
264 
 
Second, the body can serve as a refuge from the demons: 
 
To those who blaspheme against the Creator and speak badly of this body of our 
soul, who will show the grace which they have received, although they are passi-
ble, in having been joined to such an organon? They bear witness in favour of 
my words, those who in the hallucinations of dreams are terrified by the demons 
and escape to wakefulness as though to the side of the angels when the body 
awakens suddenly.
265  
 
                                                 
262 KG 4.62. 
263 Ps. 141:8. 
264 KG 4.70. 
265 KG 4.60. Cf. KG 4.73: ‗One in whom the nous always attends to the Lord, in whom the thumikos is 
full of humility following the memory of God, and in whom epithumia is completely oriented toward the 
Lord – is it appropriate for him not to fear our adversaries who circle outside our bodies?‘ Also KG 4.82: 
‗The refuge (cf. Joshua 20:2-3) is the praktikê body of the passible soul, which delivers her from the de-
mons who surround her.‘   
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The ‗thickness‘ associated with corporeality can, then, work to our advantage by shield-
ing us from troubling spiritual phenomena.
266 Here we see in action the stabilising effect 
of corporeal creation: terror, as a pathos, is an unstable movement of the nous, while a 
return to awareness of the body gives a sense of restored stability.  
 
Related to the body‘s stabilising effect upon the nous is the third aspect of its therapeu-
tic utility, namely its role in healing the soul of pathos, a process to which it is funda-
mental:  
 
ἐθεỖλʱ κὲλ ηὸ πʱζεηηθὸλ κέξνο η῅ο ςπρ῅ο ζεξʱπεύνληʱ θʱὶ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο ἟κ῵λ 
εἰο ηὴλ ἐξγʱζίʱλ πξνζδεỖηʱη.
267 
 
Those things which heal the pathêtikon part of the soul require also our body to 
put them into practice. 
 
One who is passible and prays to quickly depart [the body] resembles a sick man 
who asks the carpenter to quickly break up his bed.
268 
 
The key to the therapeutic value of the body resides in the fact that pathos has a physio-
logical basis. At the beginning of the treatise addressed to him Evagrius enjoins the 
monk Eulogios as follows: 
 
ηῆ η῵λ ὑπεξηάησλ ιʱκπεδόλη ηὴλ λνεξὰλ νὐζίʱλ ἐθηξεθόκελνο, ηʱỖο ζπλʱγσγʱỖο 
η῵λ ινγηζκ῵λ ηὸλ ὄγθνλ η῵λ ζʱξθ῵λ ἀπόδπζʱη, εἰδὼο ὅηη ὕιε ζʱξθ῵λ ηξνθὴ 
ινγηζκ῵λ θʱζίζηʱηʱη.
269 
 
in nourishing your intelligible substance on the brilliance of the supreme reali-
ties, strip off the weight of the flesh by collecting your logismoi, for you know 
that the matter of the flesh constitutes the nourishment of logismoi.
270 
 
When Evagrius speaks of ‗stripping off the weight of the flesh‘ he will expect Eulogios 
to think of Paul‘s reference at Col. 3:9 to ‗stripping off (ἀπεθδπζάκελνη) the old self 
                                                 
266 It is however abundantly clear from elsewhere in Evagrius‘ writings - most obviously the fifth chapter 
of the Antirrhētikos with its catalogue of physical traumas inflicted by the demons – that this is not al-
ways the case. 
267 Prakt. 49.3-5. 
268 KG 4.76. 
269 Eul. 1.1. 
270 Evagrius‘ understanding of the logismoi is discussed in section 2.1 below.  
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with its practices‘, and at 1 Cor. 15: 43-4 to the sôma psuchikon which, sown in dishon-
our and weakness, is raised in glory and power.
271 The idea of ‗stripping off the weight 
of the flesh‘ also evokes the athlete who strips before a contest in order not to be ‗hin-
dered by his tunic and easily dragged about‘;
272 the ‗contest‘ here being that of praktikē 
itself -  the contest against the demons and the  logismoi. But the importance of this 
‗stripping off‘ does not reside merely in its metaphorical associations; when Evagrius 
says that the ‗matter of the flesh constitutes the nourishment of the logismoi‘ he means 
it literally. Peter Brown explains: 
 
The ascetics of late antiquity tended to view the human body as an ‘autarkic’ sys-
tem. In ideal conditions, it was thought capable of running on its own ‘heat’; it 
would need only enough nourishment to keep that heat alive. In its ‘natural’ state 
– a state with which the ascetics tended to identify the bodies of Adam and Eve – 
the body had acted like a finely tuned engine, capable of ‘idling’ indefinitely. It 
was only the twisted will of fallen men that had crammed the body with unneces-
sary food, thereby generating in it the dire surplus of energy that showed itself in 
physical appetite, in anger, and in the sexual urge. In reducing the intake to 
which he had become accustomed, the ascetic slowly remade his body...Its dras-
tic physical changes, after years of ascetic discipline, registered with satisfying 
precision the essential, preliminary stages of the long return of the human person, 
body and soul together, to an original, natural and uncorrupted state.
273 
 
This, I believe, accurately describes Evagrius’ understanding of the body and its relation 
to pathos. Consider first the following: 
 
Μέηξνλ ʱὔηʱξθεο ἐπιήξσζελ ἀγγεỖνλ, γʱζηὴξ δὲ ῥεγλπκέλε νὐ ιέγεη, ἈξθεỖ.
274 
 
A sufficient measure fills a vessel; a full stomach
275 does not say ‘Enough!’ 
 
This assumes that the appetite for food, expressed through the body but deriving from 
the epithumêtikon, is inherently insatiable.
276 But this can only be true of the unhealthy 
                                                 
271 See below, 3.2, 3. 
272 Th. 6.28-9. 
273 Brown (1988: 223). 
274 8Th. 1.28. 
275 Sinkewicz (2003: 244, n.15) notes that some manuscripts read ‗a bursting stomach‘. 
276 The idea that the epithumêtikon is inherently insatiable can be traced at least to the Myth of the Water-
carriers in Plato‘s Gorgias (493a2-c3), where Socrates, in recounting the Myth, refers to ‗the part of the 
soul where the appetites are‘ (ηνῦην η῅ο ςπρ῅ο νὗ ʱἱ ἐπηζπκίʱη εἰζί) as ‗intemperate and insatiable‘  
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epithumêtikon since when the epithumētikon acts according to nature it longs for vir-
tue
277 and is characterised by temperance and self-control.
278 And if the appetites of the 
healthy epithumêtikon are not insatiable, it must follow that the body associated with it 
is ‗filled by a sufficient measure.‘ This does not yet tell us that such a body would func-
tion as an ‗autarkic system‘. But now consider the following: 
 
Ξύιʱ πνιιὰ κεγάιελ ἐγείξεη θιόγʱ, πι῅ζνο δὲ βξσκάησλ ηξέθεη ἐπηζπκίʱλ.
279 
 
A lot of wood raises a large flame; an abundance of food nourishes epithumia. 
 
ʦιὸμ  ἀκʱπξνῦηʱη  ἐπηιεηπνύζεο  ὕιεο,  θʱὶ  βξσκάησλ  ἔλδεηʱ  κʱξʱίλεη 
ἐπηζπκίʱλ.
280 
 
A flame grows dim when matter is wanting; a lack of food extingu ishes epithu-
mia. 
 
἖ὰλ δῶο ζεʱπηὸλ ἐπηζπκίᾳ βξσκάησλ, νὐδὲλ ἀξθέζεη πξὸο ηὸ πιεξ῵ζʱη ηὴλ 
἟δνλήλ· πῦξ γάξ ἐζηηλ ἐπηζπκίʱ βξσκάησλ, ἀεὶ δερνκέλε, θʱὶ ἀεὶ θιεγνκέλε.
281 
 
If you give yourself over to the  epithumia for food, nothing will ever suffice to 
fulfil your pleasure, for the epithumia for food is a fire that ever takes in and is 
ever in flames. 
 
ΜʱξʱλζεỖζʱ  θιὸμ  ἀλʱιάκπεη  ἐπηιʱβνκέλε  θξπγάλσλ,  θʱὶ  ἟δνλὴ  ζβεζζεỖζʱ 
ἀλʱδσππξνῦηʱη ἐλ θόξῳ βξσκάησλ.
282 
 
                                                                                                                                               
(ἀθόιʱζηνλ ... θʱὶ νὐ ζηεγʱλόλ). It is generally accepted that the Gorgias predates the Republic, meaning  
that ‗the part of the soul where the appetites are‘ anticipates, rather than equates with, the epithumêtikon 
of the tripartite soul.  According to the Myth, in foolish people this part of the soul is like a leaking jar 
because it can‘t be filled; however, because the Myth states that it is intemperate and insatiable in non-
foolish as well as foolish people, the implication is that the leakiness derives not from its insatiability but 
from the attempts of the foolish to fill it. Plato has Socrates say that he was told the story by ‗a subtle 
man, perhaps some Sicilian or Italian‘; Dodds (1959: 296-8) provides a detailed discussion of the exten-
sive scholarship devoted to both the source of this myth and its original meaning. Cf. also Rep. 442a6-7 
where, having declared the epithumêtikon to form the greater part of the human soul (see above, n.100), 
Plato adds that it is naturally insatiable  (θύζεη ἀπιεζηόηʱηνλ). 
277 Cf. Prakt. 86.  
278 Cf. Prakt. 89.  
279 8Th. 1.5. 
280 8Th. 1.6. 
281 8Th. 1.27. Cf. also, e.g., 8Th. 1.4, 5, 6, 31, 33; Prakt. 15. 
282 8Th. 1.33.  
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An extinguished flame lights again if it is given firewood; and a pleasure that has 
been extinguished is rekindled in a satiety of food. 
 
Μὴ δῶο βξώκʱηʱ πνιιὰ ηῶ ζώκʱηί ζνπ, θʱὶ νὺ κὴ ἴδῃο θʱζ’ ὕπλνπο θʱληʱζίʱο 
θʱθάο.  ὃλ  ηξόπνλ  γὰξ  θιόμ  θʱηʱλʱιίζθεη  δξπκόλ,  νὕησ  θʱληʱζίʱο  ʱἰζρξὰο 
ζβέλλπζη πεỖλʱ.
283 
 
Do not give much food to your body and you will not see bad visions in your 
sleep. For in the way that a flame destroys a forest so does hunger quench shame-
ful visions. 
 
The above compare epithumia to fire. Evagrius also uses metaphors of fire to describe 
sexual arousal, most notably at Eulogios 21.22 and 13.12.
284 I think these comparisons 
are significant. The final chapter of Gregory of Nyssa‘s De opificio hominis is devoted 
to a discussion of human physiology which appears to assume autarky as the ideal state 
of the body. Intended as a sequel to the Hexaëmeron of Basil of Caesarea,
285 it was 
probably written in the period following Basil‘s death in 373.
286 Given Evagrius‘ inter-
est in medical theory he might well have read it,
287 and in any case there is no reason to 
suppose that the view it expresses would have been unusual among educated Christians 
of the time. It assumes the physiological theory whereby the element of fire in the form 
of the vital heat is one of the necessary constituents of life,
288 with its source in the 
heart.
289 As Gregory explains, ‗some nourishment must needs ... be provided by nature 
for the element of heat – for it is not possible that fire should last by itself, without be-
ing  nourished by  its proper food.‘
290  The  vital  heat  is nourished by blood from  the 
liver,
291 which in turn is nourished by the food a person eats.
292 He continues: 
 
                                                 
283 AM 11. Bob Sharples has pointed out to me that ζβέλλπκη is the vox propria for putting out a fire. 
284 Both quoted below, 2.2.4. 
285 Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, De Opf., introduction. 
286 Cf. Kannengiesser, at McGinn and Meyendorff (1986: 71). 
287 See above, 1.1.3, n.137. 
288 Cf. Aristotle, DA 416a10-14: ‗By some the element of fire is held to be the cause of nutrition and 
growth, for it alone of the bodies or elements is observed to feed and increase itself. Hence the suggestion 
that in both plants and animals it is it which is the operative force. A concurrent cause in a sense it cer-
tainly is, but not without the principal cause; that is rather the soul‘. Also Gregory of Nyssa, De Opf. 
30.11.  
289 Cf. De Opf. 30.17. 
290 De Opf. 30.12. Cf. Aristotle, GC 335a17-18. 
291 De Opf. 30.12. 
292 De Opf. 30.14.  
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Now the fiery element is naturally inclined to seek for the material which serves 
as fuel, and this necessarily happens with regard to the receptacle of nourish-
ment;  for  the  more  it  becomes  penetrated  by  fire  through  the  neighbouring 
warmth, the more it draws to itself what nourishes the heat. And this sort of im-
pulse we call appetite (ὄξεμηο). But if the organ which contains the food should 
obtain sufficient material, not even so does the activity of the fire become quies-
cent: but it produces a sort of melting of the material just as in a foundry, and, 
dissolving the solids, pours them out and transfers them, as it were from a funnel, 
to the neighbouring passages: then separating the coarser from the pure sub-
stance, it passes the fine part through certain channels to the entrance of the liver, 
and expels the sedimentary matter of the food to the wider passages of the bow-
els, and by turning it over in their manifold windings retains the food for a time 
in the intestines, lest if it were easily got rid of by a straight passage it might at 
once excite the animal again to appetite (πξὸο ὄξεμηλ), and man, like the race of 
irrational animals (θʱηὰ ηὴλ η῵λ ἀιόγσλ θύζηλ), might never cease from this sort 
of occupation.
293 
 
The fiery element within the body, then, shares the natural insatiability of its external 
counterpart, and since its need for fuel is what gives rise to appetite, it imparts its insa-
tiability to the latter. Like ordinary fire, physiological fire does not simply calm down 
when it has sufficient fuel. Instead, it continues to act upon the ingested food, separating 
the purer part of it from the coarser and sending the former to the liver to further sustain 
itself and the latter to the bowel for excretion. Consequently the presence of excrement 
is an indication that an excess of food has been ingested,
294 as are seminal emissions.
295 
Assuming, as I think we can, that Evagrius subscribes to something like this theory, to 
restrict one‘s intake of food is not only to train the epithumêtikon via the body but in 
addition to act directly on the body‘s vital heat, reducing the fuel available to the fire 
that burns in the heart and therefore reducing that fire and ipso facto winding down the 
various physiological and psychological functions that turn powers. Conversely, to al-
low one‘s eating to accord with appetite is to feed and so augment the fire that burns in 
                                                 
293 De Opf. 30.20-21. 
294 Brown (1988: 223, n.36) notes that ‗excrement was always linked with luxury: it was the clear meas-
ure of overeating – e.g. John Chrysostom, Hom. 13 in I Tim.‘ He also notes that Clement of Alexandria 
cites with approval Valentinus‘ assumption that since Christ‘s body was an a state of perfect equilibrium, 
he did not defecate (cf. Strom. 3.7.59); since we know that Evagrius read Clement, it is likely that he was 
familiar with this. 
295 Cf. Cassian, Conf. 2.23; see also Brakke (1995). In the case of women the aim of cessation of sexual 
function  connects with that of transcending female nature altogether in order to become a ‗female man of 
God‘; cf. HL 9.1. For a comprehensive treatment of the ascetic understanding of diet and sexuality see 
Shaw (1998). See also Cloke (1995); Elm (1994).  
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the heart since, like elemental fire, the more fuel that is added to it, the bigger it will get, 
the fiercer it will burn and so the more fuel it will in turn demand. Moreover, insatiabil-
ity is instability, so in virtue of their inherent insatiability the movement of both exter-
nal, ‗literal‘ fire and physiological fire is inherently unstable. Because of the insatiabil-
ity of physiological fire, to eat in accordance with appetite will necessarily result in an 
excess of vital heat, a surplus over and above what is needed to maintain the body‘s vi-
tal functions. That surplus of the unstable physiological element of fire will in turn ex-
press itself as the unstable movement of the soul that is pathos, hence 
 
὇ θξʱη῵λ γʱζηξὸο, ἐιʱηηνỖ πάζε, ἟ηηώκελνο δὲ βξώκʱζηλ ʱὔμεη ηὰο ἟δνλάο.
296 
 
He who controls the stomach diminishes the pathē; he who is overcome by food 
gives increase to pleasures.
297 
 
It follows that the healthy epithumêtikon has as its correlate a body whose vital heat has 
been reduced to a level where there is no longer any excess over and above that needed 
to keep the body alive. Such a body will not be healthy in Hippocratic terms; on the 
contrary it will be weak and will look sickly: 
 
Μὴ  ἐιεήζῃο  ζ῵κʱ  ἀηνλίʱλ  ἀπνδπξόκελνλ,  κεδὲ  πηάλῃο  ʱὐηὸ  πνιπηειείᾳ 
βξσκάησλ· ἐὰλ γὰξ ἰζρύζῃ, ἐπʱλʱζηήζεηʱί ζνη, θʱὶ πόιεκνλ ἄζπνλδνλ θηλήζεη 
θʱηὰ ζνῦ, ἕσο ἂλ ʱἰρκʱισηεύζῃ ζὴλ ςπρὴλ, θʱὶ δνῦινλ πʱξʱδώζεη ζε ηῶ η῅ο 
πνξλείʱο πάζεη.
298 
 
                                                 
296 8Th. 1.2. 
297 Such a view was evidently common currency among the desert monks. Cf., e.g., The Bohairic Life of 
Pachomius, 89: ‗One day our father Pachomius…questioned Theodore on the faith of those who lived as 
anchorites in Alexandria, and about their ascesis. He replied, ―Thanks to your holy prayers, my lord fa-
ther, they are quite firm in the orthodox faith of the holy catholic Church of Christ…As regards their 
food, there are plenty of good things on their table, they eat and drink well, walking in accordance with 
what is written, These things God has provided for the faithful that they might partake of them with 
thanksgiving (1 Tim. 4:4).‖ Then our father Pachomius said, ―Is it possible for them to eat and drink 
without measure and for all that still keep their purity?‖ Theodore replied, ―In everything their purity is 
great, and their knowledge is a match for anyone.‖ Our father Pachomius had in his hand at the moment a 
small stick. He struck the ground with it twice, saying, ―If this ground is watered and if it is manured, will 
it not produce plants? It is the same with the body; if we gladden it with an abundance of dishes, of 
drinks, and of rest, it will not be possible for it to keep its purity. For, holy Scripture says, Those who are 
of Jesus the Christ have crucified their flesh with its passions and desires (cf. Gal. 5:24).‘ 
298 8Th. 1.34.  
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Do not pity a body that laments its debility, nor fatten it up with rich foods, for if 
it gains strength it will rebel against you and wage unrelenting war upon you, un-
til it takes your soul captive and delivers you as a slave to the pathos of fornica-
tion. 
 
Ἡ  νἰθηείξνπζʱ  πειηδλνπκέλνπο  ηνὺο  ὀθζʱικνὺο  θʱὶ  ηεθνκέλʱο  ηὰο  ζάξθʱο 
ʱὐη῅ο, νὐθ εὐθξʱλζήζεηʱη ἐπὶ ἀπʱζείᾳ ςπρ῅ο.
299 
 
She who pities her blackened eyes and languished flesh will not rejoice in 
apatheia of soul. 
 
On the other hand, the following suggests that Evagrius was not altogether reckless of 
physical health: 
 
Ἔιεγε  δὲ  ὁ  ἅγηνο  θʱὶ  πξʱθηηθώηʱηνο  ἟κ῵λ  δηδάζθʱινο·  νὕησ  δεỖ  ἀεὶ 
πʱξʱζθεπάδεζζʱη  ηὸλ  κνλʱρὸλ  ὡο  ʱὔξηνλ  ηεζλεμόκελνλ,  θʱὶ  νὕησ  πάιηλ  ηῶ 
ζώκʱηη θερξ῅ζζʱη ὡο ἐλ πνιινỖο ἔηεζη ζπδεζόκελνλ. Τὸ κὲλ γάξ, θεζί, ηνὺο η῅ο 
ἀθεδίʱο ινγηζκνὺο πεξηθόπηεη θʱὶ ζπνπδʱηόηεξνλ πʱξʱζθεπάδεη ηὸλ κνλʱρόλ· ηὸ 
δὲ ζ῵νλ δηʱθπιάηηεη ηὸ ζ῵κʱ θʱὶ ἴζελ ʱὐηνῦ ἀεὶ ζπληεξεỖ ηὴλ ἐγθξάηεηʱλ.
300 
 
Our saintly teacher
301 with his great experience in the practical life used to say: 
The monk must ever hold himself ready as though he were to die tomorrow, and 
in turn must treat the body as though he would have to live with it for many 
years. The first practice, he would say, cuts off the thoughts of acedia and makes 
the monk more zealous; the latter keeps the body healthy and always main tains 
its self-control in balance. 
 
What  I  suggest  is  that  he  recognised  two  indices  of  bodily  health,  one  profane,  as 
exemplified by medical science, and one spiritual.
302 While he would have believed that, 
as Dysinger notes, ‘medical science provides valuable metaphors and insights for phu-
sikê, the contemplation of God in nature’,
303 he would have believed that it failed in not 
addressing the insatiability that the epithumêtikon derives from the unchecked fire of the 
body and in valuing the apparent wellbeing of the body more than the health of the soul 
                                                 
299 AV 51. 
300 Prakt. 29. 
301 According to Guillaumont (1971: 566 ff), Makarios the Egyptian. 
302 This is a slightly different point from that of Dysinger (2005: 123, see above, n.272) in that where 
Dysinger imputes to Evagrius a distinction between physical health as understood from a Hippocratic 
perspective and the (spiritual) health of the whole person, I am suggesting that Evagrius equates the latter 
with true physical health as opposed to the Hippocratic doctors‘ false understanding of it. 
303 Dysinger (2005: 122).  
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and salvation of the nous. I say ‘apparent wellbeing’ because I think it unlikely that, 
given the value that Evagrius assigned to the body, he would have believed it to lack its 
own form of health, concomitant with that of the soul and nous. What is more probable 
is that he believed true physical health to be the state of the body that accompanies a 
healthy epithumêtikon. To have supposed otherwise would have been to suppose the 
health of the body to be based upon excess and also to be excluded from the health of the 
person as a whole, neither of which is plausible.
304 
 
As  proof  that  a  body  maintained  on  such  minimal  levels  of  vital  heat  could  be 
considered healthy in any meaningful sense, he would have had Athanasius’ description 
of Antony’s physical condition on emerging from twenty years’ solitude: 
 
἖θεỖλνη κὲλ νὖλ, ὡο εἶδνλ, ἐζʱύκʱδνλ ὁξ῵ληεο ʱὐηνῦ ηό ηε ζ῵κʱ ηὴλ ʱὐηὴλ ἕμηλ 
ἔρνλ, θʱὶ κήηε πηʱλζὲλ, ὡο ἀγύκλʱζηνλ, κήηε ἰζρλσζὲλ ὡο ἀπὸ λεζηεη῵λ θʱὶ 
κάρεο  δʱηκόλσλ·  ηνηνῦηνο  γὰξ  ἤλ,  νἶνλ  θʱὶ  πξὸ  η῅ο  ἀλʱρσξήζεσο  ᾔδεηζʱλ 
ʱὐηόλ.
305 
 
And they, when they saw him, wondered at the sight, for he had the same habit of 
body as before, and was neither fat, like a man without exercise, nor lean from 
fasting and striving with the demons, but he was just the same as they had known 
him before his retirement. 
 
Antony reputedly lived to be over a hundred.
306 Closer to home Evagrius had the exam-
ples of Makarios of Alexandria, his ‗instructor in asceticism‘,
307 who became a centenar-
ian
308 ‗eating his bread by weight‘ and ‗drinking his water by measure‘,
309 and Makarios 
the Egyptian, his ‗spiritual father‘,
310 who lived to around ninety.
311 There would have 
been others too among the ‗old men‘ whose constitutions enabled them to live long lives 
of extreme physical privation. So Evagrius would have had ample reason to believe that 
                                                 
304 Thus it is the profane understanding of physical health that Evagrius has in mind when he says, at 8Th. 
6.1, that ‗what is food to a well-conditioned body constitutes a temptation for the noble soul (ὅπεξ γάξ 
ἐζηη ηξνθὴ εὐεθηνῦληη ζώκʱηη, ηνῦηό ἐζηη πεηξʱζκὸο γελλʱίᾳ ςπρ῅). 
305 VA 14. 
306 From c.251-356; cf. Chitty (1977: 208-9). 
307 Cf. O‘Laughlin (1987: 51). 
308 Cf. Chitty (1977: 208-10). 
309 Cf. Prakt. 94, quoted below, this section, at  n.328. 
310 Cf. O‘Laughlin (1987: 51). 
311 Chitty (1977: 208-10) gives his dates as c.300-c.390.  
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in principle a healthy soul would find expression in a body that was truly healthy be-
cause its health depended on that of the soul:  
 
The body ascends from its nature through the health and strength of the soul.
312 
 
To live according to the nature of the body would mean enslavement to its unending ap-
petite for food, in reality the insatiable demand of the vital heat for fuel. But if, through 
the health of the soul in desiring virtue  and its strength in struggling to attain it,
313 the 
vital heat were to be regulated, the body would be raised above its own nature
314 to the 
acquisition of a health derivative from that of the soul. Only this would truly constitute 
its health, not that apparent physical health which, taking its lead from the nature of the 
body, would be predicated upon excess and enslavement to insatiability.
315 Moreover, I 
suspect that for Evagrius the restoration of the body, by means of dietary discipline, to 
‗an original, natural and uncorrupted state’
316 would involve the alteration of its krasis, 
such that, as the epithumētikon was brought under control and its fire cooled, the amount 
of the ‘thick’ earthy element in the body would be reduced, and the monk’s increasing 
practice of contemplation would be reflected in an increasingly rarefied physical consti-
tution;
317 Rubenson notes that Antony, ‘like Origen…thought of ascesis as a matter of 
refining and transforming the body, ultimately making it less material and more spiri-
                                                 
312 Gt.Let. 49. 
313 Cf. Prakt. 86. 
314 Cf. Gt.Let. 47. 
315 Thus I believe that Dysinger (2005: 122-3) is only partly correct when he rejects the possibility that 
Evagrius believed the physical changes wrought by rigorous asceticism to have been anything but de-
structive. While it is true that Evagrius does not claim that the demons who suggest worries such as those 
described at Praktikos 7 ‗are presenting a false picture‘; that ‗he vividly anticipates the recriminations 
which will naturally result when the devout monk compares his own physical state with that which Hip-
pocratic medicine considered to be ‚in accordance with nature‛ ;‘ that he ‗was aware of scepticism con-
cerning the physiological effects of vigorous asceticism, and that he does not claim that the respective 
philosophies of medicine and monastic ascesis are wholly compatible‘, I believe that he recognised an 
alternative, spiritual index of bodily health whose exemplars were men such as Antony and his own 
teachers in the desert, Makarios the Alexandrian and Makarios the Egyptian. Therefore, while Dysinger is 
correct to say that ‗it is not hippocratic theory which guides the monastic superior or the gnostikos’, it 
does not follow that there is a conflict between ‘physical healing ...and the restoration of the whole person 
to union with God’, only between a profane understanding (and so our understanding!) of physical heal-
ing and such restoration. Although the body is eventually superseded, it is not in the meantime excluded 
from the person’s health. 
316 Cf. Brown (1988: 223), quoted above. 
317 That is, a krasis beginning to resemble that of the angels‘ bodies of nous and fire; see above, 1.1.2.  
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tual’,
318 so it is highly likely that Evagrius shared this view and would have seen it as 
entailing transformation of bodily krasis. 
 
The fact that physical health would be achievable only through the acquisition of virtue 
would mean that any temptation to seek it by means of a direct focus upon the body 
would be clearly identifiable as demonic. Evagrius would have realised that this sort of 
physical health was not achievable by everyone, but would have attributed this to the 
intrinsic weakness of the body, a weakness deriving from its being the most fallen aspect 
of the person:  
 
ἐθεỖλʱ κὲλ ηὸ πʱζεηηθὸλ κέξνο η῅ο ςπρ῅ο ζεξʱπεύνληʱ...ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο ἟κ῵λ εἰο 
ηὴλ  ἐξγʱζίʱλ  πξνζδεỖηʱη,  ὅπεξ  δη’  νἰθείʱλ  ἀζζέλεηʱλ  πξὸο  ηνὺο  πόλνπο  νὐθ 
ἐπʱξθεỖ·
319 
 
Those things which heal the pathêtikon part of the soul require...the body to put 
them into practice, and the latter because of its weakness is not sufficient for 
these labours.
320 
 
Consider now the following: 
 
Οἱ ηὴλ ζάξθʱ θʱθ῵ο δηʱηξέθνληεο θʱὶ πξόλνηʱλ ʱὐη῅ο εἰο ἐπηζπκίʱο πνηνύκελνη, 
ἑʱπηνὺο κὴ ηʱύηελ θʱηʱκεκθέζζσζʱλ· ἴζʱζη γὰξ ηὴλ ράξηλ ηνῦ Γεκηνπξγνῦ νἱ 
ηὴλ η῅ο ςπρ῅ο ἀπάζεηʱλ δηὰ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο ηνύηνπ θηεζάκελνη θʱὶ ηῆ η῵λ ὄλησλ 
ζεσξίᾳ πνζ῵ο ἐπηβάιινληεο.
321 
 
Those who in their wickedness nourish the flesh and ‘make provision for it to 
gratify its desires’
322 – let them blame themselves and not the flesh.  For they 
know the grace of the Creator, those who have attained  apatheia of the soul 
through this body and apply themselves to some extent to the contemplation of 
beings. 
 
It can now be seen that the injunction against ‗nourishing the flesh‘ is not simply making 
a metaphorical point about valuing the body more than the soul. Rather, it is talking spe-
                                                 
318 Rubenson (1995: 71). 
319 Prakt. 49.3-6. 
320 On the weakness of the body, cf. Th. 35.9-10. 
321 Prakt. 53. 
322 Rom. 13:14.  
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cifically about allowing an excess of vital heat to obtain in the body. It suggests that do-
ing so results not just in a susceptibility to pathos but in a body that is nourished accord-
ing to a profane understanding, that is nourished beyond the level required to keep it 
alive; the sort of body, in other words, considered healthy by profane medicine. Putting 
these together, the implication is that a body which in virtue of its nourishment is con-
sidered healthy by profane medicine is, from a spiritual viewpoint, unhealthy because of 
its susceptibility to pathos. Likewise, the force of the injunction against ‗making provi-
sion for [the flesh] to gratify its desires‘ can now be appreciated. The desire of the flesh 
for food is dictated by the natural insatiability of the vital heat, while its other desires are 
expressions of the excess of vital heat that results from eating in accordance with that 
desire. So to ‗make provision for it to satisfy its desires‘ is to embroil oneself in the fu-
tile endeavour to satisfy the insatiable.
323 It is also to seek the health of the body via the 
body rather than via the true source of physical health, the soul, and as such a fundamen-
tally flawed undertaking; the quest for an illusion  - the apparent health of the body  – 
whose pursuit, again, leads only to the futile bid to satisfy the insatiable. On the other 
hand, the body has a key role to play in the attainment of apatheia because to reduce the 
vital heat to the level at which there is no excess to find expression in pathos is to estab-
lish a physical foundation for apatheia. This will be reflected in the epithumêtikon‘s no 
longer being directed toward the objects of pathos but instead ‗completely oriented to-
ward the Lord‘.
324 
 
The disciplining of the epithumêtikon via the body therefore constitutes the first stage of 
praktikê and the foundation for all subsequent spiritual progress, hence Evagrius‘ refer-
ence to the human body as a praktikê body.
325 This has significant consequences for 
Evagrius‘ view of how the body should be treated: 
 
὇ δνπιʱγσγ῵λ ζάξθʱο ʱὐηνῦ ἀπʱζὴο ἔζηʱη, ὁ δὲ ἐθηξέθσλ ʱὐηὰο ὀδπλεζήζεηʱη 
ἐπ’ ʱὐηʱỖο.
326 
 
                                                 
323 And thereby emulate the foolish people in the Myth of the Watercarriers, whose attempts to satisfy the 
insatiable causes ‗the part of the soul where the appetite are ... the intemperate and insatiable of it‘ (Gorg. 
493b1-2) to resemble a leaky jar; see above, n.276.  
324 KG 4.73. 
325 Cf. KG 3.50; Sch. Ps. 1:5. 
326 AM 6.  
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The one who enslaves his flesh, apathês shall he be; the one who feeds it, on ac-
count of it will he be pained.  
 
Ἵππνο εὐήληνο, ἐλδεὲο ζ῵κʱ, θʱὶ νὐ κὴ θʱηʱβʱιεỖ ηὸλ ἀλʱβάηελ πνηὲ, ὁ κὲλ γὰξ 
εἴθεη ἀγρόκελνο ρʱιηλῶ, θʱὶ ηῆ ρεηξὶ πείζεηʱη ηνῦ ἟ληόρνπ, ζ῵κʱ δὲ δʱκάδεηʱη ἐλ 
ιηκῶ,  θʱὶ  ἀγξππλίᾳ,  θʱὶ  νὐθ  ἀπνζθηξηᾷ  ηνῦ  ἐπηβʱηνῦληνο  ινγηζκνῦ,  νὐδὲ 
ρξεκεηίζεη θηλνύλελνλ ὑπὸ ὁξκ῅ο ἐκπʱζνῦο.
327  
 
A docile horse, lean in body, never throws its rider, for being throttled it yields to 
the bit and obeys the hand of the one holding the reins; the body is subdued with 
hunger and vigil and does not jump when a logismos mounts upon it, nor does it 
snort when it is moved by an empathês impulse.
  
 
Our relationship to the body, then, should be that of a master to his slave or a rider to his 
horse, and the body itself can be likened to a horse: in its undisciplined state it is 
volatile, turbulent, unyielding and disobedient. On the other hand, the disciplined body 
is  like  a  well-trained  horse:  docile,  yielding  and  obedient.  Such  a  body,  lean  and 
subdued, is not easily aroused to pathos. Whether or not Evagrius was familiar with the 
simile of the Charioteer in Plato’s Phaedrus, his description of the disciplined body and 
implied description of the undisciplined one certainly bear some resemblance to  its 
descriptions of the good and bad horses,
328 and although he warns of the dangers of 
excessive  asceticism,
329  his  ‘moderate’  asceticism  was  not  far,  in  its  physical 
depredations, from the treatment meted out by Plato’s charioteer to the bad horse. In the 
Praktikos he relates the following anecdote: 
 
Πʱξέβʱινλ θʱη’ ʱὐηὴλ ηὴλ ζηʱζεξὰλ κεζεκβξίʱλ ηῶ ἁγίῳ πʱηξὶ Μʱθʱξίῳ θʱὶ 
ιίʱλ ὑπὸ η῅ο δίςεο θιεγόκελνο  ᾔηνπλ  ὕδσξ  πηεỖλ· ὁ δέ θεζηλ· ἀξθέζζεηη ηῆ 
ζθηᾷ· πνιινὶ γὰξ  λῦλ ὁδνηπνξνῦληεο ἠ πιένληεο θʱὶ ηʱύηεο ἐζηέξεληʱη. Δἶηʱ 
ιόγνπο κνπ πξὸο ʱὐηὸλ πεξὶ ἐγθξʱηείʱο γπκλάδνληεο· ζάξζεη, θεζίλ, ὦ ηέθλνλ, 
ἐλ ὅινηο ἔηεζηλ εἴθνζη νὔηε ἄξηνπ, νὔηε ὕδʱηνο, νὔηε ὕπλνπ θόξνλ εἴιεθʱ· ηὸλ 
κὲλ γὰξ ἄξηνλ κνπ ἢζζηνλ ζηʱζκῶ, ηὸ δὲ ὕδσξ ἔπηλνλ κέηξῳ, ηνỖο ηνίρνηο δὲ 
ἐκʱπηὸλ πʱξʱθιίλσλ κηθξόλ ηη ηνῦ ὕπλνπ κέξνο ἀθήξπʱδνλ.
330 
 
                                                 
327 8Th. 1.35. 
328 Cf. Phdr. 253d1 ff. 
329 Cf., e.g., Prakt. 15, 29; Th. 35. 
330 Prakt. 94.  
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I went to visit the holy father Makarios
331 at full midday and I asked for water to 
drink because I was burning with extrem e thirst. But he said: Be satisfied with 
the shade, for many are at this moment travelling or sailing and are without even 
this. Then as I was discoursing with  him about  self-control  he said: Take 
courage, my child! For all of twenty years I have not taken my fill of either bread 
or water or sleep. I ate my bread by weight, drank water by measure, and I have 
snatched some little portion of sleep by leaning against the wall.  
 
Such a regime accustomed the body to minimal  levels of food, water and sleep, and 
thereby enforced continence upon the epithumêtikon: 
 
὇πελίθʱ  δηʱθόξσλ  βξσκάησλ  ἐθίεηʱη  ἟κ῵λ  ἟  ςπρή,  ηὸ  ηεληθʱῦηʱ  ἐλ  ἄξηῳ 
ζηελνύζζσ θʱὶ ὕδʱηη ἵλ’ εὐράξηζηνο γέλεηʱη θʱὶ ἐπ’ ʱὐηῶ ςηιῶ ηῶ ςσκῶ· θόξνο 
γὰξ πνηθίισλ ἐδεζκάησλ ἐπηζπκεỖ, ιηκὸο δὲ ηὸλ θόξνλ ηνῦ ἄξηνπ κʱθʱξηόηεηʱ 
εἶλʱη λνκίδεη.
332 
 
When our soul yearns for a variety of foods, then let it reduce its ration of bread 
and water that it may be grateful for even a small morsel. For satiety desires 
foods of all sorts, while hunger thinks of satiety of bread as beautitude. 
 
The body was to be maintained on a frugal and measly diet ( ηξνθ῵λ βξʱρέσλ ἀληέρνπ 
θʱὶ εὐθʱηʱθξνλήησλ)
333 punctuated by fasts in order to kill the ‘pleasure of epithumia’ 
(἟δνλὴλ ἐπηζπκίʱο).
334 Evagrius’ own adherence to this advice probably shortened his 
life considerably. Palladius quotes him as follows: 
 
Ἀθ’ νὗ θʱηέιʱβνλ ηὴλ ἔξεκνλ νὐ ζξηδʱθίνπ ἟ςάκελ, νὐρ ἑηέξνπ ιʱράλνπ ηηλὸο 
ρισξνῦ, νὐθ ὀπώξʱο, νὐ ζηʱθπι῅ο, νὐ θξε῵λ.
335 
 
From the time that I took to the desert, I have not touched lettuce nor any other 
green vegetable, nor any fruit, nor grapes, nor meat.
336  
 
The History continues: 
 
                                                 
331 Probably Makarios of Alexandria, Priest at Kellia; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 261, n.96); Guillaumont 
(1970: 699-700). 
332 Prakt. 16. 
333 Found. 3. 
334 8Th. 1.31. 
335 HL 38.12. 
336 Trans. Lowther Clarke.  
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἖ο ὕζηεξνλ δὲ ηῶ ἑμθʱηδεθάηῳ ἔηεη η῅ο πνιηηείʱο η῅ο ἄλεπ ἑςήκʱηνο, ρξείʱλ 
ἐρνύζεο ʱὐηνῦ η῅ο ζʱξθὸο δηὰ ηὴλ ἀζζέλεηʱλ ηνῦ ζηνκάρνπ ηνῦ κεηʱιʱκβάβεηλ 
δηὰ ππξόο, ἄξηνπ κὲλ ἣςʱην νὐθεηη, ιʱράλσλ δὲ κεηʱιʱκβάλσλ ἠ πηηζάλεο ἠ 
ὀζπξηδίσλ ἐπὶ δύν ἔηε ἐλ ʱὐηνỖο ηειεπηᾷ, θνηλσλήζʱο εἰο ηὰ ἖πηθάληʱ εἰο ηὴλ 
ἐθθιεζίʱλ.  ἈθεγεỖην  νὖλ  [἟κỖλ]  πεξὶ  ηὸλ  ζάλʱηνλ  ὅηη  «Τξίηνλ  ἔηνο  ἔρσ  κὴ 
ὀρινύκελνο ὑπὸ ἐπηζπκίʱο ζʱξθηθ῅ο, κεηὰ ηνζνῦηνλ βίνλ θʱὶ θόπνλ θʱὶ πόλνλ 
θʱὶ πξνζεπρὴλ ἀδηάιεηπηνλ».
337 
 
And later, in the sixteenth year of his life without cooked food, his flesh felt a 
need, owing to the weakness of the stomach, to partake of (something that had 
been) on the fire; he did not however take bread even now, but having fed on 
herbs or gruel or pulse for two years, in this regime he died, after communicating 
in church at Epiphany. Shortly before his death he told us:
338 ‗For three years I 
have not been troubled by fleshly desire, after so long a life and toil and labour 
and ceaseless prayer.‘
339  
 
This discussion of the body can now be summarised as follows: for Evagrius the purpose 
of the human body is to be devoted to asceticism, hence he refers to it as a praktikê 
body. It is like a horse that must be ‗subdued with hunger and vigil‘ to render it docile. 
The root physiological cause of the unruliness which otherwise characterises it is the in-
herent insatiability of the element of fire, which in the form of the vital heat continues to 
seek fuel even when it has sufficient to keep the body alive. It is this continual, insatiable 
quest of the vital heat to augment itself that we experience as the appetite for food over 
and above what is necessary to the body‘s survival. The excess of vital heat that results 
from gratifying that appetite finds expression in the unstable movements of the soul that 
are the pathē, movements whose instability reflect that of fire itself. True physical health 
derives from a healthy soul and is characterised by the body‘s having no excess of vital 
heat. Thus the first step toward healing the soul of pathos is to resist succumbing to the 
body‘s appetite for food, instead restricting intake of food to the amount needed to main-
tain the vital heat at the level necessary to keep the body alive. The consequence of this 
understanding of the body is that any appetite for food over and above this subsistence 
level counts as pathos. Concomitantly, apatheia will include freedom from any such ap-
petite. 
 
                                                 
337 HL 38.13. 
338 Lowther Clarke notes that Palladius was present at Evagrius’ death, at Kellia in 399 or 400, and that 
while there are variants to the text at this point, ἟κỖλ is ‘reasonably well attested’. 
339 Trans. Lowther Clarke.  
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1.2.4  The heart 
 
Another anthropological term of which Evagrius makes frequent use is ‗heart‘.
340  The 
meaning of this term, both in general and in Evagrius, is much harder to pin down than 
that of either nous or ‗soul‘. Evagrius defines it in two places. Commenting on Prov. 
25:26, he includes ‗heart‘ among the ‘many names that Scripture applies to the soul and 
her noēmata‘ (πνιιὰ...ὀλόκʱηʱ ηίζεζηλ ἟ γξʱθὴ θʱηά ηε η῅ο ςπρ῅ο θʱὶ η῵λ λνεκάησλ 
ʱὐη῅ο),
341 and commenting on Ps. 15:9 he notes that ‗it is a habit of the divine Scripture 
to say ―heart‖ in place of nous‘ (ἔζνο γὰξ ηῆ ζείᾳ ʓξʱθῆ ἀληὶ ηνῦ λνῦ ηὴλ θʱξδίʱλ 
ιʱκβάλεηλ).
342 The fact that ‗soul‘ and nous are not synonymous for him suggests that 
‗heart‘ must mean something distinct from either yet common to both. To get a sense of 
what that might be it would be instructive to look briefly at the use of the word in clas-
sical and biblical tradition. 
 
Raasch notes that although the metaphorical use of the word ‗heart‘ (kardia) is rare in 
classical Greek, ‗the theoretical importance assigned to the heart by the Stoics and by a 
school of Greek medicine…while not reflected in the ordinary use of language, had 
some influence on the monastic concept of purity of heart.
343 For the Stoics the heart is 
the seat of the ruling faculty of the soul , the hēgemonikon (a term sometimes used by 
Evagrius to denote the nous) and as such the spiritual centre of the human being, and 
they developed a notion of ‗custody of the heart‘ by means of which the soul might at-
tain apatheia
344 that was ‗strikingly similar to the monastic concept‘.
345 Evagrius would 
certainly have been familiar with this aspect of Stoic thought, but it clear from the way 
he uses the word ‗heart‘ that his primary influence was the Bible. Raasch summarises 
biblical tradition regarding the heart as follows: 
 
                                                 
340 According to the TLG and including the Epistula Fidei, there are two hundred and twenty occurrences 
of the word ‗heart‘ in Evagrius‘ Greek corpus. 
341 Sch. 317.8-11 on Prov. 25:26. 
342 Sch. 1 on Ps. 15:9. 
343 Cf. Raasch (1966: 9). She does not name the school of medicine but describes it as having arisen in 
Sicily in the third century BC and, like the Stoics, locating the soul‘s ruling faculty in the heart. 
344 Raasch (1966: 10) describes this ‗custody of the heart‘ as consisting in ‗carefully scrutinising each 
phantasia or ennoia before accepting it and in combating false thoughts and imaginings by sound think-
ing and reflection‘. 
345 Raasch (1966: 10).  
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‗With closest custody guard your heart‘, warns the Wise Man, ‗for in it are the 
sources of life‘ (Prov. 4:23). [The heart] was not only, as for us, the centre of the 
emotions, which were said to arise from the bowels, kidneys, or liver as well, but 
also of the will. It was the source of direction: ‗The heart of a man disposes his 
way…‘ (Prov. 16:9). Primarily and especially, it was the source of the mental ac-
tivities of thinking, planning and remembering, which God alone can see. It was, 
in fact, ―the source of the whole personal life, in which thought, volition, feelings 
merge as one‖; the centre of personal life, and also of the interior life, the inner 
man.
346 
 
Purity of heart thus symbolised moral purity; interior cleanliness as opposed to the mere 
absence of ritual or legal defilement. Raasch notes that ‗it was especially the mission of 
the prophets to call for [this] deeper notion of purity‘;
347 so, for example, Jeremiah: 
‗Cleanse your heart of evil, O Jerusalem, that you may be saved.‘
348  
 
It is this idea of the heart as the inner self that Jesus invokes when, in response to Phari-
saic questioning as to why his disciples failed to observe the tradition of washing their 
hands before eating, he declares that it is not what goes into a person‘s mouth that de-
files him, but what comes out of his heart: 
 
ἐθ γὰξ η῅ο θʱξδίʱο ἐμέξρνληʱη δηʱινγηζκνὶ πνλεξνί, θόλνη, κνηρεỖʱη, πνξλεỖʱη, 
θινπʱί, ςεπδνκʱξηπξίʱη, βιʱζθεκίʱη…
349 
 
for out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, 
false witness, blasphemies… 
 
By thus disregarding the laws of ritual cleanliness in favour of purity of heart Jesus goes 
even further than the prophets in the importance he attaches to the latter;
350 ‗blessed‘, he 
declares, ‗are the pure in heart, for they will see God (κʱθάξηνη νἱ θʱζʱξνὶ ηῆ θʱξδίᾳ, 
ὅηη ʱὐηνὶ ηὸλ ζεὸλ ὄςνληʱη).‘
351 
 
                                                 
346 Raasch (1966: 13). 
347 Raasch (1966: 12). 
348 Jer. 4:14; cf. Raasch, ibid. 
349 Matt. 15:19; cf. Mark 7:21. 
350 Cf. Raasch (1966: 17). 
351 Matth. 5:8.  
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Jesus characterises impurity of the heart in terms of evil thoughts [dia]logismoi, and the 
association of the logismoi with the heart is a recurrent theme in Evagrius. For example, 
he speaks of a battle of logismoi in your heart (κάρελ ινγηζκ῵λ ἐλ ηῆ θʱξδίᾳ ζνπ)
352 
and of ‘the sons and daughters born in the heart, that is, logismoi and desires of the flesh 
(η῵λ ἐλ θʱξδίᾳ ʱὐη῵λ γελλσκέλσλ πἱσλ θʱὶ ζπγʱηέξσλ, ηνπηέζηη ζʱξθηθ῵λ ινγηζκ῵λ 
θʱὶ ἐπηζπκη῵λ)’;
353 since the demons are the ultimate source of the logismoi,
354 the latter 
should be understood as referring to secondary  logismoi that we devise on the basis of 
initial ones suggested by them. Again, Evagrius warns that ‘logismoi trouble the hearts 
of the negligent (ἀκεινῦληνο δὲ θʱξδίʱλ ἐθηʱξάζζνπζη ινγηζκνί)’;
355 here we can see 
an allusion to the connection between the cosmic Fall and particular falls into pathos. 
An example of such negligence would be eating to satiety - ‘fornication is a conception 
of  gluttony,  that  which  softens  the  heart  in  advance  (πνξλείʱ,  ιʱηκʱξγίʱο  θύεκʱ, 
πξνκʱιʱθηὴξ θʱξδίʱο)’
356 – as would any relaxation of vigilance:
357 
 
ηῶ δὲ η῅ο ἐγθξʱηείʱο ρʱπλσζέληη θνιʱθείᾳ ἟δνλ῵λ ηὸ θʱη' ὀιίγνλ ἐπηβνπιεύεη [ὁ 
η῅ο  ἀζειγείʱο  δʱίκσλ]  ζπλνκηιεỖλ  ηῆ  θʱξδίᾳ,  ἵλ’  ἐμʱθζεỖζʱ  ηʱỖο  θʱθίʱο 
δηʱινγʱỖο ʱἰρκʱισηηζζῆ θʱὶ ηὸ η῅ο ἁκʱξηίʱο κỖζνο εἰο πέξʱο ἀγάγῃ.
358 
 
little by little the [demon of lust] plots against the person who has relaxed his 
vigilance due to the flattery of pleasures, in order to become the familiar of his 
heart, so that once ignited by converse with vice it may be captured and its hatred 
of sin come to an end.  
 
In some of these cases the word nous or ‗soul‘ could be substituted for ‗heart‘; for ex-
ample either could be said to be the arena in which the ‗warfare in thought‘
359 is waged, 
and Evagrius states several times that logismoi arise from the pathētikon part of the 
soul.
360 Again, one could coherently speak of the demons troubling the nous or soul of 
the negligent person, and of the nous or soul having a hatred for sin. But such a substitu-
                                                 
352 Eul. 5.5. 
353 Found. 1. Cf. AM 59: ‘Do not fail to kill the offspring of serpents, and you will not go into labour with 
the logismoi of their heart.’  
354 See below, 2.1. 
355 AM 37. 
356 Vices 2. 
357 See below, 3.4. 
358 Eul. 21.22. 
359 Cf. Prakt. 48. 
360 See below, 2.1.4.1, 2.2.4.  
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tion would change the sense of what Evagrius is saying, making it more impersonal, 
less intimate. In other cases substitution would be less coherent – it does not really 
make sense to speak of the nous or soul being softened and thereby rendered vulnerable 
to  vice, or of the demons seeking familiarity with the nous or soul. Again, when Eva-
grius  describes sadness as ‘a worm in the heart (ζθώιεμ ἐζηὶ θʱξδίʱο ιύπε)’
361  or 
declares that ‘the logismoi of the irascible person…consume the heart that gave them 
birth  (ινγηζκνὶ  ζπκώδνπο  …θʱηεζζίνπζη  ηὴλ  ηεθνῦζʱλ  θʱξδίʱλ)’
362  or  that 
‘temptations test the heart of a monk (θʱξδίʱλ κνλʱρνῦ [δνθηκάδνπζηλ] πεηξʱζκνί)’,
363 
it is clearly not simply the  nous or soul that is being referred to. Rather, in all these 
cases the referent of ‘heart’ is  the person’s deepest sense of herself as a person, as ‘me’. 
It is this inner  self that is purified by ‘anachôrēsis  in  love’  (ἀλʱρώξεζηο  ἐλ ἀγάπῃ 
θʱζʱίξεη θʱξδίʱλ);
364 that in the holy, will be filled with knowledge  (θʱξδίʱη δὲ ὁζίσλ 
πιεξσζήζνληʱη  γλώζεσο)‘;
365  that  is  adorned  by  knowledge  of  God  (θόζκνο…  
θʱξδίʱο γλ῵ζηο ζενῦ)
366 and that, when gentle, is a resting place for wisdom (ἐλ θʱξδίᾳ 
πξʱείᾳ ἀλʱπʱύζεηʱη ζνθίʱ)‘.
.367 The idea of keeping watch over one’s heart
368 has an 
especially direct and personal feel to it. Again, it would make no sense to speak of the 
nous  or  soul  being  expanded  by  contemplations;  yet  when  Evagrius  says  that 
‘contemplations of the world expand the heart; the logoi of providence and judgement 
exalt it (θόζκσλ ζεσξίʱη πιʱηύλνπζη θʱξδίʱλ, ιόγνη δὲ πξνλνίʱο θʱὶ θξίζεσο ὑςνῦζηλ 
ʱὐηήλ)‘
369 we can understand that it is the person himself, his inner being, that is trans-
formed and uplifted. 
 
These examples give some indication of the meaning and scope of the word ‗heart‘ for 
Evagrius. Driscoll notes that while Evagrius‘ ‗philosophical framework allows him to 
penetrate the biblical text more deeply…the biblical language is itself decisive, enabling 
                                                 
361 8Th. 5.3. 
362 8Th. 4.16. 
363 AM 60. 
364 AM 8. 
365 AM 24. 
366 AM 27. 
367 AM 31. 
368 E.g. Eul. 32.34; Th. 36; Cf. Prov. 4:23. 
369 AM 135.  
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him to make connections and shape insights that would not be possible to him if left to 
the philosophical tradition alone.‘
370 He continues, 
 
[Evagrius] does not use [the word ‗heart‘] as a simple biblical code word for one 
or another part of the soul, as this is conceived by Greek philosophy. Instead, we 
shall find him using it across all three parts and beyond. With this term he is able 
to show the dynamic and  inextricable  interconnections that exist between the 
various dimensions of the inner life…[It allows him] to move fluidly across vari-
ous  dimensions  of  the  inner  life.  With  it  he  sometimes  refers  to  [the 
epithumêtikon and thumos], at other times to all three parts [of the soul], then to 
one part only, but also to the mind, or the mind as it is united with the soul. Heart 
is certainly the object of purification in the work of praktikê, but it is also the in-
strument of contemplation.
371 
 
The word ‗heart‘ allows Evagrius to show the interconnections between, and to ‗move 
fluidly across the various dimensions of the human life‘ because for him the heart is not 
simply the seat of the soul’s ruling faculty; it is, rather, ‘the centre of the personal life 
and of the interior life’; that which the person feels to be ‘me’, and it is this sense of 
‘me’  that  constitutes  those  interconnections  and  unites  those  dimensions.  When  he 
                                                 
370 Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 146). 
371 Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 157). We must, however, be careful in our understanding of 
this distinction between ‗philosophical‘ and ‗biblical‘ language. It is certainly the case that they comprise 
two different idioms. Driscoll further explains (1999: 145-6): ‗When the language is taken from the phi-
losophical tradition, it allows for a clear and precise articulation of the various dimensions of the spiritual 
journey. In Evagrius and most others who function in similar theological traditions, this philosophical 
language does not contaminate the Christian content but makes it possible to think about it more pro-
foundly. Thus, the distinction of the rational, irascible, and concupiscible parts of the soul, together with 
apatheia as a term describing health in the latter two parts, all enable a clear understanding of particular 
issues that must be dealt with in order to reach the ultimate goal of contemplative knowledge of the Holy 
Trinity.‘ But while there is a real and substantive difference in idiom between philosophical and biblical 
tradition we should beware of regarding the two discourses as essentially different in kind since to do so 
would be anachronistic. On the one hand, Greek philosophy had, ever since Plato, tended to acquire a 
theological hue, whether in the form of Platonism itself, Aristotle‘s ‗first philosophy‘ or the Zeus of the 
Stoics; even the Epicureans, despite their notoriety as atheists among both pagans and Christians,  ac-
cepted the existence of the gods - and, as Bob Sharples has reminded me, regarded them as examples to 
us of the best form of (tranquil) life - merely denying their interest in or relevance to human affairs; only 
in Scepticism is the element of philosophical religion absent. On the other hand, there was by Evagrius‘ 
time a well-established tradition of regarding Christianity as the ‗true philosophy‘. Thus Driscoll (1999: 
15) notes that the naturalness with which Evagrius moves from ‗what may first seem a more philosophi-
cal term, ―mind‖ (λνῦο) to what may seem the more biblical term, ―heart‖…only shows that the sharp 
distinction between philosophical and biblical is not made by Evagrius. It tends to be more our problem, 
not that of these ancients.‘ Cf. Jaeger (1961: 31); also, e.g., Long (1986: 100-101); Dihle (1994: 278); 
Sharples (1996: 56); Clement, Strom. 1.1.1.2; Ruether (1969: 169). Ruether notes, ibid., n.1, that the des-
ignation of the Christian as the ‗true philosopher‘ is first found in Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 8.  
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speaks of the  nous or ‘soul’ he is discussing the human person objectively, as one 
rational being among others, but when he speaks of the ‘heart’ he is referring to, and 
addressing himself to, the person in terms of their subjectivity; their  inner sense of self-
hood. In doing so he is evoking that special intimacy upon which the force of Christ be-
ing kardiognōstês
372relies, as also that of the injunction to keep watch over the heart. 
The nous is the metaphysical core of personhood; the heart its phenomenological core.  
 
Two final points remain to be noted. First, as Guillaumont point out, Evagrius is mind-
ful of stylistic issues when he writes. In particular, when, as is often the case, he uses 
parallelism, he tends to employ the rhetorical device of variatio whereby repetition of a 
word is avoided by replacing its second occurrence with a synonym.
373 Some of his uses 
of ‗heart‘ certainly seem to fall into this category.
374 However, I think he is too aware of 
linguistic subtlety to regard apparent synonyms as no more than that, and that instead he 
would see such occasions as opportunities to reinforce or otherwise inflect his meaning. 
Second, at least some of Evagrius‘ uses of ‗heart‘ are clearly intended to call to mind 
specific scriptural passages; thus for example Driscoll shows how Ad Monachos 31, 
which begins, ‗In the gentle heart, wisdom will rest‘, draws for both its vocabulary and 
the idea it expresses upon Jesus’ words at Matt. 11:28-29.
375 This Christological refer-
ence is, accordingly, part of the proverb’s intended meaning: ‘The monk will learn to 
have a gentle heart by learning from the Lord.’
376  
 
 
1.2.5  Summary 
 
The human estate is intermediate between the angelic and the demonic. The health of 
the human soul and the natural condition for human beings is apatheia, the means to 
achieving which is praktikē, asceticism. 
 
                                                 
372 Cf. Acts 1:24, 15:8; Th. 37.2-3; AM 104; also Prakt. 47. 
373 Cf. Guillaumont (1970: 436). He is referring specifically to the Praktikos, but his remarks apply 
equally to many of Evagrius‘ writings. 
374 E.g. AM 31, 44. 
375 Cf. Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 150); see below, 3.2, for discussion of this aphorism. 
376 Driscoll (2003: 255).  
Page 87 of 268 
 
Like the other rational beings, the human being is in reality a triune nous, fragmented as 
a result of the Fall into nous, soul and body. The soul is in turn tripartite, comprising 
logistikon,  thumos  and  epithumētikon.  The  latter  predominates  in  humans.    Strictly 
speaking the word nous encompasses the human being in her entirety, but in practice 
Evagrius also uses it as a synonym for logistikon. 
 
Central to Evagrius‘ anthropology is the idea of the nous as subject to change in both 
epistemic and metaphysical terms. The image of God consists in the receptivity of the 
nous to knowledge of God, but the nous is also receptive to objects of contemplation 
and of the senses. In addition, its power of self-determination is a form of receptivity, 
and it was this, in the form of receptivity to that which is other than God, that occa-
sioned the primordial movement and Fall. The epistemic receptivity of the nous is re-
flected in metaphysical passibility in virtue of which the nous is changed by whatever it 
receives. In relation to God this means a return to its true nature of simplicity, incorpo-
reality and stillness, and in relation to contemplation, progress toward these. In relation 
to sense-perception, it means the imprinting of the nous by the noēmata it receives. 
However, such imprinting is agent-dependent, only taking place if cognition is of the 
objects qua sensibles; if instead the focus of the nous is upon their logoi or spiritual sig-
nificance then the noēmata concerned will not imprint the nous; Evagrius refers to this 
as ‗spiritual  sensation‘.  The  metaphysical  changeability  of  the  nous  is  rooted  in  its 
power of self-determination in that a choice or decision is a movement of the nous. This 
movement can be either stable or unstable; if it is stable it is toward God and tends ulti-
mately toward stillness; if unstable it is away from God and tends to ever-increasing in-
stability. Corporeal creation contains, but does not eliminate, the instability of the nous, 
which the human being experiences as empatheia. Apatheia is the stabilisation of the 
nous that enables contemplation and thereby the transformations of the nous (including 
both soul and body) whereby it re-ascends to God.  
 
The true nature of the nous is to be without form, matter or movement, a condition real-
ised only in union with God. A nous thus naked is ‗the place of God.‘ The nous has a 
light associated with it which becomes visible upon attainment of apatheia.  
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Just as the term nous can refer either to the person in her entirety or to the rational part 
of the soul, so the word ‗soul‘ can refer either to the fallen entity in its entirety or to its 
pathētikon part alone. The nature of the three parts of the soul is best understood by ref-
erence to the virtues that define its healthy state. Evagrius recognises both practical and 
contemplative virtues, the former constitutive of  apatheia, the latter its fruit. At the 
practical level the healthy condition of the soul can be summarised as the epithumētikon 
longing for virtue, the thumos struggling on behalf of the soul and the logistikon manag-
ing practical affairs so as to facilitate contemplation and perceiving the contemplation of 
beings, and at the contemplative level, as the epithumētikon being completely oriented 
toward God, the thumos humble in memory of him and the logistikon always attending 
to him.  
 
In humans the body, the most fallen part of the nous, is  constituted primarily of earth, 
and the part of the soul most closely associated with it is the epithumētikon. The body is 
valuable and good, but its value is purely instrumental: it is necessary for certain sorts 
of contemplation, can serve as a refuge from troubling spiritual phenomena and is es-
sential to the process of healing the soul of its vulnerability to pathos.  
 
The necessity of the body to the attainment of apatheia is due to the fact that pathos has 
a  physiological  basis  in  an  excess  of  vital  heat.  Such  excess  is  the  result  of  the 
epithumētikon being unhealthy since in this case its desires, including the appetite for 
food, the source of the vital heat, are insatiable. If the epithumētikon is healthy then, 
since it is directed toward virtue, its desires are not insatiable and it does not crave more 
food than that needed to maintain just enough vital heat to keep the body alive. 
 
A body maintained on such minimal levels of vital heat would not be considered healthy 
in Hippocratic terms but I have argued that Evagrius recognised two indices of bodily 
health, one profane and the other spiritual, with the latter representing the true health of 
the body and involving the refinement of the body‘s krasis. In spiritual terms the health 
of the body depends upon that of the soul, meaning that physical health can only be 
achieved through the pursuit of virtue, and its ‗own‘ desires – that is, those of the un-
healthy epithumētikon – are to be disregarded. Consequently the body must be subjected  
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to rigorous discipline and ‗subdued by hunger and vigil‘, and apatheia will include free-
dom from any desire for food over and above that needed to keep the body alive. 
 
Evagrius‘ use of the word ‗heart‘ is biblical rather than Greek in its inspiration. The 
heart is the centre of the personal life and of the interior life; it is the person‘s sense of 
themselves as a ‗me‘. As such it is not identical with the nous or with any part of the 
soul but can refer to any of these since, as the person‘s deepest sense of themselves, it 
both moves across and unites the various dimensions of the inner life. It is both the ob-
ject of purification and the instrument of contemplation. It is the phenomenological core 
of personhood as opposed to the metaphysical core.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Empatheia 
 
The focus of this chapter is upon the psychology and phenomenology of empatheia, the 
sickly condition of the soul which, according to Evagrius, is our lot until, by means of 
askēsis, we restore it to apatheia, its health and our natural state. In the Praktikos he as-
serts a direct connection between pathos and the logismoi in that it is through allowing a 
logismos to linger that pathos is aroused. Accordingly this chapter looks at both, starting 
with the logismoi. It concludes with a description of empatheia as it is experienced. 
 
 
2.1  The logismoi 
 
The human being is a fallen nous and the human state a temporary one, ultimately to be 
superseded by a return  to the  union  with God which was the  first condition of the 
logikoi. The return is via a contemplative ascent whose foundation is apatheia, which, 
constituted by the practical virtues,
1 is cultivated by exercising our self-determination in 
favour of virtue. 
 
The primary domain of moral choice differs according to whether a person is a secular 
or a monk. For secular people it is the external world, their moral choices being exe r-
cised above all in relation to things and circumstances outside of themselves. Evagrius 
refers to these as pragmata, ‗objects‘. The external focus of such people‘s moral choice 
reflects that of their attention and both are signs of their relative immersion in the exter-
nal world and, correspondingly, in the thickness of corporeality. In the case of monks, 
however, the emphasis has shifted to the internal, a shift both initiated and marked sym-
bolically by their renunciation of the world. Consequently their moral choices are exer-
cised primarily in relation not to things outside of themselves but to the contents of their 
own minds; in particular, what Evagrius calls the logismoi: 
 
                                                 
1 Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31.  
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ΤνỖο κὲλ θνζκηθνỖο νἱ δʱίκνλεο δηὰ η῵λ πξʱγκάησλ κᾶιινλ πʱιʱίνπζη, ηνỖο δὲ 
κνλʱρνỖο ὡο ἐπὶ πιεỖζηνλ δηὰ η῵λ ινγηζκ῵λ· πξʱγκάησλ γὰξ δηὰ ηὴλ ἐξεκίʱλ 
ἐζηέξεληʱη·  θʱὶ  ὅζνλ  εὐθνι῵ηεξνλ  ηὸ  θʱηὰ  δηάλνηʱλ  ἁκʱξηάλεηλ  ηνῦ  θʱη’ 
ἐλέξγεηʱλ,  ηνζνῦηνλ  ρʱιεπώηεξνο  θʱὶ  ὁ  θʱηὰ  δηάλνηʱλ  πόιεκνο  ηνῦ  δηὰ  η῵λ 
πξʱγκάησλ ζπληζηʱκέλνπ· εὐθίλεηνλ γάξ ηη πξᾶγκʱ ὁ λνῦο θʱὶ πξὸο ηὰο ἀλόκνπο 
θʱληʱζίʱο δπζθάζεθηνλ.
2 
 
The demons war with seculars more through objects, but with monks they do so 
especially through logismoi, for they are deprived of objects because of the soli-
tude. Further, to the extent that it is easier to sin kata dianoian than in action, so 
is the warfare kata dianoian more difficult than that which is conducted through 
objects. For the nous is a thing easily set in motion and difficult to check in its 
tendency towards unlawful fantasies.
3 
 
The monk seeking apatheia must bring the unruly nous that is his true essence under 
control, and this means mastering his responses to the logismoi.  
 
The idea that evil thoughts are deployed by the demons against monks did not originate 
with Evagrius. It is to be found in the Vita Antonii: 
 
Οὗηνη κὲλ νὖλ, ἐὰλ ἴδσζη θʱὶ πάληʱο κὲλ Χξηζηηʱλνὺο, κάιηζηʱ δὲ κνλʱρνὺο, 
θηινπνλνῦληʱο  θʱὶ  πξνθόπηνληʱο,  πξ῵ηνλ  κὲλ  ἐπηρεηξνῦζη  θʱὶ  πεηξάδνπζηλ, 
ἐρόκελʱ  ηξίβνπ  ηηζέληεο  ζθάλδʱιʱ·  ζθάλδʱιʱ  δὲ  ʱὐη῵λ  εἰζηλ  νἱ  πνλεξνὶ 
ινγηζκνί.
4 
 
When [the demons] see all Christians, but especially monks, labouring diligently 
and making progress, first they attack them and tempt them, placing s tumbling 
blocks in their path, and their snares are the evil logismoi.
5 
 
The devil, seeking to entice Antony away from his askêsis, suggests impure (ῥππʱξνύο) 
logismoi  to  him,
6  and accordingly Antony enjoins his disciples above all to guard 
(θπιάηηεηλ,
7 ηεξεỖλ
8) themselves
9 or their soul
10  against such  logismoi.  Although in 
                                                 
2 Prakt. 48. 
3 See above, 1.2.1.3. 
4 VA 23; Guillaumont (1971: 57). 
5 Trans. mine. 
6 VA 5. 
7 VA 20; 55, 89. 
8 VA 55. 
9 VA 20, 55. 
10 VA  89.  
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these examples the word logismos is qualified by an adjective making explicit its pejo-
rative sense, it also appears five times in the Vita with pejorative sense but minus adjec-
tive.
11 
 
Evagrius‘ understanding of the logismoi concurs with that of the Vita, with which he was 
certainly familiar, and also with that of Origen,
12 for whom 
 
Πεγὴ  νὖλ  θʱὶ  ἀξρὴ  πάζεο  ἁκʱξηίʱο  δηʱινγηζκνὶ  πνλεξνὶ·  κὴ  γὰξ 
ἐπηθξʱηεζάλησλ ηνύησλ, νὔηε θόλνη νὔηε κνηρεỖʱη νὔη’ ἄιιν ηη η῵λ ηνηνύησλ 
ἔζνληʱη...ηὸ πεγὴλ εἶλʱη πάλησλ η῵λ ἁκʱξηεκάησλ ηνὺο πνλεξνὺο δηʱινγηζκνύο, 
δπλʱκέλνπο κνιῦλʱη θʱὶ  ηά,  εἰ ρσξὶο  ʱὐη῵λ πξάηηνηλην, δηθʱηώζʱληʱ  ἂλ ηὸλ 
πνηήζʱληʱ.
13 
 
The spring and source, then, of every sin are evil  thoughts; for,  unless these 
gained  the  mastery,  neither  murders  nor  adulteries  nor  any  other  such  thing 
would exist...Evil thoughts are the spring of all sins, and can pollute even those 
actions which, if they were done apart from evil thoughts, would have justified 
the man who did them.
14 
 
However, despite the moral and spiritual significance that both Origen and the  Vita 
assign to evil thoughts, it is Evagrius who undertakes the first systematic treatment of 
the subject. 
 
 
2.1.1  What is a logismos? 
 
For Evagrius, the demons suggest logismoi to the monks in the hope of inciting them to 
sin kata dianoian. The word logismos means ‗thought‘, ‗reasoning‘ or ‗calculation‘. In 
the Septuagint and New Testament, however, it is used in a broader sense, as is its cog-
nate dialogismos: 
 
                                                 
11 Cf. VA 5, 6, 23, 87, 88; Guillaumont (1971: 58). The idea of evil thoughts that beset the monk is also to 
be found in the Life of Pachomius; cf., e.g., The Bohairic Life of Pachomius 91, 94, 101. 
12 Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 58). However, since many of Origen’s writings survive only in Rufinus’ Latin 
translation, there is no way of knowing whether any particular instance of the noun cogitatio translates 
δηʱινγηζκόο, ινγηζκόο or some other term. 
13 C.Matt. 11:15.12-51. 
14 See below, 3.4.7, for the latter theme in Evagrius.  
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‗To think (hashab) is to devise, to conceive, to bring something into being in the 
heart‘.
15 Although there is a conceptual element in the biblical use of the word 
‗thoughts‘, the term includes the meaning of impulses, dispositions and plans as 
well.
16 
 
As we shall see, Evagrius‘ use of the word logismos belongs, in virtue of the breadth of 
meaning with which he endows it, to biblical rather than Greek tradition.  
 
Strictly speaking, logismoi can, for Evagrius, include within their scope thoughts of an-
gelic and human provenance as well as those that come from demons. In this he takes 
up a theme from Origen‘s De Principiis: 
 
We find that the ‗thoughts which proceed out of the heart‘ (‘cogitationes’, quae 
‘de corde nostro procedunt’),
17 whether they are a memory of deeds we have 
done or a contemplation of any things or causes whatsoever, proceed sometimes 
from ourselves, sometimes are aroused by the opposing powers, and occasionally 
also are implanted in us by God or the holy angels.
18 
 
In Chapter 8 of On Thoughts Evagrius describes the three types of logismos: 
 
Τ῵λ ινγηζκ῵λ η῵λ ἀγγειηθ῵λ θʱὶ η῵λ ἀλζξσπίλσλ θʱὶ η῵λ ἐθ δʱηκόλσλ, ηʱύηελ 
ηὴλ δηʱθνξὰλ κεηὰ πνιι῅ο η῅ο πʱξʱηεξήζεσο ἐγλώθʱκελ εἶλʱη, ὅηη πξ῵ηνλ κὲλ 
νἱ ἀγγειηθνὶ ηὰο θύζεηο η῵λ πξʱγκάησλ πεξηεξγάδνληʱη θʱὶ ηνὺο πλεπκʱηηθνὺο 
ʱὐη῵λ  ἐμηρηληάδνπζη  ιόγνπο,  νἷνλ·  ηίλνο  ράξηλ  γεγέλεηʱη  ὁ  ρξπζὸο  θʱὶ  δηὰ  ηί 
ςʱκκώδεο  θάησ  πνπ  ηνỖο  κνξίνηο  η῅ο  γ῅ο  ἐγθʱηέζπʱξηʱη  θʱὶ  κεηὰ  πνιινῦ 
θʱκάηνπ  θʱὶ  πόλνπ  εὑξίζθεηʱη·  π῵ο  δὲ  εὑξεζεὶο  ὕδʱηη  πιύλεηʱη  θʱὶ  ππξὶ 
πʱξʱδίδνηʱη  θʱὶ  νὕησο  εἰο  ηερληη῵λ  ἐκβάιιεηʱη  ρεỖξʱο  η῵λ  πνηνύλησλ  η῅ο 
ζθελ῅ο ηὴλ ιπρλίʱλ θʱὶ ηὸ ζπκηʱηήξηνλ θʱὶ ηὰο ζπồζθʱο θʱὶ ηὰο θηάιʱο, ἐλ ʱἷο 
νὐθέηη  λῦλ  πίλεη  δηὰ  ηὴλ  ράξηλ  ηνῦ  ζση῅ξνο  ἟κ῵λ  ὁ  Βʱβπιώληνο  βʱζηιεύο, 
Κιεώπʱο δὲ <ὃο> θέξεη θʱξδίʱλ θʱηνκέλελ ὑπὸ ηνύησλ η῵λ κπζηεξίσλ. ὇ δὲ 
δʱηκνληώδεο ινγηζκὸο ηʱῦηʱ νὔηε νἶδελ νὔηε ἐπίζηʱηʱη· κόλελ δὲ ηὴλ θη῅ζηλ ηνῦ 
ʱἰζζεηνῦ ρξπζίνπ ἀλʱηδ῵ο ὑπνβάιιεη θʱὶ ηὴλ ἐθ ηνύηνπ ηξπθήλ ηε θʱὶ δόμʱλ 
ἐζνκέλελ πξνιέγεη. ὇ δὲ ἀλζξώπηλνο ινγηζκὸο νὐδε ηὴλ θη῅ζηλ ἐπηδεηεỖ νὐδὲ 
ηίλνο ἐζηὶ πεξηεξγάδεηʱη ζύκβνινλ ὁ ρξπζόο, ἀιιὰ κόλνλ εἰο ηὴλ δηάλνηʱλ ηνῦ 
ρξπζνῦ  ηὴλ  κνξθὴλ  εἰζθέξεη  ςηιήλ,  πάζνπο  πιενλεμίʱο  θερσξηζκέλελ.  ὇  δὲ 
                                                 
15 B Vawter, The Ways of Gods, ―The Way‖, IV (1964), p.170, quoted by Raasch. 
16 Raasch (1966: 14). 
17 Cf. Matt. 15:19; Mark 7:21. 
18 DP 3:2.4 (R).  
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ʱὐηὸο ιόγνο θʱὶ ἐπὶ η῵λ ἄιισλ πξʱγκάησλ ῥεζήζεηʱη θʱηὰ ηὸλ θʱλόλʱ ηνῦηνλ 
κπζηηθ῵ο γπκλʱδόκελνο. 
 
After lengthy observation we have learned to recognize the difference between 
angelic and human logismoi, and those that come from the demons. Firstly, an-
gelic [logismoi] are concerned with the investigation of the natures of things and 
search out their spiritual principles. For example, the reason why gold was made 
and why it is sand-like and scattered through the lower regions of the earth, and 
is discovered with much labour and toil; how when it is discovered it is washed 
and delivered to the fire and then placed in the hands of the artisans who make 
the lampstand of the tabernacle, the incense burner, the censers and the vessels
19 
from which by the grace of the Saviour the king of  Babylon no longer drinks,
20 
but it is Cleopas who brings a heart burning with these mysteries.
21 The demonic 
logismos neither knows nor understands these things, but without shame it sug-
gests only the acquisition of sensible gold and predicts the enjoyment and esteem 
that will come from this. The human logismos neither seeks the acquisition of 
gold nor is concerned with investigating what gold symbolises; rather, it merely 
introduces in the intellect the simple form of gold separate from any pathos of 
greed. The same principle can be applied to other matters by mystically engaging 
the exercise of this rule. 
 
Whereas Origen clearly states that some thoughts are implanted in us by angels, Eva-
grius speaks simply of ‗angelic logismoi‘, a formulation which in view of his under-
standing of contemplative ascent could be understood as denoting not just thoughts in-
spired  by  angels  but  also  thoughts  characteristic  of  angels  but  enjoyed  by  humans. 
There can be no doubt that the latter denotation is intended, but is the former? It is: 
some thoughts, he tells us, are inspired in us (἟κỖλ ἐκβʱιινκέλνηο) by angels,
22 and an-
gels fill us with spiritual contemplation ( πλεπκʱηηθ῅ο ζεσξίʱο ἟κᾶο πιεξνῦζηλ).
23 So 
the train of thought regarding the spiritual significance of gold might arise in a person‘s 
nous in virtue of their success in the practice of contemplation or it might be inspired by 
an angel. In its details we see an example of the type of contemplation which, taking its 
starting point from the cognition, via the physical body, of sensible objects, investigates 
the logoi of those objects; an example, that is, of how to read the ‗letter from God‘ that 
                                                 
19 Cf. Exod. 25:29, 31; 27:1-3. 
20 Cf. Dan. 5:1-30. 
21 Luke 24:32. 
22 Prakt. 80. 
23 Prakt. 76.  
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is corporeal creation. In addition, this investigation of the spiritual significance of gold 
has, for Evagrius, a further, more profound level of meaning, as Sinkewicz notes: 
 
The gold scattered through the earth and subsequently rediscovered, refined, and 
refashioned for a holy purpose is for Evagrius a symbol of the fall of the intel-
lects from the realm of the pre-existence and their dispersal through different 
worlds along with their joining to souls and bodies; subsequently, by the practice 
of the virtues, they are purified and delivered from the captivity of the devil (‗the 
king of Babylon‘), ultimately regaining spiritual knowledge and restoration to 
their original state.
24 
 
When gold is thought about in this way, its  noêma will not imprint the nous,
25 and so 
although this contemplation is rooted in the body as ‗the organon that shows (the nous) 
sensible things‘,
26 it ascends from the corporeal to the intelligible and so brings the nous 
closer to God. 
 
By contrast, the logismos which comes from the demons sees only the sensible gold and 
its worldly significance. Failing to look beyond these to what gold symbolises in spiri-
tual terms and thereby to use the noêma of sensible gold as a stepping-stone to the ac-
quisition of wisdom, such logismoi instead arouse pathē associated with that worldly 
significance, such as the desire to acquire gold and to enjoy the goods and esteem af-
forded by its possession. Because the nous is focused upon the sensible gold, it is im-
printed by their noêmata.  And, as we shall see, the aroused pathē then ‗bind‘ the nous 
to these and associated noêmata, leading the nous to become increasingly fixated upon 
their objects, which in turn exacerbates the pathē. In this way demonic logismoi embroil 
the nous in a vicious circle of immersion in the sensible world.  
 
While the angelic logismos elevates the nous from the sensible to the intelligible and the 
demonic logismos immerses it in the sensible, the human logismos is characterised by 
neutrality: it involves no pathos in relation to the gold but nor does it look beyond it for 
its spiritual significance. This neutrality reflects the position of humans, situated be-
                                                 
24 Sinkewicz (2003: 268, n.16). 
25 See above, 1.2.1.1. 
26 KG 4.62. Cf. KG 2.61: ‗The contemplation of the incorporeals which we knew in the beginning without 
matter, we now know linked to matter, but that which concerns bodies we have never seen without bod-
ies.‘  
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tween the angels and the demons. It is noteworthy that although the human constitution 
has a predominance of epithumia, Evagrius considers logismoi involving a desire for 
gold to be of demonic rather than human origin. This suggests that he identifies the truly 
human not with our pathological state but with our healthy state - that is, apatheia. This 
is confirmed in the Chapters of the Disciples, which states directly that the human lo-
gismos is apathês.
27 Being apathês, it is the starting point for the cultivation of angelic 
logismoi.  
 
For Evagrius, then, logismoi can in principle come to us from the angels, from ourselves 
or from the demons. However, he most often uses the term in the latter sense such that, 
as Guillaumont notes, even in the absence of any qualifying adjective such as πνλεξόο 
or δʱηκνληώδεο, the word logismos itself suffices to denote an evil thought.
28 And what 
is distinctive of such thoughts is that, as Chapter 8 of  On Thoughts makes plain ‘[they 
present] reality to us simply in terms of its desirability in order to gain pleasure or 
power’,
29  thereby  absorbing  the  actual  world  ‘into  the  self’s  desire  for  pleasure  or 
control’
30 and leading us to see and relate to the material world and other people solely 
in terms of our own narrowly-understood self-interest. 
 
Evagrius offers three definitions of logismos. The first two are almost identical: 
 
Definition 1: 
 
Λνγηζκὸο γὰξ δʱηκνληώδεο ἐζηὶλ εἰθσλ ηνῦ ʱἰζζεηνῦ  ἀλζξώπνπ ζπληζηʱκέλε 
θʱηὰ δηάλνηʱλ, ἀηειήο, κεζ῾ ἥο ὁ λνῦο θηλνύκελνο ἐκπʱζ῵ο ιέγεη ηη ἠ πξάηηεη 
ἀλόκσο ἐλ ηῶ θξππηῶ πξὸο ηὸ κνξθνύκελνλ ἐθ δηʱδνρ῅ο εἴδσινλ ὑπ’ ʱὐηνῦ.
31 
 
                                                 
27 Cf. Disc. 140.1; also Disc. 139: ‗All the things that the nous thinks by itself (ὅζʱ ἀθ’ ἑʱπηνῦ ινγηδεηʱὶ ὁ 
λνῦο) are called apathē; all those that it thinks when it is being troubled by the body  (ἐλνρινύκελνο ἐθ 
ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο) are called empathē in respect of the nous (ὡο πξὸο ηὸλ λνῦλ), and all those that do not con-
tribute to the sustasis of the body (ὅζʱ δὲ κὴ ζπληεινῦληʱ πξὸο ζύζηʱζηλ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο) are called empa-
thē and vices of the nous, in which the demons are sometimes also involved (ἔζζ’ ὅηε θʱὶ πξνζηηζεκέλσλ 
η῵λ δʱηκόλσλ).‘. 
28 Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 56). He notes (1971: 57-8) that the pejorative use of the word logismos to de-
note thoughts suggested by demons is already to be found in the Vita Antonii; Cf. VA 5, Migne PG 26, 
848A; 6, 849A; 23, 877B; 87, 88, 965B. 
29 Williams, R, ―‗Tempted as we are‘: Christology and the Analysis of the Passion‘, p.4. 
30 Ibid., p.5. 
31 Th. 25.52-6.  
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Demonic logismos is an image of the sensible person constituted kata dianoian, 
incomplete, with which the nous, moved by pathos, speaks or acts unlawfully in 
secret with regard to the phantoms it forms in turn. 
 
Definition 2: 
 
Λνγηζκὸο δʱηκνληώδεο ἐζηὶλ εἰθὼλ ηνῦ ʱἰζζεηνῦ ἀλζξώπνπ, ζπληζηʱκέλε θʱηὰ 
δηάλνηʱλ, κεζ’ ἥο ὁ λνῦο θηλνύκελνο ἐκπʱζ῵ο, ιέγεη ηη ἠ πξʱηηεη ἀλόκσο, ἐλ ηῶ 
θξππηῶ, πξὸο ηὸ πʱξεκπεζὸλ εἴδσινλ ἐθ δηʱδνρ῅ο ὑπ’ ʱὐηνπ.
32 
 
Demonic logismos is an image of the sensible person constituted kata dianoian, 
with which the nous, moved by pathos, speaks or acts unlawfully, in secret, with 
regard to the idol that has in turn crept in. 
 
The differences between Definitions 1 and 2 are of emphasis rather than substance. 
Definition 1 appears in Chapter 25 of On Thoughts, at the end of an extended discussion 
of the psychological processes involved in the experience of the logismoi. Evagrius ex-
plains how the nous receives noēmata of sensible objects, then continues: 
 
Ὥζπεξ νὖλ πάλησλ ὁ λνῦο η῵λ ʱἰζζεη῵λ πξʱγκάησλ δέρεηʱη ηὰ λνήκʱηʱ, νὕησ 
θʱὶ ηνῦ ἰδίνπ ὀξγάλνπ - ʱἰζζεηὸλ γὰξ θʱὶ ηνῦην - ρσξὶο δὲ πάλησο η῅ο ὄςεσο· 
ηʱύηελ  γὰξ  ἐλ  ἑʱπηῶ  κνξθ῵ζʱη  ἀδπλʱηεỖ,  κεδέπνηε  ζεʱζάκελνο.  Κʱὶ  κεηὰ 
ηνύηνπ ινηπὸλ ἔλδνλ ηνῦ ζρήκʱηνο ὁ λνῦο ἟κ῵λ πάληʱ πξάηηεη θʱὶ θʱζέδεηʱη θʱὶ 
βʱδίδεη θʱὶ δίδσζη θʱὶ ιʱκβάλεη θʱηὰ δηάλνηʱλ· θʱὶ ηʱῦηʱ πνηεỖ θʱὶ ιέγεη ὅζʱ θʱὶ 
βνύιεηʱη ηῶ ηάρεη η῵λ λνεκάησλ, πνηὲ κὲλ ηνῦ ἰδίνπ ζώκʱηνο ἀλʱιʱκβάλσλ ηὸ 
ζρ῅κʱ θʱὶ ηὴλ ρεỖξʱ ἐθηείλσλ ἐπὶ ηὸ δέμʱζζʱη ηη η῵λ δηδνκέλσλ, πνηὲ δὲ ηνῦη’ 
ἀπνβʱιὼλ ηὸ ζρ῅κʱ θʱὶ ηὴλ ηνῦ πιεζίνλ ἐλ ηάρεη κνξθὴλ ἐλδπζάκελνο ὡο ἂλ 
δηδνύο ηη ηʱỖο ἰδίʱηο ρεξζίλ ... ΓεỖ νὖλ ηὸλ ἀλʱρσξνῦληʱ ηεξεỖλ ηὸλ ἴδηνλ λνῦλ 
θʱηὰ  ηὸλ  θʱηξὸλ  η῵λ  πεηξʱζκ῵λ·  κέιιεη  γὰξ  ἁξπάδεηλ  εὐζὺο  ἐπίζηʱληνο  ηνῦ 
δʱίκνλνο  ζώκʱηνο  ηνῦ  ἰδίνπ  ηὸ  ζρ῅κʱ  θʱὶ ζπκπιέθεηλ ἔλδνλ πξὸο κάρελ ηῶ 
ἀδειθῶ  ἠ  ἅπηεζζʱη  γπλʱηθόο...ρσξὶο  δὲ  ηνύηνπ  ηνῦ  ζρήκʱηνο  νὐθ  ἂλ  λνῦο 
κνηρεύζνη πνηέ, ἀζώκʱηνο ὢλ θʱὶ ἄλεπ ηνηνύησλ λνεκάησλ ἐγγίζʱη πξάγκʱηη 
ʱἰζζεηῶ κὴ δπλάκελνο· θʱὶ ηʱῦηά ἐζηη ηὰ πʱξʱπηώκʱηʱ.
33 
 
So just as the nous receives the noēmata of all sensible objects, in this way it re-
ceives also that of its own organism – for this too is sensible – but of course with 
the exception of one‘s face, for it is incapable of creating a form of this within it-
self since it has never seen itself. With this figure then our nous does everything 
                                                 
32 Rfl. 13. 
33 Th. 25.14-38.  
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interiorly – it sits and walks, gives and receives kata dianoian. It does and says 
all that it wishes due to the quickness of its noēmata: sometimes it assumes the 
figure of its own body and extends its hand to receive something it is given, 
sometimes after casting off this figure it quickly puts on the form of its neighbour 
as if it were giving something with its own hands...The anchorite must therefore 
keep watch over his own nous in the time of temptations, for he will seize the 
figure of his own body, as soon as the demon presents himself, and engage inte-
riorly in a fight with a brother or join with a woman...But without this form a 
dianoia could never commit adultery, since it is incorporeal and incapable of ap-
proaching a sensible object without such noēmata: and this constitutes the trans-
gression. 
 
Evagrius is here analysing the process of what we would call doing something in one‘s 
imagination. When a person experiences a logismos, his nous creates kata dianoian, on 
the basis of its store of remembered noēmata of sensible objects, an image or ‗form‘ of 
his body. Evagrius refers to this as the nous ‗creating a form [of its own organism]‘, ‗as-
suming the figure of its own body‘ or ‗seizing the figure of his body‘. With this created 
form, or assumed or seized figure, the person then performs, kata dianoian, whatever 
the logismos enjoins. So if the logismos is tempting him to fight with a brother then with 
this form or figure he will fight with that brother kata dianoian; we would say that he 
imagines himself fighting with him or that he fights with him in his imagination. It is 
not only his own body that he  can ‗put on‘ in this way; he can also ‗assume the figure‘ 
of someone else in order to act kata dianoian as that person. So he could, for example, 
assume the figure of the brother in question in order to speak, in his person, in his – the 
brother‘s - defence. If it is the figure of his own body that he assumes, then, Evagrius 
says, it will lack a face because he has never seen his own face.
34  
 
Definition 1 concludes this analysis. ‗Motivated by this contemplation,‘ continues Eva-
grius, ‗we have presented the rationale of impure logismos (ἐθ ηʱύηεο δὲ η῅ο ζεσξίʱο 
θηλεζέληεο, θʱὶ ηὸλ ηνῦ ἀθʱζάξηνπ ινγηζκνῦ πʱξεζήθʱκελ ιόγνλ)‘.
35 The logismos is 
the ―image of the sensible person‖, which in turn is the created form, or assumed or 
                                                 
34 This would seem to suggest that when he imagines himself acting he does so in the third rather than the 
first person; that is, rather than imagining himself acting ‗from the inside‘, he visualises himself acting. If 
he were imagining himself acting in the first person – from the inside – then he would not see his face  
(unless of course he were imagining himself looking at his reflection), just as I do not see my face when I 
act in the flesh.  
35 Th. 25.50-1.  
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seized figure, of the person‘s body. The image is incomplete because it lacks a face. The 
involvement of pathos has not been stated explicitly but is implicit in the examples 
Evagrius has given, since both fighting with a brother and joining with a woman result 
from pathos – anger and fornication respectively. The speech or action are secret be-
cause internal to the agent. The reference to ―the phantoms [the nous] forms in turn‖ 
acknowledges the fact, again not explicitly stated, that the form of its own body is not 
the only form that the nous creates kata dianoian in the process of experiencing a lo-
gismos since it must also create those of whoever or whatever else the  logismos in-
volves. 
 
Williams, in discussing Thoughts 25, draws attention to the fact that in the scenario that 
Evagrius describes, the nous, in ‗seizing upon material images of possible actions, [cre-
ates] a fictional world and fictional relationships‘.
36 The logismoi, as well as leading us 
to construe the world solely in terms of our own desires, induce us to construct, on the 
basis of our desires, fictional counterparts of the  world, populated by phantoms, in 
which those desires can be satisfied. In short, on the basis of our desires for pleasure or 
control the logismoi deflect us from the real world into a false world of our own con-
struction. 
 
Definition 2, which appears in Reflections, differs from Definition 1 in two respects. 
First, it omits to mention that the image of the sensible person is incomplete. This, I 
suggest, is in keeping with its presentation as an aphorism rather than as the conclusion 
of an extended analysis. As an aphorism it is intended to stand alone for the purposes of 
memorisation and meditation, and since the reason for the incompleteness is not obvi-
ous without reference to other material it would be inappropriate to include it. The sec-
ond difference is the substitution of the expression ‗idol that has ... crept in‘ for ‗phan-
toms [the nous] forms‘. What Evagrius is doing is substituting an ethical description for 
a metaphysical one. In metaphysical terms the ‗phantoms‘ are, like the image of the per-
son‘s  own  body,  forms  created  by  the  nous  on  the  basis  of  remembered  noēmata, 
whereas in ethical terms, as empathē noēmata they fall within the scope of the Second 
                                                 
36 Wiliams (2007: 5).  
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Commandment.
37 Consequently a phantom formed by the  nous is at the same time an 
idol that has crept in. 
 
The third of Evagrius‘ definitions of logismos, from the Chapters of the Disciples, is 
rather simpler: 
 
Definition 3: 
 
Λνγηζκὸο ... ἐζηη λόεκʱ ἐκπʱζέο.
38 
 
A logismos is an empathēs noêma. 
 
This definition makes explicit two features of the logismoi that are not explicit in Defi-
nitions 1 and 2 but it obscures two others. The first of the features that it makes explicit 
is the involvement of pathos with the logismoi: as we shall see, an empathēs noêma is a 
noêma of a sensible object that is charged with pathos due to the person having been in 
a state of pathos in respect of its object when the noêma imprinted his nous.
39 The rela-
tion between pathos and the logismoi is rooted in the orientation toward sensible objects 
that the latter express. Sensible objects, it will be recalled, are susceptible of spiritual 
interpretation in terms of their logoi, and the first stage of the re-ascent to God consists 
in discerning these.
40 This means engaging with such objects solely in terms of their 
logoi. By contrast, the logismoi betray an attachment to the external world and so to 
sensible objects qua sensible. The medium of this attachment is pathos and so the lo-
gismoi will always involve empathē noēmata.
41 The second feature of the logismoi that 
Definition 3 makes explicit follows from the definition of an empathēs noēma and is 
that they always involve noēmata of sensible objects
42 (Definitions 1 and 2, it will be 
recalled, specify only ‗the sensible person‘.)  
 
The features of the logismoi that Definition 3 obscures are, firstly, their de facto posses-
sion of agency, and, secondly, their fictional and therefore delusory nature. The former, 
                                                 
37 See above, 1.2.1.1, n.167. 
38 Disc. 65.2. 
39 See below, 2.2.3. 
40 See above, 1.2.1.1. 
41 Cf. Disc. 138.1: ‗Every empathês logismos is demonic (Πᾶο ἐκπʱζὴο ινγηζκὸο δʱηκνληώδεο ἐζηί)‘. 
42 Cf., e.g., Th. 2.1-2.  
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but not the latter, in fact needs modifying in the light of Definition 3 such that, rather 
than defining all logismoi as exercising agency it should now be noted that although 
many do, some do not – an example being the noēma of ‗the face of a person who has 
done me harm or dishonoured me‘ mentioned at Th. 2.6-7, although this noēma will, if 
allowed to, give rise to logismoi which do possess agency, namely fantasies of revenge. 
So what determines whether or not a logismos possesses agency is, as we would expect, 
whether or not the nous has assumed agency within it. 
 
As this consideration about agency suggests, to define a logismos as an empathēs noêma 
is to speak in very simplified terms. That Evagrius is deliberately doing so is clear from 
the context since this is one of several equally schematic definitions in the first sentence 
of a short chapter on the virtues that heal the thumos and epithumêtikon: 
 
Πάζνο ἐζηὶ ζπκόο, ἐπηζπκίʱ θʱὶ ηὰ ἑμ῅ο, λόεκʱ δέ ἐζηη κλήκε ςηιή, ινγηζκὸο δέ 
ἐζηη λόεκʱ ἐπʱζέο.
43 
 
Pathos is thumos, epithumia and so forth; a noêma is a simple memory, and a lo-
gismos is an empathēs noêma. 
 
These are in fact approximations rather than definitions: they serve only to convey a 
general impression. In the case of the logismoi, while a logismos might indeed happen 
to consist of a single empathes noêma, it will more often be complex and is likely to 
involve verbal content. Nonetheless, the terms logismos and empathes noêma, can, if 
both are understood in a simplifed way, be coherently understood as equivalent. 
 
So far we have considered what a logismos is by means of Evagrius’ definitions, but the 
best evidence for how, in practical, everyday terms, he construes the logismoi is the 
Antirrhêtikos. His presentation therein of the content of logismoi can be divided into 
two types: direct statement of the form ‗the logismos that says x‘, where x is a proposi-
tion or imperative, and, far more frequently, indirect statement of the form ‗the logismos 
that x‘, where x is a verb phrase. For example: 
 
                                                 
43 Disc. 65.1-2.  
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Against the logismos that says to me, ‗Do not torment your soul with a lot of fast-
ing that gains you nothing and does not purify your nous.‘
44 
 
Against the logismos that says to me, ‗The command to fast is burdensome.‘
45 
 
Against the thoughts that seek without the labour of fasting to cultivate the ra-
tional land.
46 
 
Against the logismos that compels me to eat at the ninth hour.
47 
 
Both types involve the assignment of agency to the  logismoi themselves. It might be 
supposed that this is no more than an accident of grammar, or is at most metaphor, but 
although I do believe there to be a metaphorical sense at play, Definitions 1 and 2 sug-
gest that there is also something more going on. Both define a logismos as an image of 
the sensible person which is constructed kata dianoian by the nous, with which the per-
son acts kata dianoian. Both, in other words, define the logismos as having agency kata 
dianoian. So taking them at face value, which, although there might well be additional 
levels to Evagrius‘ meaning, there is no reason not to, the agent that tells the monk not 
to torment his soul with so much fasting that gains him nothing and does not purify his 
nous, or that the command to fast is burdensome, or that seeks without the labour of 
fasting to cultivate the rational land, or that compels him to eat at the ninth hour, is the 
part of him that activates the image of his body that his nous has created kata dianoian 
and in virtue of which that image is said to exercise agency – to give and receive, fight 
with a brother or join with a woman, and so forth. In such cases the nous  effectively 
splits into two parts, one of which animates the image and through it exercises agency 
while the other remains detached, an observer and agent of resistance. That Evagrius 
would see it this way is indicated by his advice to combat the demon of acedia by divid-
ing the soul so that one part offers consolation and the other receives it.
48  
 
This is the literal interpretation of Evagrius‘ assignment of agency to the logismoi. But I 
believe it is also susceptible of a metaphorical reading according to which it emphasises 
the fact that although we allow ourselves to act out  logismoi in the sense described 
                                                 
44 Ant. 1.2. 
45 Ant. 1.5. 
46 Ant. 1.1. 
47 Ant. 1.7. 
48 Cf. Prakt. 27.  
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above, they do not originate with us and are fundamentally alien to us. Because we were 
created with the seeds of virtue but not of vice,
49 human nature is essentially good and  
it is only through misuse of our self-determination that we become capable of vice:  
 
἖θ  δὲ  η῅ο  θύζεσο  νὐδεὶο  ἐμέξρεηʱη  ινγηζκὸο  πνλεξόο·  νὐ  γὰξ  ἀπ’  ἀξρ῅ο 
γεγόλʱκελ πνλεξνί, εἴπεξ θʱιὸλ ζπέξκʱ ἔζπεηξελ ὁ θύξηνο ἐλ ηῶ ἰδίῳ ἀγξῶ.
50 
 
No evil logismos derives from our nature, for we were not created evil from the 
beginning, if indeed the Lord sowed a good seed in his field.
51  
 
It is from demons rather than from us that the logismoi originate, and for Evagrius the 
line between the logismos and the demon that suggests it is for practical purposes so 
close that, as Guillaumont notes, he refers indifferently to ‗the demon‘ or ‗the logismos‘ 
of a given vice, using one or the other terms as shorthand for the complete expression, 
‗the logismos suggested by the demon‘ of that vice.
52 When he speaks of a logismos as 
though it were an agent he is, therefore, emphasising its otherness; the fact that it does 
not originate in the person who thinks it and is therefore alien to his true nature. In the 
case of the logismos that ‗compels [the monk] to eat at the ninth hour‘ the metaphorical 
agency of the logismos is to all intents and purposes identical with the actual agency of 
the demon: the demon compels the monk to eat by means of a logismos that compels 
him to do so. Likewise, the metaphorical voice of the logismos that says ‗Do not tor-
ment your soul with a lot of fasting that gains you nothing and does not purify your 
nous‘ or ‗The command to fast is burdensome‘ or that the rational land can be cultivated 
without the labour of fasting,  is the vehicle for the non-metaphorical voice of the de-
mon. So although the monk will be thinking these thoughts, and although they might 
correspond with the contra-natural desires of his epithumêtikon, they are not his, and it 
is  this  fundamental  independence  of  logismos  from  thinker  that  Evagrius  affirms 
through the ascription of  metaphorical agency  to the  logismoi. Sometimes though a 
metaphorical reading seems strained: 
 
                                                 
49 Cf. KG 1.39; see above, 1.4.  
50 Th. 31.9-11. 
51 Cf. Luke 16: 19-31. 
 
52 Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 57).  
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Against the logismos of acedia that is eager to find another cell for its dwelling 
place on the pretext that the first one that it had was very foul and full of mois-
ture so that it got all kinds of diseases from it.
53 
 
This makes sense if the agent is understood to be an aspect of the  nous and therefore of 
the person himself since then it is the person who got the diseases. In this case the attri-
bution of concern to the logismos indicates that it is suggesting a false understanding of 
these circumstances (although what it is saying might be true from a profane point of 
view); presumably they are either spiritually irrelevant or ordeals to be endured. This 
logismos can however also be understood in another way, according to which the dis-
eases are not real, but as we would say ‗all in the mind‘. In this case it is telling the 
monk that he gets diseases that in reality he does not get, from properties of the cell that 
perhaps it does not possess, and the whole story is a pretext to induce him to vacate the 
cell. On this reading, since no-one really gets the diseases the agency of the logismos 
can, after all, be understood metaphorically.  
 
The example of the logismoi that seek without the labour of fasting to cultivate the ra-
tional land suggests that logismoi can consist as much in sequences of thoughts and 
ways of thinking as in individual logismoi, and indeed Evagrius sometimes speaks in 
terms of ‗thinking‘ rather than specifying a logismos or logismoi, for example: 
 
Against the thinking that is diligent about food and neglects compassion for the 
needy.
54 
 
That an Evagrian logismos can be a sequence of thoughts related more or less closely to 
one another is plain from examples such as the following: 
 
Against the logismos that, in the absence of serious illness, coaxes us to drink 
wine and prophesies to us about pain in the stomach and the entire digestive sys-
tem.
55 
 
Against the logismos that arouses compassion in us, persuades us to give to the 
poor, and afterwards makes us sad and annoyed about what we gave.
56 
                                                 
53 Ant. 6.26. 
54 Ant. 1.66. 
55 Ant. 1.26.  
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The first in particular also reveals a further aspect of the ascription to the logismoi of 
metaphorical agency, one that concerns the workings of temptation. The  logismos  is 
tempting the monk to drink wine, but it does not do so simply by, for example, present-
ing him with a noêma of wine and a corresponding imperative ‗Drink wine!‘, to which 
he might either give or withhold assent from a position of affective neutrality. Rather, it 
uses complex tactics that involve the arousal of both desire and fear. The second exam-
ple, rather than employing two component logismoi roughly simultaneously, employs a 
sequence of them such that one paves the way for the next. In both cases the different 
elements work together to secure the monk‘s assent.   
 
The relation between the logismoi and pathos will be discussed more fully in section 
2.2.4. Meanwhile, the word logismos in Evagrius‘ usage can be defined as follows: 
 
A logismos is the cognitive cause, correlate or result of a pathos. It can be an im-
age of the person‘s body, created by the nous kata dianoian and animated by an 
aspect of it, with which it speaks and acts unlawfully kata dianoian in relation to 
other images it creates kata dianoian, or it can be a single empathês noêma or 
thought, sequence of thoughts or way of thinking. Logismoi frequently possess 
agency and always involve noēmata of sensible objects. 
 
 
2.1.2  The ‘matter’ of the logismoi 
 
Evagrius speaks of the logismoi having ‗matter‘ (hulê). In other contexts where he refers 
to the ‗matter‘ of something he means that which fuels it; for example,  
 
Ὕιε ππξὸο μύιʱ, ὕιε δὲ γʱζηξὸο βξώκʱηʱ.
57 
 
Wood is the matter used by fire, and food is the matter used by gluttony. 
 
Likewise, the matter of the logismoi is what inspires and feeds them. For example, 
 
                                                                                                                                               
56 Ant. 1.58. 
57 8Th. 1.4.  
Page 106 of 268 
 
Μόλνο  η῵λ  ινγηζκ῵λ  ὁ  η῅ο  θελνδνμίʱο  ἐζηὶ  πνιύϋινο  θʱὶ  ὅιελ  ζρεδὸλ 
πεξηιʱκβάλσλ  ηὴλ  νἰθνπκέλελ  θʱὶ  πᾶζη  ηνỖο  δʱίκνζηλ  ὑπʱλνίγσλ  ηὰο  ζύξʱο, 
ὥζπεξ  ηηο  πξνδόηεο  πνλεξὸο  γελόκελνο  πόιεσο·  δηὸ  θʱὶ  πάλπ  ηʱπεηλνỖ  ηνῦ 
ἀλʱρσξνῦληνο ηὸλ λνῦλ πνιι῵λ ιόγσλ θʱὶ πξʱγκάησλ ʱὐηὸλ πιεξ῵λ...
58 
 
Alone among the logismoi that of vainglory has an abundance of matter; embrac-
ing nearly the whole inhabited world, it opens the gates to all the demons, like 
some evil betrayer of a city. That is why it greatly humiliates the nous of the an-
chorite, filling it with numerous words and objects... 
 
The reason why the logismos of vainglory has ‗an abundance of matter‘ is that any suc-
cess, large or small, spiritual or otherwise, can arouse it, and this is why, too, ‗it opens 
the gates to all the demons‘ and ‗fills the nous with numerous words and objects.‘ In 
other words, there are a great many things that can occasion and augment it. But while 
logismoi of vainglory are especially well-provided for in terms of possible matter, all 
logismoi find much to feed upon in our dealings with one another and in the world at 
large: 
 
Οἱ κὲλ ἀθάζʱξηνη ινγηζκνὶ πνιιὰο εἰο ʱὔμεζηλ ὕιʱο πξνζδέρνληʱη θʱὶ πνιινỖο 
ζπκπʱξεθηείλνληʱη πξάγκʱζη.
59 
 
Impure thoughts receive for their increase numerous materials and extend them-
selves to many objects. 
 
Whereas logismoi with an abundance of matter will flourish, those with a paucity of it 
will lack staying power and accordingly be easy to banish: 
 
὇ηʱλ  ηηλὲο  η῵λ  ἀθʱζάξησλ  ινγηζκ῵λ  ηʱρέσο  θπγʱδεπζ῵ζη,  δεηήζσκελ  ηὴλ 
ʱἰηίʱλ,  πόζελ  ηνῦην  ζπκβέβεθε,  πόηεξνλ  δηὰ  ηὴλ  ζπάληλ  ηνῦ  πξάγκʱηνο,  ηὸ 
δπζπόξηζηνλ εἶλʱη ηὴλ ὕιελ, ἠ δηὰ ηὴλ πξνζνῦζʱλ ἟κỖλ ἀπάζεηʱλ νὐθ ἴζρπζε 
θʱζ’ ἟κ῵λ ὁ ἐρζξόο, νἷνλ· εἴ ηηο η῵λ ἀλʱρσξνύλησλ ἐλζπκεζείε ὑπὸ δʱίκνλνο 
ἐλνρινύκελνο η῅ο πξώηεο πόιεσο πλεπκʱηηθὴλ θπβέξλεζηλ πηζηεπζ῅λʱη, νὗηνο 
δεινλόηη  νὐ  ρξνλίδεη  ηνῦηνλ  ηὸλ  ινγηζκὸλ  θʱληʱδόκελνο…εἰ  δὲ  ἐπὶ  πάζεο 
πόιεσο  θʱὶ  η῅ο  ηπρνύζεο  γίλεηʱη  θʱὶ  ὁκνίσο  ινγίδεηʱη,  νὕηνο  κʱθάξηνο  η῅ο 
ἀπʱζείʱο ἐζηίλ.
60 
 
                                                 
58 Th. 14.1-6. 
59 Th. 36.1-2. 
60 Th. 20.1-11.  
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Whenever certain impure logismoi are chased away quickly, let us search out the 
cause. Whence has this occurred? Is it for want of the object, the matter being 
hard to acquire, or because of the apatheia present in us did the enemy have no 
strength against us? For example, if an anchorite who is tormented by a demon 
imagines himself being entrusted with the spiritual governance of the First City, 
he clearly does not dwell for long on imagining this logismos … But if it is a case 
of just any city taken at random and he works it out in the same way, he is 
blessed with apatheia. 
 
In sum, the matter of the logismoi comprises anything that they can derive inspiration 
and plausibility from and so feed upon, or, to put it another way, it is what invigorates 
the fictional worlds that we create on the basis of our desires. 
 
 
2.1.3  The eightfold classification of most generic logismoi 
 
Evagrius divides all demonic logismoi into eight categories, a schema which in the hands 
of subsequent thinkers went on to form the basis for the doctrine of the seven cardinal 
sins. He introduces it at the beginning of the Praktikos: 
 
὆θηώ  εἰζη  πάληεο  νἱ  γεληθώηʱηνη  ινγηζκνὶ  ἐλ  νἷο  πεξηέρεηʱη  πᾶο  ινγηζκόο. 
Πξ῵ηνο  ὁ  γʱζηξηκʱξγίʱο,  θʱὶ  κεη’  ʱὐηὸλ  ὁ  η῅ο  πνξλείʱο·  ηξίηνο  ὁ  η῅ο 
θηιʱξγπξίʱο· ηέηʱξηνο ὁ η῅ο ιύπεο· πέκπηνο ὁ η῅ο ὀξγ῅ο· ἕθηνο ὁ η῅ο ἀθεδίʱο· 
ἕβδνκνο ὁ η῅ο θελνδνμίʱο· ὄγδννο ὁ η῅ο ὑπεξεθʱλίʱο.
61 
 
Eight are all the most generic  logismoi in which are encompassed every logis-
mos. First that of gluttony, and after it that of fornication; third, that of avarice; 
fourth, that of distress; fifth, that of anger; sixth, that of acedia; seventh, that of 
vainglory; eighth, that of pride. 
 
The entire struggle of the monks, according to Evagrius, takes place through these eight 
logismoi.
62 This section will consider each in turn. First though it can be noted that the 
eightfold classification is not the only system employed by Evagrius, nor is it fully 
comprehensive, omitting self-love (θηιʱπηίʱ) which in  Reflections he declares to be 
                                                 
61 Prakt. 6. 
62 Ant. Prol. 6. Evagrius‘ source for the eightfold classification remains uncertain; cf. Guillaumont (1971: 
63-84).  
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‘first of all [the logismoi]’,
63 wandering (πιάλνο) and insensitivity (ἀλʱηζζεζίʱ), both of 
which have chapters to themselves in On Thoughts,
64 and jealousy (θζόλνο), which ap-
pears in Vices. That said, it is the principal one and the most familiar, as well as the one 
that provides the structure for several of his works, most notably the Praktikos, Antir-
rhêtikos, and Eight Thoughts. Second, it is not only the terms ‗logismos‘ and ‗demon‘ 
that Evagrius uses interchangeably, but along with them the terms pathos and ‗spirit‘ 
(πλεῦκʱ). So, for example, in the Praktikos he speaks of the thought of gluttony (ὁ η῅ο 
γʱζηξηκʱξγίʱο ινγηζκὸο),
65 the demon of fornication (ὁ η῅ο πνξλείʱο δʱίκσλ)
66 and the 
pathos of anger (἟ ὀξγὴ πάζνο),
67 as well as simply using the name of the generic 
logismos, for example ἟ θηιʱξγπξίʱ γ῅ξʱο κʱθξὸλ ὑπνβάιιεη,
68 while in On Thoughts 
he refers to the spirit of fornication (ηὸ πλεύκʱ πνξλείʱο).
69 Nevertheless, there is no 
doubt that Evagrius considers the  logismos, the pathos and the demon or spirit to be 
distinct entities.  
 
In discussing the eight generic logismoi I shall focus not upon Evagrius‘ justly famous 
descriptions of them in the Praktikos but upon the Antirrhētikos listings for them, since 
my purpose to convey not so much the particular character of each type of logismos as a 
sense of the mental and emotional turmoil that the logismoi betoken. 
 
2.1.3.1 Gluttony 
 
The Praktikos definition of gluttony appears to focus not upon an excessive desire for 
food but upon worries about the physical consequences of asceticism. In fact, though, 
these worries arise out of an excessive desire for food, namely the desire to accord one‘s 
eating to the insatiable demand of the body‘s vital heat for fuel. At the same time they 
invite the monk to privilege the profane understanding of physical health over the spiri-
tual understanding of it and accordingly to sacrifice the true health of the body for what 
is only its apparent health. But the significance of gluttony extends far beyond the body. 
                                                 
63 Rfl. 53.  
64 Chapters 9 and 11 respectively. 
65 Cf. Prakt. 7. 
66 Cf. Prakt. 8. 
67 Cf. Prakt. 11. 
68 Cf. Prakt. 9. 
69 Cf. Th. 1.7, Guillaumont (1971: 57).  
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This demon is, along with those of avarice and vainglory, one of those ranged first in 
battle  (πξ῵ηνη  θʱηὰ  ηὸλ  πόιεκνλ  ζπλίζηʱληʱη)
70  against those engaged in  praktikē, 
hence Christ‘s temptation by these three vices.
71 If gluttony is succumbed to then other 
temptations follow in its stead, first and foremost that to fornication,
72 but ultimately all 
the other pathē too. This is partly due to a ‗surplus‘ of physical vitality, but partly too 
because ‗the direct absorption of matter in order to please the stomach‘ is, along with 
avarice and vainglory, one of the most fundamental ways of construing the world in 
terms of our own desires.
73 But the significance of gluttony for Evagrius also reflects 
the body‘s integral role in the process of redemption. As we have seen, he declares that 
to control the stomach is to diminish the pathē,
74 and I have argued that this is because 
he believes that any vital heat over and above that needed to keep the body alive finds 
expression in  pathos, and that accordingly his many references to fire in relation to 
epithumia, pleasure and so forth are not simply metaphors. It follows that the impor-
tance that he assigns to dietary restraint is due not just to its intrinsic value but to its 
consequences. In the first place, it establishes a foundation for apatheia in the body it-
self. This is reflected in the epithumêtikon‘s no longer being directed toward the objects 
of pathos but instead longing for virtue.
75 Again, if a person ceases to care for food then 
one of the causes for disturbance of the  thumos is removed, as is a cause for distress.
76 
More generally, a fixation upon food is dis tracting and undermining,
77 and excessive 
consumption of food dulls the mind.
78 For all these reasons a correct approach to food is 
fundamental and reflects the interconnectedness of the spiritual and the corporeal: 
 
἖πηζπκίʱ βξώζεσο ἔηεθε πʱξʱθνὴλ, θʱὶ γεῦζηο ἟δεỖʱ ἐμέβʱιε πʱξʱδείζνπ.
79 
 
Desire for food gave birth to disobedience and a sweet taste expelled from para-
dise.
80 
 
                                                 
70 Th. 1.1-6. 
71 Cf. Luke 4: 1-13, Matt. 4: 1-11; Letter 6. 
72 See below, 2.1.3.2. 
73 Cf. Williams (2007: 4). 
74 Cf. 8Th. 1.2; see above, 1.2.3. 
75 Cf. Prakt. 86. 
76 Cf. Th. 1.8-10. 
77 E.g. 8Th. 1.12, 20. 
78 8Th. 1.1, 17,  
79 8Th. 1.10.  
80 Cf. Gen. 3:6, 23.  
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Eve‘s desire for the apple led her to disobey God and so to expulsion from the Garden. 
Likewise, a desire for food is a desire for something other than God. It is an orientation 
toward the sensible and away from the spiritual, and a preference for pleasure over the 
good. The ‗sweet taste‘ of food ‗expels from paradise‘ for at least three reasons. First, a 
focus upon food distracts the nous from the pursuit of knowledge. Second, it leads to a 
privileging of the profane understanding of health over the spiritual understanding of it, 
and thereby threatens to undermine the very foundation of the ascent to God. Third, to 
succumb to gluttony, whether from desire for the food itself or out of misplaced concern 
about the body‘s health, is to induce in both soul and body a state inimical to the prac-
tice of contemplation and prayer. All of these are ways in which it cuts the person off 
from spiritual joy; that is, from paradise. 
 
The Antirrhêtikos entries for gluttony include: the thoughts that seek without the labour 
of fasting to cultivate the rational land;
81 the thought that says to me, ―Do not torment 
your soul with a lot of fasting that gains you nothing and does not purify your intel-
lect‖.
82 The thought that suggests to me, ―Keeping vigil does not benefit you at all; 
rather, it gathers many thoughts against you‖.
83 The thoughts that hinder us from our 
way of life by instilling fear in us and saying, ―A miserable death results from austere 
fasting‖.
84 The thought that recalls delicacies of the past and remembers pleasant wines 
and the cups that we would hold in our hands when we used to recline at table and 
drink.
85 The demon that persuades me through its flattery and says to me with promises, 
―You will no longer suffer any harm from food and drink because your body is weak 
and dry from prolonged fasting‖.
86 The thought that travels to its corporeal kinfolk and 
finds a table filled with all kinds of foods.
87 The thoughts that entice us to be comforted 
with a little treat of vegetables;
88 the thought that at harvest time casts into us the desire 
for fruits.
89 The thought that says that the monastic discipline is difficult and extremely 
                                                 
81 Cf. Ant. 1.1; cf. also 1.9. 
82 Cf. Ant. 1.2; cf. 1.1, 4, 6, 9. 
83 Cf. Ant. 1.17; cf. 1.20. 
84 Cf. Ant. 1.19. 
85 Cf. Ant. 1.30; also 1.36, 38. 
86 Cf. Ant. 1.33. 
87 Cf. Ant. 1.39; also 1.41, 
88 Cf. Ant. 1.53; also 1.45. 
89 Cf. Ant. 1.54.  
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burdensome, that through affliction it cruelly lays waste to our body, and that it does not 
profit the soul.
90 
 
2.1.3.2 Fornication 
 
The demon of fornication, Evagrius tells us in the Praktikos, ‗compels one to desire 
various bodies‘ (ζσκάησλ θʱηʱλʱγθάδεη δηʱθόξσλ ἐπηζπκεỖλ).
91 The principal charac-
teristics of its logismoi are the vivid fantasies that they involve, both in waking con-
sciousness and in dreams.
92 This demon endeavours to persuade the monk that he lacks 
the  strength  to  overcome  his  bodily  nature.
93  It is one of the swiftest ( ὀμύηʱηνο), 
suddenly  hurling  its  filth
94  and able almost to overtake the movement of the  nous 
(ζρεδὸλ ηὴλ θίλεζηλ ηνῦ λνὸο ἟κ῵λ πʱξʱηξέρνληʱο);
95 that is, to overwhelm the  nous 
before it realises it is under attack so that it has no opportunity to defend itself;
96 in 
reality, the demon cannot overwhelm the nous; as we shall see, Evagrius maintains that 
even in the throes of pathos it is possible to refrain from sin.
97 
 
Eulogios  21.22  includes  an  eloquent  description  of  temptation  by  logismoi  of 
fornication.
98  Allusions to fire are central to it, and as in the case of  logismoi  of 
gluttony, these allusions and others like them
99 are, I suggest, not simply metaphors but 
references to the body’s vital heat. The monk experiences a surplus of this as ‘the fire of 
his nature’,
100 a ‘fire’ which finds expression in the pathos of sexual desire, of which 
this passage identifies three components: a general sensation of pleasurable warmth; the 
‗burning‘ which is ‗ignited in the flesh‘ – that is, the specific physical expressions of 
sexual arousal, and ‗burning images of error‘ - that is, mental images charged with the 
                                                 
90 Cf. Ant. 1.66. 
91 Prakt. 8.1-2. 
92 Cf. Th. 29. For Evagrius‘ attribution of agency to us in dreams, see below, 3.1. 
93 Cf. Eul. 21.22. 
94 Cf. Eul. 21.22. 
95 Cf. Prakt. 51. For other references to the ‗quickness‘ of the demon of fornication, Pry. 90:  
96 Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 256, n.58). 
97 See below, 2.2.4. 
98 Quoted below, 2.2.4. 
99 E.g. Ant. 2.14: ‗To the angel of the Lord that suddenly appeared in my intellect, cooled the thought of 
fornication, and drove out from it (my intellect) all the thoughts that besieged it‘; Ant. 2.47: ‗For the soul 
that does not know from where these burning thoughts are sent against us‘. 
100 Cf. Eul. 21.22.  
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pathos. The demon of fornication exploits the body‘s nature, specifically any surplus of 
vital heat. Sometimes it suggests logismoi, sometimes it touches the body directly,
101 
and sometimes it exploits an inclination toward sexual pleasure. If the monk allows the 
logismoi and feelings of arousal to linger
102 then it suggests secondary logismoi which 
justify his continuing to do so. It also uses its ability to tempt the monk as ammunition 
against him, endeavouring to persuade him of the futility of trying to remain chaste - 
and it should be recalled that Evagrius‘ understanding of chastity encompassed all ex-
pressions of sexual function.
103 It is easy to see then why, given the theory of physiol-
ogy that I have imputed to him, he considers dietary self-control to be a precondition of 
chastity: 
 
὇ πιεξ῵λ γʱζηέξʱ,  θʱὶ ἐπʱγγειιόκελνο ζσθξνλεỖλ,  ὅκνηόο ἐζηη ηῶ ιέγνληη, 
ρʱιηλνῦλ ππξὸο ἐλέξγεηʱλ ἐλ θʱιάκῃ. Ὁλ ηξόπνλ γὰξ ππξὸο ῥνπὴλ ἐλ θʱιάκῃ 
ηξέρνπζʱλ  ἀδύλʱηνλ  ἐπηζρεỖλ,  νὕησο  ὁξκὴλ  ἀθόιʱζηνλ  θιεγνκέλελ  ἐλ  θόξῳ 
πʱῦζʱη ἀδύλʱηνλ.
104 
 
The one who fills his stomach and then announces that he is chaste is like one 
who says he can hold in check the action of fire in a reed. In the same way that it 
is impossible to restrain the momentum of a fire rushing through a reed, so it is 
impossible to stop the licentious impulse that is fired by satiety. 
 
The Antirrhêtikos entries for fornication include: the thoughts that compel us to linger in 
conversation with a married woman on the pretext that she has visited us frequently or 
that she will benefit spiritually from us.
105 The demon of fornication that imitates the 
form of a beautiful naked woman, luxurious in her gait, her entire body obscenely dissi-
pated, (a woman) who seizes the intellect of many persons and makes them forget the 
better things.
106 The demons of fornication that take for themselves pretexts from the 
Scriptures and from the topics that are written  in them.
107 The thought of sadness that 
arises in us due to the many temptations of fornication that come upon us and cut off 
                                                 
101 Cf., e.g., Th. 16.12-14; Ant. 2.45; Disc. 152. 
102 Cf. Eul. 21.22; see below, 2.2.4. 
103 See above, 1.2.3. 
104 E.g. 8Th. 2.11. Cf. Th. 1.6-8.  
105 Cf. Ant. 2.35; cf. also 2.1, 36. 
106 Cf. Ant. 2.32. 
107 Cf. Ant. 2.50.  
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our hope by saying to us, ―What beautiful thing do you expect after all this labour?‖
108 
The thought that says, ―Youth is neither guilty nor culpable if it fornicates or if it gladly 
receives unclean thoughts‖.
109 The thought of the soul that is oppressed by thoughts of 
fornication, which divide the evil passion of fornication into diverse images, collect im-
pure thoughts, put them in rotation, (then) cleave to one of these enslaving thoughts and 
make it persist upon the weak soul.
110 The thought that reminds us of the house in which 
we gave many fruits to Satan.
111 The demon that advised me in my intellect that I 
should marry a woman and become the father of sons and so not resist with hunger the 
thoughts of fornication.
112 
 
2.1.3.3 Avarice 
 
Logismoi of avarice consist partly in worries about a future shaped by the privations of 
asceticism, but also encompass more general attachments, for example to material com-
forts or the prestige associated with wealth. To worry about such basic necessities as 
clothes or food is to defy Jesus’ injunction against anxiety about such things
113 and, 
since ‘two sparrows sold for  a penny’ are under the administration of the holy an-
gels’,
114 to lack faith in Providence. Finally, avarice is a species of idolatry: 
 
἖πηθʱηάξʱηνο ὁ πνη῵λ εἴδσινλ, θʱὶ ηηζεὶο ἐλ ἀπνθξύθῳ, ὡζʱύησο θʱὶ ὁ ἔρσλ 
θηιʱξγπξίʱο  πάζνο·  ό  κὲλ  γὰξ  πξνζθπλεỖ  θίβδεινλ  ἀλσθειὲο,  ὁ  δὲ 
ἀγʱικʱηνθνξεỖ θʱληʱζίʱλ πινύηνπ.
115 
 
‗Cursed be the one who makes an image and puts it in hiding.‘
116 The same is 
true for one who has the pathos of avarice, for the former worships a useless 
piece of base metal; the latter carries around in his nous the fantasy of wealth.
117  
 
                                                 
108 Cf. Ant. 2.1; also 2.31, 64. 
109 Cf. Ant. 2.5; also 2.4. 
110 Cf. Ant. 2.9; also 2.11, 12, 21, 24, 54, 56.. 
111 Cf. Ant. 2.40. 
112 Cf. Ant. 2.49. 
113 Cf. Matt. 6:25, 31. 
114 Th. 6.1-10; cf. Matt. 10:29. 
115 8Th. 3.14. 
116 Cf. Deut. 27:15. At Col. 3:5 Paul declares that greed (πιενλεμίʱ) is idolatry. 
117 Cf. Ant. 3.51.  
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The Antirrhêtikos entries for avarice can be roughly summarised as the desire to acquire 
money;
118 the desire to retain money;
119 the desire to retain money and yet attain the 
death of Jesus;
120 the desire to spend money how one wants;
121 meditating upon riches 
and giving no thought to the pain of wealth;
122 anxiety about poverty;
123 resentment at 
not being given money;
124 the desire to keep resources for oneself;
125 the desire to rely 
on charity;
126 meanness;
127 lack of compassion;
128 the desire to file a lawsuit;
129 making 
a brother work hard for the sake of money rather than do something of greater spiritual 
value;
130 demanding too much manual labour from a brother;
131 regret about having 
given money to the poor;
132 self-satisfaction at giving up inheritance;
133 regret about re-
nouncing money;
134 doubt about vocation;
135 the desire to acquire resources or posses-
sions;
136 the desire to preserve resources or possessions;
137 the desire to take advantage 
of others;
138 the tendency to judge for the sake of temporal goods;
139 self-pity over one’s 
neediness;
 140 desire for the worldly esteem attendant upon wealth;
141 desire for worldly 
possessions;
142 nostalgia for past comforts;
143 admiration for wealth;
144 justifications for 
love of money.
145 
                                                 
118 Cf. Ant. 3:1, 11, 23, 29, 41, 42, 55. 
119 Cf. Ant. 3:13. 
120 Cf. Ant. 3:30. 
121 Cf. Ant. 3:15, 19. 
122 Cf. Ant. 3:21. 
123 Cf. Ant. 3:2, 26, 36, 56. 
124 Cf. Ant. 3:3. 
125 Cf. Ant. 3:5, 10, 37. 
126 Cf. Ant. 3:43. 
127 Cf. Ant. 3:9, 10, 14, 28, 40, 43, 44, 47, 57. 
128 Cf. Ant. 3:5, 7, 27, 31, 37, 38, 48. 
129 Cf. Ant. 3:39. 
130 Cf. Ant. 3:6. 
131 Cf. Ant. 3:4, 8. 
132 Cf. Ant. 3:12, 33. 
133 Cf. Ant. 3:16. 
134 Cf. Ant. 3:24. 
135 Cf. Ant. 3:24. 
136 Cf. Ant. 3:35, 37, 49, 50, 52, 53. 
137 Cf. Ant. 3:24, 35, 49. 
138 Cf. Ant. 3:25. 
139 Cf. Ant. 3:25. 
140 Cf. Ant. 3:17. 
141 Cf. Ant. 3:18, 32. 
142 Cf. Ant. 3: 20. 
143 Cf. Ant. 3:21, 34, 50. 
144 Cf. Ant. 3:46. 
145 Cf. Ant. 3:50, 51, 54.  
Page 115 of 268 
 
2.1.3.4 Distress 
 
Distress, according to the Praktikos definition, ‗sometimes occurs through the frustra-
tion of one‘s desires [or  sometimes] follows closely  upon anger‘ (἟ ιύπε πνηὲ κὲλ 
ἐπηζπκβʱίλεη θʱηὰ ζηέξεζηλ η῵λ ἐπηζπκη῵λ, πνηὲ δὲ θʱὶ πʱξέπεηʱη ηῆ ὀξγῆ).
146 This 
demon cuts off and dries up every pleasure of the soul ( πᾶζʱλ  ἟δνλὴλ  η῅ο  ςπρ῅ο 
πεξηθόπησλ θʱὶ μεξʱίλσλ).
147 Its Antirrhêtikos entries include feelings of despair and 
abandonment by God or the angels in the face of trials,
148 fear of the demons,
149 noctur-
nal attacks by demons,
150 physical attacks by demons,
151 and vivid and frightening hal-
lucinations.
152 They also include ignorance of the role of the demons in the spiritual 
life
153 or of how the demons operate,
154 or attempts by the demons to persuade the monk 
of the futility of his struggle
155 or to make him fearful of the rigours of the monastic 
life.
156 Some logismoi of distress threaten him with shame or dishonour,
157 some try to 
induce distress by evoking memories of one‘s past sins
158 and some afflict the nous with 
distress concerning transitory affairs.
159 One threatens him with madness
160 and one en-
try warns of the demon who ‗alters the nous and impresses it with a single concept that 
is filled with severe grief—this is an indication of great madness.‘
161 
 
   
                                                 
146 Prakt. 10.1-2. 
147 Th. 4-5. Cf. Disc. 69.5-6: ‗Only the logismos of distress does not involve pleasure.’ 
148 Cf. Ant. 4.1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 16, 27, 44, 51. 
149 Cf. Ant. 4.8, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 28, 38, 39, 53, 54, 62, 65, 70, 71, 76. 
150 Cf. Ant. 4.8, 11, 18, 19, 21, 29, 31, 33, 38, 53. 
151 Cf. Ant. 4.15, 18, 22, 33, 35, 36, 41, 49, 52, 53, 56, 65. 
152 Cf. Ant. 4.13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 29, 32, 34, 38, 45, 47, 48, 53, 58, 62, 63. 
153 Cf. Ant. 4.3, 7, 17, 52. 
154 Cf. Ant. 4.6, 46, 66. 
155 Cf. Ant. 4.12, 30. 
156 Cf. Ant. 4.50, 69, 70, 71. 
157 Ant. 4.25 has a particularly personal ring in relation to Evagrius: ‗Against the demon that threatens me 
with curses and said, ―I will make you an object of laughter and reproach among all the monks because 
you have investigated and made known all the kinds of all the unclean thoughts.‖‘. Cf. also Ant. 4.43, 64, 
68. 
158 Cf. Ant. 4.55, 73. 
159 Cf. Ant. 4.74. 
160 Cf. Ant. 4.43, 
161 Cf. Ant. 4.37.  
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2.1.3.5 Anger 
 
The Praktikos defines anger, in terms borrowed from Aristotle, as ‗a boiling over of the 
thumos and a movement directed against one who has done injury or is thought to have 
done so’ (ζπκνῦ…δέζηο θʱὶ θίλεζηο θʱηὰ ηνῦ ἞δηθεθόηνο ἠ δνθνῦληνο ἞δηθεθέλʱη).
162 
Evagrius notes that it ‘renders the soul furious all day long, but especially during prayers 
it seizes the nous and represents to it the face of one who has distressed it’ (πʱλεκέξηνλ 
κὲλ ἐμʱγξηνỖ ηὴλ ςπρὴλ, κάιηζηʱ δὲ ἐλ ηʱỖο πξνζεπρʱỖο ζπλʱξπάδεη ηὸλ λνῦλ, ηὸ ηνῦ 
ιειππεθόηνο πξόζσπνλ ἐζνπηξίδνπζʱ),
163 and that ‘sometimes when this goes on for a 
while and turns into resentment, it provokes disturbances at night accompanied by wast-
ing  and  pallor  of  the  body,  as  well  as  the  attacks  of  venomous  wild  beasts’  (ὅηε 
ρξνλίδνπζʱ  θʱὶ  κεηʱβʱιινκέλε  εἰο  κ῅ληλ,  ηʱξʱρὰο  λύθησξ  πʱξέρεη,  η῅μίλ  ηε  ηνῦ 
ζώκʱηνο  θʱὶ ὠρξόηεηʱ,  θʱὶ ζεξίσλ ἰνβόισλ ἐπηδξνκάο).
164  He also notes that these 
‘four  signs  that  follow  upon  resentment’  can  be  found  accompanying 
(πʱξʱθνινπζνῦληʱ) numerous logismoi.
165 
 
The Antirrhêtikos entries for anger include the thought that advised us to love angry 
people and words of wrath;
166 desire for vengeance.
167 The thought that is quickly en-
flamed with anger and swiftly embittered against the brothers.
168 The thoughts that cast 
us into grief over brothers‘ failings.
169 Thinking that perfect humility is beyond human 
nature;
170 not accepting chastisement with humility.
171 Not understanding that being re-
viled by other people is a test sanctioned by God.
172 Resentment.
173 Agitation due to 
                                                 
162 Prakt. 11.1-2.  Cf. DA  403a29-b1: ‗A physician would define an affection of the soul differently from 
a dialectician: the latter would define e.g. anger as the desire (ὄξεμηο) for returning distress for distress 
(ἀληηιππήζεσο), or something like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of the blood or 
warm substance around the heart.‘ 
163 Prakt. 11.3-5. 
164 Prakt. 11.5-7. 
165 Prakt. 11.8-9. 
166 Cf. Ant. 5.26. 
167 Cf. Ant. 5.27, 32, 42, 53, 61. 
168 Cf. Ant. 5.29, 46. 
169 Cf. Ant. 5.47. 
170 Cf. Ant. 5.7. 
171 Cf. Ant. 5.23. 
172 Cf. Ant. 5.8. 
173 Cf. Ant. 5.21, 49.  
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acedia.
174 The thoughts that provoke us to hate and curse our enemies;
175 that advise us 
to take advantage and to defraud;
176 that are embittered against love;
177  the thought that 
depicted in the intellect a brother who in hatred said something wicked or listened to 
something hateful;
178 that is set in motion by the slander of the brothers and that o b-
scures the soul with a cloud of rage;
179 that thinks up treachery against a brother;
180 that 
provokes us to strife with the brothers and prevents us from cutting off arguments.
181 
Wanting to repay evil for evil or abuse for abuse and not wanting, through blessings, to 
forget abusive and slanderous thoughts.
182 
 
2.1.3.6 Acedia 
 
The  logismos of  acedia  is especially pernicious and complex, being able to  include 
within  itself  other  logismoi.
183  Lengthy though the  Praktikos  definition  is,  it  merits 
quoting in full: 
 
The demon of acedia, also called the noonday demon,
184 is the most oppressive 
of all the demons. He attacks the monk about the fourth hour,
185and besieges the 
soul until the eighth hour. First of all, he makes it appear that the sun moves 
slowly or not at all, and that the day seems to be fifty hours long. Then he co m-
pels the monk to look constantly towards the windows, to leap out of the cell, to 
watch the sun to see how far it is from the ninth hour, to look this way and that in 
case one of the brothers....
186  
 
                                                 
174 Cf. Ant. 5.35. 
175 Cf. Ant. 5.37. 
176 Cf. Ant. 5.43. 
177 Cf. Ant. 5.40. 
178 Cf. Ant. 5.6. 
179 Cf. Ant. 5.11. 
180 Cf. Ant. 5.20. 
181 Cf. Ant. 5.24. 
182 Cf. Ant. 5.61. 
183 Cf. Sch. 1 on Ps. 139:3, PG 12.1664B. 
184 Cf. Ps. 90: 6; Sinkewicz (2003: 99). 
185 According to Sinkewicz (2003: 99), this would have been 10am. 
186 Prakt. 12.1-9.  
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Guillaumont points out that Evagrius deliberately leaves this last phrase dangling, to 
indicate that, whoever the brother and whatever his business, the distraction would be 
welcome.
187 The definition continues: 
 
And further, he instils in him a dislike for the place and for his state of life itself, 
for manual labour, and also the idea th at love has disappeared from among the 
brothers and there is no one to console him. And should there be someone during 
those days who has offended the monk, this too the demon uses to add further to 
his dislike. He leads him on to a desire (ἄγεη δὲ ʱὐηὸλ θʱὶ εἰο ἐπηζπκίʱλ) for other 
places where he can easily find the wherewithal to meet his needs and pursue a 
trade that is easier and more productive; he adds that pleasing the Lord is not a 
question of being in a particular place: for scripture says that the divinity can be 
worshipped everywhere.
188 He joins to these suggestions the memory of his close 
relations and of his former life; he depicts for him the long course of his lifetime, 
while bringing the burdens of asceticism (ηνὺο η῅ο ἀζθήζεσο πόλνπο) before his 
eyes; and, as the saying has it, he deploys every device in order to have the monk 
leave his cell and flee the stadium. No other demon follows immediately after 
this one: a state of peace and ineffable joy ensues in the soul after this struggle.
189 
 
The Antirrhêtikos entries for acedia include the thought of the demon of acedia that 
hates the manual labour of the skill it knows and wants to learn another by which one 
will be better supported and which will not be so arduous.
190  The thought that com-
plains about the brothers on the pretext that there is no love in them and they do not 
want to console those who are sad and weary.
191 Impatiently expecting to be filled with 
the fruits of knowledge of truth.
192 Loving the world and its affairs.
193 The thought that 
deprives us of reading and instruction in spiritual words, leading us astray as it says, 
―Look, such-and-such holy old man knew only twelve Psalms, and he pleased God‘.
194 
The thought that wants its family and the people of its household and thinks, ―The de-
mon of acedia is stronger than we are, and I cannot defeat the thoughts that come forth 
from it and oppose me.‖
195 The thought that is eager to find another cell for its dwelling 
                                                 
187 Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 440-1). 
188 Cf. John 4: 21-4. 
189 Prakt. 12.9-25. 
190 Cf. Ant. 6.1. 
191 Cf. Ant. 6.30. 
192 Cf. Ant. 6.3. 
193 Cf. Ant. 6.4; cf. also 6.23, 35. 
194 Cf. Ant. 6.5; cf. 6.8. 
195 Cf. Ant. 6.7, 39, 43, 44, 45, 53.  
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place on the pretext that the first one that it had was very foul and full of moisture so 
that it got all kinds of diseases from it.
196 The soul‘s thoughts that have been set in mo-
tion by acedia and want to abandon the holy path of the illustrious ones and its dwelling 
place.
197 Thoughts that reject manual labour and lean the body in sleep a gainst the 
wall.
198 The thought that said that a person can acquire purity and stability apart from 
the monastic life;
199 The thoughts of acedia that are in us on the pretext, ―Look, our rela-
tives are saying about us that it is not on account of God that we have left the world and 
embraced monasticism, but on account of our sins or our weakness, because we could 
not excel in the affairs of the world.‖
200 
 
2.1.3.7 Vainglory 
 
Vainglory consists, in essence, in valuing human esteem and has the ability to attach 
itself to and thereby corrupt virtuous actions,
201 making it particularly tenacious: 
 
Χʱιεπὸλ δηʱθπγεỖλ ηὸλ η῅ο θελνδνμίʱο ινγηζκόλ· ὃ γὰξ πνηεỖο εἰο θʱζʱίξεζηλ 
ʱὐηνῦ ηνῦην ἀξρή ζνη θελνδνμίʱο ἑηέξʱο θʱζίζηʱηʱη.
202 
 
It is difficult to escape the logismos of vainglory, for what you do to rid yourself 
of it becomes for you a new source of vainglory. 
 
The Antirrhêtikos entries for  vainglory include the  desire for the priesthood without 
awareness of the danger it brings;
203 the thought that arouses in me jealousy toward the 
brothers who have received from the Lord the gift of knowledge;
204 performing right-
eousness for the sake of human esteem.
205 The thought that incites us to teach the broth-
                                                 
196 Cf. Ant. 6.26; cf. also 6.15, 24, 33, 39, 44, 52, 53. 
197 Cf. Ant. 6.52. 
198 Cf. Ant. 6.28. 
199 Cf. Ant. 6.41. 
200 Cf. Ant. 6.46. 
201 E.g. 8Th. 7.1-7, 16, 17; Th. 3, 30. 
202 Prakt. 30.1-3. Cf. Prakt. 31: ‗I have noticed that the demon of vainglory is pursued by almost all the 
demons and with the fall of its pursuers it shamelessly comes forward and displays for the monk the 
grandeur of his virtues.‘ 
203 Cf. Ant. 7.3; cf. 7.8, 26, 36, 40. 
204 Cf. Ant. 7.2. 
205 Cf. Ant. 7.4; cf. 7.24, 30, 43..  
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ers and the worldly people when we have not yet acquired health of the soul.
206 The 
thought that compels us to talk a lot about superfluous things;
207 that advises me sternly 
to withdraw from the brotherhood and cloister myself from the brothers, supposing that 
they lead me astray.
208 The temptation to tell the secrets of the monastic life to worldly 
people.
209 The thoughts that entice us to go into the world in order to benefit those who 
see us.
210 The demon that says, ―you are proficient with the gift of healing that you have 
received‖;
211 the vainglorious desire to learn the wisdom of the Greeks;
212 The thought 
that encourages us to persuade our relatives that if we live justly in the monastic life we 
will be worthy of the soul‘s health and knowledge of the truth.
213 The thoughts that re-
quest gifts of healing or knowledge of God;
214 the thoughts that endeavour through a 
sad appearance to reveal our fasting, as if the  nous had been set free and released from 
thoughts of gluttony, in order that it may be bound and held captive by the thought of 
vainglory.
215 
 
2.1.3.8 Pride 
 
Whereas vainglory consists in valuing and desiring the esteem of other people, pride 
consists in an excess of self-esteem, which at its most extreme leads to the denial of 
God.
216 Presumably because of its reliance upon empty self -esteem and its association 
with the denial of God, pride – evidently alone among the logismoi – has no matter.
217  
 
The Antirrhêtikos entries under pride include the following: the thought that says to me, 
―Look, you have become a perfect monk‖;
218 the blasphemous thought that denies God 
and rejects the angel that assists me;
219 the thought that glorifies me on the pretext that 
                                                 
206 Cf. Ant. 7.9; cf. 7.1,13, 29, 41.. 
207 Cf. Ant. 7.12; cf. 7.33 
208 Cf. Ant. 7.11. 
209 Cf. Ant. 7.17. 
210 Cf. Ant. 7.18; cf. 7.20. 
211 Cf. Ant. 7.35 
212 Cf. Ant. 7.37. 
213 Cf. Ant. 7.39. 
214 Cf. Ant. 7.42. 
215 Cf. Ant. 7.32; cf. 7.38. 
216 E.g. Disc. 210. 
217 Cf. Disc. 33. 
218 Cf. Ant. 8.39; also 8.1, 35, 45, 58, 59. 
219 Cf. Ant. 8.3; also 8.5, 7, 9, 10, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 35, 41, 47, 49, 49a, 49d.  
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by my great strength I have cast down demons;
220 the thought that advises scorn of the 
holy fathers on the pretext that they have not laboured in their way of life any more than 
we have.
221 The demon that said to me that all people bless me and that I am the pr o-
genitor of sages.
222 The blasphemous thought that denied the free will that is in us and 
said that we sin and are justified not by our own will and therefore condemnation is not 
decreed justly;
223 the thought that denied God‘s grace.
224 The demon that promises to 
interpret the Scriptures for us.
225 The thought of pride that glorifies me on the pretext 
that I edify souls with a stable way of life and knowledge of God;
226 the thought that at 
a time of severe and  prolonged temptation prevents me from entreating the Lord 
through the brothers.
227 The thoughts that are puffed up against the brothers because of 
our fleshly birth and suppose that it is glorious.
228 The demons that ‗heal‘ the mature 
person of humility (and bring it) to the pride of the sick.
229 The thought that despises a 
brother who does not eat and considers him to be weak on the pretext, ―He is not able to 
stand in the battle when eating, and therefore he has given himself to fasting‖;
230 the 
thought that passed judgment on the one who eats on the pretext, ―It is because he can-
not control himself‖;
231 the thought that glorifies me on the pretext, ―I am able not only 
not to be enslaved to the belly, but also to conquer anger‖;
232 the thought that exalts me 
on the pretext that I have attained perfection in the service of the commandments.
233  
 
2.1.3.9 Summary 
 
The foregoing consideration of how the eight generic logismoi manifest has, in addition 
to revealing much about the way in which Evagrius construes the logismoi, made two 
                                                 
220 Cf. Ant. 8.6, 13, 14, 22, 25, 48. 
221 Cf. Ant. 8.8. 
222 Cf. Ant. 8.15. 
223 Cf. Ant. 8.16. 
224 Cf. Ant. 8.18. 
225 Cf. Ant. 8.26. 
226 Cf. Ant. 8.30. 
227 Cf. Ant. 8.34. 
228 Cf. Ant. 8.37. 
229 Cf. Ant. 8.40. 
230 Cf. Ant. 8.53. 
231 Cf. Ant. 8.54. 
232 Cf. Ant. 8.55. 
233 Cf. Ant. 8.58; cf. also 8.59.  
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things plain. The first is that, as already noted,
234 to experience a logismos is to experi-
ence pathos. Second and relatedly, the logismoi destabilise the movements of the nous 
and soul. This destabilisation is the psychological correlate of the instability of fire and 
the psychological expression of an excess of vital heat. 
 
 
2.1.4  The sequence of the eightfold classification of most generic logismoi 
 
The eightfold classification of generic logismoi appears in the foregoing sequence in the 
Praktikos, Antirrhêtikos and Vices, although in the latter jealousy is inserted between 
vainglory and pride. In Eight Thoughts, the positions of anger and distress are reversed 
but otherwise the sequence remains the same. So what is its rationale? Does it relate to 
the derivation of the logismoi from the parts of the soul or to the way in which the lo-
gismoi are experienced? Evagrius does not tell us, but his disciple, John Cassian,
235 lists 
the eight principal vices in terms which are simply a translation, with glosse s, of Prak-
tikos 6,
236 then later in the same work relates a similar, although more extensive, list of 
vices to the three parts of the soul.
237 In itself this might constitute grounds for attribut-
ing a similar view to Evagrius.
238 However, the evidence reveals that while there might 
be some connection between the sequence and both the derivation of the  logismoi from 
the parts of the soul and the way in which the logismoi are experienced, in both cases 
the connection is somewhat flexible. 
 
2.1.4.1 The derivation of the logismoi from the parts of the soul 
 
For reasons which will become clearer in section 2.2.4, all logismoi would seem basi-
cally to derive from the pathētikon part of the soul. However, Evagrius is unclear about 
their specific attributions. The following list, which is not intended to be exhaustive, 
conveys a general sense of what he says on this subject: 
 
                                                 
234 See above, 2.1.1. 
235 For discussion of the influence exercised by Evagrius upon Cassian see Marsili, S, ―Giovanni Cassiano 
ed Evagrio Pontico‖, Studia Anselmiana 5, Rome 1936.  
236 Cf. Conf. 5:2. 
237 Conf. 24: 15.  
238 Ware, at Lubheid and Russell (1982: 63), citing Cassian, Conf. 24: 15, takes it to do so.  
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(i)  Gluttony derives from the epithumêtikon;
239 
(ii)  Fornication derives from the epithumêtikon;
240 
(iii)  Fornication does not derive from the epithumêtikon;
241 
(iv)  Avarice derives from the epithumêtikon;
242 
(v)  Distress derives from the thumos;
243 
(vi)  Distress affects only rational beings;
244 
(vii)  Anger derives from the thumos;
245 
(viii)  Acedia derives from the epithumêtikon and thumos;
246 
(ix)    Acedia affects only rational beings;
247 
(x)  Vainglory derives from the epithumêtikon;
248 
(xi)  Vainglory affects only rational beings;
249 
(xii)  Pride affects only rational beings;
250 
(xiii)  All logismoi derive from the pathêtikon part of the soul;
251 
(xiv)  Almost all logismoi derive from the pathêtikon part of the soul.
252 
 
Propositions (i), (ii) and (iv) are what we would expect, but (iii) is not, and contradicts 
(ii). It comes from Disciples 69: 
 
ΤξεỖο  εἰζηλ  νἱ  γεληθώηʱηνη  ινγηζκνὶ  νἱ  ἐθ  ηνῦ  ἐπηζπκεηηθνῦ  γηλόκελνη, 
γʱζηξηκʱξγίʱο θʱὶ θηιʱξγπξίʱο θʱὶ θελνδνμίʱο· ἠ γὰξ βξώκʱηʱ ἠ ρξήκʱηʱ ἠ 
δόμʱλ ηηο ἐπηζπκεỖ.
253 
                                                 
239 Cf. Disc. 69, 130. 
240 Cf. Disc. 130, Th. 16. 
241 Implied by Disc. 69. 
242 Cf. Disc. 69, 130. 
243 Cf. Disc. 166. 
244 Cf. Rfl. 40. 
245 Cf., e.g., Prakt 11; Disc. 96.1-2. 
246 Cf. Sch. 13 on Ps. 118.28, Let. 27; see above, 3.2.6. 
247 Cf. Disc. 177. 
248 Cf. Disc. 69, 130. 
249 Cf. Rfl. 40; Th. 18, 28; Disc. 177. 
250 Cf. Th. 18; Disc. 177. 
251 Implied by KG 6.53, 55, 83. 
252 Cf. Th. 3. 
253 Disc. 69.1-4. Cf. Disc. 57.1-5: ‗The monk must despise (θʱηʱθξνλ῅ζʱη) gluttony, avarice and vain-
glory, love of pleasure (θηιεδνλίʱ), and self-love (θηιʱπηίʱ), the mother of all, and also the enemy 
(ἔρζξʱ) of the soul, namely the flesh (ζάξμ), for these are the logismoi in the forefront (νἱ πξνεγνύκελνη 
ινγηζκνί).‘ Cf. Rom. 8:7: ‗[Τhe] mind (θξόλεκʱ) that is set on the flesh is hostile (ἔρζξʱ) to God; it does 
not submit to God's law, indeed it cannot‘.  
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The most generic logismoi that come from the epithumêtikon are three: gluttony, 
avarice and vainglory, for one desires food and money and esteem. 
 
These three logismoi are those whose demons stand in the front line against the prak-
tikoi.
254 Thus the omission of fornication need not be taken as a denial of its epithumetic 
origin but as an affirmation of its dependence upon gluttony.
255 Proposition (v) is again 
what we would expect, but seems to be contradicted by (vi). This, however, assumes 
that the parts of the soul that we share with animals take the same form in them as in us, 
and we have already seen that this is not the case since in humans the  thumos and 
epithumêtikon are rational whereas in animals they are not.
256 This means that there is 
no difficulty with either (vi) or (viii). So far there has appeared to be a straightforward 
correspondence between the sequence of the logismoi and the parts of the soul, but (x) 
dispels this impression. It does however make sense, given that vainglory is in essence 
the desire for esteem.  Again, granting that in humans the pathêtikon part of the soul is 
rational, there is no difficulty with (xi). What about (xii)? Alone among the logismoi 
pride is nowhere assigned by Evagrius to a part of the soul. I believe however that its 
natural home is the logistikon, first because it does not seem to involve, at least in any 
direct way, either epithumia or thumos, and second, because it seems reducible to delu-
sion (about one’s own abilities and one’s dependence upon God), which in turn seems 
naturally to connect it with the ‘contemplative vice’ of false knowledge.
257 
  
It would seem, then, that gluttony, fornication, avarice, and vainglory derive from the 
epithumêtikon; distress and anger from the thumos; acedia from both epithumêtikon and 
thumos and pride from the logistikon. But there are passages that cast doubt on this 
scheme, or at least upon its rigidity. Consider first the following: 
 
Τ῵λ ινγηζκ῵λ νἱ κὲλ, ὡο δώνηο ἟κỖλ ἐπηζπκβʱίλνπζηλ· νἱ δὲ ὡο ἀλζξώπνηο· θʱὶ 
ὡο δώνηο κὲλ, ὅζνη ἀπὸ ἐπηζπκίʱο εἰζὶ θʱὶ ζπκνῦ· ὡο ἀλζξώπνηο δὲ, ὅζνη ἀπὸ 
                                                 
254 Cf. Th. 1.1-6; these are the logismoi with which the devil tempted Jesus in the desert; cf. Luke 4:2-13; 
Matt. 4:3-11. 
255 E.g. Th. 1.6-7. 
256 See above, 2.2.1. 
257 AM 43, 124-6, 134.  
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ιύπεο εἰζὶ θʱὶ θελνδνμίʱο θʱὶ ὑπεξεθʱλίʱο· νἱ δὲ ἐθ η῅ο ἀθεδίʱο, θʱὶ ὡο δώνηο 
θʱὶ ὡο ἀλζξώπνηο κηθηνὶ ὄληεο.
258 
 
Among logismoi, some come to us as animals, others as human beings. [Those 
that come] as animals are all those that derive from epithumia and thumos; [those 
that come to us] as human beings are all those that derive from distress, vainglory 
and pride; those that derive from acedia are mixed, coming to us both as animals 
and as human beings. 
 
This  implies  that  distress  does  not  derive  from  the  thumos  nor  vainglory  from  the 
epithumêtikon. Disciples 177 confirms the derivation from the rational part of the soul 
of acedia, vainglory and pride, but omits distress: 
 
Τξηηηὸλ εἶδνο ινγηζκ῵λ ἐθ ηνῦ ινγηθνῦ ἀλζξώπνπ, ηνπηέζηηλ ἀθεδίʱ, θελνδνμίʱ 
θʱὶ ὑπεξεθʱλίʱ· ἐπηζπκβʱίλνπζη δὲ ἐπὰλ ηνὺο ἐθ η῅ο ἐπηζπκίʱο ἠ ηνῦ ζπκνῦ 
ληθήζῃ ηηο ινγηζκνύο.
259 
 
Three kinds of logismoi come from rational man, namely acedia, vainglory and 
pride, and they supervene when he has triumphed over the logismoi that come 
from epithumia or the thumos. 
 
According to On Thoughts 18 it is vainglory, pride, envy and censoriousness that affect 
humans alone: 
 
Among the impure demons some tempt the human person as a human being; oth-
ers trouble the human person as an irrational animal. The first, when they visit us, 
instil within us noēmata of vainglory or pride or envy or censoriousness – these 
do not touch (ἅπηεηʱη) any irrational beings. When the second class of demons 
draws near (πξνζεγγίδνληεο), they move (θηλνῦζη) our thumos or epithumia in a 
manner contrary to nature (πʱξὰ θύζηλ). These are the pathē which we have in 
common with irrational animals (θνηλὰ ἟κ῵λ ηε θʱὶ η῵λ ἀιόγσλ δῴσλ).
260   
 
On Thoughts 28 confirms the association of vainglory with the logistikon: 
 
Ὅηʱλ  ζπκὸλ  ἠ  ἐπηζπκίʱλ  λύθησξ  ζπληʱξάμʱη  κὴ  δπλεζ῵ζηλ  νἱ  δʱίκνλεο,  ηὸ 
ηεληθʱῦηʱ θελνδνμίʱο ἐλύπληʱ πιάηηνπζη.
261 
                                                 
258 Rfl. 40. 
259 Disc. 177. 
260 Th. 18.1-8. 
261 Th. 28.1-3.  
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When the demons have not been able to trouble the thumos or epithumêtikon at 
night, they then fabricate dreams of vainglory. 
 
On the other hand, Disciples 130 associates vainglory with the epithumêtikon, but with 
some uncertainty: 
 
Vainglory, if it is from the epithumêtikon, is at least the last of the [pathē] of the 
epithumêtikon, but the cause of epithumia in general – gluttony and fornication, 
avarice and vainglory, and the like – is an excess of the natural attachment God 
has given the soul for the body (ὁ πιενλʱζκόο ἐζηη ηνῦ θπζηθνῦ θίιηξνπ νὗ 
ἔδσθελ ὁ ζεὸο ηῆ ςπρῆ πξὸο ηὸ ζ῵κʱ); and through not enduring want and suf-
fering according to nature, but greatly loving oneself, love of pleasure ensues 
(δηὰ ηὸ κὴ θʱξηεξεỖλ ἐλ ηῆ θʱηὰ θύζηλ ἐλδείᾳ θʱὶ πόλῳ, ἀιιὰ ηὸ πνιὺ θηιʱπηεỖλ, 
ἕπεηʱη θʱὶ ηὸ θηιεδνλεỖλ).
262 
 
It would seem then that Evagrius was uncertain regarding the source of some of the  lo-
gismoi.  There  is  no  doubt  that  he  associates  gluttony  and  fornication  with  the 
epithumêtikon and anger with the thumos and that all three affect both humans and ani-
mals. Avarice is associated with the epithumêtikon and distress with the thumos, but both 
affect only humans. Acedia involves the epithumêtikon and thumos and perhaps the lo-
gistikon too, and again affects humans alone. Vainglory and pride also affect humans 
alone. Evagrius says nothing about the source of pride and seems uncertain as to whether 
or not vainglory derives from the epithumêtikon. Finally, the following suggest that all 
logismoi derive from the pathêtikon part of the soul: 
 
Πεηξʱζκόο ἐζηη κνλʱρνῦ ινγηζκὸο δηὰ ηνῦ πʱζεηηθνῦ κέξνπο η῅ο ςπρ῅ο ἀλʱβὰο 
θʱὶ ζθνηίδσλ ηὸλ λνῦλ.
263 
 
The temptation of a monk is a  logismos that rises through the pathêtikon part of 
the soul and darkens the nous. 
 
Ὑπόθεηηʱη ηὸ πάζνο ἐλ ηῆ ςπρῆ, ἐμ νὗ γελλᾶηʱη ὁ ἐκπʱζὴο ινγηζκόο.
264 
 
Pathos lies below in the soul and from it comes the empathês logismos. 
                                                 
262 Disc. 130; cf. Disc. 41: ‗The one who has put away (ἀπνζέκελνο) pathos for the body, that is, that of 
self-love, will easily put away the other pathē as well, such as anger, sadness and so forth.‘ 
263 Prakt. 75. 
264 Disc. 49.3-4. See below, 4.5.  
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The intelligible arrow is the evil logismos, which is constituted by the pathêtikon 
part of the soul.
265 
 
It is when the nous approaches the intelligible that it is no longer united to the lo-
gismos that comes from the pathētikon part of the soul.
266   
 
It is said that the nous sees things that it knows and that it does not see things that 
it does not know; and because of this it is not all thoughts that the knowledge of 
God forbids it, but those which assail it from thumos and epithumia and those 
which are against nature.
267  
 
But chapter 3 of On Thoughts suggests otherwise with its use of ‘almost’ (ζρεδὸλ): 
 
἖θ  γὰξ  η῵λ  δύν  ηνύησλ  πʱζ῵λ  πάληεο  νἱ  δʱηκνληώδεηο  ζρεδὸλ  ζπλίζηʱληʱη 
ινγηζκνὶ νἱ ηὸλ λνῦλ ἐκβάιινληεο «εἰο ὄιεζξνλ θʱὶ ἀπώιεηʱλ».
268 
 
From [the epithumêtikon and thumos] are constituted almost all the demonic lo-
gismoi that cast the nous ‘into ruin and destruction.’
269  
 
In sum, it would seem that although Evagrius generally imputes the logismoi to the pa-
thētikon part of the soul, some – the possible candidates being avarice, distress, acedia, 
vainglory and pride - derive either wholly or partly from the logistikon. The inconsis-
tencies in Evagrius‘ associations of the logismoi with the parts of the soul perhaps rep-
resent inconsistencies or developments in his thought. But it is possible too that they 
reflect the nature of the subject-matter as he sees it, in particular the lack of any clear 
boundary between the cognitive and the affective in his psychology given that the three 
parts of the soul are but progressively more fallen aspects of the nous, such that he is 
seeking only the degree of precision that discourse about the logismoi admits of. Also, 
while he clearly values rigour and consistency, his final appeal is always to experi-
ence.
270 Consequently his use of classificatory schemata retains a degree of flexibility, 
                                                 
265 KG 6.53; cf. KG 4.32: ‗The lobe of the liver (Ex. 29:13) is the first thought that is constituted by the 
concupiscient part of the soul‘. 
266 KG 6.55. 
267 KG 6.83. 
268 Th. 3.5-7. 
269 1 Tim. 6:9. 
270 Cf. Th. 25.3-4.  
Page 128 of 268 
 
such that while he will have reason to assign a given logismos to a given part of the 
soul, his doing so should not be taken as either fixed or exclusive. 
 
2.1.4.2 The relation between the sequence of the eightfold classification of most generic 
logismoi and how they are experienced 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two timescales over which a person will experience the lo-
gismoi: the local one of his daily experience and the global one of his lifetime. Eva-
grius’ focus is upon the former; that is, upon the causal relations between the logismoi 
as experienced day to day. He follows the account of Jesus’ temptation in the desert in 
assigning priority to three: 
 
Among the demons who set themselves in opposition to praktikê, the ones ranged 
first in battle are those entrusted with the appetites of gluttony, those who make 
suggestions of avarice to us and those who entice us to seek human esteem (η῵λ 
ἀληηθεηκέλσλ δʱηκόλσλ ηῆ πξʱθηηθῆ, πξ῵ηνη θʱηὰ ηὸλ πόιεκνλ ζπλίζηʱληʱη νἱ 
ηὰο  γʱζηξηκʱξγίʱο  ὀξέμεηο  πεπηζηεπκέλνη  θʱὶ  νἱ  ηὴλ  θηιʱξγπξίʱλ  ἟κỖλ 
ὑπνβάιινληεο θʱὶ νἱ πξὸο ηὴλ η῵λ ἀλζξώπσλ δόμʱλ ἟κᾶο ἐθθʱινύκελνη). All the 
other demons march along behind these and in their turn take up the people 
wounded  by  them  (νἱ  δὲ  ἄιινη  πάληεο  θʱηόπηλ  ηνύησλ  βʱδίδνπζηλ  ηνὺο  ὑπὸ 
ηνύησλ ηηηξσζθνκέλνπο δηʱδερόκελνη). For example, it is not possible to fall into 
the hands of the spirit of fornication unless one has fallen under the influence of 
gluttony; nor is it possible to trouble (ηʱξάμʱη) the thumos, unless one is fighting 
for food or wealth or esteem.
271 And it is not possible to escape the demon of dis-
tress, if one is deprived of all these things, or is unable to attain them. Nor will 
one escape pride...if one has not banished avarice, the root of all evils
272...To put 
it briefly, no one can fall into a demon’s power, unless he has first been wounded 
by those in the front line.
273 
 
On the causal priority of gluttony, avarice and vainglory, Williams notes that 
 
[these three passions] are the three fundamental ways in which we can misjudge 
our relation with the material world, three forms  of seeing physical reality in 
terms of pleasure or power – the direct absorption of matter in order to please the 
stomach, the accumulation of wealth of whatever kind to create false security, re-
                                                 
271 Cf. Disc. 97. 
272 1 Tim. 6:10. 
273 Th. 1.1-17.  
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liance on worldly rather than heavenly strength, and the use of other people’s 
opinions to guarantee our own sense of worth.
274 
 
Some of these causal dependences that Evagrius here specifies are familiar: to succumb 
to logismoi of gluttony is to invite those of fornication.
275 Logismoi of distress often re-
sult from the frustration of desires, including those related to anger. Others are new: an-
ger – a troubled thumos – relates to the desire for food, wealth or esteem,
276 while pride 
has roots in avarice.
277 And some connections are omitted, for example the fact that  lo-
gismoi of distress can lead to those of acedia,
278 those of avarice to those of vainglory 
and the latter to those of pride,
279 distress or fornication.  
 
The causal relations among the  logismoi are also the subject of a chain of three apho-
risms in Reflections; that these refer to the everyday experience of the logismoi is indi-
cated by the quotation from the Book of Proverbs in the third: 
 
Τ῵λ  ινγηζκ῵λ  νἱ  κὲλ  ἟γνῦληʱη,  νἱ  δὲ  ἕπνληʱη·  θʱὶ  ἟γνῦληʱη  κὲλ  νἱ  ἐθ  η῅ο 
ἐπηζπκίʱο,
280 ἕπνληʱη δὲ νἱ ἐθ ηνῦ ζπκνῦ.
281 
 
Among logismoi, there are some that lead and there are some that follow: those 
that derive from epithumia are in the lead and those that derive from thumos fol-
low after. 
                                                 
274 Williams (2007: 4). 
275 See above, 2.4; 3.4.1, 2. 
276 Cf. Pry. 27: ‗Desire provides material for anger, and the latter in turn troubles the intellectual eye, 
spoiling the state of prayer‘. Also Disc. 166: ‗Logismoi that derive from epithumia are in the forefront, 
those that derive from the thumos follow after. And so all logismoi that produce in us love of the world 
and the things in it (cf. 1 John 2:15) derive from epithumia, but with the privation of these things [the 
logismoi] from the thumos naturally supervene, so that if we neither loved nor desired [the things in the 
world] we would never become angry through being deprived of them. If therefore you see someone an-
gry or resentful or distressed or jealous, find out by which of the pathē of epithumia he has previously 
been overpowered.‘ (Οἱ η῅ο ἐπηζπκίʱο ινγηζκνὶ πξνεγνύκελνί εἰζηλ, νἱ δὲ ἐθ ηνῦ ζπκηθνῦ ἑπόκελνη. Ὅζνη 
νὖλ ινγηζκνὶ ἀγάπελ ἐκπνηνῦζηλ ἟κỖλ πξὸο ηὸλ θόζκνλ θʱὶ ηὰ ἐλ ʱὐηῶ η῅ο ἐπηζπκίʱο εἰζί· θʱηὰ ζηέξεζηλ 
δὲ ηνύησλ πεθύθʱζηλ νἱ ηνῦ ζπκηθνῦ ἐπηζπκβʱίλεηλ, ὥζηε εἰ νπδὲλ ἞γʱπ῵κελ ἠ ἐπεζπκνῦκελ, νὐθ ἂλ 
ὠξγηδόκεζά πνηε, ζηεξηζθόκελνη ηνύησλ. ἖ὰλ νὖλ ἴδῃο ηηλὰ ὀξγηδόκελνλ ἠ κλεζηθʱθνῦληʱ ἠ ιππνύκελνλ 
ἠ θζνλνῦληʱ, γίλσζθε πνίνπ η῵λ η῅ο ἐπηζπκίʱο πʱζ῵λ πξνεηηήζε.) 
277 Cf. Th. 21.12-22, quoted below. 
278 See above, 3.4.4. Interestingly, acedia is not mentioned in On Thoughts. 
279 Cf. Th. 21. 
280 Some manuscripts read ὑπεξεθʱλίʱο, but the reading ἐπηζπκίʱο is supported by two Greek manuscripts 
and the Syriac version, and I agree with Sinkewicz as to its greater plausibility; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 278, 
n.26; 304). 
281 Rfl. 41.  
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Τ῵λ  ἟γνπκέλσλ  ινγηζκ῵λ  νἱ  κὲλ  πάιηλ  πξνεγνῦληʱη,  νἱ  δὲ  ἕπνληʱη·  θʱὶ 
πξνεγνῦληʱη κὲλ, νἱ ἐθ η῅ο γʱζηξηκʱξγίʱο, ἕπνληʱη δὲ νἱ η῅ο πνξλείʱο.
282 
 
Among the logismoi that lead, some in turn are in the forefront, while others fol-
low on: those in the forefront come from gluttony and those that follow derive 
from fornication. 
 
Τ῵λ  ἑπνκέλσλ  ινγηζκ῵λ  ηνỖο  πξώηνηο  νἱ  κὲλ  ἟γνῦληʱη,  νἱ  δὲ  ἕπνληʱη·  θʱὶ 
἟γνῦληʱη κὲλ νἱ η῅ο ιύπεο, ἕπνληʱη δὲ νἱ ἐθ η῅ο ὀξγ῅ο· εἴγε, θʱηὰ ηὴλ πʱξνηκίʱλ, 
ιόγνο ιππεξὸο ἐγείξεη ὀξγάο.
283 
 
Among the logismoi that follow the first, some lead and some follow: those of 
distress lead and those of anger follow, according to the Proverb, ‘A hurtful word 
rouses anger’.
284  
 
The second aphorism’s subdivision of the logismoi that lead into those in the forefront 
and those that follow on is new, as is the idea of logismoi that derive from fornication. 
Both appear to be unique to it. The third is inconsistent with Evagrius’ claim that dis-
tress is constituted from logismoi of anger and results from the frustration of a desire for 
revenge,
285 although consistent with the sequence of the logismoi in the Praktikos, Vices 
and Antirrhêtikos. All three confirm the causal priority of epithumetic logismoi over 
those deriving from the thumos. 
 
Just as gluttony forms the natural beginning of the sequence in experiential terms, so 
vainglory and pride form its natural conclusion: 
 
Μόλνη η῵λ ινγηζκ῵λ νἱ η῅ο θελνδνμίʱο θʱὶ ὑπεξεθʱλίʱο κεηὰ ηὴλ ἥηηʱλ η῵λ 
ινηπ῵λ ινγηζκ῵λ, ἐππζπκβʱίλνπζη ινγηζκνί.
286 
 
Alone among the logismoi, the logismoi of vainglory and pride supervene upon 
the defeat of the remaining logismoi. 
 
                                                 
282 Rfl. 42. 
283 Rfl. 43. 
284 Prov. 15.1. 
285 Cf. 8Th. 5.1. 
286 Rfl. 57.  
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Chapter 21 of On Thoughts gives an example of how one logismos can lead to another, 
in this case avarice into vainglory and the latter into pride. In doing so it underlines the 
independence of such trains of thought from the eightfold sequence.  
 
It appears to me that the demon of avarice is the most varied and ingenious in de-
ceit (πάλπ πνηθίινο…πξὸο ἀπάηελ εὐκήρʱλνο). Often constrained by the most 
severe  renunciation,  he  immediately  pretends  to  be  the  administrator  and  the 
friend of the poor; he generously receives guests who are not yet there; he sends 
assistance to others who are in need; he visits the city‘s prisons and he buys those 
who are being sold; he attaches himself (θνιιᾶηʱη) to wealthy women and indi-
cates to them who should be treated well; and those who have acquired an ample 
purse he advises to renounce it. And deceiving the soul little by little in this way, 
he encompasses it (ʱὐηὴλ…πεξηβάιιεη) with the logismoi of avarice and hands it 
over (πʱξʱδίδσζη) to the demon of vainglory. This demon introduces a crowd of 
people  who  glorify  the  Lord  for  these  arrangements  and  certain  people  who 
gradually speak among themselves about the priesthood; he then predicts the 
death  of  the  incumbent  priest  and  adds  that  he  should  not  flee  after 
accomplishing  so  many  things.  In  this  way,  the  wretched  nous,  now  bound 
(ἐλδεζεὶο) by these logismoi attacks those people opposed (to his priesthood), but 
those offering acceptance he readily lavishes with gifts and approves their good 
sense; but those who are rivals he hands over to the magistrates and demands that 
they be expelled from the city.
287 
 
Here Evagrius exposes the hidden motivations behind apparently philanthropic fanta-
sies. What we would call self-deception is in the first instance, the demons‘ deception of 
us; only if we fail to recognise it do we then fall prey to self-deception. Here they ex-
ploit the monk‘s philanthropic concerns to seduce him into daydreams in which he be-
gins by acting upon them and thereby benefits their objects but ends up in daydreams of 
self-aggrandizement and skulduggery. Nor is this the end of it: 
 
Then  as  these  logismoi  are  present  and  churning  around  within  (ἔλδνλ 
ὄλησλ…θʱὶ ζηξεθνκέλσλ), immediately the demon of pride appears, forming 
continual lightning flashes in the air of the cell and sending forth winged drag-
ons, and finally provoking the loss of reason (ζηέξεζηλ θξελ῵λ).
288 
 
In terms of how the logismoi are experienced day to day, then, gluttony is the most fun-
damental in that succumbing to it causes vulnerability to all the other logismoi: to con-
                                                 
287 Th. 21.1-12. 
288 Th. 21.22-26.  
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trol the stomach is to diminish the pathē whereas to accede to its demands is to give in-
crease to pleasures.
289 At the other end of the sequence, defeat of the preceding logismoi 
paves the way for vainglory and pride. So there are certain predictable causal connec-
tions among the logismoi but they do not always correspond to the sequence of the 
eightfold  classification.  In  particular  the  priority  of  gluttony,  avarice  and  vainglory 
bears no obvious relation to it.  
 
What about the way in which the logismoi are experienced over a lifetime? Will a per-
son have to begin by overcoming those of gluttony, then deal with those of fornication, 
then avarice, and so forth, until finally he is confronted with pride? Both Guillaumont 
and Ware note that the sequence of the eightfold classification reflects in a general way 
the  monk’s  spiritual  development.  As  Ware  puts  it,  ‘beginners  contend  against  the 
grosser and more materialistic sins...those in the middle of the journey are confronted 
by the more inward temptations of discouragement and irritability...the more advanced, 
already initiated into contemplation, still need to guard themselves against the most sub-
tle and ‚spiritual‛ of the vices, vainglory and pride.
290 Both however stress the general-
ity of this schema, Guillaumont noting that although the sequence has to some extent an 
empirical basis it is also largely a matter of convention since for Evagrius the reality is 
ultimately not susceptible of such systematic representation.
291 Both of these interpreta-
tions are, in my view, correct, as is Williams’ observation that for Evagrius as for Cas-
sian, ‘the logismoi…are not a disconnected assemblage of regrettable tendencies, but a 
complex pattern of moral vulnerability. The list of the eight passions or thoughts is less 
of a catalogue than a genealogy, beginning from the most elementary impulse to misuse 
the material world we inhabit, and  traced through to the most sophisticated of self-
delusions.’
292 
 
 
   
                                                 
289 Cf. 8Th. 1.2. 
290 Ware (1982: 62-3). Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 93);  
291 Ibid. 
292 Williams (2007: 7).  
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2.1.5  Summary 
 
What Evagrius calls the logismoi play a key role in his anthropology and psychology. 
This section has sought to reconstruct and explain the theory implicit in his use of the 
term. It began by noting that apatheia, being constituted by the practical virtues,
293 is 
cultivated by choosing virtue in preference to vice and that for a monk this means ma s-
tering his responses to the  logismoi. It then examined Evagrius‘ use of the term logis-
mos. It noted that, following Origen, he recognises that logismoi can be of angelic or 
human provenance as well as demonic, but that in practice he reserves the term for the 
latter type. It was noted that (demonic) logismoi are always associated with pathos, al-
ways involve noēmata of sensible objects, frequently exercise de facto agency, and in-
duce us to construct on the basis of our desires fictional worlds, populated by phantoms, 
in which those desires can be satisfied. Evagrius‘ concept of the ‗matter‘ of logismoi 
was discussed and identified as that which inspires and gives plausibility to the logismoi 
and thereby invigorates the fictional worlds that they lead us to construct. Then his 
eightfold classification of generic logismoi was examined, including consideration of its 
immediate precedents and of the individual logismoi. Because of the close association 
between the logismoi and pathos, this revealed the sort of phenomena that Evagrius re-
gards as pathē and how the logismoi destabilise the movements of the nous and soul, 
this destabilisation being the psychological expression of excessive vital heat. Finally, 
the rationale for the eightfold classification of generic logismoi was discussed, first in 
terms of the derivation of the logismoi from the parts of the soul, it being concluded that 
for the most part there is no straightforward relation between them and that this reflects 
the lack of a clear-cut boundary between the cognitive and the affective in Evagrius‘ 
psychology;
294 and, second, in terms of the relation between the sequence and the way 
in which the logismoi are experienced, both day-to-day and across a person‘s lifetime. It 
was noted that while the sequence is largely a matter of convention, it is also a geneal-
ogy that maps the progression from the most primitive ways of erring in our interaction 
with the external world to the most sophisticated. 
 
 
                                                 
293 Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31. 
294 See below, 2.2.4.  
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2.2  Pathos 
 
Pathos involves the directedness of the nous toward the sensible world and so away 
from  God. Each time a person succumbs to it  he  mirrors the primordial  fall of the 
logikos that is his essence. The cognitive instigators and correlates of pathos are the lo-
gismoi, consideration of which has, accordingly, comprehensively illustrated the sort of 
phenomena that Evagrius regards as pathē. This section looks at how pathos was under-
stood by some earlier thinkers before considering how Evagrius construes it in theoreti-
cal terms. Then the association between pathos and noēmata is examined. The section 
concludes with an analysis of how pathos is aroused. 
 
 
2.2.1  A preliminary understanding of pathos 
 
The sense of the term pathos assumed in pagan philosophical discussions of apatheia 
and metriopatheia tends to be treated by modern commentators as roughly coextensive 
with that of our ‗emotion‘ or ‗passion‘. But in fact pathos has a far wider range of con-
notations and the fit between it and these modern terms is poor. Long and Sedley draw 
attention to this in the case of the Stoics, noting that for them pathos is ‗an unhealthy 
state of mind, not synonymous with emotion in ordinary language.‘
295 This is equally 
true of Evagrius, for whom, as we have seen, the pathē include not just occurrent emo-
tions such as anger, sadness and anxiety, but moods such as boredom and listlessness; 
dispositions such as irascibility; all desires associated with food, sex and money, and 
vices such as avarice and spiritual pride.   
 
So what did the term pathos mean to the ancient Greeks? As Konstan notes, the word 
pathos derives from the verb paschô, meaning ‚to suffer‛ or ‚to experience‛, and, like 
the Latin patior, to which it is related, derives from a prehistoric stem *pa which has the 
basic sense of ‚suffer‛. Via patior it is related to the English words ‚passion‛ and ‚pas-
sive.‛
296 Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen note that  
 
                                                 
295 Long & Sedley (1987: 420). 
296 Konstan (2006: 3).  
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The basic meaning of the term pathos is not ‗emotion‘; pathos stands for a much 
more general notion which covers all accidental and contingent changes that hap-
pen to somebody in contrast to what he or she actively does. The broad sense of 
pathos, familiar from Aristotle‘s Categories and Metaphysics, comes out in trans-
lations such as ‗affection‘, ‗experience‘, ‗undergoing‘ or ‗attribute‘ as opposed to 
‗emotion‘ or even ‗passion‘.
297  
 
But in addition it can, as Aristotle makes clear, have a distinctively negative timbre: the 
third of the four definitions of it that he offers in the Metaphysics reads, ‗especially, in-
jurious alterations and movements, and, above all, painful injuries‘ (ἔηη ηνύησλ κᾶιινλ 
ʱἱ  βιʱβεξʱὶ  ἀιινηώζεηο  θʱὶ  θηλήζεηο,  θʱὶ  κάιηζηʱ  ʱἰ  ιππεξʱὶ  βιάβʱη).
298  Konstan 
summarises its meaning as follows: 
 
In classical Greek, pathos may refer more generally to what befalls a person, often 
in the negative sense of an accident or misfortune, although it may also bear the 
neutral significance of a condition or state of affairs. In philosophical language pa-
thos sometimes signifies a secondary quality as opposed to the essence of a thing 
(cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1022b15-21; Urmson 1990: 126-7).
299 Psychologically, 
it may denote a mental activity or phenomenon such as remembering (Aristotle, 
De memoria et reminiscentia, 449b4-7; cf. 449b24-5 for memory as the pathos of 
formerly perceived or contemplated things).
300  
 
So pathos carries connotations of passivity and suffering; of being a contingent or acci-
dental state which arises in reaction to an external stimulus toward which it is conse-
quently directed and which is likely to be injurious to the person concerned, and which 
is something that befalls him rather than something he actually does. And this in es-
sence is how philosophers construe it in relation to apatheia and metriopatheia. Regard-
less of which of these they consider the proper goal for man, and regardless too of the 
other issues which became embroiled in the associated controversies, it would seem that 
these basic characteristics of pathos are agreed upon. 
 
There is however one key point at which this philosophical understanding of pathos de-
parts from its more general cluster of meanings: as evidenced by the fact that philoso-
                                                 
297 Sihvola & Engberg-Pedersen (1998: viii). 
298 Met. 1022b18-19, trans. W D Ross. 
299 Urmson, J O, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, London 1990. 
300 Konstan (2006: 3-4).  
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phers debated whether man‘s goal should be apatheia or metriopatheia, they maintained 
that our susceptibility to pathos could be modified and denied that it is something that 
simply befalls us as opposed to something that we do. The philosophical view, although 
variously developed, is that the pathē are in principle, if not always in practice, under 
our control. The bridge between what is actually possible and what is possible in theory 
is formed by the training of the soul, of which more below.
301 This being the case, the 
association of pathos with passivity needs to be qualified: the soul can be trained not to 
succumb to pathos and a soul thus trained can avoid passivity in respect of it. So al-
though pathos in this context retains its connotations of passivity and suffering; of being 
a contingent or accidental state which arises in reaction to an external stimulus toward 
which it is consequently directed, and of likely being injurious to the person concerned, 
the proposition that it is something that befalls a person as opposed to something he 
does is rejected.  
 
All of these features of pathos are to be found in Evagrius‘ understanding of it. A brief 
consideration of its principal antecedents - the views of the Stoics, Clement of Alexan-
dria and Origen - will set it in context.  
 
According to Stobaeus, 
 
πάζνο δ’εἶλʱη θʱζηλ ὁξκὴλ πιενλάδνπζʱλ θʱὶ ἀπεηζ῅ ηῶ ʱἱξνῦληη ιόγῳ ἠ θίλεζηλ 
ςπρ῅ο <ἄινγνλ> πʱξὰ θύζηλ (εἶλʱη δὲ πάζε πάληʱ ηνῦ ἟γεκνληθνῦ η῅ο ςπρ῅ο).
 302 
 
[The Stoics] say that pathos is impulse which is excessive and disobedient to the 
dictates of reason, or a movement of the soul which is irrational and contrary to 
nature; and that all pathē belong to the soul‘s hêgemonikon.
303 
 
What does this mean? For the Stoics a pathos is a movement of the soul in virtue of be-
ing an impulse. It is characterised by excess. As an impulse it is generated by assent to a 
proposition and can therefore be identified with a judgement ascribing a truth value to 
it. In this sense, a pathos is a value judgement. It is however a false one since it ascribes 
positive or negative value  to things whose value is indifferent. As false judgements 
                                                 
301 See below, 4.6. 
302 Stobaeus 2:88, SVF 3.378; LS 65A (trans. theirs). 
303 By ‗the Stoics‘ here and below is meant ‗orthodox Stoics‘.  
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pathē are irrational in the sense of being disobedient to right reason,
304 and are contrary 
to nature because it is natural for man, as a rational animal, to follow right reason.
305  
The association of pathos with excess is closely connected with its irrationality. Galen 
reports the following elucidation by Chrysippus of what is meant by saying  that the 
impulse constituting a pathos is excessive: 
 
νἷνλ ἐπὶ ηνῦ πνξεύεζζʱη θʱζ’ ὁξκὴλ νὐ πιενλάδεη ἟ η῵λ ζθει῵λ θίλεζηο ἀιιὰ 
ζπλʱπʱξηίδεη ηη ηῆ ὁξκῆ ὥζηε θʱὶ ζη῅λʱη, ὅηʱλ ἐζέιῃ, θʱὶ κεηʱβάιιεηλ. ἐπὶ δὲ η῵λ 
ηξερόλησλ θʱζ’ ὁξκὴλ νὐθέηη ηνηνῦηνλ γίλεηʱη, ἀιιὰ πιενλάδεη πʱξὰ ηὴλ ὁξκήλ ἟ 
η῵λ ζθει῵λ θίλεζηο ὥζηε ἐθθέξεζζʱη θʱὶ κὴ κεηʱβάιιεηλ εὐπεηζ῵ο νὕησο εὐζὺο 
ἐλʱξμʱκέλσλ. ʱἷο νἶκʱί ηη πʱξʱπιήζηνλ θʱὶ ἐπὶ η῵λ ὁξκ῵λ γίλεζζʱη δηὰ ηὸ ηὴλ 
θʱηὰ  ιόγνλ  ὑπεξβʱίλεηλ  ζπκκεηξίʱλ,  ὥζζ’  ὅηʱλ  ὁξκᾷ  κὴ  εὐπεηζ῵ο  ἔρεηλ  πξὸο 
ʱὐηόλ, ἐπὶ κὲλ ηνῦ δξόκνπ ηνῦ πιενλʱζκνῦ πʱξὰ ηὴλ ὁξκήλ, ἐπὶ δὲ η῅ο ὁξκ῅ο 
πʱξὰ ηὸλ ιόγνλ.  ζπκκεηξίʱ γὰξ ἐζηη θπζηθ῅ο ὁξκ῅ο ἟ θʱηὰ ηὸλ ιόγνλ θʱὶ ἕσο 
ηνζνύηνπ <νὗ> [θʱὶ ἕσο] ʱὐηὸο ἀμηνỖ.
306 
 
When someone walks in accordance with his impulse, the movement of his legs is 
not excessive but commensurate with the impulse, so that he can stop or change 
whenever he wants to. But when people run in accordance with their impulse, this 
sort of thing no longer happens. The movement of their legs exceeds their impulse, 
so that they are carried away and unable to change obediently, as soon as they 
have started to do so. Something similar, I think, takes place with impulses, owing 
to their going beyond the rational proportion. The result is that when someone has 
the impulse he is not obedient to reason. The excess in running is called ‗contrary 
to the impulse‘, but the excess in the impulse is called ‗contrary to reason‘. For the 
proportion of a natural impulse is what accords with reason and goes only so far as 
reason itself thinks right.
307 
 
Impulses have a ‘proper and natural proportion’ (θʱζ’ ʱὑηνὺο θʱὶ θπζηθὴλ η῵λ ὁξκ῵λ 
ζπκκεηξίʱλ).
308 An impulse that accords with this will be perfectly obed ient to reason 
whereas one that exceeds it will not. Chrysippus illustrates this with reference to the 
actions of walking and running. When a person walks, the movement of his body is 
fully  under  his  control.  But  when  he  runs  his  control  over  his  movement  is 
compromised such that there will be an interval between his decision to stop running 
and his actually doing so. An impulse of ‘proper and natural proportion’ is like the 
                                                 
304 Cf. Inwood (1985: 157). 
305 Cf. Galen, PHP 4:2.10ff, SVF 3: 462, LS 65J. 
306 PHP 4:2.10-18, SVF 3.463, part; LS 65J. 
307 Trans. Long and Sedley. 
308 Ibid.  
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action of walking, wholly and immediately obedient to reason, whereas an excessive 
impulse is like the action of running, beyond the agent’s immediate control.  
 
Proneness to pathē arises from poor condition of the soul; specifically, poor pneumatic 
tension of the hegemonikon.
309 This, together with the irrationality and excessiveness of 
the  impulses  which  constitute  pathē  is  why  they  are  regarded  as  ailments 
(ἀξξσζηήκʱηʱ).  Chrysippus  cites  in  this  connection  the  case  of  Menelaus  who had 
resolved that it would be correct to kill Helen when he confronted her at Troy, but when 
the time came was overcome by her beauty so that he failed to act in accordance with 
his resolve.
310 ‚Menelaus acted on what he saw to be a bad reason because his whole 
character was weak; an impulse was excessive in him which a stronger character might 
have resisted.‛
311 The false opinion that possessions, for example, are a good is not yet 
an ailment, but it becomes so when it becomes love of property (θηινρξεκʱηίʱ) and 
money  (θηιʱξγπξίʱ),  that  is,  when  it  acquires  an  affective  charge,
312  people with 
unhealthy souls being disposed to this happening.  Thus Galen reports Chrysippus as 
comparing the souls of inferior men with bodies which are especially prone to illness.
313  
 
The Stoic understanding of  pathos  is  taken  up by both  Clement of Alexandria and 
Origen. Clement defines it as follows: 
 
ὁξκὴ κὲλ νὖλ θνξὰ δηʱλνίʱο ἐπί ηη ἠ ἀπό ηνπ· πάζνο δὲ πιενλάδνπζʱ ὁξκὴ ἠ 
ὑπεξηείλνπζʱ ηὰ θʱηὰ ηὸλ ιόγνλ κέηξʱ, ἠ ὁξκὴ ἐθθεξνκέλε θʱὶ ἀπεηζὴο ιόγῳ· 
πʱξὰ θύζηλ νὖλ θίλεζηο ςπρ῅ο θʱηὰ ηὴλ πξὸο ηὸλ ιόγνλ ἀπείζεηʱλ ηὰ πάζε.
314 
 
Impulse is the motion of the dianoia to or from something. Pathos is an excessive 
impulse that overreaches the measures of reason, or impulse unbridled and disobe-
dient to reason. Pathê, then, are a movement of the soul contrary to nature, in dis-
obedience to reason.  
 
Origen commences the third book of the De Principiis with an account of the Stoic the-
ory of action, of which their theory of pathos is an aspect. So although he does not say 
                                                 
309 Cf. Annas (1992: 106). 
310 Cf. Annas (1992: 107). 
311 Annas (1992: 107). 
312 PHP 4:5, SVF 3.480, part; LS 65L. 
313 PHP 5:2, Posidonius fr. 163, part; LS 65R. Cf. Stobaeus 2:93 (SVF 3.421); LS 65S. 
314 Strom. 2.13.59.6.  
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so directly, it can be assumed that he too would regard pathos as excessive impulse; he 
certainly associates it with excess. Arguing that even in the absence of demonic influ-
ence we are capable of exceeding due measure and moderation in our appetites for food, 
drink and sex, he notes that 
 
My own opinion is that the same process of reasoning can be applied to the rest of 
the natural movements (naturalibus motibus), such as covetousness, anger, sorrow 
or any others whatever, which by the fault of intemperance exceed the limits of 
their natural measure (per intemperantiae vitium modum mensurae naturalis exce-
dunt).
315 
 
He continues: 
 
Initia quidem et velut quaedam semina peccatorum ab his rebus, quae in usu natu-
raliter habentur, accipimus; cum vero indulserimus ultra quam satis est et non res-
titerimus  adversum  primos  intemperantiae  motus,  tunc  primi  huius  delicti  ac-
cipiens locum virtus inimica instigat et perurget omni modo studens profusius di-
latare peccata, nobis quidem hominibus occasiones et initia praebentibus peccato-
rum, inimicis autem potestatibus latius ea et longius et si fieri potest absque ullo 
fine propagantibus. Ita denique in avaritiam lapsus efficitur, cum primo homines 
parum quid pecuniae desiderant, deinde augescente vitio cupiditas increscit. Post 
haec iam etiam cum caecitas menti ex passione successerit, inimicis virtutibus 
suggerentibus ac perurgentibus, pecunia iam non desideratur, sed rapitur et vi aut 
etiam sanguinis humani profusione conquiritur.
316 
 
We derive the beginnings and what we may call the seeds of sin from those desires 
which are given to us naturally for our own use. But when we indulge these to ex-
cess and offer no resistance to the first movements towards intemperance, then the 
hostile power, seizing the opportunity of this first offence, incites and urges us on 
in every way, striving to extend the sins over a larger field; so that while we men 
supply the occasions and beginnings of our sins, the hostile powers spread them 
far and wide and if possible endlessly. It is thus that the fall into avarice at last 
takes place, men first longing for a little money and then increasing in greed as the 
vice grows. Afterwards their pathos is succeeded by a mental blindness and, with 
the  hostile  powers  stimulating  and  urging  them  on,  money  is  now  not  merely 
longed for but even seized by force or acquired through the shedding of human 
blood.  
 
                                                 
315 DP 3.2.2 (R). 
316 Ibid.  
Page 140 of 268 
 
It can be noted that here Origen uses Seneca‘s term for the first stage in the arousal of 
anger, namely ‗first movements‘ (primi motus).
317  
 
 
2.2.2  Evagrius’ understanding of pathos 
 
Prima facie Evagrius‘ understanding of pathos would seem to have much in common 
with that of the Stoics. He would agree that a pathos is excessive and disobedient to 
reason, irrational and contrary to  nature, and that in a sense all pathē belong to the 
hêgemonikon. Like the Stoics he regards a pathos as a movement of the soul; indeed, for 
him  the  association  of  pathos  with  movement  is  fundamental,  firstly  because  each 
episode of pathos mirrors the primordial fall of the logikoi from God, and secondly 
because  pathos  is  intrinsically  destabilising  in  respect  of  the  nous.  Unlike  them, 
however, he does not speak of  pathos as an impulse.
318 Nor does he speak of it as 
generated by an assent to a proposition or as a judgement, although he might agree that 
it could in principle be analysed in this way due to his belief that the  pathêtikon part of 
the soul is simply thickened nous, meaning that for him as for the Stoics the human soul 
is – in principle at least - entirely rational. Like the Stoics, Evagrius believes the quality 
of human rationality to be variable; for them this is due to the tonos of the pneuma; for 
him, to the ‗thickening‘ of the nous. Evagrius would certainly agree that the judgement 
giving rise to a pathos represents a false evaluation, but he would understand this as a 
tacit preference for the sensible world over God. Because he holds the three parts of the 
soul to be aspects of the nous, and because he identifies the hêgemonikon with the nous, 
he could agree that all pathē belong to the hêgemonikon. Both Evagrius and the Stoics 
view human irrationality as a change to rationality rather than its absence, although, 
unlike Evagrius, orthodox Stoicism rejects the theory of psychic partition, and  both 
regard human irrationality, and therefore pathos, as contrary to nature and as a malady 
of the soul.
319 
 
                                                 
317 De Ira 2.4.1. 
318 The word hormê occurs only five times in his Greek corpus: in the expressions ‗impassioned impulse‘ 
(ὁξκ῅ο ἐκπʱζνῦο; 8Th. 1.35) and ‗licentious impulse‘ (ὁξκὴλ ἀθόιʱζηνλ; 8Th. 2.11); to denote the 
onrush of fire (ὁξκὴ ππξόο; AV. 37); assaults by the demons (ηὰο η῵λ δʱηκόλσλ ὁξκάο; Prakt. 77.1) and 
attacks by the impious (ὁξκὰο ἀζεβ῵λ ἐπεξρνκέλʱο; Th. 27.31). 
319 E.g. PHP 4.5.21-5 (SVF 3.480, part); LS 65L.  
Page 141 of 268 
 
Evagrius nowhere defines pathos but attention to his writings reveals that for him it re-
tains its traditional associations with excess, passivity and changeability in respect of an 
external influence, directedness to a causative external stimulus and injuriousness to the 
agent, and for him too the agent is responsible for his pathê. The passivity and change-
ability in respect of an external influence characteristic of pathos are properties of the 
empathês nous in relation to the sensible world. Pathos renders the nous passive and 
changeable in relation to the external world by ‗binding‘ it to it.
320 Disciples 112 reports 
the following teaching: 
 
Οὐ ηὸ ἔρεηλ πξάγκʱηʱ βιάπηεη ἟κᾶο, ἀιιὰ ηὸ ἐκπʱζ῵ο ἔρεηλ· πιενλάζʱζʱ γὰξ ἟ 
ηνῦ ἀγξνῦ κέξηκλʱ θʱὶ ἟ πξὸο ηὴλ γπλʱỖθʱ ἀγάπε ἀιινηξίνπο η῅ο γλώζεσο ἟κᾶο 
πνηεỖ. Οἱ νὖλ ἅγηνη γπλʱỖθʱο ἔρνληεο θʱὶ πινῦηνλ νὐδὲλ ἐβιάβεζʱλ, θʱὶ γὰξ ὁ Ἰὼβ 
ηὰ ηέθλʱ ἀπνιέζʱο ἐθηινζόθεη θʱὶ ηνὺο θίινπο δησξζνῦην, ἅηε πάζε κὴ ἔρσλ.
321 
 
It is not the possession of objects that harms us, but their impassioned possession, 
because when the worry of a farmer
322 or love for a wife
323 have become exces-
sive, they render us strangers to knowledge. The saints who had wives and wealth 
did not suffer any harm, so Job, when he had lost his children, philosophized and 
corrected his friends since he did not have pathē. 
 
This echoes the Stoic view according to which virtue is good, vice is evil and all else is 
indifferent. Things themselves do not have the capacity to harm us; what causes the 
damage is our attitude toward them.
324 The ‘worry of a farmer’ and ‘love for a wife’ 
allude to the Parable of the Banquet at Luke 14:16-24. The first guest invited to the 
banquet declines the invitation because he has to go to his  field, the second because of 
his oxen and the third because of his wife. The banquet symbolises the Kingdom of 
God,
325 and the point being made is that in order to follow Jesus a person must be 
prepared to renounce all else.
326 Evagrius’ point is that a person’s feelings for a thing 
become a pathos when that thing takes precedence for him over the Kingdom of God; 
that is, when those feelings have become excessive. The Kingdom of God, for him, is 
                                                 
320 Cf. Thoughts 40.3-5; Rfl. 23; see below, 2.2.3. 
321 Disc. 112. 
322 Cf. Luke 14:18. 
323 Cf. Luke 14:20. 
324 Cf., e.g., Epictetus, Ench. 5: ‗It is not things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about 
them.‘ 
325 Cf. Luke 14:15. 
326 Cf. Luke 14: 26-33.  
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knowledge of the Holy Trinity,
327 hence the pathē ‘render us strangers to knowledge.’ 
He invokes the example of Job to illustrate the correct attitude, one that finds echoes in 
both Epictetus and Origen.
328 It should however be noted that, given his emphasis on 
the warfare kata dianoian,
329 the excessiveness of pathos finds expression not only in 
the decision, say, to go to the theatre instead of to church, or in a person’s loss of faith 
in the face of adversity. It is at play in every instance of temptation. Given the necessity 
of apatheia to the practice of contemplation and, ultimately, to redemption, the very fact 
that  a  person  has  to  struggle  to  resist  the  temptation  to  eat  when  hungry,  or  the 
temptation to allow logismoi of fornication to linger, shows that his love for God must 
compete for his attention with the pleasures of food and sex. 
 
While Disciples 112 defines pathos in terms of excess, Disciples 130 locates its origin in 
excess: 
 
Τὸ δὲ ʱἴηηνλ η῅ο θʱζόινπ ἐπηζπκίʱο, γʱζηξηκʱξγίʱο ηε θʱὶ πνξλείʱο, θηιʱξγπξίʱο 
ηε θʱὶ θελνδνμίʱο, θʱὶ η῵λ ἑμ῅ο, ὁ πιενλʱζκόο ἐζηη ηνῦ θπζηθνῦ θίιηξνπ νὗ 
ἔδσθελ ὁ ζεὸο ηῆ ςπρῆ πξὸο ηὸ ζ῵κʱ.
330 
 
The cause of epithumia in general – gluttony and fornication, avarice and vain-
glory and so forth – is an excess of the natural love that God has given the soul 
for the body.
331 
 
Like the logismoi, pathos has its physiological source in an excess of the body’s vital 
heat, the result of conforming one’s intake of food to the body’s insatiable desire for 
                                                 
327 Cf. Prakt. 3. 
328 Cf. Epictetus, Ench. 3: ‘If you kiss your own child or wife, say to yourself that you are kissing a 
human being; for when it dies you will not be disturbed (νὐ ηʱξʱρζήζῃ)’. At C.Matt. 10:24.1-26 Origen, 
discussing sicknesses of the soul (ηὰ η῅ο ςπρ῅ο ἀξξσζηήκʱηʱ), interprets Paul’s reference to the ‘sickly’ 
(ἄξξσζηνη) at 1 Cor. 11:30 as meaning those who ‘instead of loving God "with all their soul and all their 
heart and all their mind," love money, or a little glory, or wife, or children‘ (ἀληὶ ηνῦ ηὸλ ζεὸλ ἀγʱπᾶλ, 
ἀγʱπ῵ληεο ἀξγύξηʱ ἠ δνμάξηʱ ἠ γύλʱηθʱ ἠ πʱỖδʱο). He alludes to the Parable of the Banquet at Ex.Mart. 
37 in urging Ambrose and Protoctetus not to shrink from martyrdom. 
329 Cf. Prakt. 48; see above, 3.0. 
330 Disc. 130.2-6. 
331 At Disc. 41 Evagrius identifies ὁ πξὸο ηὸ ζ῵κʱ πάζνο with self-love (θηιʱπηίʱ). If ‘an excess of the 
natural love that God has given the soul for the body’ is self-love then this passage echoes Reflections 53: 
‘First of all [the logismoi] is the logismos of self-love, after which come the eight.‘ However, at Disc. 57 
Evagrius distinguishes between self-love as ‗the mother of all [the logismoi]‘ and ‗the enemy of the soul, 
the flesh (η῅ο ἐρζξᾶο ηῆ ςπρῆ, ηνπηέζηη η῅ο ζʱξθόο)‘; cf. Rom. 8:7.  
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food.
332 So Evagrius could mean one or both of two things here. He could be saying that 
an excessive love for the body makes us want to conform our eating to its desire for 
food, blinding us to the fact that the body’s true welfare lies in the health of the soul and 
leading us to fuel the epithumêtikon. Or he could be making the more general point that 
an excessive love for the body spills over into an excessive attachment to external 
things, making them seem more important than God. In both cases pathos retains its 
traditional association with excess.
333  
 
For Evagrius, then, pathos involves an attachment to corporeal creation which amounts 
to a  de facto preference for it over God and which is therefore excessive. This attach-
ment can be seen as the distorted image of the natural love of the nous for God. Like-
wise, the passivity of the empathês nous in relation to the sensible world can be seen as 
the distorted image of its natural receptivity to God. The changeability in relation to the 
sensible world that pathos represents for the nous is, like the passivity, a consequence of 
the attachment to corporeal creation that it constitutes, since that attachment subjects the 
nous to corporeal creation‘s changeability.  And the attachment of the nous to the sensi-
ble world, along with its passivity and changeability in relation to it, comprises the 
directedness to a causative external stimulus characteristic of pathos. This directedness 
is reflected at the psychological level by the facts that the pathē are naturally set in 
motion by the senses (ὑπὸ η῵λ ʱἰζζήζεσλ πέθπθε θηλεỖζζʱη ηὰ πάζε)
334 and that a de-
sire is joined to every pathos (ὄξεμηο δὲ πʱληὶ πάζεη ζπλέδεπθηʱη),
335 and in general by 
the close association of pathos with sensation, desire and pleasure: 
 
Πάζεο  κὲλ  ἟δνλ῅ο  ἐπηζπκίʱ  θʱηάξρεη,  ἐπηζπκίʱλ  δὲ  ηίθηεη  ʱἴζζεζηο·  ηὸ  γὰξ 
ʱἰζζήζεσο ἄκνηξνλ θʱὶ πάζνπο ἐιεύζεξνλ.
336 
 
Desire is the source of every pleasure, and sensation gives birth to appetite. For 
that which has no part in sensation is also free from pathos. 
                                                 
332 See above, section 2.4, 3.4.1. 
333However, it is only in the two chapters of Disciples quoted above that he speaks of excess 
(πιενλάζʱζʱ, πιενλʱζκόο) in relation to the pathē in general, his uses of the word pleonexia, both in his 
own writings and elsewhere in Disciples, relating to greed in the context of avarice. Cf. Prakt. Prol. 41; 
Th. 4.20-1, 8.21, 17.21, 22.6, 30.11; Sch. 157.3 on Prov. 17:9; Sch. 38.8 on Eccl. 5:7-11; Disc. 42.5, 69.4, 
82.1. 
334 Prakt. 38. However, the pathē can also be set in motion by memory or by the demons; cf. Rfl. 59. 
335 8Th. 5.10. 
336 Prakt. 4.2-4.  
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Τʱ κὲλ ζσκʱηηθὰ πάζε ἐθ η῵λ θπζηθ῵λ η῅ο ζʱξθὸο ηὴλ ἀξρὴλ ιʱκβάλεη, θʱζ’ 
ὧλ θʱὶ ἐγθξάηεηʱ, ηὰ δὲ ςπρηθὰ ἐθ  η῵λ ςπρηθ῵λ ηὴλ θύεζηλ ἔρεη, θʱζ’ ὧλ θʱὶ ἟ 
ἀγάπε.
337 
 
The pathē of the body take their origin from the natural [desires] of the flesh, 
against  which  self-control  [is  effective];  the  pathē  of  the  soul  have  their 
conception from the [desires] of the soul, against which love [is effective]. 
 
Τὰ κὲλ η῅ο ςπρ῅ο πάζε ἐθ η῵λ ἀλζξώπσλ ἔρεη ηὰο ἀθνξκάο· ηὰ δὲ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο 
ἐθ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο· θʱὶ ηὰ κὲλ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο πάζε πεξηθόπηεη ἐγθξάηεηʱ, ηὰ δὲ η῅ο 
ςπρ῅ο ἀγάπε πλεπκʱηηθή.
338 
 
The pathē of the soul have their origin in human beings; those of the body have 
their origin in the body. Self-control cuts away the pathē of the body; spiritual 
love cuts away those of the soul. 
 
The injuriousness to the agent that characterises pathos arises from its distancing him 
from God, as a result of which the person in thrall to pathos is ‗sickly‘ (ἄξξσζηνο).
339 
Finally, our responsibility for our  pathē is stated in Praktikos 6,
340 and again in Disci-
ples: 
 
Κʱθίʱ νὐθ ἔζηηλ ὁ λνῦο νὐδὲ ηὸ πξᾶγκʱ νὐδὲ ηὸ λόεκʱ ηνῦ πξάγκʱηνο, ἀιιὰ ηὸ 
πάζνο  ηὸ  ζπλεδεπγκέλνλ  ηῶ  λνήκʱηη·  ἐγὼ  δὲ  ʱἴηηνο  η῅ο  ὑπνζηάζεσο  ʱὐη῅ο, 
ἐπεηδὴ θʱὶ η῅ο ἀλʱηξέζεσο ʱὐη῅ο.
341 
 
Vice is not the nous nor the object nor the noêma of the object, but the pathos 
that is yoked together with the object,
342 and I am the cause of its existence, since 
also of its destruction. 
 
We are responsible for our pathē both in the cosmological sense, in that pathos came 
into existence through our choosing to turn away from God, and in the moral and psy-
chological sense, in that each time we succumb to pathos we do so by choice. This re-
flection of the cosmological by the moral and psychological is the reason why whenever 
                                                 
337 Eul. 21.23. 
338 Prakt. 35. 
339 Disc. 203.7; cf. Origen, C.Matt. 10:24. At Prakt. 54.5-6 Evagrius associates our becoming sick 
(λνζνῦκελ) in a given part of the soul with the pathē of that part growing in strength (ἰζρύεη). 
340 Cf. Prakt. 6.7-8; see above, 3.4. 
341 Disc. 165. 
342 The meaning of this will be discussed in the following section.  
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we allow ourselves to succumb to pathos we effectively repeat our primordial deflection 
from God and consequent fall into corporeality.  
 
It might be supposed that, because we are responsible for our pathē, to succumb to an 
episode of pathos counts as a sin, but this is not the case. Although pathos is something 
we choose, it is not, according to Disciples 157, yet a sin but only its herald:  
 
Πξὶλ ἠ ηὴλ θʱηὰ δηάλνηʱλ ηειεζζ῅λʱη ἁκʱξηίʱλ, δύν ἔιεγελ εἶλʱη ηεθκήξηʱ θʱὶ 
νἱνλεὶ πξννίκηʱ· ʱὐηὸ ηὸ πάζνο θʱὶ νἱ πεξὶ ʱὐηὸ ινγηζκνί.
343 
 
Before the accomplishment of a sin kata dianoian, [Evagrius] said, there are two 
signs and two as it were preliminaries: the pathos itself and the logismoi around 
it. 
 
In maintaining that to succumb to pathos is not yet to sin, Evagrius extends the range of 
both our self-control and our moral responsibility. Even though a person might be in the 
throes of pathos, it is still possible for him to extricate himself rather than allow himself 
to be carried to sin kata dianoian or kat’ energeian.
344 How this might work in practice 
is discussed in Section 2.2.4. 
 
It has been stated that pathos involves an attachment to the sensible world, but given the 
range of phenomena that Evagrius regards as pathē this might seem rather strange. Cer-
tainly there is nothing problematic about the idea of a desire for gold or human esteem 
involving such attachment, nor many cases of distress, anger and so forth. But how can 
hunger or thirst per se, or the fatigue characteristic of acedia, be said to involve such an 
attachment? The answer lies in Evagrius‘ anthropology. Since the nous is by nature con-
templative, any activity or state other than that of contemplation is unnatural to it. The 
prerequisite for contemplation is apatheia. Since any awareness of physical affectivity 
distracts the nous from contemplation, this must include apatheia in respect of the body: 
 
                                                 
343 Disc. 157.1-3. 
344 An example of how pathos can lead to sin kat’ energeian occurs at Th. 24.26-29. There Evagrius 
warns that if the nous refuses to move on (κὴ κεηʱβʱίλεη) from the noêma of an object for which it has a 
pathos – that is, if it clings (πεξηερόκελνο) to that noêma as its immediate focus of awareness – then it is 
submerged in the pathos (ηῶ πάζεη βεβάπηηζηʱη) and in danger of making its way towards sin in act 
(θηλδπλεύεη πξὸο ηὴλ θʱη’ ἐλέξγεηʱλ ἁκʱξηίʱλ ὁδεύσλ).  
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Ὅζʱ ἀθ’ ἑʱπηνῦ ινγίδεηʱη ὁ λνῦο, ηʱῦηʱ ἀπʱζ῅ ιέγνληʱη· ὅζʱ δἐ ἐλνρινύκελνο 
ἐθ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο, ηʱῦηʱ ἐκπʱζ῅ ιέγνληʱη ὡο πξὸο ηὸλ λνῦλ.
345 
 
Whatever things the nous thinks by itself are called apathê; whatever things it 
thinks when being troubled by the body are called empathê in relation to the 
nous. 
 
Any awareness of hunger, thirst or other physical affects is symptomatic of the continu-
ing immersion of the nous in the thickness of corporeality and its corresponding dis-
tance from God. Concomitantly, since the role of the sensible world is to serve as the 
starting point for the contemplation of spiritual reality, any mode of awareness that fo-
cuses on it for its own sake represents its de facto prioritization over the love of God 
and pursuit of knowledge. ‘What good is there besides God?’ (ηί ἄιιν ἀγʱζὸλ, ἀιι’ ἠ 
ʘεόο;).
346 Evagrius speaks of avarice as a kind of idolatry
347 but he could speak of all 
pathos in these terms since it is an attachment to something other than God.  
 
To summarise, pathos, for Evagrius, is an unstable movement of the nous and soul that 
is the psychological expression of an excess of vital heat. It involves an attachment to 
the sensible world that is excessive and therefore idolatrous. It makes the nous passive 
in relation to the sensible world, meaning that the sensible world is a causative external 
stimulus in relation to the nous and that the empathês nous is subject to the diversity and 
changeability of corporeal creation. The fact that pathos distances a person from God 
means that it is injurious to him. Pathos falls within the scope of our self-determination, 
meaning that we are responsible for our pathē. Evagrius regards a very wide range of 
phenomena as pathē. Since the healthy epithumêtikon is defined as longing for virtue
348 
any desire for anything other than virtue itself is a  pathos; this includes hunger and 
thirst as well as all expressions of the body‘s sexual nature.
349 Most of what we would 
recognise as emotions count as pathē but with notable exceptions that include love,
350 
godly joy,
351 spiritual pleasure,
352 godly distress
353 and anger against the demons.
354 Pa-
                                                 
345 Disc. 139.1-3. 
346 Pry 33. 
347 Cf. 8Th. 3.14; see above, 2.1.3.3. 
348 Cf. Prakt. 86. 
349 In this Evagrius echoes the Stoic principle that virtue alone is intrinsically good. 
350 For agapē cf., e.g., Prakt. Prol. 50; for (spiritual) erôs, Pry. 52; see above, 1.2.2. 
351 Cf., e.g., Eul. 6.6-7, 7.6-7. 
352 Cf., e.g., Prakt. 24.  
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thos  also  encompasses  phenomena  such  as  fatigue,  drowsiness,  lethargy,  weakness, 
anxiety, irritability, agitation, boredom, listlessness, self-satisfaction and what we would 
regard as depression. 
 
 
2.2.3  Empathê noêmata  
 
Although pathos always involves the body – through the vital heat if not directly - for 
Evagrius it also involves the nous, to which it finds ingress through its association with 
noēmata, the basic components of our mental content. Evagrius characterises this asso-
ciation terms of ‗yoking together‘
355 and refers to noēmata that have pathos ‗yoked to-
gether with‘ (ζπλεδεπγκέλʱ) them
356 as empathê noêmata.
357 The closest he comes to 
directly explaining their origin is the following: 
 
Ὥλ ηὰο κλήκʱο ἔρνκελ ἐκπʱζεỖο, ηνύησλ θʱὶ ηὰ πξάγκʱηʱ πξόηεξνλ κεηὰ πάζνπο 
ὑπεδεμάκεζʱ· θʱὶ ὅζʱ η῵λ πξʱγκάησλ πάιηλ κεηὰ πάζνπο ὑπεδερόκεζʱ, ηνύησλ 
θʱὶ ηὰο κλήκʱο ἕμνκελ ἐκπʱζεỖο.
358 
 
When we have empatheis memories, it is because we previously ὑπεδεμάκεζʱ the 
objects with pathē; and again, in so far as we ὑπεδερόκεζʱ objects with πάζε, we 
will have empatheis memories of them.  
 
To ὑπνδέρεζζʱη an object with pathos results in the formation of an empathēs memory, 
that is, a memory composed of empathê noêmata. But what is it to ὑπνδέρεζζʱη an 
object with pathos? In speaking of how the nous acquires noēmata Evagrius normally 
uses either δέρνκʱη
359 or ιʱκβάλσ.
360 The meaning of  ὑπνδέρνκʱη is similar to that of 
these verbs used in this way, but the prefix  ὑπό  adds emphasis, indicating that the 
reception is somehow more forceful. This sense of extra force is perhaps best captured 
                                                                                                                                               
353 Cf., e.g., Eul. 7.6-7. 
354 Cf., e.g., Prakt. 24. 
355 Cf. Disc. 64.2. Cf. Disc. 165.1-2; see below. 
356 Disc. 64.2. Cf. Disc. 165.1-2. 
357 Cf. Pry. 4, 53, 54, 71; Rfl. 7; Sch. 93 on Prov. 7:12, 166 on Prov. 17:23, 344 on Prov. 28:7; Sch. 2 on 
Ps. 145:8. 
358 Prakt. 34.1-4. 
359 Cf. Th. 24, 25; Sch. 263 on Prov. 23:33. 
360 Cf. Rfl. 16, 17; Sch. 166 on Prov. 17:23; Sch. 35 on Eccl. 5:1-2.  
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by translations such as ‗to take up‘, ‗to welcome‘ or ‗to entertain‘.
361 The fact that 
ὑπνδέρνκʱη is qualified by κεηὰ πάζνπο makes it clear that this extra force derives from 
the involvement of  pathos, and the fact that Evagrius  speaks of the  λνῦο taking up 
πξάγκʱηʱ rather than noēmata emphasises that the pathos is directed toward an external 
object. 
 
An  empathês  noêma, then, is a  noēma that the  nous  has taken up with  pathos.  An 
example of such a noêma would be ‘the face of someone who has caused me loss or 
someone who has dishonoured me’ referred to at Thoughts 2.5-6.
362 Reflection upon it 
provides further clarification of the nature of empathê noēmata and how they harm the 
nous. If someone injures me and I respond with resentment, I will ‗take up their face 
with resentment‘; that is, internalise an image of their face suffused with the pathos I 
am feeling. As a result, the pathos will be associated with the image and I will have 
formed an empathês noēma. This ‗resentful noēma‘ will then be stored as an empathês 
memory and recollection of the person‘s face will include recollection of the resent-
ment. In addition, the extra force with which pathos imbues the ‗taking up‘ of a noêma 
will carry over into its imprinting of the nous and storage in memory: if I harbour a 
strong emotion in respect of something or someone, my memory and noêma of them 
will be characterised by a special vividness and tenacity. This can make both memory 
and image especially liable to intrude into consciousness and reawaken in me the pathos 
concerned  – in  this case the  emotion of resentment  – something which can  happen 
whether I am awake or, via dreams, while I sleep.
363 All of these things – the particular 
vividness, tenacity and intrusivenss of such noēmata – are aspects of the thickening of 
the nous – that is, its immersion in corporeality. 
 
                                                 
361 Sinkewicz translates ὑπνδέρεζζʱη as ‘to entertain’, but to me this suggests a temporal dimension that 
need not be involved in the formation of empatheis, or indeed any, memories. Although, according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, one of the meanings of ‘entertain’ is ‘admit to consideration; receive (an 
idea)’, most of its meanings involve a temporal dimension, and it can also mean to ‘keep or maintain in 
the mind; harbour, cherish, experience (a feeling),. Consequently, although it perhaps need not imply a 
temporal dimension, it can easily be read as meaning that the formation of an empathes memory requires, 
in addition to the empathes reception of the noêma of the object of the pathos, that the noēma in question 
be held in mind over a period of time. In fact, though, it surely does not, our formation of memories of 
perceived events being, in general, simultaneous with the perception.. 
362 Quoted above, 3.1. 
363 Cf. Th. 4.  
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Like all noêmata of sensible objects, empathê noêmata can be taken up not only from 
the senses or from memory but from the krasis of the body:
364   
 
ὅηʱλ  κὴ  ηὴλ  κλήκελ  θηλ῅ζʱη  ἐλ  ηῆ  πξνζεπρῆ  ὁ  θζνλεξὸο  δʱίκσλ,  ηόηε  ηὴλ 
θξᾶζηλ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο ἐθβηάδεηʱη εἰο ηὸ πνη῅ζʱη μέλελ ηηλὰ θʱληʱζίʱλ ηῶ λῶ, θʱὶ 
κνξθ῵ζʱη ʱὐηόλ.
365 
 
Whenever the jealous demon is unable to move the nous by means of the mem-
ory in prayer, he then forces the krasis of the body to produce some strange fan-
tasy in the nous and endow [the nous] with form.  
 
Evagrius cites as an example the demonic suggestion of an image that purports to repre-
sent God. This induces the nous to think that it has attained the goal of prayer, and ac-
cording to ‗a man experienced in the gnostic life‘
366 
 
ὑπὸ ηνῦ η῅ο θελνδνμίʱο πάζνπο γίλεζζʱη, θʱὶ ὑπὸ ηνῦ δʱίκνλνο ηνῦ ἁπηνκέλνπ 
ηνῦ θʱηὰ ηὸλ ἐγθέθʱινλ ηόπνπ, θʱὶ θιεςὶ πάιινληνο.
367 
 
happens under the influence of the pathos of vainglory and that of the demon 
who touches a place in the brain and causes palpitations in the blood vessels.
368  
 
The fact that demons can cause fantasies to arise by manipulating the krasis of the body 
shows that they can be responsible for the production of noēmata that, although involv-
ing sensible objects and therefore being ultimately grounded in sense perception, do not 
themselves have a sensory origin. This mechanism perhaps explains the origin of all 
empathê noêmata that are not the direct product of the senses or of memory, and hence 
the origin of all fantasies and hallucinations associated with the logismoi. Those associ-
ated with logismoi of fornication would certainly seem to involve manipulation of the 
krasis  of  the body, since the demon of fornication sometimes touches the body di-
                                                 
364 See above, 1.2.1.1. 
365 Pry. 68. 
366 Sinkewicz (2003: 281, n.52) notes, ‗The MSS tradition is evenly divided between the two readings 
‗practical‘ and ‗gnostic‘. Hausherr, [Les le￧ons d’un contemplatif. Le Trait￩ de l’Oraison d’Évagre le 
Pontique, Paris 1960], 106, has suggested that the individual in question may be John of Lykopolis.‘ 
367 Pry. 72. 
368 Cf. Pry. 72.  
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rectly,
369 but since all pathē, and hence all the logismoi, have a physiological basis in 
excess vital heat, this explanation would seem to extend naturally to them as well. 
 
It has been stated that empathê noēmata harm the nous by immersing it in corporeality 
and thereby thickening it, and that they do so because the pathos ‗yoked together with‘ 
them makes them particularly vivid, tenacious and intrusive. Evagrius refers to this as 
pathos  ‗binding  the  nous,  through  noēmata,  to  sensible  objects‘  (ηὰ  πάζε  ...  ηὰ 
ζπλδεζκνῦληʱ [ηὸλ λνῦλ] δηὰ η῵λ λνεκάησλ ηνỖο πξάγκʱζη ηνỖο ʱἰζζεηνỖο):
370  
 
Οὔηε ηὰ πξάγκʱηʱ δεζκνỖ ηὸλ λνῦλ, νὔηε ηὰ ηνύησλ λνήκʱηʱ, ἀιιὰ ηὰ ἐκπʱζ῅ 
η῵λ πξʱγκάησλ λνήκʱηʱ. Κʱὶ γὰξ ηὸλ ρξπζὸλ ὁ Κύξηνο ἔθηηζε, θʱὶ ʱὐηὸο ηὴλ 
γπλʱỖθʱ ἐπνίεζελ, νὐδὲλ δὲ η῵λ γεγνλόησλ ὑπὸ ʘενῦ ἐλʱληηνῦηʱη ηῆ ζσηεξίᾳ 
η῵λ ἀλζξώπσλ, ἀιι’ ἟ πνξλείʱ θʱὶ ἟ πιενλεμίʱ δεζκνῦζη ηὸλ λνῦλ, ἀλʱγθάδνπζη 
ρξνλίδεηλ  ηὰ  λνήκʱηʱ  η῵λ  πξʱγκάησλ  ἐλ  θʱξδίᾳ.Ἵζηεζη  γὰξ  ηὸλ  λνῦλ  ηὰ 
πξάγκʱηʱ δηὰ η῵λ ἐλ πάζεη λνεκάησλ, θʱζάπεξ θʱὶ ηὸ ὕδσξ ηὸλ δης῵ληʱ δηὰ η῅ο 
δίςεο, θʱὶ ηὸλ πεηλ῵ληʱ ὁ ἅξηνο δηὰ η῅ο πείλεο.
371 
 
Neither do objects bind the  nous nor do their noēmata, but rather the empathê 
noēmata of objects. For the Lord created gold and he made woman, but none of 
the  beings  created  by  God  are  opposed  to  people’s  salvation,  but  rather 
fornication and greed bind the nous and force the noēmata of objects to linger in 
the heart. For objects hold the nous in check by means of empathê noēmata, just 
as water holds the thirsty person by means of thirst, and bread the hungry person 
by means of hunger.
372 
 
In the absence of pathos the nous, being naturally contemplative, would not linger upon 
sensible objects: 
 
                                                 
369 See above, 2.1.3.2. 
370 Th. 40.3-5. Cf. Rfl. 23: The nous will not transcend all the noēmata associated with objects ‘if it has 
not put off the pathē that bind it to sensible objects through noēmata (ηὰ πάζε ... ηὰ ζπλδεζκνῦληʱ [ηὸλ 
λνῦλ] δηὰ η῵λ λνεκάησλ ηνỖο πξάγκʱζη ηνỖο ʱἰζζεηνỖο)’. 
371 Sch. 2 on Ps. 145:8. 
372 Cf. Th. 22.1-8: ‗Just as the noêma of bread lingers within the hungry person on account of the hunger, 
and the noêma of water in the thirsty person because of the thirst, so too the noēmata of wealth and pos-
sessions linger on account of greed and the noēmata of food and shameful logismoi begotten by food lin-
ger with us because of the pathē (ὥζπεξ γὰξ ηὸ λόεκʱ ηνῦ ἄξηνπ ρξνλίδεη ἐλ ηῶ πεηλ῵ληη δηὰ ηὴλ πεỖλʱλ 
θʱὶ ηὸ λόεκʱ ηνῦ ὕδʱηνο ἐλ ηῶ δης῵ληη δηὰ ηὴλ δίςʱλ, νὕησ θʱὶ ηὰ λνήκʱηʱ η῵λ ρξεκάησλ θʱὶ θηεκάησλ 
ρξνλίδεη δηὰ ηὴλ πιενλεμίʱλ θʱὶ ηὰ λνήκʱηʱ η῵λ βξσκάησλ θʱὶ η῵λ ηηθηνκέλσλ ʱἰζρξ῵λ ινγηζκ῵λ ἐθ 
η῵λ βξσκάησλ ρξνλίδεη δηὰ ηὰ πάζε)‘. Cf. also Let. 39.2.  
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Ἀδύλʱηνλ ηὸλ λνῦλ ρξνλίζʱη <ἐλ> πξάγκʱηη εἰ κὴ πάζνο ἔρεη πξὸο ʱὐηό, νἷνλ 
ἐπηζπκίʱο ἠ νξγ῅ο ἠ θελνδνμίʱο ἠ ιύπεο.
373 
 
It is impossible for the nous to linger on an object if it doesn‘t have pathos for it, 
for example that of epithumia or anger or vainglory or distress. 
 
But pathos compels it to dwell upon them: 
 
἖λ νἷο πξάγκʱζηλ ἠ λνήκʱζηλ ἔρεη πάζνο ὁ λνῦο, ἐλ ηνύηνηο πεξηθʱζέδεηʱη· ἐθ δὲ 
ηνύησλ δπζέθζπʱζηόο ἐζηηλ, ἐπεηδὴ ἐρξόληζελ.
374 
 
The nous installs itself among objects or noēmata for which it has a pathos, and 
it is difficult to withdraw it when it lingers.
375  
 
When pathos is implicated in the reception of noēmata it reinforces their imprinting of 
the nous and also the corresponding memory formation. The resulting memories are 
particularly vivid and tenacious, and liable to intrude into both waking consciousness 
and dreams. As the pathos associated with a memory fades so too will the memory and 
its intrusiveness, but while it endures it binds the nous through the noêma to the sensible 
object it represents.
376  
 
                                                 
373 Disc. 39.1-3. 
374 Disc. 162. 
375 Cf. Rfl. 36: ‗The impure nous is one that dallies among sensible objects with blameworthy pathos 
(λνῦο ἀθάζʱξηόο ἐζηηλ, ὁ ἐγρξνλίδσλ κεηὰ πάζνπο ςεθηνῦ ηνỖο πξάγκʱζη ηνỖο ʱἰζζεηνỖο)‘. 
376 For Evagrius pathos intensifies the memory of any object with which it is associated. But Aristotle 
takes a very different view of the effect of pathos upon memory formation. At De Memoria 450a30-b3 he 
notes that ‘The movement which occurs stamps a sort of imprint of the percept, just like the people who 
make impressions with seals. This is why, in those subject to great movement through πάζνο or through 
time of life, no memory is created, just as if the movement of the seal were to fall into running water‘ (἟ 
γὰξ γηγλνκέλε θίλεζηο ἐλζεκʱίλεηʱη νἷνλ ηύπνλ ηηλὰ ηνῦ ʱἰζζήκʱηνο, θʱζάπεξ νἱ ζθξʱγηδόκελνη ηνỖο 
δʱθηπιίνηο. δηὸ θʱὶ ηνỖο κὲλ ἐλ θηλήζεη πνιιῆ δηὰ πάζνο ἠ δη’ ἟ιηθίʱλ νὖζηλ νὐ γίγλεηʱη κλήκε, θʱζάπεξ 
ἂλ εἰο ὕδσξ ῥένλ ἐκπηπηνύζεο η῅ο θηλήζεσο θʱὶ η῅ο ζθξʱγίδνο; Trans. mine, based on Beare, in Barnes, 
1984).  Unlike Evagrius, Aristotle speaks of the formation of memories as a kind of imprinting, and he 
claims that extremes of pathos put the soul into a state of flux so that the imprints effectively get washed 
away. This directly contradicts Evagrius‘ view of pathos as a binding force in relation to noēmata and 
memories. So how might the disparity between their respective observations be explained? A provisional 
answer, supported by what is now known about traumatic memory, might be that in some cases extremes 
of pathos result in amnesia of the event concerned, while in others they severely disrupt the memory of it; 
cf., e.g., Shay (1995: 172). Neither phenomenon would contradict what Evagrius says about the effect of 
pathos on memory: amnesia, because he is only interested in cases where pathos reinforces a memory, 
and disruption of memory, because his concern is not with the accuracy of the memory but with its inten-
sity, tenacity and intrusiveness.                                                                                                                    
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To summarise: if the nous has a pathos in respect of an object, then every noêma of that 
object that it receives has the pathos in question ‗yoked together with‘ it. In so far as a 
person is subject to pathos, his nous is continually being populated with these empathê 
noêmata. Through them, pathos binds the nous to sensible objects, keeping it anchored 
in the thickness of corporeality.  
 
 
2.2.4  The arousal of pathos 
 
According  to  Praktikos  6, it  is when a  logismos  is allowed to  linger that  pathos  is 
aroused: 
 
πʱξελνριεỖλ κὲλ ηῆ ςπρῆ ἠ κὴ πʱξελνριεỖλ [νἱ ινγηζκνὶ], η῵λ νὐρ ἐθ’ ἟κỖλ ἐζηη· 
ηὸ δὲ ρξνλίδεηλ ʱὐηνὺο ἠ κὴ ρξνλίδεηλ, ἠ πάζε θηλεỖλ ἠ κὴ θηλεỖλ, η῵λ ἐθ’ ἟κỖλ.
377 
 
Whether [the logismoi] trouble the soul or do not trouble it is not one of the things 
that are up to us, but whether they linger or do not linger, arouse pathē or do not 
arouse them, is one of the things that are up to us.
378 
 
It seems clear from this that logismoi occur before, and cause, pathos. Yet we saw from 
our consideration of the logismoi that in fact they always have pathos built into them. 
We have also seen that Evagrius almost always locates the origin of the logismoi in the 
pathētikon part of the soul and that, in particular, Disciples 49 reports him as teaching 
that the empathēs logismos comes from pathos.
379 So in fact the  logismoi both cause 
pathos and have their source in it. What is at issue here is the distinction between dispo-
sitional and occurrent pathos, but before turning to this, a point of clarification.  
 
                                                 
377 Prakt. 6. 
378 Trans. mine. The question of whether or not we are responsible either for the stimuli we experience or 
for our reactions to them had been long debated. Gorgias, in his Defence of Helen, had argued that she 
was not culpable for her actions because the force of the stimuli, which she could neither control nor 
resist, was such as to compel them. Aristotle refers to a view that men have no control over phantasiai, 
which appear to each in a form answering to his character, and rejects it on the grounds that man is 
responsible for his character and consequently for the phantasiai (EN 1114a32). In other words, he holds 
the agent responsible for the way in which he sees things. The Stoics hold a person responsible for the 
way in which he responds to phantasiai, that is, whether or not he assents to them, and they assign his 
character a determining role in this; cf. Inwood (1985: 58). See below, 2.2.4, for discussion of the scope 
of our self-determination in relation to temptation. 
379 See above, 2.1.4.1.  
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It was noted above that although Evagrius thinks in terms of the Platonic tripartition of 
the soul, and, by extension, contrasts her pathētikon part with her rational part, he re-
gards all three parts of the soul as essentially rational, all being aspects of the fallen tri-
une nous. Accordingly he understands pathos not as something other than reason but as 
a compromised version of it.
380 It follows that the line dividing logismoi from pathē is at 
best a blurred one, and not only do logismoi always involve empathē noēmata but Eva-
grius frequently defines logismoi in affective terms. In terms of their psychic origin I 
suggest, therefore, that both the affective aspects of a logismos and certain of its cogni-
tive aspects - mental pictures, fantasies and so forth - derive from the pathētikon part of 
the soul, and that the point at which the rational part becomes involved is, in the first 
instance, when it assents – explicitly or implicitly – to the logismos by allowing it to 
linger and, ultimately, when it animates, and thereby endows with agency, an image of 
the person‘s body ‗with which it speaks and acts unlawfully kata dianoian in relation to 
other images it creates kata dianoian‘. So when Praktikos 6 speaks of its being up to us 
whether or not logismoi linger and arouse pathos it is referring specifically to the en-
gagement of the rational part of the soul with the logismoi and the consequent arousal of 
fresh pathos. The logismoi themselves will, however, originate in the pathētikon part of 
the soul and include both affective and cognitive aspects. Likewise, although temptation 
(peirasmos) as described by Praktikos 6 is experienced as a contest between desire and 
reason, to characterise it as such would be metaphysically inaccurate; the contestants 
are, rather, the relatively fallen and compromised reason constitutive of the pathētikon 
part of the soul on the one hand, and, on the other, the relatively unfallen and uncom-
promised reason constitutive of her rational part.    
 
The distinction between dispositional and occurrent pathos is succinctly described at 
Disciples 49, and with it, the psychological dynamics of empatheia:  
 
Ὑπόθεηηʱη ηὸ πάζνο ἐλ ηῆ ςπρῆ, ἐμ νὗ γελλᾶηʱη ὁ ἐκπʱζὴο ινγηζκόο· πξὸ δὲ 
ηνύηνπ ζπλίζηʱληʱη νἱ ινγηζκνὶ ἵλʱ θʱηὰ δηάλνηʱλ ἁκάξηῃ· ὁκνίσο θʱὶ πξὸ η῅ο 
θʱη’  ἐλέξγεηʱλ  ἁκʱξηίʱο  ζπλίζηʱληʱη  πνιιὰ  πξάγκʱηʱ·  ἐπὰλ  δὲ  ηειεζζῆ  ἟ 
ἁκʱξηίʱ, ηὰ κέζʱ ἀθίζηʱληʱη, κόλνλ δὲ ηὸ εἴδσινλ η῅ο ἁκʱξηίʱο ἐκκέλεη ἐλ ηῶ 
λῶ η῅ο ςπρ῅ο θʱὶ ηὸ πάζνο ηὸ γελλ῵λ ηὸλ ινγηζκόλ.
381 
 
                                                 
380 See above, 1.2. 
381 Disc. 49.3-10. For the ‗image of the sin‘ (ηὸ εἴδσινλ η῅ο ἁκʱξηίʱο), cf. Th. 36.17.  
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Pathos lies below in the soul and from it comes the empathês logismos. Before 
(the  pathos  manifests)  the  logismoi  coalesce  so  that  there  might  be  sin  kata 
dianoian. Likewise, before a sin kat’ energeian (is committed) many objects coa-
lesce. But once a sin has been committed, the intermediaries disappear and only 
the image of the sin remains in the nous of the soul, and the pathos that engen-
dered the logismos.  
 
I understand this as follows: a disposition to pathos subsists in the soul. This disposition 
comprises the physiological ‗matter‘ of the logismoi in the form of excess vital heat, and 
the psychological ‗matter‘ of the  logismoi in the form of the ‗natural desires of the 
flesh‘ and the ‗desires of the soul‘,
382 and empatheis memories.
383 In response to cir-
cumstances – demonic suggestion or other internal or external stimuli – these give rise 
to the logismoi; since the logismoi always involve pathos the qualifier empathês empha-
sises this rather than defining a subset of logismoi. In saying that before the pathos 
manifests the logismoi coalesce, Evagrius distinguishes between dispositional  pathos 
and the fresh episode of occurrent pathos that the logismoi arising from dispositional 
pathos arouse if allowed to linger in conscious awareness. The coalescing is that of the 
logismoi understood as discrete entities into sequences, and it happens before the pathos 
manifests ‗so that there might be sin kata dianoian‘. The occurrent pathos that the lo-
gismoi arouse is to be distinguished not only from the underlying dispositional pathos 
but from the sin itself since the pathos, like the logismos is merely the ‗sign and, as it 
were, preliminary‘ (ηεθκήξηʱ θʱὶ νἱνλεὶ πξννίκηʱ)
384 of sin. Although Evagrius specifies 
sin kata dianoian, there is in this context no relevant distinction between it and sin kat’ 
energeian, his focus upon the former simply reflecting his greater interest in the warfare 
kata dianoian.
385 The description of logismoi, objects and sin as intermediaries empha-
sises the spiritual significance of dispositional pathos on the one hand, and the ‗image 
of the sin‘ on the other. According to Disciples 49, then, the following cycle is enacted: 
 
dispositional 
pathos 
=>  logismoi  =>  occurrent 
pathos 
=>  sin kata 
dianoian or kat’ 
energeian 
=>  dispositional 
pathos 
 
                                                 
382 Eul. 21.23; see above, 3.2. 
383 Cf. Prakt. 34; see above, 3.3. 
384 Disc. 157.2; see above. 
385 Cf. Prakt. 48; see above.  
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Two aspects of dispositional pathos can now be identified. The first is the general sick-
liness of the soul, and the second, the pathos associated with particular memories. As 
we have seen, the latter makes such memories especially liable to intrude into aware-
ness, and this intrusion, I suggest, is part of what Evagrius has in mind when he says 
that from the pathos that lies below in the soul comes the empathês logismos. But part 
too will be logismoi that have a somatic origin, for example thoughts of food triggered 
by hunger or sexual fantasies triggered by physical arousal, both hunger and sexual de-
sire being part of our disposition to pathos. 
 
At Eulogios 13.12 Evagrius describes in detail the process by which logismoi engender 
pathos: 
 
὇ η῅ο ἀζειγείʱο δʱίκσλ, πῆ κὲλ ηῶ πʱξζέλῳ θʱηὰ δηάλνηʱλ ηὰο ἀθνιάζηνπο 
ζπκπινθὰο  ὑπεηζθέξεη,  πῆ  δὲ  ηνῦηνλ  λεάληζηλ  δη’  ὀλεηξάησλ  ζπκπιέθεζζʱη 
θʱληάδεη, ὅπσο εἰ κὲλ ηῆ κλήκῃ ηνῦ θʱληʱζζέληνο θιίλνηην πξὸο ἟δνλήλ, ηνỖο 
ινγηζκνỖο ρξήζνηην πξὸο πόιεκνλ· εἰ δὲ νὐ θιίλνηην ἀιι’ ἀληʱγσλίδνηην, θἂλ η῅ο 
ʱἴζζεηʱη ηὸ πάζνο ηῆ θύζεη κεκελεθόο, νὐ πξόηεξνλ ζπγθξνηνῦζη πόιεκνλ νἱ 
η῅ο ʱἰζρύλεο ινγηζκνί, πξὶλ ἠ ρώξʱλ ἕμνπζη ηνῦ ηῆ ςπρῆ ζπλνκηιεỖλ· νὐδ’ ʱὖ 
πάιηλ θηλεζείε πξὸο ηὸ πνιεκεỖλ ἟ ςπρή, πξὶλ ἠ κάζῃ ἀληηπʱξʱηάηηεζζʱη ηνỖο 
ἀληηπάινηο  ινγηζκνỖο.  ὅηʱλ  νἱ  δʱίκνλεο  ηὴλ  ἔλλνηʱλ  ηᾶο  ʱἰζρίζηνηο  ἟δνλʱỖο 
πεηξ῵ληʱη ζʱιεύεηλ, ηόηε θʱὶ ηὸλ η῅ο ιʱηκʱξγίʱο πόιεκνλ πξνζάγνπζηλ, ὅπσο 
ηʱỖο  ὕιʱηο  ηὴλ γʱζηέξʱ  πξνππξώζʱληεο, ἀθνπσηέξσο ηὴλ ςπρὴλ ηῆ ἀζειγείᾳ 
βʱξʱζξόζσζηλ. ἐλ ηῆ ῥᾳζπκίᾳ η῅ο ςπρ῅ο πεξηδξάζζνληʱη ἟κ῵λ νἱ δʱίκνλεο ηνῦ 
ινγηζηηθνῦ θʱὶ ἐλ ηνỖο ινγηζκνỖο ἀπεξεύγνληʱη ηὰο η῅ο θʱθίʱο ἟δνλάο.
386 
 
The demon of lust sometimes smuggles in kata dianoian licentious intertwinings 
with a virgin, and sometimes through dreams it depicts  him being intertwined 
with young girls, so that if one should incline towards pleasure at the memory of 
what was fantasized, the demon could make use of the logismoi for warfare; but 
if one should not so incline but rather fight back, even when one feels the pathos 
which has remained in one‘s nature, the logismoi of shame cannot join battle be-
fore they gain a place to converse with the soul; nor in turn would the soul be 
moved to engage in warfare before it learns that it is ranging itself against the 
opposing logismoi. Whenever the demons try to destabilise one‘s thinking [or in-
tent, good sense or better judgment; ἔλλνηʱ can mean all of these] with shameful 
pleasures, then they lead in the warfare of gluttony, so that once they have fired 
the matters of the stomach beforehand they can the more effortlessly cast the soul 
                                                 
386 Eul. 13.12. Sinkewicz (2003: 239, n.28) notes that this paragraph is unique to recension B of To 
Eulogios, as found in the MSS Lavra Γ 93.  
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into the pit of lust. In the laziness of the soul the demons are able to grasp our lo-
gistikon and in the logismoi they disgorge the pleasures of vice.  
 
In the situation described here the disposition to pathos is exploited by the demon of 
fornication who causes the monk to recall sexual fantasies and dreams that it had sug-
gested to him previously. Evagrius warns him not to incline towards pleasure but in-
stead to fight back. Both aspects of dispositional pathos are at play here, one in the pa-
thos associated with the memories; the other - the general sickness of his soul - in his 
inclination toward pleasure. But I think a third aspect can also be identified, that which 
Evagrius calls ‗the pathos which has remained in one‘s nature‘ and which I take to be 
the pathos specific to the situation – in this case, sexual desire. To the extent that the 
monk inclines toward pleasure the demon can make use of the logismoi for warfare - I 
take these to be both the remembered fantasies and further logismoi that the demons 
will suggest. If, on the other hand, he fights back then the logismoi will be unable to 
‗join battle‘ since their ability to do so depends upon his allowing them a ‗place to con-
verse‘ with his soul. Fighting back consists in mustering the logistikon to resist the in-
clination of the pathētikon part of the soul to pleasure, but in order for the monk to do so 
he must first recognise his situation as one of temptation, since ‗the soul will not be 
moved to engage in warfare before it learns that it is ranging itself against the opposing 
logismoi.‘ How quickly he does so will depend upon how vigilant he is, the demon of 
fornication in particular being able to seem swifter than the movement and vigilance of 
the nous (ὀμύηεξνο ... η῅ο θηλήζεσο θʱὶ λήςεσο ηνῦ λνόο),
387 meaning that arousal can 
be so sudden that he feels powerless to resist.
388 Evagrius affirms the role of gluttony in 
temptation by the demon of fornication, then reminds his readers of the perils of laz i-
ness – this will mean laziness both in succumbing to gluttony and in failing in vigilance. 
He concludes by stating that sometimes the logismoi attract the pathē and sometimes the 
pathē the logismoi but that either way it is through the pathē that the logismoi ‗make 
war upon the soul.‘ Since logismoi are always wholly or partly constituted by empathê 
noêmata the pathos he is referring to here must be other than that already built into the 
logismos. So what does he mean? The key is to be found in a closer look at both the 
disposition to, and arousal of, pathos. 
                                                 
387 Cf. Pry. 90. 
388 Cf. Prakt. 51; 8Th. 2.11. The demon associated with blasphemy is also particularly swift in its attacks; 
cf. Prakt. 43, 51.  
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Three aspects of the disposition to pathos have now been identified: 
 
D1  The fire of one‘s nature; that is, the general sickliness of the soul.  
 
D2  The pathos which has remained in one‘s nature; that is, the pathos specific to the 
present situation. 
 
D3  The pathos associated with particular noêmata and memories.  
 
These three aspects correspond to levels of increasing differentiation. The first, D1, is 
the most fundamental and general. At the level of D2 it differentiates into the disposi-
tions to particular pathē, and at the level of D3 these further differentiate into the dispo-
sitions to particular manifestations of a pathos via the pathē associated with particular 
noēmata or logismoi. The arising of a logismos involves all three aspects: D1 is the un-
derlying condition which makes it possible; D2 determines which particular pathos a 
given movement of the soul instantiates, and D3 gives that pathos its specific manifesta-
tion and is therefore the point at which the logismos takes form.  
 
Now consider the following passage from Eulogios 21.22, which again describes temp-
tation  by  the  demon  of  fornication.  In  it  Evagrius  tracks  each  stage  of  the  cycle 
identified in Disciples 49, leading from dispositional pathos through the arising of the 
logismoi and fresh pathos to the committing of sin and consequent strengthening of dis-
positional pathos: 
 
Χʱιεπώηʱηόλ ἐζηη ζπλεζείᾳ ἟δνλ῵λ ζπλάπηεζζʱη ηὴλ θʱξδίʱλ θʱὶ πνιι῵λ ρξείʱ 
θόπσλ ηὴλ λνκὴλ θʱθ῵λ εἰο ἄθξνλ ἐθθόςʱη. Μὴ νὖλ ηʱỖο ἟δνλʱỖο η῵λ ινγηζκ῵λ 
ζπλνκηιεỖλ  ἐζίζῃο·  ἐλ  γὰξ  ζπιιόγῳ  θʱθ῵λ  ἐθθʱίεηʱη  πῦξ.  Οὕησ  γὰξ 
ἐθζεξκʱίλνληέο  ζε,  ινγίδεζζʱη  πνηνῦζη  θόπνλ  εἶλʱη  ηὴλ  ππξὰλ  η῅ο  θύζεσο 
θξʱη῅ζʱη, θʱὶ ὅηη πνιὺο ὁ η῅ο θʱξηεξίʱο ρξόλνο θʱὶ βʱξὺο ὁ η῅ο ἐγθξʱηείʱο βίνο· 
ἀλʱθέξνπζη  δέ  ζνη  θʱὶ  κλήκʱο  ὧλ  ζε  λύθησξ  θʱληάδνπζηλ  ʱἰζρξ῵λ, 
κνξθάδνληέο  ζνη  ππξσηηθὰ  η῅ο  πιάλεο  εἴδσιʱ.  Δἶηʱ  θʱὶ  ζθνδξόηεξνλ  ἐλ  ηῆ 
ζʱξθὶ ἐμάςʱληεο ηὸλ ππξεηόλ, ηῶ λόκῳ η῅ο ἁκʱξηίʱο γλσκνδνηνῦζί ζνη ἔλδνλ, 
ὅηη ὅζνλ νὐθ ἰζρύεηο θʱηʱζρεỖλ ηὴλ η῅ο θύζεσο βίʱλ, θἂλ ζήκεξνλ ἁκʱξηήζῃο 
δη’  ἀλάγθελ,  ἀιι’  ʱὔξηνλ  κεηʱλνήζεηο  δηὰ  ηὴλ  ἐληνιήλ·  θηιάλζξσπνο  γὰξ  ὁ  
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λόκνο θʱὶ ζπγρσξ῵λ ἀλνκίʱο ηνỖο κεηʱλννῦζη…ὅπσο ηῆ ἀληηζηξόθῳ κεηʱλνίᾳ 
ςπρὴλ ἀλʱθιάζʱληεο ηὸλ λʱὸλ η῅ο ζσθξνζύλεο πνξλεỖνλ πνηήζσζηλ.
389 
 
It is a very serious matter for the heart to be tied to a habit of pleasures, and much 
effort is needed to cut off completely the spread of evils. Therefore, d o  not 
become accustomed to associating with the pleasures of the  logismoi, for in the 
assemblage of evils there burns a fire. Giving you warmth in this way, they have 
you reckon that it is an effort to master the fire of one’s own nature, and the time 
of perseverance is lengthy and the life of self-control burdensome; and they bring 
back to you memories of the shameful fantasies that they suggested during the 
night, forming before you burning images of error. Then, having ignited in your 
flesh an even more intense burning, they introduce within you by means of the 
law of sin the notion that so far as you do not have the strength to restrain the 
force of  your nature, even if  you sin today by necessity, tomorrow  you  will 
repent  for  the  sake  of  the commandment,
390  for the law is humanitarian and 
forgives the iniquities of those who repent...Thus, after restoring
391 the soul by a 
reverse repentance, they make the temple of chastity into a place of fornication. 
 
Since all of the logismoi involve pleasure, the arousal of pathos always involves an in-
clination toward pleasure: either a pleasure directly promised by the logismoi or – as is 
the case with distress - one whose unavailability is their focus. Consequently, for the 
heart to be ‗tied to a habit of pleasures‘ is to be disposed to the arousal of pathos.  
 
Whereas Eulogios 13.12 emphasises the cognitive aspect of the logismoi, in the form of 
remembered  fantasies,  as  the  first  term  in  the  process  of  temptation,  this  passage 
emphasises their affective aspect: the initial object of awareness is not a mental image 
but a sensation of pleasurable warmth. This sensation is part of the ‘pleasures of the 
logismoi’. These pleasures have two aspects. The first is any pleasure already associated 
with  a  logismos  through  association  with  its  constituent  noêma  or  noêmata,  and  is 
therefore part of the disposition to  pathos. This pleasure is experienced prior to the 
engagement of the rational part of the soul, and when it is engaged incline it to allow the 
logismoi to linger. In the case of Eulogios 13.12 it is the pleasure associated with the 
remembered  fantasies  and  is  recalled,  and  therefore  passively  relived,  as  part  of 
recalling the fantasies. The second aspect of the pleasures of the logismoi is the new, 
                                                 
389 Eul. 21.22. 
390 Cf. Rom. 7: 23-5. 
391 The literal meanings of ἀλʱθιίλσ are ‘to lie’, ‘lean back’, ‘recline’, ‘bend back’, and so forth. ‘Re-
store’, which is Sinkewicz’ translation, would thus be an ironic as well as metaphorical reading, but I 
think Evagrius would intend both its literal and ironic senses.  
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occurrent  pleasure  that entertaining  them  affords.  In  the case  of  logismoi  involving 
memories of pleasant experiences this will arise straightforwardly out of the pleasure 
attaching to those memories and will involve reliving the experience and fantasising 
about repeating it. In other cases it might be less obvious. For example, the pleasure 
associated with logismoi of gluttony could be that of imagined eating, but it could also 
be  that  of  allowing  oneself  to  indulge  in  worries  about  one’s  health.  The  pleasure 
associated with resentment might include that of indulgence in self-pity at the memory 
of what precipitated the resentment and of imagining ways of avenging oneself, but in 
addition anger can of itself be ‘sweeter…than the dripping of honey’.
392 The pleasure 
involved in acedia might be that  of allowing oneself to give up trying to read and 
instead to fall asleep
393 or of imagining the approach of a visitor.
394 In their second 
aspect, then, the pleasures of the  logismoi are those of allowing them to linger and 
anticipating  the  further  pleasures  to  be  afforded  by  succumbing  to  the  pathos  and 
perhaps committing the sin to which they relate. The logismoi and their pleasures are 
the ‘assemblage of evils’, and the ‘fire’ that burns in them, like all of the references to 
fire  in  this  passage,  can  be  understood  in  two  senses,  both  metaphorical:  the 
physiological ‘fire’ of excessive vital heat and the psychological ‘fire’ of passion.  
 
In this example logismoi of fornication arise from the disposition to pathos. Intrinsic to 
them is the first aspect of the pleasures of the logismoi, part of that disposition. In virtue 
of their having arisen the person cannot help but experience this pleasure, but at first he 
does so only passively, as part of becoming aware of the logismoi. If he is sufficiently 
vigilant and self-discplined he will banish them immediately, but if not, he will start 
actively to enjoy them. This active enjoyment is the second aspect of the pleasure of the 
logismoi, the beginnings of occurrent pathos, and the first taste of the ‘fire’ that burns 
within them. The stronger his disposition to pathos – the more his heart is ‘tied to a 
habit of pleasures’– the stronger will be his temptation to allow the logismoi to linger. 
And  every  moment  that  he  does  so  sees  the  increase  of  the  pathos  and  of  its 
destabilising  effect  upon  his  thinking,  intent,  good  sense  and  better  judgement. 
Progressively more influenced by, and reluctant to relinquish, the pleasure and warmth 
he is feeling – the ‘fire burning’ in the ‘assemblage of evils’ – he starts putting less 
                                                 
392 Cf. Iliad. 18.109-10. 
393 Cf. 8Th. 6.15. 
394 Cf. Prakt. 12.  
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effort into resisting and more effort into thinking of excuses not to. In the language of 
Disciples  49 this  thinking  is  part  of  the  coalescing  of  the  logismoi.  As  pathos  and 
destabilisation continue to grow he recalls the pleasurable fantasies he experienced the 
previous night and begins to think of reasons to allow himself to succumb. The pathos 
that began with the first small stirrings of enjoyment of the initial logismoi is now full-
blown. But even at this point sin is not a  fait accompli, as Evagrius is at pains to make 
clear: 
 
Μὴ πξνθάζεη πάιηλ κεηʱλνίʱο δειεάδνπ ἐιπίζηλ ἀδήινηο, πνιινὶ γὰξ πεζόληεο 
εὐζὺο ἀλεξπάζζεζʱλ, ἕηεξνη δὲ ἀλʱζη῅λʱη νὺθ ἴζρπζʱλ ηῆ η῵λ ἟δνλ῵λ ζπλεζείᾳ 
ὡο ὑπὸ λόκνλ δεζέληεο.
395 
 
Do not get hooked on the bait of uncertain hopes under the pretext of a new 
repentance, for many have fallen and were immediately snatched away, and 
others were unable to recover, for they were bound by the habit of pleasures as 
though they were under a law. 
 
Although now fully in the throes of  pathos, he could still muster his self-control and 
refrain from sinning. But if, unwilling to ‘extinguish the feverish mind of the flesh’,
396 
he fails to do so then afterwards the pathos will subside and the logismoi vanish, leaving 
him with only the ‘image of the sin’  – that is, the empathês memory of it - and his 
disposition to pathos reinforced through indulgence.  
 
So far we have seen how the logismoi arise out of the disposition to pathos and how the 
initial object of awareness in an episode of temptation might be either the cognitive as-
pect of a logismos or its affective aspect. Now some further clarification is needed. Ac-
cording to Praktikos 6 it is up to us whether or not the logismoi linger and, as a result of 
the engagement with them of the rational part of the soul, arouse fresh pathos. But what 
about cases where, as with Eulogios 21.22, temptation begins with a pathos that, experi-
enced prior to the involvement of the rational part of the soul, inclines it to engage with 
the logismoi? Does this not pose a serious problem for the attainment of apatheia since 
the ability to resist pathos is itself undermined by pathos? A brief consideration of what 
                                                 
395 Eul. 21.23. 
396 Eul. 21.23; cf. Rom. 8:6.  
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the Stoics and Origen had to say about the arousal of pathos will give a clearer sense of 
Evagrius‘ solution to this problem.  
 
Orthodox Stoicism regards a pathos as a species of action, meaning that it depends upon 
the agent‘s assent and is therefore under his control. But this has the effect of excluding 
a set of phenomena which, while apparently pathē, cannot be said to result from either 
explicit or implicit assent, namely the involuntary arousals which occur in response to 
stimuli prior to the engagement of the rational mind. Later Stoics addressed this prob-
lem, denoting these arousals propatheiai
397 or ‗first movements‘.
398 Seneca notes that 
the impression of having received an injury is followed by a mental shock (ictus animi 
... qui nos post opinionem iniuriae movet).
399 But while this shock might appear to be 
anger it is not, since it occurs prior to assent and is something the mind suffers rather 
than causes (patitur magis animus quam facit).
400 He distinguishes between the involun-
tary prompting that is a preparation for anger, anger itself, and the brutishness that 
originates from anger but pursues cruelty for its own sake .
401 Epictetus acknowledges 
the existence of phantasiai which jolt the human mind at the first appearance of a thing, 
which ‗do not belong to the will and are not chosen‘, but rather ‗infiltrate themselves by 
a certain force of their own‘. Given, for example ‗the sudden announcement of some 
danger ... it is inevitable that for a brief time even the mind of the sage is moved and 
contracts and grows pale (sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et 
pallescere necessum est)‘, not because he believes that something bad is happening but 
due to ‗certain rapid and unsolicited movements (motus) which pre-empt the functions 
of the mind and reason.‘
402 Both Seneca and Epictetus, then, maintain a clear distinction 
between the initial shock that follows an opinio or phantasia but precedes assent, and 
the pathos that it heralds.  
 
                                                 
397 According to Inwood (1985: 180 and 308, n.256), although the term may originate with Posidonius, 
the doctrine does not; cf. Inwood. 
398 The term originates with Seneca, De Ira 2:4.1. 
399 De Ira 2:2.2-3. 
400 De Ira 2:3.1. 
401 De Ira 2:4-5, trans. Basore; cf. Graver (2007: 125-32). 
402 From the fifth book of Epictetus‘ Discourses, paraphrased by Gellius Noctes Atticae 19:1, trans. 
Sorabji at (2000: 376).  
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Origen uses the expression ‗first movements‘ at De Principiis 3.2.2,
403 although it is not 
clear whether he intends it to be understood in its strict Senecan sense. Earlier he di s-
cusses the arousal of pathos in the course of defining the scope of the autexousion: 
 
Δἰ δέ ηηο ʱὐηὸ ηὸ ἔμσζελ ιέγνη εἶλʱη ηνηόλδε, ὥζηε ἀδπλάησο ἔρεηλ ἀληηβιέςʱη 
ʱὐηῶ ηνηῶδε γελνκέλῳ, νὗηνο ἐπηζηεζάησ ηνỖο ἰδίνηο πάζεζη θʱὶ θηλήκʱζηλ, εἰ κὴ 
εὺδόθεζηο γίλεηʱη θʱὶ ζπγθʱηάζεζηο θʱὶ ῥνπὴ ηνῦ ἟γεκνληθνῦ ἐπὶ ηόδε ηη δηὰ 
ηάζδε πηζʱλόηεηʱο. ἟ γπλὴ ηῶ θξίλʱληη ἐγθξʱηεύεζζʱη θʱὶ ἀλέρεηλ ἑʱπηὸλ ἀπὸ 
κίμεσλ,  ἐπηθʱλεỖζʱ  θʱὶ  πξνθʱιεζʱκέλε  ἐπὶ  ηὸ  πνη῅ζʱί  ηη  πʱξὰ  πξόζεζηλ, 
ʱὐηνηειὴο ʱἰηίʱ γίλεηʱη
404 ηνῦ ηὴλ πξόζεζηλ ἀζεη῅ζʱη· πάλησο γὰξ εὐδνθήζʱο ηῶ 
γʱξγʱιηζκῶ θʱὶ ηῶ ιείῳ η῅ο ἟δνλ῅ο, ἂληηβιέςʱη ʱὐηῶ κὴ βεβνπιεκέλνο κεδὲ ηὸ 
θεθξηκέλνλ  θπξ῵ζʱη,  πξάηηεη  ηὸ  ἀθόιʱζηνλ.  ὁ  δέ  ηηο  ἔκπʱιηλ,  η῵λ  ʱὐη῵λ 
ζπκβεβεθόησλ  ηῶ  πιείνλʱ  κʱζήκʱηʱ  ἀλεηιεθόηη  θʱὶ  ἞ζθεθόηη·  νἱ  κὲλ 
γʱξγʱιηζκνὶ  θʱὶ  νἱ  ἐξεζηζκνὶ  ζπκβʱίλνπζηλ,  ὁ  ιόγνο  δέ,  ἅηε  ἐπὶ  πιεỖνλ 
ἰζρπξνπνηεζεὶο  θʱὶ  ηξʱθεὶο  ηῆ  κειέηῃ  θʱὶ  βεβʱησζεὶο  ηνỖο  δόγκʱζη  πξὸο  ηὸ 
θʱιὸλ ἠ ἐγγύο γε ηνῦ βεβʱησζ῅λʱη γεγελεκέλνο, ἀλʱθξνύεη ηνὺο ἐξεζηζκνὺο θʱὶ 
ὑπεθιύεη ηὴλ ἐπηζπκίʱλ.
405 
 
But if anyone should say that [an] impression from without is of such a sort that 
it is impossible to resist it whatever it may be, let him turn his attention to his 
own pathē and movements, whether there is not an approval, assent and inclina-
tion of the hêgemonikon towards a particular action on account of some specious 
attractions. For instance, when a woman shows herself to a man who has re-
solved to remain chaste and to abstain from sexual intercourse and invites him to 
act contrary to his purpose, she does not become the complete cause of the aban-
donment of that purpose. For he is wholly delighted at the titillation and the 
smoothness of the pleasure and wishes neither to resist it nor to confirm his reso-
lution, and then he commits the licentious act. On the other hand, the same things 
might happen to a man who has undergone more instruction and training, and 
while the titillations and arousals are present, his  reason, having been further 
strengthened and cultivated by diligence and confirmed by right doctrines to-
wards  the  good,  or  being  near  to  such  confirmation,  repels  the  arousals  and 
weakens the force of the epithumia.
406 
 
According to the Stoic theory of action a pathos is a movement of the hêgemonikon, so 
it can be presumed that by ‗inclination of the hêgemonikon‘ Origen means pathos. But 
                                                 
403 Quoted above, 2.2.1. 
404 It is clear from the context that there should be a negative here, but it is missing from the text (that of 
Görgemanns and Karpp). 
405 DP 3:1.4. 
406 Trans. mine.  
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it is unclear whether by ‗movements‘ he intends us to understand ‗first movements‘ in 
the Senecan sense, or, rather, the pathos itself. So while his overall meaning is clear, he 
effectively downplays the distinction between  Senecan  first  movements and  pathos 
proper by not clearly distinguishing between them. The reason for this becomes appar-
ent in what follows. The man experiences titillation, smooth pleasure
407 and delight 
that undermine his resolve. All are first movements because all precede his decision 
whether or not to confirm it. Accordingly, Origen does not confine first movemen ts to 
the initial shocks characteristic of arousal to anger or fear but recognises them as p o-
tentially more complex and even able to include second-order affects – in this case, de-
light at the first-order affects of titillation and smooth pleasure. Rather than there being 
a clearly defined point at which the man is able to resist the phantasiai giving rise to a 
first movement, the erosion of his resolve is gradual. With every moment that he al-
lows himself to delight in the titillations and pleasure his resolve weakens. Delight 
gives way to approval and approval to assent. Consequently there is no longer a clear 
distinction between first movements, assent and pathos, but instead a gradual progres-
sion from the first stirrings of pathos to its full manifestation.  
 
The similarity to the situation of the person in Eulogios 21.22 is clear. Unlike Seneca 
and Epictetus, Origen allows considerable affective complexity to precede assent, and 
viewing his example through an Evagrian lens it becomes plain that the man‘s pathē (or 
first movements) both start from a logismos - an empathēs noēma of the woman – and 
constitute matter for further logismoi, meaning that instead of a simple picture in which 
the cognitive precedes the affective, a more complicated view emerges in which the two 
are interwoven and causally effective in respect of one another. The cognitive and the 
affective start to look less like two distinct things and more like two aspects of a single 
thing. And this of course is how Evagrius sees it. His notion of a logismos subverts the 
distinction between cognition and affectivity, a subversion reflected in his anthropology 
by the fact that the three parts of the soul are but the fallen expression of the triune nous. 
Logismoi arise from the pathētikon part of the soul but have cognitive as well as affec-
tive aspects. The cognitive aspect of a logismos consists in mental images that them-
selves derive from the pathētikon part of the soul. Its affective aspect comprises both the 
dispositional pathos associated with it and any fresh, occurrent pathos to which it con-
                                                 
407 I understand this to be the pleasure of anticipation rather than commission.  
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tributes. The initial object of awareness might be either the cognitive aspect of a logis-
mos or the affective aspect. Hence, 
 
Πόηεξνλ ἟ ἔλλνηʱ ηὰ πάζε θηλεỖ, ἠ ηὰ πάζε ηὴλ ἔλλνηʱλ πξνζεθηένλ.
408 
 
One should attend to whether it is the representation that arouses the pathē or the 
pathē that arouse the representation. 
 
This picture has the advantage over that of the Stoics in being truer to the messiness of 
real life: however much we might like to suppose that things are as clear cut as Seneca 
and Epictetus affirm, sooner or later attention to our own experience will disabuse us. 
And although Origen presents a more complex analysis he too locates the inception of 
pathos in a cognitive event. It is left to Evagrius to address the fact that some pathē be-
gin with the physical – the promptings of hunger or thirst or the touch of the demon of 
fornication upon the body. But this surely makes the question of how pathos can be re-
sisted even more urgent: how can I resist the pathē that originate in my body? Evagrius 
has an answer – one in fact already alluded to by Origen in the passage discussed above. 
The way to resist such pathē is ultimately through training the soul in virtue while re-
ducing the body‘s susceptibility to pathos through a program of physical practices in-
cluding dietary restriction. For Evagrius, episodes of temptation never occur in a vac-
uum but are embedded in the monk‘s life and ascetic practice. In particular cases the 
                                                 
408 Prakt. 37. It continues, ‗Some people have held the first opinion, others the second‘ (ηηζὶ κὲλ γὰξ 
ἔδνμε ηὸ πξόηεξνλ, ηηζὶ δὲ ηὸ δεύηεξνλ). Guillaumont (1971: 584 ff) notes that the first view would ap-
pear to be that of the Stoics but that it is harder to attribute the second; he suggests it refers to Aristotle‘s 
observation at DA 403a19-23, that ‗while sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences 
there is no excitement or fear felt, on others faint and feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. 
when the body is already in a state of tension resembling its condition when we are angry‘ (πνηὲ κὲλ 
ἰζρπξ῵λ θʱὶ ἐλʱξγ῵λ πʱζεκάησλ ζπκβʱηλόλησλ κεδὲλ πʱξνμύλεζζʱη ἠ θνβεỖζζʱη, ἐλίνηε δ’ ὑπὸ κηθξ῵λ 
θʱὶ ἀκʱπξ῵λ θηλεỖζζʱη, ὅηʱλ ὀξγᾷ ηὸ ζ῵κʱ θʱὶ νὕησο ἔρῃ ὥζπεξ ὅηʱλ ὀξγίδεηʱη, trans. Nussbaum). 
However, DM 702a16-19, like the Stoics, assigns causal priority to cognition: ‘For the pathē suitably pre-
pare the organic parts, desire the pathē, and phantasia the desire; and phantasia comes about either 
through thought or through sense-perception’ (ηὰ κὲλ γὰξ ὀξγʱληθὰ κέξε πʱξʱζθεπάδεη ἐπηηεδείσο ηὰ 
πάζε, ἟ δ' ὄξεμηο ηὰ πάζε, ηὴλ δ’ ὄξεμηλ ἟ θʱληʱζίʱ· ʱὕηε δὲ γίλεηʱη ἠ δηὰ λνήζεσο ἠ δη' ʱἰζζήζεσο). 
Guillaumont also draws attention to Plotinus’ discussion at Enn. 3.6.4 of the respective causal priority of 
pathē and opinions: ‘Some of the pathē arise as the result of opinions, as when someone, being of the 
opinion that he will die, feels fear, or, thinking that some good is going to come to him, is pleased…but 
some of them are of a sort to take the lead and, without any act of choice, to produce the opinion in the 
part of the soul whose natural function it is to have opinions’ (Τ῵λ δὲ πʱζ῵λ ηὰ κὲλ ἐπὶ δόμʱηο 
ζπλίζηʱηʱη, ὡο ὅηʱλ δνμάζʱο ηηο κέιιεηλ ηειεπηᾶλ ἴζρῃ θόβνλ, ἠ νἰεζεὶο ἀγʱζὸλ ʱὐηῶ ηη ἔζεζζʱη 
἟ζζῆ…ηὰ δέ ἐζηηλ ὡο ἟γεζάκελʱ ʱὐηὰ ἀπξνʱηξέησο ἐκπνηεỖλ ἐλ ηῶ πεθπθόηη δνμάδεηλ ηὴλ δόμʱλ). Plot-
inus, however, sees this issue in terms of a radically different anthropology from that of Evagrius.    
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close interconnection of the cognitive and the affective means that it makes no real dif-
ference which aspect of a logismos is experienced first since the other is certain to fol-
low close behind, and either way it is likely that pathos will make itself felt before the 
decision is made whether or not to allow it to linger and will accordingly exert its influ-
ence upon that decision. What then of Praktikos 6 with its clear assertion that it is up to 
us whether or not a logismos lingers and arouses pathos? The fact that pathos can make 
itself felt in an episode of temptation prior to the involvement of the rational part of the 
soul in no way diminishes the power of the latter to resist pathos, even though it might 
feel to the agent as if it does. This is clear from Eulogios 21.22 where Evagrius treats 
him as capable of holding back from sin even in the throes of fresh pathos. Thus the as-
sertion in Praktikos 6 of our power to resist the progression from logismoi to pathos is 
to be understood not as an aetiology of pathos analogous to that of the Stoics whereby a 
cognitive stimulus is followed by assent and only then by pathos, but instead as a re-
minder to the rational part of the soul that however beleaguered by pathos it might be, it 
still has the power to arrest the further augmentation of that pathos and its progression 
to sin. 
 
Eulogios 13.12 and 21.22 reveal the close interaction between the cognitive and the 
affective in temptation by logismoi of fornication, but how do they relate in other kinds 
of temptation? Consider now the example from Thoughts 2 referred to in section 2.2.3 
above:  
 
εἰ ηνῦ δεκηώζʱληόο κε ἠ ἀηηκάζʱληνο ἐλ ηῆ δηʱλνίᾳ κνπ ηὸ πξόζσπνλ γέλνηην, 
ἐιεγρζήζεηʱη ὁ η῅ο κλεζηθʱθίʱο πʱξʱβʱιὼλ ινγηζκόο.
409 
 
If the face of a person who has caused me loss or dishonoured me should arise in 
my dianoia this will be proof of the approach of the logismos of resentment. 
 
The face in question is an empathês noêma constituting an empathês memory of an 
event, the subsequent recollection of which will tempt me to succumb to fresh resent-
ment in a process that can be schematised as follows: 
 
                                                 
409 Th. 2.5-7.  
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(1a)  The empathês noêma/logismos of the person‘s face arises into  my awareness 
from my disposition to pathos and as it does so I begin to feel stirrings of re-
sentment. 
 
or 
 
(1b)  I begin to feel stirrings of resentment and then the empathês noêma/logismos of 
the person‘s face arises into my awareness from my disposition to pathos 
 
(2)  Whether or not I am aware of these stirrings they start influencing my current 
mental and emotional state by inclining me to dwell anew on the injury she did 
to me.  
 
(3)  Although the originating event – her injuring me – was not pleasant, there was a 
certain pleasure associated with resentment I felt and so that pleasure is part of 
the pathos associated with the noêma of her face.  
 
(4)  That pleasure draws my attention toward itself and the noêma and my attention 
amplifies the pleasure and the resentment.  
 
(5)  At first the only pleasure I feel is that associated with the noêma, which I experi-
ence passively as part of it. But as soon as my attention inclines toward that pas-
sively experienced pleasure I start actively to enjoy that re-experiencing. This 
active enjoyment is the beginning of new, occurrent pleasure: the ‗pleasure of 
the logismoi‘. 
 
(6)  This new pleasure is part of the fresh pathos that I am now experiencing. The 
other part is fresh resentment. 
 
(7)  The arousal of fresh pathos is accompanied by the arising of fresh logismoi (or 
additional aspects of the overarching logismos of resentment), some of which 
might be further memories of the originating event. These in turn augment the  
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pathos, resulting in more logismoi which further augment the pathos, and so 
forth.  
 
(8)  I imagine myself somehow acting out my resentment. This imaginary acting out 
is the sin kata dianoian referred to at Disciples 49. 
 
(9)  By allowing myself to succumb to a fresh episode of resentment, and addition-
ally by acting out that resentment in my imagination, I have strengthened my 
disposition to pathos in general and resentment in particular, making this cycle 
of events more liable to repetition. 
 
It can be seen from this that temptation involving resentment follows the same pattern 
as that involving fornication, and it can, I suggest, safely be inferred that the same ap-
plies to temptation involving other logismoi. One caveat must, however, be noted. Eva-
grius notes that two of the demons can be especially swift in their attacks, the demon of 
fornication and the demon ‗that snatches us away into blasphemy.‘
410 In cases of such 
rapid assaults the process of temptation described in steps 1-9 and at Eulogios 13.12 and 
21.22 will be accelerated, or even perhaps overridden, by an onrush of pathos. But Eva-
grius maintains that even under such circumstances the agent has the power to resist; 
this is evident not only from his treatment, at Eulogios 21.22, of agent responsibility in 
the throes of pathos, but from Praktikos 51, where he notes that a swift attack by the 
demon of fornication poses no hindrance to the knowledge of God unless it should set 
the logismoi in motion with pathos. 
 
 
2.2.5  Summary 
 
This section began by looking at the philosophical understanding of pathos and then at 
Evagrius‘ view of it. We saw that for Evagrius pathos involves an attachment to the 
sensible world that is excessive and idolatrous; makes the nous passive in relation to the 
sensible world; is injurious because it distances us from God, and falls within the scope 
of our self-determination. Most of what we would consider emotions count as Evagrian 
                                                 
410 Cf. Prakt. 51; also Pry. 90.  
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pathē, as do various moods and other physical and psychological affects. Although for 
Evagrius pathos always involves the body, it is also present in the nous through associa-
tion with noēmata of sensible objects. Through these empathē noēmata it binds the nous 
to the sensible world. It was noted that logismoi originate in the pathētikon part of the 
soul and include both affective and cognitive aspects. The distinction between disposi-
tional and occurrent  pathos  was discussed and three aspects of dispositional  pathos 
were seen to be identifiable in Evagrius‘ writings. The process of temptation was exam-
ined in detail in relation first to logismoi of fornication and then to logismoi of resent-
ment. It emerged that the logismoi always involve pleasure which is experienced before 
the rational part of the soul becomes involved in an episode of temptation and which 
makes it harder to resist them, but that even when a person is in the throes of fresh pa-
thos the rational part of her soul retains the power to prevent it from increasing further 
or progressing to sin.  
 
 
2.3  The empathēs nous 
  
This chapter has examined the psychological components of empatheia, namely the lo-
gismoi and pathos. The logismoi have been seen to comprise both cognitive and affec-
tive aspects. The former can be of two types: first, mental images arising from the com-
promised rationality of the pathētikon part of the soul, and, second, agency deriving 
from the involvement of the rational part of the soul. The affective aspects of the logis-
moi include both dispositional and occurrent pathos. Now it remains to summarise the 
experiential effects of empatheia upon a person. How do the excess, the directedness 
toward the external world and consequent passivity and changeability in respect of it, 
and the injuriousness to the agent characteristic of pathos find expression in our lives? 
The excess, it will be recalled, consists in our allowing external things to command 
more of our attention than God and what conduces to knowledge of him, and this in turn 
is what the directedness toward the external world amounts to. So if  my desire to eat 
competes for my allegiance with my desire to obey the dietary restrictions that I know 
to be in the interests of virtue then my desire to eat is excessive and therefore a pathos. 
It is in this deflection of the agent from the good that the injuriousness to her of pathos 
consists.   
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The combined effects of all these things in a person‘s life, along with the passivity and 
changeability in respect of the external world that they involve, are instability and epis-
temic distortion. In binding the nous to the external world pathos binds it to its multi-
plicity and mutability, and this is reflected in pathos itself being a kind of movement. 
The understanding of pathos in terms of movement was by Evagrius‘ time traditional. 
Aristotle‘s Metaphysics, as we saw, includes as a definition of it ‗injurious alterations 
and movements‘ (ʱἱ βιʱβεξʱὶ ἀιινηώζεηο θʱὶ θηλήζεηο),
411 and the De Anima defines 
becoming  angry  as  ‗a  certain  mode  of  movement  of  such  and  such  a  body‘  (ηὸ 
ὀξγίδεζζʱη θίλεζίο ηηο ηνῦ ηνηνπδὶ ζώκʱηνο).
412 Pathos is defined as a movement of the 
soul by the Stoics,
413 and, following them, Clement of Alexandria,
414 and understood as 
such by Origen.
415 Evagrius himself consistently speaks of pathos in terms of kinēsis
416 
and for him its association with movement underscores its connection with the Fall, the 
vulnerability of the nous to pathos being both the direct consequence of its primordial 
deflection from God, and, in everyday terms, the ongoing consequence and cause of its 
inability to sustain a continual focus upon him. 
 
Now, though, some clarification is necessary: it is not so much movement per se that 
specifically characterises pathos but, rather, chaotic and disorderly movement. A par-
ticularly eloquent source for this idea, and one with which Evagrius would have been 
familiar, is Plato‘s metaphor, at Phaedrus 246a ff, of the soul as a winged team of 
horses and their charioteer. Following on from an affirmation of the intrinsic mobility 
and immortality of the soul,
417 it includes descriptions of the type of movement charac-
teristic of the gods on the one hand and mortals on the other. The gods travel easily 
through the heavens and the region above, their chariots being ‗well-balanced and easily 
controlled‘ (ἰζνξξόπσο εὐήληʱ ὄληʱ ῥᾳδίσο πνξεύεηʱη)
418 since their horses are good 
                                                 
411 Met. 1022b18-19, trans. W D Ross. 
412 DA 403a26, trans.  J A Smith. 
413 Cf. Stobaeus 2:88, SVF 3.378; LS 65A; see above, 2.2.1. 
414 Cf. Strom. 2.13.59.6; see above, 2.2.1. 
415 I take this to be implied by the allusion at DP 3:1.4 to ‗pathē and movements‘; see above, 2.2.4. 
416 E.g. at Prakt. 6, 37, 38 and 47. For a discussion of Evagrius‘ association of pathos with movement 
and, consequently, of apatheia with immobility, see Rasmussen (2005: 153-5). 
417 Phdr. 245c8-9: ‗All soul is immortal. For that which is always in movement is immortal‘ (ςπρὴ πᾶζʱ 
ἀζάλʱηνο. ηὸ γὰξ ἀεηθίλεηνλ ἀζάλʱηνλ). This and the following translations are those of Rowe. 
418 Phdr. 247b2.    
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and of good stock (θʱιόο ηε θʱὶ ἀγʱζὸο θʱὶ ἐθ ηνηνύησλ).
419 In the case of mortals, 
however, one horse is good but the other bad, making driving difficult and troublesome 
(ρʱιεπὴ…θʱὶ δύζθνινο)
420 and confining them to the region below the heavens. These 
souls follow after the gods,
421 
 
ἅπʱζʱη  ηνῦ  ἄλσ  ἕπνληʱη,  ἀδπλʱηνῦζʱη…ζπκπεξηθέξνληʱη,  πʱηνῦζʱη  ἀιιήιʱο 
θʱὶ ἐπηβάιινπζʱη, ἑηέξʱ πξὸ η῅ο ἑηέξʱο πεηξσκέλε γελέζζʱη. ζόξπβνο νὖλ θʱὶ 
ἅκηιιʱ θʱὶ ἱδξὼο ἔζρʱηνο γίγλεηʱη, νὗ δὴ θʱθίᾳ ἟ληόρσλ πνιιʱὶ κὲλ ρσιεύνληʱη, 
πνιιʱὶ δὲ πνιιὰ πηεξὰ ζξʱύνληʱη.
422 
 
all of them eager to rise up, but unable to do, and are carried round together… 
trampling and jostling one another, each trying to overtake the next. So there en-
sues the greatest confusion, competition and sweated exertion, in which through 
incompetent driving many souls are maimed, and many have their wings all bro-
ken. 
 
A soul unable to follow in the train of a god and thereby glimpse ‗part of what is true‘ 
(ηη η῵λ ἀιεζ῵λ)
423 becomes 
 
ιήζεο ηε θʱὶ θʱθίʱο πιεζζεỖζʱ βʱξπλζῆ, βʱξπλζεỖζʱ δὲ πηεξνξξπήζῃ ηε θʱη ἐπὶ 
ηὴλ γ῅λ πέζῃ…
424 
 
weighed down by being filled with forgetfulness and incompetence, and because 
of the weight loses its wings and falls to the earth… 
 
This description is strongly redolent of Evagrius‘ vision of the fall of the logikoi, due to 
inattentiveness,
425 negligence
426 or carelessness,
427 into the thickness of corporeality and 
bondage by pathos to the sensible world, and the resulting plight of the nous, whereby it 
is  ‗entangled  in  material  things  and  agitated  by  continuous  concerns  (πξάγκʱζη 
ζπκπιεθόκελνο ὑιηθνỖο, θʱὶ θξνληίζη ζπλερέζη δνλνύκελνο):
428 
                                                 
419 Phdr. 246b2-3. 
420 Cf. Phdr. 246c ff. 
421 More precisely, after the soul ‗which follows a god best and has come to resemble him most‘ – 248a2. 
422 Phdr. 248a7-b4. 
423 Phdr. 248c2-3. 
424 Phdr. 248c7-8. 
425 Cf. KG 1.49. 
426 Cf. KG 3.28; also DP 1.5.5 (R); 1.3.8 (R). 
427 Cf. KG 3.28.  
428 Pry. 70; cf.  2 Tim. 2:4.  
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Κπθιεύεη γὰξ ὁ λνῦο ἐκπʱζὴο ὢλ θʱὶ δπζθάζεθηνο γίλεηʱη ηὰο πνηεηηθὰο η῵λ 
἟δνλ῵λ ὕιʱο ἐπηζθεπηόκελνο.
429 
 
The nous goes round and round when it is caught in the pathē and is hard to re-
strain when it visits matter conducive to pleasures. 
 
Οὐ  δύλʱηʱη  δεδεκέλνο  δξʱκεỖλ,  νὐδὲ  λνῦο  πάζεζη  δνπιεύσλ  πξνζεπρ῅ο 
πλεπκʱηηθ῅ο  ηόπνλ  ἰδεỖλ·  ἕιθεηʱη  γὰξ,  θʱὶ  πεξηθέξεηʱη  ἐθ  ηνῦ  ἐκπʱζνῦο 
λνήκʱηνο, θʱὶ νὐρ ἵζηʱηʱη ἀθιόλεηνο.
430 
 
It is not possible to run while tied up, nor can a mind that is a slave to the pathē 
behold the place of spiritual prayer, for it is dragged and spun round by empathēs 
noēma and it cannot achieve a stable state. 
 
The empathēs nous, at the mercy of externals, can be seized by anger,
431 dragged about 
by thoughts of worry,
432  strangled by the noonday demon
433 or carried away into blas-
phemy.
434 It is subject to wandering
435 and easily moved, having difficulty checking 
forbidden fantasies.
436 It is darkened by logismoi rising through the pathētikon part of 
the soul,
437 by our being dragged towards worldly desires and by our  thumos being 
compelled contrary to nature.
438 It is defiled by logismoi of anger or fornication
439 and 
thickened by the company of secular people.
440 It has a strong tendency to be plundered 
by memory at the time of prayer.
441 In short, it is prey to all the turbulence, physical as 
well as psychological, associated with the  logismoi and the pathē they arouse - and it 
should be remembered that this means not only particular episodes of mental and emo-
tional turmoil and physical suffering but the ongoing process of cycling through the lo-
gismoi and their attendant pathē in one sequence or another as we ricochet through the 
                                                 
429 Th. 26.13-15. 
430 Pry. 71. 
431 Prakt. 11. 
432 Th. 6. 
433 Cf. Prakt. 36. The ‗noonday demon‘ is that of akêdia; cf. Prakt. 12.1. 
434 Prakt. 43, 46. 
435 Prakt. 15 
436 Prakt. 48. 
437 Prakt. 74. 
438 Prakt. 24. 
439 Prakt. 23. 
440 Prakt. 41. 
441 Pry. 44.  
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‗complex pattern of moral vulnerability‘
442 that Evagrius‘ eightfold classification of ge-
neric logismoi represents. 
 
For the soul that, due to the thoughts of sloth and acedia that have persisted in it, 
has become weak, has been brought low, and has dissipated in the miseries of its 
soul; whose strength has been consumed by its great fatigue; whose hope has 
nearly been destroyed by this demon‘s force; that has become mad and childish 
with passionate and doleful tears; and that has no relief from anywhere.
443 
 
Now consider the following: 
 
Τί  βνύιεηʱη  ηνỖο  δʱίκνζη  ἐλεξγεỖλ  ἐλ  ἟κỖλ  γʱζηξηκʱξγίʱλ,  πνξλείʱλ, 
θηιʱξγπξίʱλ, ὀξγήλ ηε θʱὶ κλεζηθʱθίʱλ, θʱὶ ηὰ ινηπὰ πάζε; ἵλʱ πʱρπλζεὶο ὁ λνῦο 
ἐμ ʱὐη῵λ, κὴ δπλεζῆ ὡο δεỖ πξνζεύμʱζζʱη· ηὰ γὰξ ηνῦ ἀιόγνπ κέξνπο πάζε 
ἄξμʱληʱ νὐθ ἐᾷ ʱὐηὸλ ινγηθ῵ο θηλεỖζζʱη θʱὶ ηὸλ ʘενῦ Λόγνλ ἐπηδεηεỖλ.
444 
 
Why do the demons want to produce in us gluttony, fornication, avarice, anger, 
and resentment, and the other  pathē? So that the nous becomes thickened by 
them and unable to pray as it ought; for when the pathē of the irrational part have 
arisen, they do not allow it to be moved rationally and to seek the Word of God. 
 
This reminds us that although the pathē have their origin in the human body and soul - 
in our senses, appetites and desires
445 - the logismoi do not originate with us but with 
the demons; as we have seen, Evagrius regards the logismoi as fundamentally alien to us 
since human nature is essentially good.
446 Thus empatheia is not the natural human 
condition
447 but a state of collusion with the demons into which we enter b y allowing 
ourselves to be seduced by pleasure into letting the logismoi linger and arouse (further) 
pathos in us. The attractiveness to us of pleasure can be traced to the predominance of 
epithumia  in  the  human  constitution,
448  since  the  satisfaction  of  app etite  always 
involves pleasure and so in a sense all appetite is directed toward pleasure. Therefore in 
suggesting the  logismoi – which, it will be recalled, always involve pleasure
449 - the 
                                                 
442 Williams (2007:7); see above, 2.1.4.2. 
443 Ant. 6.38.  
444 Pry. 50. 
445 E.g. Prakt. 4, 35; Eul. 21.23; see above, 2.2.2. 
446 See above, 2.1.1. 
447 Cf. Th. 8; see above, 2.1.1. 
448 KG 1.68; see above, 1.2. 
449 See above, 2.2.4.  
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demons are playing to the particular weakness of human beings, and just as apatheia is 
the natural human condition,
450 empatheia is our especial pathology. Pathos thickens 
the nous by binding it to the sensible world and in so doing prevents it from being 
moved rationally; that is, in a stable and orderly manner. And so to look ahead, apatheia 
will be characterised not by immovability on the part of the soul but by its rational 
movement;
451 that is, a kind of movement appropriate to contemplation.  
 
This  idea  of  stable  and  orderly  movement  replacing  the  chaotic  and  disorderly 
movement  characteristic  of  pathos  connects  the  instability  of  empatheia  with  the 
epistemic distortion noted to be its second defining feature. The fundamental reason for 
that distortion is simple: since God is both the source of knowledge and its only true 
object the fall from union with him was a fall from knowledge into ignorance.
452 This is 
reflected in the fact that empatheia, mediated through the logismoi, leads us to construe 
the  world  solely  in  terms  of  our  desires  and  to  construct  on  their  basis  fictional 
counterparts of it, populated by phantoms, in which they can be satisfied. Thus in so far 
as we are prey to it the world of which we are aware and in which we act is not the real 
world peopled by real human beings but a false one of our own making in which real 
human beings are reduced to being ‗matter‘ for our fantasies.
453 The instigator of this 
desire-based fictional world is the pathētikon part of the soul, the impaired rationality of 
which is directed not toward truth, the proper object of reason, but what we desire to be 
true. But it is when the rational part of the soul assents to, and assumes agency within it 
that it derives from us such reality as we can give it. And so we isolate ourselves in sub-
jective worlds of our own creation, cut off not only from God but from other human be-
ings and the rest of creation, and in so doing perpetuate the instability and fragmentation 
of the Fall. In this condition we are unable to read the ‗letter from God‘ that is corporeal 
creation. Instead of being able to appreciate the spiritual significance of created things 
or even engage with them neutrally, we are trapped in a self-referential perspective in 
which nothing has meaning except in terms of its utility in respect of what we mistak-
enly suppose to be our self-interest.  And, as we go about our lives in this pathos-driven 
way, the noēmata that the nous takes up will have pathos ‗yoked together‘ with them 
                                                 
450 Cf. Th. 8; see above, 2.1.1. 
451 Pace Rasmussen (2005: 153-55), whose discussion of movement and immovability in relation to pa-
thos and apatheia does not distinguish between soul and nous in terms of the effects of apatheia. 
452 See above, 1.1. 
453 See above, 2.1.1.  
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and so  imprint the  nous,  further  thickening  it and, by  forming  empathēs  memories, 
augmenting our disposition to pathos and perpetuating our predicament. 
 
So much for the pathology of the human soul; now to its health. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Apatheia 
 
The essence of the human being is a formless and incorporeal nous, the ‗place of God‘,
1 
created to exist in the stillness and ‗unspeakable peace‘
2 of union with him. The nous is, 
however, capable of movement because it has the power of self-determination. Since the 
first condition of the nous was union with God, its first exercise of self-determination 
was a deflection from him, and since God is unmoving, this meant a transition into 
movement and, consequently, changeability. Because the movement was away from 
God, it was unstable and, as such, precipitated the Fall. God‘s response was to under-
take corporeal creation to reintroduce stability to the created order and provide the noes 
with a way of re-ascending to  him.  The foundation  for this ascent  is  apatheia, the 
‗health of the soul‘ (ὑγείʱ ςπρ῅ο).
3  
 
Before proceeding it would be appropriate to clarify which part of the human person is 
the proper subject of  apatheia, since Evagrius variously predicates it of the nous,
4 the 
soul,
5 the pathētikon part of the soul,
6 the epithumētikon
7 and the heart.
8 The answer is 
in principle simple: the nous is the proper subject of apatheia, where nous is understood 
not as effectively synonymous with logistikon but as denoting the whole entity. But de-
spite this, and the fact that, as we have seen, Evagrius often speaks of the nous rather 
than the soul in order to maintain a focus upon our true nature, prior to, above and be-
yond our present, ensouled condition,
9 he also associates apatheia with the soul in con-
trast to the nous, as in the following: 
 
δὸμʱ θʱὶ θὼο ηνῦ λνόο ἐζηηλ ἟ πλεπκʱηηθὴ γλ῵ζηο· δὸμʱ θʱὶ θὼο η῅ο ςπρὴο ἟ 
ἀπάζεηʱ.
10 
                                                 
1 See above, 1.2.1.3. 
2 Cf. KG 1.65. 
3 Prakt. 56.3. 
4 E.g. Prakt. 83; Th. 15, 26. 
5 E.g. Prakt. 2, 56, 60, 67; Rfl. 3; Th. 22. 
6 Gnost. 2. 
7 Th. 16. 
8 Th. 43. 
9 See above, 1.2.1. 
10 KG 1.81.  
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The glory and light of the nous is spiritual knowledge; the glory and light of the 
soul is apatheia. 
 
Here Evagrius is speaking of the nous as synonymous with the logistikon and ‗soul‘ as 
denoting the pathētikon part of the soul and so associating apatheia with the latter. In 
any case, to speak of apatheia as pertaining to the nous, if the latter is understood to en-
compass the body, would be misleading inasmuch as apatheia does not, properly speak-
ing, attach to the body since its affections derive not from itself but from the soul, spe-
cifically its pathētikon part. For both these reasons it would seem more correct to say 
that apatheia attaches to the latter. But although the pathētikon part of the soul is cer-
tainly the principal locus of pathos in the soul, there is reason to believe that the lo-
gistikon is also vulnerable to pathos in its own right and not just via the thumos or 
epithumētikon. In the  first place there  is Evagrius‘ reference to  apatheia of the  pa-
thētikon part of the soul to account for. In it he defines the praktikos as ‗he who has only 
acquired apatheia of the pathētikon part of the soul‘ (ὁ ηὸ πʱζεηηθὸλ κέξνο η῅ο ςπρ῅ο 
κόλνλ ἀπʱζὲο θεθηεκέλνο).
11 If, as this implies, there can be, in addition to an apatheia 
of the pathētikon part of the soul, an apatheia of the rational part, there must  be pathē 
of the rational part. We have already seen that, despite Evagrius‘ usual attribution of the 
logismoi to the pathētikon part of the soul, several apparently derive at least in part from 
the logistikon.
12 We have also seen that in practice the boundary between  logismoi and 
pathē is blurred since logismoi always have dispositional pathos associated with them.
13 
In addition, the three parts of the soul are not, it will be recalled, absolutely distinct enti-
ties but successive stages in the descent of the nous.
14 Finally, we have seen that the en-
tire nous, even in its pre-lapsarian state, is intrinsically passible.
15 For all these reasons 
it seems likely that the logistikon has its own pathē; indeed, this seems far more plausi-
ble than its being somehow immune to the passibility of the other parts of the soul and 
of the nous as a whole. But this raises the question of why the pathētikon part of the 
soul, if it is not the only source of pathos, should be singled out as pathētikon at all.
16 A 
twofold answer presents itself. First, it is the primary and most fundamental source of 
                                                 
11 Gnost. 2. 
12 See above, 2.1.4.1. 
13 See above, 2.1.1, 2.2.4. 
14 See above, 1.1.2. 
15 See above, 1.2.1. 
16 Cf., e.g., Prakt. 49; 74; 78; 84.  
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pathos, being more closely associated with the body and the external world than the 
rational part of the soul. In particular, it is the source of the appetite for food, in turn the 
source of vulnerability to all the other pathē.
17 Second, the capacity to resist pathos is 
intrinsic to, and resides in, the logistikon alone. Consequently the pathētikon part of the 
soul depends upon something other than, and outside of, itself to free it from pathos.
18 
Therefore it can be concluded that although the  pathētikon part of the soul is the pri-
mary and most fundamental intra-psychic source of pathos, the logistikon too is passi-
ble, and, accordingly, the entire soul is the proper subject of apatheia. 
 
What, then, are we to make of Evagrius‘ references to apatheia of the pathētikon part of 
the soul, the epithumētikon and the heart? The former two can now be explained easily: 
both refer to a specific kind of apatheia, ‗imperfect apatheia‘, discussed below in Sec-
tion 3.4. Evagrius‘ reference to apatheia of the heart requires slightly more explanation. 
The heart, as we have seen, is the centre of a person‘s interior life; that which they ex-
perience as ‗me‘.
19 To speak of apatheia of the heart, therefore, is to shift the focus onto 
this uniquely intimate domain; to raise the question of apatheia in relation to my most 
personal and immediate sense of myself. I suggested above that when Evagrius speaks 
of the nous or ‘soul’ he is discussing the human person objectively but when he speaks 
of the ‘heart’ he is invoking their subjectivity,
20 and I think the extreme infrequency 
with which he predicates apatheia of the heart – I am only aware of the instance cited 
above – testifies to his sensitivity to the two different vocabularies he uses. When he 
uses the term apatheia he does so in conjunction with other philosophical terms whereas 
when he wants to speak of apatheia in relation to the heart he does so by reference to 
purity, or, more often, by allusion.
21  
 
In sum, Evagrius speaks of apatheia in relation to the nous, the soul, the pathētikon part 
of the soul, the epithumētikon and the heart, but its proper object is the soul understood 
as the entire tripartite entity, or, speaking in a different sense, the heart.  The assignment 
of apatheia to the soul needs to be qualified in that, while it is true in the case of the 
fallen nous (that is, the soul) that the soul is the subject of apatheia, the pre-lapsarian 
                                                 
17 See above, 1.2.3, 2.1.3.1. 
18 Cf. Prakt. 86. 
19 See above, 1.2.4. 
20 See above, 1.2.4. 
21 See below, 3.2.  
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nous would also have been apathēs, as will the post-restoration nous. However, since 
Evagrius‘ discussions of apatheia always concern the incarnate nous (that is, the soul), I 
shall from now on speak of the soul as the subject of apatheia unless the context re-
quires use of another term. 
 
 
3.1  Apatheia as stability 
 
The pre-lapsarian nous in discarnate union with God existed in stillness, but the fallen 
nous, although capable under certain circumstances of experiencing stillness, is highly 
mobile: Evagrius speaks of it wandering (πιʱλώκελνλ),
22 describes it as easily moved 
(εὐθίλεηνλ)
23 and likens it to a potter‘s wheel in the very great rapidity of its movement 
(ὀμύηʱηνο…θʱηὰ ηὴλ θίλεζηλ ἟κ῵λ ὁ λνῦο).
24 The more distant from God the  nous is, 
the more unstable its movement is; the closer to him, the more stable. Apatheia, as free-
dom from the turbulence of the pathē is the stable condition of the nous that enables its 
return to God. We can see an allusion to the stability afforded by apatheia, to the re-
ward of attaining it and to Evagrius‘ association with it in the following entry from the 
Antirrhētikos: 
 
[Against] the thought of pride that glorifies me on the pretext that I edify souls 
with a stable way of life and knowledge of God;
25 
 
Since pathos is the unstable movement of the nous, apatheia is by definition its stable 
movement. Or is it? Rasmussen has argued that Evagrius associates apatheia with im-
movability:  
 
If movement characterises the passions, the opposite is the case regarding apa-
theia. Apatheia is a condition which is characterised by peacefulness (Prakt. 12 
and 57), where the mind is calm and still (Prakt. 64) and untroubled (Prakt. 67). 
This condition is identical with the original state of the rational beings before the 
fall, which, we remember, was characterised by movement… Perhaps it is possi-
                                                 
22 Cf. Prakt. 15.1; also KG 1.85: ‗The nous wanders when impassioned and is uncontrolled when it attains 
the elements of its desire.‘ 
23 Prakt. 48.6. 
24 Th. 24.6-7. 
25 Cf. Ant. 8.30; see above, 2.1.3.8.  
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ble to say that the monastic struggle against thoughts, demons and passions is 
really about the struggle for immovability.
26 
To begin with, there is a double ambiguity to be unpacked from the notion of ‗immov-
ability‘. The first ambiguity is semantic and is that immovability can be either absolute 
or relative. That is, to say ‗x is immovable‘ can either mean ‗x is immobile‘, in the sense 
of ‗x is not moving at all‘
27 or it can mean ‗x is immovable in relation to y‘, as in, ‗x can-
not be moved from y‘, where y could, for example, be a state of stable movement. That 
Rasmussen understands immovability as immobility is clear from her identification of it 
with the pre-lapsarian state of the logikoi (an identification which is misplaced since al-
though the pre-lapsarian logikoi were immobile they were not immovable). The second 
ambiguity is logical and concerns the distinction between the metaphysical and the phe-
nomenological; that is between, (a), my nous being actually – that is, metaphysically - 
immovable, and, (b), my experiencing my nous as immovable. It would be possible for 
(a) but not (b) to be the case; for (b) but not (a) to be the case, or for both or neither (a) 
and (b) to be the case. Rasmussen does not acknowledge either of these ambiguities but 
her claim appears to be that apatheia is characterised by immobility that is both meta-
physical and phenomenological, both actual and experienced. My claim, by contrast, is 
that apatheia is characterised by actual - that is, metaphysical - movement that is experi-
enced as stillness. So far the only support I have adduced for it is the Platonic associa-
tion of movement with soul, since although I have also inferred from the premiss that 
pathos  is unstable  movement  to  the conclusion  that  apatheia  is stable  movement,  it 
would be equally valid to infer from it, as Rasmussen seems to have, that apatheia is 
immobility. I shall now explain (i) why metaphysical immovability can never be a prop-
erty of the Evagrian nous; (ii) under what circumstances the nous can be (metaphysi-
cally) immobile, and, (iii), when (metaphysical) movement can be experienced as still-
ness. 
The reason for (i) is simple: metaphysical immovability can never be a property of the 
nous as far as Evagrius is concerned because movability is inseparable from the power 
of self-determination, an exercise of which  is, as we have seen, a  movement of the 
                                                 
26 Rasmussen (2005: 154). 
27 Although ‗immobile‘ can also be synonymous with ‗immovable‘, I shall not intend it to be understood 
in that sense here.  
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nous.
28 Again, with (ii) things are straightforward: God is immobile but movement is 
intrinsic to corporeal creation, so the nous is immobile when, and only when, it is in 
discarnate union with God. The nous was immobile - although not of course immovable 
- in its pre-lapsarian existence, and will again be immobile, although not immovable, 
following  the  apokatastasis.  The  incarnate  nous  can  never  be  immobile  because 
movement is intrinsic to corporeal creation. With (iii) things become more complicated. 
With the unstable movement of the soul or nous – that is, pathos - the phenomenological 
is  a  reliable  guide  to  the  metaphysical  since  pathos  will  always  be  experienced  as 
unstable movement. To see this, we need only think back to Evagrius’ descriptions of 
the  logismoi and their associated  pathē: to be tempted by a  logismos,  which means 
already to be experiencing its built-in pathos, is to experience a mental and emotional 
instability that impels us toward the even greater instability of a fresh episode of pathos. 
The stable movement of the soul or nous can, however, be experienced as stillness. This 
can happen in two ways. The first relates to the  nous  which, although  apathēs and 
perhaps contemplating, is not yet enjoying the experiential union with God that is pure 
prayer. In this case, its experience will be one of concurrent stillness and movement, the 
movement being its orientation toward God, and the stillness, the serenity that enables it. 
Evagrius’ account at On Thoughts 8 of investigating the spiritual logoi of gold describes 
a series of movements of the apathēs nous: from the question of ‘why gold was made’, 
to ‘why it is sand-like and scattered through through the lower regions of the earth, to 
why it is ‘discovered with much labour and toil’, and so forth.
29 Again, the following 
describes a stable movement of the nous, the experience of which would involve both 
movement and stillness: 
 
Ὅηʱλ ὁ λνῦο ζνπ ηῶ πνιιῶ πξὸο ηὸλ ʘεὸλ πόζῳ θʱηὰ κηθξὸλ νἷνλ ὑπʱλʱρσξεỖ 
η῅ο  ζʱξθὸο,  θʱὶ  πάληʱ  ηὰ  ἐμ  ʱἰζζήζεσο  ἠ  κλήκεο  ἠ  θξάζεσο  λνήκʱηʱ 
ἀπνζηξέθεηʱη,  εὐιʱβείʱο  ὁκνῦ  θʱὶ  ρʱξᾶο  ἔκπιεσο  γελόκελνο,  ηόηε  λόκηδε 
἞γγηθέλʱη ὅξνηο πξνζεπρ῅ο.
30 
 
When the nous out of a great longing for God gradually withdraws, as it were, 
from  the  flesh and turns aside all  noēmata deriving  from the senses or from 
                                                 
28 Cf. Sch. 10.1-2 on Eccl. 2:11; Sch. 23.1 on Prov. 2:17; see above, 1.1.1. 
29 Cf. Th. 8.5-14; see above, 2.1.1. 
30 Pry. 61.  
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memory or from krasis, being filled with both reverence and joy, then consider 
yourself to be near the frontiers of prayer. 
 
‗Great longing‘, ‗gradually withdrawing‘, ‗turning aside‘, ‗being filled with reverence 
and joy‘ – all are movements of the nous that would be experienced as such. But they 
are predicated upon apatheia: we know the nous here described is apathēs from the fact 
that its epithumētikon is acting according to nature in longing for God
31 and from its 
ability to ‗withdraw from the flesh‘ and ‗turn aside all noēmata deriving from the senses 
or memory or krasis‘. This apatheia would be experienced as the serenity and detach-
ment underlying and enabling these movements toward ‗the frontiers of prayer‘. When, 
however, the nous reaches and crosses those frontiers it will no longer experience any 
movement, but will instead feel itself caught up in the stillness of union with God. Now 
phenomenology comes apart from metaphysics because while the nous will experience 
only stillness it will remain subject to the  movements intrinsic to corporeality  – the 
flows of blood and breath in the body; the continuing orientation of the three parts of the 
soul towards God, and also the existence of body and soul in time, existence in time be-
ing itself a form of movement since it entails change. So while apatheia is always ex-
perienced as stillness, it is constituted by the stable movement of the nous, and, except in 
the union with God that is pure prayer, will be accompanied by the experience of that 
movement. 
 
That said, although I have argued that the apathēs nous is in motion I have not yet 
adduced any direct evidence for this being Evagrius’ view. So does such evidence exist? 
It does. For example, at Kephalaia Gnostika 6.46 he speaks of ‗the praktikē soul moved 
by the commandments of Christ‘. Here as elsewhere he uses the adjective praktikē as a 
synonym for apathēs: the soul that is moved by the commandments of Christ is the apa-
thēs soul, in contrast to the soul which is moved by pathos. Again, in On Prayer 50 he 
declares that when the pathē of the irrational part of the soul have arisen, they do not 
allow the nous to ‗be moved in a rational manner (ινγηθ῵ο θηλεỖζζʱη) and to seek the 
word of God‘,
32 from which it follows that when the soul is apathēs the nous can be 
‗moved in a rational manner.‘ The ‗rational movement‘ of the nous is of course contem-
plation, hence for example Evagrius speaks of ‗the pure nous which is moved by spiri-
                                                 
31 Cf. KG 4.73; Prakt. 86; see above, 1.2.2. 
32 Pry. 50.5-6.  
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tual knowledge‘,
33 of the nous ‗eagerly [hastening] on towards immaterial and formless 
knowledge (πξὸο ἄϋινλ θʱὶ ἀλείδενλ γλ῵ζηλ ἐπεηγόκελνο)
34 and of the angel of God 
‗[moving] the light of the nous to an unerring activity‘ (θηλεỖ ηὸ θ῵ο ηνῦ λνῦ ἀπιʱλ῵ο 
ἐλεξγεỖλ).
35 
 
Because apatheia is the natural state of the human soul,
36 Evagrius refers to it as ‗our 
own state‘ (η῅ο νἰθείʱο θʱηʱζηάζεσο).
37 Insofar as the nous possesses apatheia it is 
emancipated from the turbulence associated with the logismoi. It is no longer bound by 
pathos to sensible objects,
38 is free of entanglement in material things and of agitation 
by continuous concerns
39  and  is  no  longer  ‘dragged  and  spun  round  by  empathē 
noēmata and unable to achieve a stable state’:
40  
 
Ἀπάζεηά ἐζηη θʱηάζηʱζηο ἞ξέκεʱ ςπρ῅ο ινγηθ῅ο, ἐθ πξʱύηεηνο θʱη ζσθξνζύλεο 
ζπληζηʱκέλε.
41 
 
Apatheia is the tranquil state of the rational soul,
42 constituted by gentleness and 
chastity.  
 
Rasmussen suggests that allusions to the immovability that she associates with apatheia 
should be read into Evagrius‘ uses in the Praktikos of cognates of the verb histēmi, ‗to 
stand‘, such that references to standing, whether metaphorical or literal,
43 should be un-
derstood as implicit allusions to apatheia, and that in particular a symbolic connection 
obtains between the monastic practice of standing while praying and ‗the ideal, tran-
scendent ―stand‖ before God.‘
44  In other  words,  when Evagrius speaks of  the  nous 
                                                 
33 KG 6.48. At KG 3.42 Evagrius defines contemplation as spiritual knowledge; see below, 1.1.3 
34 Pry. 68. 
35 Pry. 74. 
36 Cf. Th. 8, Disc. 140; see above, 1.2, 2.2.1. 
37 Prakt. 43.8. 
38 Cf. Th. 40-3-5; Rfl. 23; Sch. 2 on Ps. 145:8; also Th. 22.1-8. See above, 2.2.3. 
39 Cf. Pry. 70; see above, 2.3. 
40 Cf. Pry. 71; see above, 2.3. 
41 Rfl. 3. 
42 Cf. Sch. Ps. 36:11: ‗an abundance of peace is apatheia of the soul with true knowledge of beings‘ 
(πι῅ζνο δὲ εἰξήλεο ἐζηὶλ ἀπάζεηʱ ςπρ῅ο κεηὰ γλώζεσο η῵λ ὄλησλ ἀιεζνῦο). 
43 She cites as examples Prakt. 15, ‗When the nous wanders, reading, vigils and prayer bring it to a stand-
still‘ (λνῦλ κὲλ πιʱλώκελνλ ἵζηεζηλ…) and Prakt. 46, ‗This demon‘s goal is to stop us from praying so 
that we may not stand (κὴ ζη῵κελ) before God‘. 
44 Rasmussen (2005: 154-55).  
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standing before God he is evoking both the monk‘s physical posture during prayer and 
the stability and experiential stillness of apatheia, the former being in turn a symbol of 
the latter. With the foregoing caveats about ‗immovability‘, I think this is often cor-
rect,
45 and in particular we shall see in the following section that the ‗stand of the nous 
before God‘ is indeed symbolic of apatheia. Meanwhile it can be noted how, in the 
second part of this aphorism, Evagrius uses the verb sunistamai, a cognate of histēmi 
and also of sustasis, to implicitly reinforce the association of apatheia with stability that 
is made explicit in the first part of it. Again, 
 
θʱζʱξζεỖζʱ  ςπρὴ  η῅ο  η῵λ  ἀξεη῵λ  πιεξόηεηνο  ἀθιόλεηνλ  ηὴλ  ηάμηλ  ηνῦ  λνῦ 
θʱηʱζθεπάδεη, δεθηηθὸλ ʱὐηὸλ πνηνῦζʱ η῅ο δεηνπκέλεο θʱηʱζηάζεσο.
46 
 
When the soul has been purified by the full complement of the virtues, it stabi-
lises
47 the attitude of the nous and prepares it to receive the desired state. 
 
The soul that has been ‗purified by the full complement of the virtues‘ is the apathēs 
soul, and the ‗desired state‘ that it prepares the soul to receive is that of pure prayer.
48 
 
Commenting on Prov. 18:16, ‘A man’s gift enlarges him, and seats him among princes’, 
Evagrius understands a ‘man’s gift’ to be the right life (βίνο ὀξζόο) that enlarges him 
and makes him worthy of the fullness of God,
49 and the verb ‘seats’ as referring to ‘the 
seat of the nous…the excellent state which keeps that which is sitting there difficult to 
move  or  immovable’
50  (λνῦ  γὰξ  θʱζέδξʱ  ἐζηὶλ  ἕμηο  ἀξίζηε  δπζθίλεηνλ  ἠ  ἀθίλεηνλ 
                                                 
45 An obvious exception being his use of the word katastasis, ‗state‘. The meaning of this word is simply 
too broad for it to be associated only with stability, and Evagrius uses it of both stable and unstable states, 
as, for example, in the following: Sch. 23 on Prov. 2:17: ‗the former (πξόηεξʱ) katastasis [of the 
logikoi]‘; Sch. 91.1-2 on Prov. 7:6-10, ‗the impure (ἀθάζʱξηνο) katastasis of the soul‘; Sch.153.4-6 on 
Prov. 17:2, ‗he gives to each brother knowledge according to his katastasis‘; Sch. 240.1 on Prov. 22:10, 
‗the worst (ρεηξίζηε) katastasis‘;  Prakt. 80.3-5, ‗A peaceful (εἰξεληθή) katastasis follows upon the 
former logismoi, but a troubled (ηεηʱξʱγκέλε) one follows upon the latter.‘ 
46 Pry. 2. 
47 Rasmussen (2005: 155) translates aklonētos as ‗immovable‘ and interprets this chapter as clear evi-
dence for the connection between apatheia and immovability that she proposes. ‗Stabilises‘ is Sinkewicz‘ 
translation. Liddell and Scott give the meanings of aklonētos  as ‗unshaken, unmoved.‘ 
48 Pace Rasmussen, who takes the ‗desired state‘ to be apatheia itself. 
49 Cf. Eph. 3:19. 
50 Sinkewicz translates akinēton here as ‗immobile‘, but because of the ambiguity of this term – see 
above, n.26 – it is unclear how he intends it to be understood. Liddell and Scott give both ‗immobile‘ and 
‗immovable‘ as meanings of akinēton, but I feel that the latter is, in the context, a more suitable transla-
tion since it is unambiguous and in the sense of ‗immovable‘ logically related to the predicate ‗difficult to  
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δηʱηεξνῦζʱ ηὸλ θʱζεδόκελνλ);
51 that is, apatheia. ‘Difficult to move’ means ‘difficult 
to dislodge from stable movement’ and should be understood both metaphysically and 
phenomenologically.  For  the  reasons  given  above,  however,  ‘immovable’  must  be 
understood in phenomenological terms alone; that is, as meaning that the  nous feels 
immovable. The following makes the same point, bearing in mind that apatheia is syn-
onymous with the establishment of virtue in the soul:
52  
 
Virtue is that state of the reasoning soul in which it is difficult to move it towards 
evil.
53 
 
In his gentleness, tranquility and stability the Evagrian apathēs resembles the Stoic sage, 
described by Stobaeus as follow: 
 
[ιέγνπζη] ηὸλ ζπνπδʱỖνλ…εἶλʱη δὲ θʱὶ πξᾶνλ, η῅ο πξʱόηεηνο νὔζεο ἕμεσο θʱζ' 
ἡλ πξάσο ἔρνπζη πξὸο ηὸ πνηεỖλ ηὰ ἐπηβάιινληʱ ἐλ πᾶζη θʱὶ κὴ ἐθθέξεζζʱη εἰο 
ὀξγὴλ  ἐλ  κεδελί.  θʱὶ  ἟ζύρηνλ  δὲ  θʱὶ  θόζκηνλ  εἶλʱη,  η῅ο  θνζκηόηεηνο  νὔζεο 
ἐπηζηήκεο θηλήζεσλ πξεπνπζ῵λ, ἟ζπρηόηεηνο δὲ εὐηʱμίʱο πεξὶ ηὰο θʱηὰ θύζηλ 
θηλήζεηο θʱὶ κνλὰο ςπρ῅ο θʱὶ ζώκʱηνο.
54 
 
[They say that] the good man…is gentle, his gentleness being a state by which he 
brings gentleness to bear upon acting appropriately in everything and never being 
carried  away  to  anger  against  anyone.  He  is  also  tranquil  and  orderly,  his 
orderliness being knowledge of fitting movements and his tranquility the good 
discipline of the natural movements and rests of his soul and body.
55 
 
For  Evagrius,  the  tranquillity  afforded  by  apatheia  derives  in  large  part  from  the 
neutrality it affords in relation to our thoughts and occurrent sense-perception. We have 
seen that ‘the human [that is, apathēs] logismos neither seeks the acquisition of gold nor 
is concerned with investigating what gold symbolises; rather, it merely introduces in the 
intellect the simple form of gold separate from any pathos of greed‘,
56 and this neutral-
ity also characterises sense perception, meaning that although the noēmata of sensible 
                                                                                                                                               
move‘, whereas ‗immobile‘ is not. To put it another way,  x could not be both ‗difficult to move‘ and 
‗immovable‘, but it could be both ‗difficult to move‘ and ‗immobile‘ in the sense of ‗still‘. 
51 Sch. 184.3-5 on Prov. 18:16. 
52 See above, 1.2.2. 
53 KG 6.21. 
54 Stobaeus 2:115.5-17, SVF 3:564, 632; LS 65W. 
55 Translation mine. 
56 Th. 8.18-21; see above, 2.1.1.  
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objects will imprint the nous insofar as we focus upon the objects themselves rather 
than their logoi, the imprinting will not have the force that it would were pathos in-
volved. But it is not only to our thoughts and perceptions of objects that apatheia brings 
tranquility, but to our memories of them: 
 
ἀπάζεηʱλ ἔρεη ςπρή, νὐρ ἟ κὴ πάζρνπζʱ πξὸο ηὰ πξάγκʱηʱ, ἀιι’ ἟ θʱὶ πξὸο ηὰο 
κλήκʱο ʱὐη῵λ ἀηάξʱρνο δηʱκέλνπζʱ.
57 
 
The soul possesses  apatheia, not by virtue of its experiencing no pathos with 
respect  to  objects,  but  because  it  remains  untroubled  even  with  regard  to 
memories of them. 
 
Evagrius also includes our dream life within the domain of apatheia:  
 
ἀπʱζείʱο ηεθκήξηνλ, λνῦο ἀξμάκελνο ηὸ νἰθεỖνλ θέγγνο ὁξᾶλ, θʱὶ πξὸο ηὰ θʱζ’ 
ὕπλνλ θάζκʱηʱ δηʱκέλσλ ἣζπρνο, θʱὶ ιεỖνο βιέπσλ ηὰ πξάγκʱηʱ.
58 
 
It is a proof of  apatheia when the nous has begun to see its own light
59 and 
remains still before the phantasms occurring during sleep and looks upon objects 
with serenity. 
 
It is probable that in extending apatheia to our dream life Evagrius is not simply treat-
ing the latter as an adjunct of our waking life, the character of which reflects the overall 
health of the soul, but as morally and spiritually relevant in a more substantive and di-
rect way. His departure from Constantinople
60 was precipitated, so Palladius tells us, by 
his swearing an oath in a dream to ‗leave this city and care for [his] soul‘ (ἀλʱρσξεỖο 
η῅ο πόιεσο ηʱύηεο θʱὶ θξνληίδεηο ζνπ η῅ο ςπρ῅ο);
61 upon waking he questioned the va-
lidity of such an oath, but reasoned, ‗even if the oath was in a trance, nevertheless I did 
take it‘ (εἰ θʱὶ ἐλ ἐθζηάζεη γέγνλελ ὁ ὅξθνο ἀιι’ ὅκσο ὤκνζʱ).
62 It would seem, then, 
that he regards us as capable in principle of full agency in our dreams, a belief which, in 
                                                 
57 Prakt. 67. 
58 Prakt. 64. 
59 At Gnost. 45 Evagrius attributes to Basil of Caesarea the view that the nous has a light of its own that is 
only visible to those who have attained apatheia. 
60 Prior to settling in the desert Evagrius had been in Constantinople, first in the retinue of Gregory Na-
zianzus and then in that of his successor as bishop, Nektarios. He left the city in order to extricate himself 
from a potentially disastrous romantic entanglement; cf. HL 38.2-7. 
61 HL 38.6. 
62 HL 38.7.  
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assigning agency to us under circumstances to which it might be supposed not to ex-
tend, would accord with his imputing to the person in the throes of pathos the ability 
nonetheless to refrain from sin.
63  
 
In this section I have explained how Evagrius can speak of apatheia both as being char-
acterised by stillness and associated with movement. It has been noted that apatheia be-
stows stillness (that is, stable movement experienced as stillness) not only in respect of 
our thoughts and occurrent sense-perception but in respect of our memories, and not 
only in our waking life but in our dreams. From the latter it has been further noted that 
Evagrius imputes full agency to the nous not only in the throes of pathos but in the 
dream state. Finally, it has been noted that Evagrius‘ references to the nous standing be-
fore God allude to apatheia as well as to the physical stand of the monk in prayer. 
 
 
3.2  Apatheia as death and resurrection 
 
Apatheia is the purified state of the soul, and for Evagrius its attainment amounts to a 
kind of death: 
 
ζ῵κʱ κὲλ ρσξίζʱη ςπρ῅ο, κόλνπ ἐζηὶ ηνῦ ζπλδήζʱληνο· ςπρὴλ δὲ ἀπὸ ζώκʱηνο, 
θʱὶ ηνῦ ἐθηεκέλνπ η῅ο ἀξεη῅ο. ηὴλ γὰξ ἀλʱρώξεζηλ κειέηελ ζʱλάηνπ θʱὶ θπγὴλ 
ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο νἱ Πʱηέξεο ἟κ῵λ ὀλνκάδνπζηλ.
64 
 
Separating body from soul belongs solely to the one who joined them together; 
but separating soul from body belongs also to one who longs for virtue. Our Fa-
thers called anachoresis a meditation on death and a flight from the body. 
 
Although Evagrius attributes this teaching to ‗the Fathers‘, its locus classicus is Plato‘s 
Phaedo,
65 where Plato has Socrates define ‗purification‘ (θάζʱξζηο) as ‗the separation 
of the soul from the body as far as possible‘ (ηὸ ρσξίδεηλ ὅηη κάιηζηʱ ἀπὸ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο 
                                                 
63 Cf. Eul. 21.23; see above, 2.2.4. 
64 Prakt. 52. 
65 Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 256, n.59) who notes that ‗the meditation on death had become a common notion 
by the end of the fourth century‘ and points to its presence at, e.g., VA 19. It is also, of course, a Pauline 
theme; e.g. 1 Cor. 15:31, ‗I die daily‘ (θʱζ’ ἟κέξʱλ ἀπνζλῄζθσ).  
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ηὴλ ςπρὴλ)
66 and the correct practice of philosophy as consisting in ‗a release and sepa-
ration of soul from body‘ (ιύζηο θʱὶ ρσξηζκὸο ςπρ῅ο ἀπὸ ζώκʱηνο).
67 But while the 
theme of purification as death has pagan origins, Paul gives it an added dimension by 
construing that death in terms of sharing in the death of Christ in order to share in his 
resurrection,
68 and it is in this sense that Evagrius‘ adoption of it is to be understood.
69 
Explaining, in the Prologue to the Praktikos, the symbolism of the habit worn by the 
Egyptian monks, he declares, 
 
ηὴλ  δὲ  κεισηὴλ  ἔρνπζηλ  νἱ  πάληνηε  ηὴλ  λέθξσζηλ  ηνῦ  Ἰεζνῦ  ἐλ  ηῶ  ζώκʱηη 
πεξηθέξνληεο θʱὶ θηκνῦληεο κὲλ πάληʱ ηὰ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο ἄινγʱ πάζε, ηὰο δὲ η῅ο 
ςπρ῅ο θʱθίʱο κεηνπζίᾳ ηνῦ θʱινῦ πεξηθόπηνληεο.
70 
 
They wear the sheepskin who ‗always carry in the body the death of Jesus‘ in 
muzzling all the irrational pathē of the body and in cutting off the evils of the 
soul by participation in the good. 
 
The praktikos ‗always carries in his body the death of Jesus so that the life of Jesus may 
also  be  manifested  in  [his]  body  (ἵλʱ  θʱὶ  ἟  δσὴ  ηνῦ  Ἰεζνῦ  ἐλ  ηῶ  ζώκʱηη  ἟κ῵λ 
θʱλεξσζῆ)‘
71 - the reader is left to complete the quote for herself – and, as Driscoll 
notes, Evagrius consistently ‗understands death to apply to praktikē and resurrection to 
knowledge‘.
72 Praktikē is a kind of death because it involves dying to the world by re-
nouncing all our attachments to it. But the real death suffered by the nous is not that in 
which it turns away from the external world, but that in which it turned away from God, 
and its ‗death‘ to the external world is but the precursor to its ‗resurrection‘ in knowl-
edge of God; ‗through praktikē the Lord saves one from death‘ (δηὰ…πξʱθηηθ῅ο ῥύεηʱη 
ηηλʱ ἀπὸ ζʱλάηνπ ὁ θύξηνο):
73  
 
θύζηλ κὲλ ινγηθὴλ ὑπὸ θʱθίʱο ζʱλʱησζεỖζʱλ ἐγείξεη Χξηζηὸο δηὰ η῅ο ζεσξίʱο 
πάλησλ η῵λ ʱἰώλσλ· ὁ δὲ ηνύηνπ πʱηήξ ηὴλ ἀπνζʱλνῦζʱλ ςπρὴλ ηὸλ ζάλʱηνλ 
ηνῦ Χξηζηνῦ ἐγείξεη δηὰ η῅ο γλώζεσο η῅ο ἑʱπηνῦ· θʱὶ ηνῦηό ἐζηη ηὸ ὑπὸ ηνῦ 
                                                 
66 Phd. 67c5-7. 
67 Phd. 67d9-10. 
68 Cf. Phil. 3: 10-11; Col. 3:3; 2 Cor. 4:10; 2 Tim. 2:11. 
69 Cf. Driscoll (2003: 238). 
70 Prakt. Prol. 6. 
71 2 Cor. 4:10. 
72 Driscoll (2003: 238). 
73 Sch. 11 on Ps. 32:19.  
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ἀπνζηόινπ ιεγόκελνλ,  ηὸ  «εἰ ζπλʱπεζάλνκελ ηῶ Χξηζηῶ, πηζηεύνκελ ὅηη θʱὶ 
ζπδήζνκελ ʱὐηῶ».
74 
 
The rational nature that was put to death by evil, Christ raises up through the 
contemplation of all the ages; the soul that has died the death of Christ, his Father 
raises up through knowledge of himself. And this is what was said by the Apos-
tle: ‗If we have died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him.‘
75 
 
To ‗die with Christ‘ is to ‗die‘, by means of praktikē, to immersion in pathos and the 
straitened perspective that sees objects solely in terms of their relevance to our desires. 
To be empathēs is to be locked in this narrow perspective, our minds surrendered to the 
logismoi and so to the construction of fictional worlds that cut us off from the real world, 
the world of objects ‗as they were created‘. Thus Disciples 58: 
 
ὥζπεξ ἐπὶ ηνῦ ἔμσ ἀλζξώπνπ ἟ ςπρὴ δηὰ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο ἐλεξγνῦζʱ ἁκʱξηάλεη, 
νὕησο θʱὶ ὁ ἔζσ ἄλζξσπνο, ηνπηέζηηλ ὁ λνῦο, δηὰ η῵λ λνεκάησλ η῵λ ἐκπʱζ῵λ. 
θʱὶ ὥζπεξ ὁ ἔμσ ἔρεη ηὰο ἀξεηὰο πξὸο πʱηδείʱλ ἵλʱ γέλεηʱη ζώθξσλ, νὕησο θʱὶ ὁ 
λνῦο, θʱζʱξ῵ο ὁξ῵λ θʱὶ ἀπʱζ῵ο ὡο γέγνλε ηὰ πξάγκʱηʱ, ζσθξνλεỖ· εἰο ηνῦηνλ 
ιέγεη ὁ Πʱῦινο νἰθεỖλ ηὸλ Χξηζηόλ· ὑπὲξ νὗ θʱὶ ἞ηηκᾶζζʱη γέγξʱπηʱη δηὰ ηνῦ 
ζηʱπξνῦ. θʱὶ ὥζπεξ ὁ ἔμσ ἄλζξσπνο ἀπνζλῄζθσλ ρσξίδεηʱη ηνῦ θόζκνπ, νὕησο 
θʱὶ ὁ ἔζσ ἄλζξσπνο ἀπνζλῄζθσλ θʱηὰ δηάλνηʱλ ρσξίδεηʱη η῵λ λνεκάησλ. 
 
Just as with the exterior self the soul sins by acting through the body, so the inte-
rior self - that is the nous - [sins by acting] through the empathê noēmata. And 
just as the exterior self has the virtues for education in order that he might be-
come chaste, so the nous becomes chaste when, with purity and apatheia, it sees 
objects as they were created; it is in [such a nous] that, according to Paul, Christ 
dwells,
76 and for which, it is written, he suffered the shame of the cross.
77 And 
just as the exterior self separates himself from the world by dying, so the interior 
self, by dying kata dianoian, separates himself from noēmata. 
 
Again we can presume that Evagrius deliberately leaves his reader to complete a quote: 
according to Heb. 12:2 Jesus endured the shame of the cross ‗for the sake of the joy that 
was set before him‘ (η῅ο πξνθεηκέλεο ʱὐηῶ ρʱξᾶο). One dies the death of praktikē for 
the sake of the joy of the ‗resurrection‘: 
 
                                                 
74 Th. 38. 
75 Rom. 6:8. 
76 Cf. Eph. 3:17. 
77 Cf. Heb. 12:2.  
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ἐὰλ δειώζῃο Χξηζηόλ, γελήζῃ κʱθʱξηζηόο,  
ηὸλ δὲ ζάλʱηνλ ʱὐηνῦ ἀπνζʱλεỖηʱη ἟ ςπρή ζνπ,  
θʱί νὐ κὴ ἐπηζπάζεηʱη ἀπὸ ζʱξθὸο ʱὐη῅ο θʱθίʱλ,  
ἀιι’ ἔζηʱη ἟ ἔμνδόο ζνπ ὡο ἔμνδνο ἀζηέξνο,  
θʱὶ ἟ ἀλʱζηʱζίο ζνπ ὥζπεξ ὁ ἣιηνο ἐθιάκςεη.
78 
 
If you imitate Christ, you will become blessed.  
Your soul will die his death,
79  
and it will not derive evil from its flesh.  
Instead, your exodus will be like the exodus of a star,  
and your resurrection will glow like the sun.  
 
The soul that by means of praktikē imitates Christ ‗will not derive evil from its flesh‘ 
because rather than ‗nourishing it and making provision for it to gratify its desires‘
80 it 
‗subdues it with hunger and vigil‘ so that the body ‗does not jump when a logismos 
mounts upon it nor snort when moved by an empathēs impulse‘
81 but instead becomes 
the means by which the soul attains apatheia.
82 Thus Ad Monachos 118:  
 
ζάξθεο Χξηζηνῦ πξʱθηηθʱὶ ἀξεηʱί,  
ό δὲ ἐζζίσλ ʱὐηὰο γελήζεηʱη ἀπʱζήο. 
 
Flesh of Christ: virtues of praktikē;  
he who eats it, apathēs shall he be.  
 
Driscoll notes that the word ‗exodus‘ is used by Evagrius to denote the passage from 
praktikē to knowledge and so ‗describes the death that the monk dies with Christ‘,
83 
while the star symbolises ‗a soul making progress‘ and its degree of brightness its de-
gree of progress;
84 when a person attains apatheia of the heart then during prayer they 
will see their nous shine like a star (λνῦλ ἀζηεξνεηδ῅).
85 He also notes that Evagrius‘ 
thinking about resurrection seems in particular to draw upon Paul‘s distinction, at I Cor. 
                                                 
78 AM 21. 
79 Cf. 2 Cor. 4:10-11; 2 Tim. 2:11. 
80 Cf. Prakt. 53; Rom. 13:14. 
81 Cf. 8Th. 1.35. 
82 Cf. Prakt. 53; see above, 1.2.3.  
83 Driscoll (2003: 241); cf. Sch. 12 on Prov. 1:20-21: ‗Here he calls ―exodus‖ the soul‘s exit from evil and 
ignorance ‘ (ἔμνδνλ λῦλ ὀλνκάδεη ηὴλ ἐμειζνῦζʱλ ςπρὴλ ἀπὸ θʱθίʱο θʱὶ ἀγλσζίʱο). 
84 Driscoll (2003: 242); cf. KG 3.84: ‗The whole of second natural contemplation bears the sign of the 
stars, and the stars are those to whom it has been entrusted to illuminate those who are in the night.‘ 
85 Th. 43.  
Page 190 of 268 
 
15:44, between a sôma psuchikon and a sôma pneumatikon, and that Evagrius uses the 
Pauline expression ‗spiritual body‘, along with ‗resurrection‘, to describe ‗a return to 
original unity of those elements into which the mind ―disintegrated‖ (i.e. into soul, into 
a body) in falling from essential knowledge.‘
86 It is, accordingly, instructive to look at 
what Paul says about the ‗spiritual body‘: 
 
ζὺ ὅ ζπείξεηο, νὐ δῳνπνηεỖηʱη ἐὰλ κὴ ἀπνζάλῃ…ζπείξεηʱη ἐλ θζνξᾷ, ἐγείξεηʱη ἐλ 
ἀθζʱξζίᾳ·  ζπείξεηʱη  ἐλ  ἀηηκίᾳ,  ἐγείξεηʱη  ἐλ  δόμε·  ζπείξεηʱη  ἐλ  ἀζζελείᾳ, 
ἐγείξεηʱη ἐλ δπλάλεη· ζπείξεηʱη ζ῵κʱ ςπρηθόλ, ἐγεηξεηʱη ζ῵κʱ πλεπκʱηηθόλ. εἰ 
ἔζηηλ  ζ῵κʱ  ςπρηθόλ,  ἔζηηλ  θʱὶ  πλεπκʱηηθόλ…ζʱξμ  θʱὶ  ʱἷκʱ  βʱζηιείʱλ  ζενῦ 
θιεξνλνκ῅ζʱη νὐ δύλʱηʱη νὐδὲ ἟ θζνξὰ ηὴλ ἀθζʱξζίʱλ θιεξνλνκεỖ… ζʱιπίζεη 
γὰξ θʱὶ νἱ λεθξνὶ ἐγεξζήζνληʱη ἄθζʱξηνη θʱὶ ἟κεỖο ἀιιʱγεζόκεζʱ. δεỖ γὰξ ηὸ 
θζʱξηὸλ  ηνῦην  ἐλδύζʱζζʱη  ἀθζʱξζίʱλ  θʱὶ  ηὸ  ζλεηὸλ  ηνῦην  ἐλδύζʱζζʱη 
ἀζʱλʱζίʱλ. ὅηʱλ δὲ ηὸ θζʱξηὸλ ηνῦην ἐλδύζεηʱη ἀθζʱξζίʱλ θʱὶ ηὸ ζλεηὸλ ηνῦην 
ἐλδύζεηʱη  ἀζʱλʱζίʱλ,  ηόηε  γελήζεηʱη  ὁ  ιόγνο  ὁ  γεγξʱκκέκνο,  «θʱηεπόζε  ὁ 
ζάλʱηνο εἰο λỖθνο».
87 
 
What you sow does not come to life unless it dies…What is sown is corruptible, 
what is raised is incorruptible. It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory. It is 
sown in weakness, it is raised in power. It is sown an animal body, it is raised a 
spiritual body. If there is an animal body, there is also a spiritual body…Flesh 
and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, nor does the corruptible inherit the 
incorruptible…The [last] trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised incor-
ruptible, and we will all be changed. For this corruptible body must put in incor-
ruptibility, and this mortal body must put on immortality. When this corruptible 
body puts on incorruptibility, and this mortal body puts on immortality, then the 
saying that is written will be fulfilled: ‗Death has been swallowed up in victory.‘ 
 
It is clear that Evagrius understands ‗animal body‘ (ζ῵κʱ ςπρηθόλ) as referring to what, 
in the Great Letter, he calls the body‘s nature or attributes
88 – that is, the nature and at-
tributes it shares with corporeal creation. In the Great Letter he discusses the possibility 
of our rising above ‗the movements we have in common with the wild animals‘. The 
movements he cites are ‗hunger, sleep, lust, rage, fear, distress, enmity, sloth, disquiet, 
cunning, savagery, pride, mournfulness, lamentation and wickedness‘, and their ‗oppo-
site movements‘, namely ‗satisfaction, vigilance, loathing, serenity, fortitude, gladness, 
                                                 
86 Driscoll (2003: 245). 
87 I Cor. 15:36-54. 
88 Cf. Gt.Let. 46.  
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love, diligence, quiet, simplicity, meekness, humility, joy, consolation and goodness.‘
89 
He also lists the senses – ‗seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling.‘ Of all of these, 
‗and whatever else may be like them that has not been noted‘, he says: 
 
In accordance with…the body‘s subjugation to the soul (since the latter is able to 
do everything like God, in whose image it is), it might be thought that even while 
the body lives certain of the movements we mentioned can be renounced. Again, 
it might be thought…that if it were perfectly in the likeness of God as it was cre-
ated, it could even elevate itself above all the movements; but since it renounced 
being the image of God and willingly became the image of animals, it is subju-
gated to all those movements of the body which it has in common with the beasts 
and wild animals. When it is beneath its nature by its actions, it is not possible 
for it to make its body above its nature by its movements. Fire cannot extinguish 
a fire,  nor can water dry water;  likewise, the soul that  is  in  the body by  its 
works…cannot liberate the body from its own attributes. 
 
We partake of corporeal nature because we chose to renounce the image of God and as-
sume the image of animals:  
 
δηόηη  γλόληεο  ηὸλ  ζεὸλ  νὐρ  ὡο  ζεὸλ  ἐδόμʱζʱλ  ἠ  εὐρʱξίζηεζʱλ,  ἀιι’ 
ἐκʱηʱηώζεζʱλ  ἐλ  ηνỖο  δηʱινγηζκνỖο  ʱὐη῵λ  θʱὶ  ἐζθνηίζζε  ἟  ἀζύλεηνο  ʱὐη῵λ 
θʱξδίʱ.  θάζθνληεο  εἶλʱη  ζνθνὶ  ἐκσξάλζεζʱλ  θʱὶ  ἢιιʱμʱλ  ηὴλ  δόμʱλ  ηνῦ 
ἀθζάξηνπ  ζενῦ  ἐλ  ὁκνηώκʱηη  εἰθόλνο  θζʱξηνῦ  ἀλζξώπνπ  θʱὶ  πεηεηλ῵λ  θʱὶ 
ηεηξʱπόδσλ θʱὶ ἑξπεη῵λ. δηὸ πʱξέδσθελ ʱὐηνὺο ὁ ζεὸο ἐλ ηʱỖο ἐπηζπκίʱηο η῵λ 
θʱξδη῵λ ʱὐη῵λ εἰο ἀθʱζʱξζίʱλ.
90  
 
Though they knew God, they did not honour him as God or give thanks to him, 
but they became vain in their thoughts and their uncomprehending heart was 
darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools; and they exchanged the glory 
of the incorruptible God for an image in the likeness of a corruptible human be-
ing or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles. Therefore God gave them up in the 
desires of their hearts to impurity. 
 
The pre-lapsarian logikoi knew God, but in turning away from him failed to honour or 
give thanks to him. Likewise human beings, since we are essentially noes created in the 
                                                 
89 Ibid.  
90 Rom. 1:21-4. In using the expression ‗an image in the likeness‘ (ἐλ ὁκνηώκʱηη εἰθόλνο) Paul alludes to 
Genesis 1:26: ―Let us make man in our image, after our likeness…‖ (πνηήζσκελ ἄλζξσπνλ θʱη’ εἰθόλʱ 
἟κεηέξʱλ θʱὶ θʱζ’ ὁκνίσζηλ); both passages use the same word, eikôn, for ‘image’, and the word Paul 
uses for ‘likeness’, homoiôma, is a close cognate of homoiôsis.  
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image of God and therefore receptive to knowledge of God, can be said to know him, 
but we too fail to honour or thank him. Instead, like the guests invited to the banquet, we 
care more for our possessions, relationships and so forth,
91 not realising that all that is 
good comes from God.
92 Because our thoughts  – our [dia]logismoi – are not directed 
toward God they are vain, and because our hearts are full of such thoughts there is no 
room in them for God, meaning that they are darkened and their desires impure. In this 
condition we repeatedly choose to ‗exchange the glory of the incorruptible God‘ for the 
image of that which is corruptible, a choice that both arises from and reinforces the ‗im-
purity of the desires of our hearts.‘ This impurity is manifest in the pathētikon part of the 
soul being given over to the movements that we ‗have in common with the wild ani-
mals.‘
93 All of these things are part of the ‗dishonour‘ that Paul speaks of in relation to 
the sôma psuchikon.  
 
The ‗attributes of the body‘ are, properly speaking, those of the pathētikon part of the 
soul, but ‗the things that heal the pathētikon part of the soul require the body to put 
them  into  practice‘  (ἐθεỖλʱ  κὲλ  ηὸ  πʱζεηηθὸλ  κέξνο  η῅ο  ςπρ῅ο  ζεξʱπεύνληʱ...ηνῦ 
ζώκʱηνο ἟κ῵λ εἰο ηὴλ ἐξγʱζίʱλ πξνζδεỖηʱη), a task for which ‗the latter, because of its 
weakness,  is  not  sufficient‘  (ὅπεξ  δη’  νἰθείʱλ  ἀζζέλεηʱλ  πξὸο  ηνὺο  πόλνπο  νὐθ 
ἐπʱξθεỖ).
94 This is the ‗weakness‘ of the sôma psuchikon to which Paul refers at 1 Cor. 
15:43, and because of it the body must ‗ascend from its nature through the health and 
strength of the soul‘,
95 this of course being apatheia. That the soul can, although not 
‗perfectly in the likeness of God as it was created‘, nonetheless effect this purification 
derives from the efficacy that the image of God¸ although damaged, yet retains: ‗the 
soul ascends through the strength and wisdom of God according to his nature.‘
96 
 
                                                 
91 Cf. Luke 14:16-24; see above, 2.2.2. 
92 Cf. Pry. 33: ‗What good is there besides God? Therefore, let us give back to him all that is ours and it 
will go well for us. For the one who is good is certainly also the provider of good gifts‘ (Τί ἄιιν ἀγʱζὸλ, 
ἀιι’ ἠ ʘεόο; Οὐθνῦλ ʱὐηῶ ἀπνδ῵κελ πάληʱ ηὰ θʱζ’ ἟κᾶο, θʱὶ εὖ ἟κỖλ ἔζηʱη· ὁ γὰξ ἀγʱζὸο πάλησο, θʱὶ 
ἀγʱζ῵λ ἐζηη πʱξνρεὺο δσξε῵λ); also 8Th. 8:12: ‗You have nothing good which you have not received 
from God‘ (νὐδὲλ ἔρεηο, ὃ κὴ πʱξὰ ʘενῦ ἔιʱβεο); cf. 1 Cor. 4:7: ‗What do you have that you did not re-
ceive?‘ 
93 Gt.Let. 41. 
94 Prakt. 49.3-6; cf. Th. 35.9-10. 
95 Gt.Let. 49. 
96 Gt.Let. 49.  
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What exactly it means in practice for the soul to raise itself and the body above the 
movements they share with corporeal nature – that is, for the nous to attain apatheia - 
can be appreciated by reference to the previous chapter‘s discussion of the logismoi and 
of pathos and its arousal. In the first place it means that the monk will feel neither hun-
ger or thirst. He will, without any effort of self-discipline, conform his intake of food 
and liquid to the level required to keep his body alive, and will experience no desire to 
eat or drink in excess of this, either in terms of quantity or variety: 
 
ὁ ηέιεηνο νὐθ ἐγθξʱηεύεηʱη, θʱὶ ὁ ἀπʱζὴο νὐρ ὑπνκέλεη, εἴπεξ ηνῦ πάζρνληνο ἟ 
ὑπνκνλή, θʱὶ ηνῦ ὀρινπκέλνπ ἟ ἐγθξάηεηʱ.
97  
 
The one who is perfect does not practise self-control and the one who is apathēs 
does not practise perseverance, since perseverance is for the person subject to the 
pathē and self-control for the person who is troubled. 
 
On the other hand, although he will experience no desire to vary his dietary regime, he 
will be content to do so when appropriate, for example for the sake of hospitality or be-
cause of physical sickness.
98 Since he will avoid eating or drinking to excess his  apa-
theia will have a firm foundation in his body, there being no surplus of vital heat to 
manifest as pathos. Nor will there be any surplus of food or drink to be excreted as 
waste products. He will not be distracted by dreams or fantasies about food and drink, 
nor by worries about the effect of his regime upon his health. His thinking will be vigi-
lant (λεθάιηνλ θξόλεκʱ),
99 his prayer ‗like a young eagle soaring upwards‘ (λενζζὸο 
ἀεηνῦ ἀληπηάκελνο)
100 and his nous ‗like a radiant star in the clear night air‘ (ἀζηὴξ ἐλ 
ʱἰζξίᾳ  ιʱκπξόο).
101  He will not experience sexual desire, movements, fantasies or 
dreams; the above passage from  Great Letter 46 continues by noting that when the 
movements of the body occur ‗in a natural and orderly way, they are a sign of some 
small portion of health for the soul; but when there are none, it is a sign of perfec-
tion.‘
102 The sight of a woman will move him not to pleasure but to offer glory to God 
                                                 
97 Prakt. 68. 
98 Ibid. 
99 8Th. 1.13. Νεθάιηνο is one of a family of terms whose primary meaning relates to an absence of wine, 
hence its sense of ‘vigilant’ derives from ‘sober, self-controlled, wary.’ 
100 8Th. 1.14. 
101 8Th. 1.15. 
102 Gt.Let. 47. Cf. Prakt. 55: ‗When the natural movements of the body during sleep are free of images, 
they reveal that the soul is healthy to a certain extent. The formation of images is an indication of ill- 
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(θηλεỖ πξὸο δνμνινγίʱλ ʘενῦ);
103 thus even when exposed to the ‗matter‘ of logismoi he 
will remain apathēs.
104 Not hankering after possessions, he will be a well-prepared trav-
eller who finds shelter in any place (ὁδνηπόξνο εὐζηʱιὴο, θʱὶ ἐλ πʱληὶ ηόπῳ εὑξίζθσλ 
θʱηάιπκʱ),
105 and like an athlete who cannot be thrown and a light runner who speedily 
attains ‗the prize of his higher calling‘ (ἀζιεηὴο ἀκεζνιάβεηνο, θʱὶ δξνκεὺο θνῦθνο, 
ηʱρέσο θζάλσλ ἐπὶ ηὸ βξʱβεỖνλ η῅ο ἄλσ θιήζεσο).
106 He will no more be wounded by 
distress (ηηηξώζθεηʱη ἀπὸ ιύπεο) than a person wearing armour is affected by an arrow 
(ὁ ηεζσξʱθηζκέλνο νὐ δέρεηʱη βέινο).
107 He will be gentle and patient with his fellows 
and humble before God, reserving his anger for the demons alone.
108 He will not fall 
prey to acedia, will be careless of human esteem and will never lose sight of his d e-
pendence upon God. 
 
All this does not mean that he will no longer have the experience of logismoi being sug-
gested to him; Evagrius states that it is not in our power whether or not the logismoi 
trouble the soul, only whether or not they linger and arouse fresh pathos in us.
109 The 
difference between him and the person who is empathēs, rather, is that the apathēs will 
not find the logismoi tempting: 
 
Αἱ  ἀξεηʱη  νὐ  ηὰο  η῵λ  δʱηκόλσλ  ὁξκὰο  ἀλʱθόπηνπζηλ,  ἀιι’  ἟κᾶο  ἀζῶνπο 
δηʱθπιάηηνπζηλ.
110 
 
The virtues do not check the assaults of the demons, but they preserve us un-
harmed. 
 
He will look upon objects with serenity (ιεỖνο βιέπσλ ηὰ πξάγκʱηʱ) and will remain 
untroubled by memories of them (πξὸο ηὰο κλήκʱο ʱὐη῵λ ἀηάξʱρνο δηʱκέλνπζʱ) and 
                                                                                                                                               
health. If it is a matter of indistinct faces, consider this a sign of an old pathos; if the faces are distinct, it 
is a sign of a current wound‘ (ʱἱ ἀλείδσινη ἐλ ηνỖο ὕπλνηο ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο θπζηθʱὶ θηλήζεηο ὑγηʱίλεηλ πνζ῵ο 
κελύνπζη ηὴλ ςπρήλ· π῅μηο δὲ εἰδώισλ ἀξξσζηίʱο γλώξηζκʱ· θʱὶ ηὰ κὲλ ἀόξηζηʱ πξόζσπʱ ηνῦ πʱιʱηνῦ 
πάζνπο, ηὰ δὲ ὡξηζκέλʱ η῅ο πʱξʱπηίθʱ πιεγ῅ο ζύκβνινλ λόκηδε). 
103 8Th. 2.17. 
104 See above, 2.1.2. 
105 8Th. 3.4. 
106 8Th. 3.10; cf. Phil. 3:14. 
107 Cf. 8Th. 5.12. 
108 Cf. Eul. 11.10; see above, 1.2.2. 
109 Cf. Prakt. 6; see above, 2.2.4. 
110 Prakt. 77.  
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still  before  the  apparitions  occurring  during  sleep  (πξὸο  ηὰ  θʱζ'  ὕπλνλ  θάζκʱηʱ 
δηʱκέλσλ ἣζπρνο).
111 In short, he lives in tranquillity without fear of any evil logismos 
(ὁ ἀπʱζὴο ἟ζπράδεη ἀθόβσο ἀπὸ πʱληὸο θʱθνῦ ινγηζκνῦ);
112 Evagrius affirms the pro-
tective nature of apatheia in the following scholia: 
 
ἄθξνλ…ηεỖρνο ʱὐη῅ο ηὴλ ἄθξʱλ ἀπάζεηʱλ ιέγεη, εἴπεξ «νἱ ἀγʱπ῵ληεο ηὸλ λόκνλ 
πεξηβάιινπζηλ ἑʱπηνỖο ηεỖρνο»
113 
 
He calls the summit of apatheia the summit of a wall, since ‗those who love the 
law fortify themselves with a wall.‘  
 
θξʱγκόο ἐζηηλ ἀπάζεηʱ ςπρ῅ο ινγηθ῅ο ἐθ η῵λ πξʱθηηθ῵λ ἀξεη῵λ ζπλεζη῵ζʱ.
114 
 
The ‗fence‘ is apatheia of the rational soul constituted by the practical virtues.  
 
πᾶο ὁ ἀγʱπ῵λ ηὸλ λόκνλ πνηεỖ ηὸλ λόκνλ· πᾶο δὲ ὁ πνη῵λ ηὸλ λόκνλ ἀπάζεηʱλ 
θηᾶηεη  (sic)  θʱὶ  γλ῵ζηλ  ζενῦ.  εἰ  δὲ  «νἱ  ἀγʱπ῵ληεο  ηὸλ  λόκνλ  πεξηβάιινπζηλ 
ἑʱπηνỖο ηεỖρνο»,
115 λῦλ ηὸ ηεỖρνο ηὴλ ἀπάζεηʱλ ζεκʱίλεη θʱὶ ηὴλ γλ῵ζηλ ηὴλ ηνῦ 
ζενῦ, ἅπεξ κόλʱ πέθπθε θπιάζζεηλ ηὴλ θύζηλ ηὴλ ινγηθὴλ.
116 
 
Whoever loves the law practises the law, and whoever practises the law acquires 
apatheia  and  knowledge  of  God.  And  if  ―those  who  love  the  law  fortify 
themselves with a wall‖, now  the wall designates apatheia and knowledge of 
God, which alone naturally protect rational nature.  
 
So far we have seen that the purification of the soul that is the attainment of apatheia 
amounts to a kind of death, in that it involves ‗dying‘ to our attachments to the external 
world. These attachments are the result of our choice to exchange the image of God for 
the ‗image of animals‘. Their media are the movements of the pathētikon part of the 
soul, movements that ‗we have in common with the beasts and wild animals.‘ They 
make our thoughts vain, our hearts dark and our desires impure. For Evagrius the mem-
                                                 
111 Cf. Prakt. 64, 67; see above, 3.1. 
112 Sch. 17 on Prov. 1:33: ‗He that hearkens to me shall dwell in confidence and shall rest securely from 
all evil.‘ 
113 Sch. 12 on Prov. 1:20-21: ‗Wisdom sings aloud in passages, and in the broad places speaks boldly. 
And she makes proclamation on the top of the walls, and sits by the gates of princes‘; cf. Prov. 28:4. 
114 Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31: ‗If thou let him alone, he will altogether remain barren and covered with 
weeds; and he becomes destitute and his stone walls are broken down.‘  
115 Prov. 28:4. 
116 Sch. 343 on Prov. 28:4: ‗They that forsake the law practise ungodliness; but they that love the law for-
tify themselves with a wall.‘  
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bers of this triad are intimately connected with one another and find expression in the 
logismoi which, as we have seen, have pathos built into them. The body is too weak to 
purify itself, but it can be raised from its nature through the health and strength of the 
soul – that is, through apatheia; although the image of God is damaged it retains suffi-
cient efficacy to heal the soul, and through it, the body. For the soul to raise the body 
above its nature and itself above its vicious movements is for the monk to become im-
mune to temptation by the logismoi, although logismoi will still be suggested to him. 
Consequently apatheia is like a protective wall or fence. His thoughts will no longer be 
vain since they will no longer be directed away from God. Likewise, his heart will not 
be darkened nor his desires impure. Hence apatheia, as ‗death‘ to our attachment to 
corporeal nature, is the purity and chastity of the soul.  
 
It will by now have become apparent that Evagrius uses different ways of talking about 
the same thing to clarify different aspects of it and, by doing so, to describe as fully as 
possible the thing itself. In doing so he is following what he understands to be the ex-
ample  of  Scripture  in  using  ‗many  names  to  name‘  (πνιινηο  ὀλόκʱζηλ  ὀλνκάδεηλ), 
among other things, virtue and knowledge.
117 Before returning to Evagrius‘ use of the 
Pauline idea of the ‗spiritual body‘, therefore, I want to mention two other ways in 
which he talks about the apatheia in its sense of being purity and chastity of the soul 
and, as such, a kind of death. The first of these is apatheia as purity of heart.
118 In his 
scholion on Prov. 19:17 Evagrius explicitly equates the two: 
 
Γόκʱ  λῦλ  ηὴλ  θʱζʱξόηεηʱ  η῅ο  θʱξδίʱο  ὠλόκʱζελ·  θʱη’  ἀλʱινγίʱλ  γὰξ  η῅ο 
ἀπʱζείʱο θʱηʱμηνύκεζʱ γλώζεσο.
119 
 
Here he calls ‗gift‘ purity of heart, for it is in proportion to our apatheia that we 
are judged worthy of knowledge. 
 
More usually, though, their equivalence is implicit rather than explicit. For example, at 
Letter 56 Evagrius, discussing the beatitude ‘blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall 
                                                 
117 Sch. 7.4 on Prov. 1:9; cf. Sch. 317 on Prov. 25:26. 
118 For discussion of Evagrius‘ use of the expression ‗purity of heart‘ as an alternative to apatheia, see 
Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999), pp. 141-159. 
119 Sch. 199 on Prov. 19:17: ‗He that has pity on the poor lends to the Lord; and he will recompense him 
according to his gift.‘  
Page 197 of 268 
 
see God’,
120 states that ‘purity is apatheia of the reasonable soul’.
121 Consider now the 
following proverb, Ad Monachos 31: 
 
἖λ θʱξδίᾳ πξʱείᾳ ἀλʱπʱύζεηʱη ζνθίʱ, 
ζξόλνο δὲ ἀπʱζείʱο ςπρὴ πξʱθηηθή.
122 
 
In the gentle heart, wisdom will rest; 
a throne of apatheia, a soul accomplished in praktikē. 
 
As Driscoll points out, both its vocabulary and the general idea it expresses are derived 
from Jesus’ words at Matt. 11:28-29: 
 
Γεῦηε πξόο κε πάληεο νἱ θνπη῵ληεο θʱὶ πεθνξηηζκέλνη, θἀγὼ ἀλʱπʱύζσ ὑκʱο. 
ἄξʱηε ηὸλ δπγόλ κνπ ἐθ’ ὑκᾶο θʱὶ κάζεηε ἀπ’ ἐκνῦ, ὅηη πξʱΰο εἰκη θʱὶ ηʱπεηλὸο 
ηῆ θʱξδίᾳ, θʱὶ εὑξήζεηε ἀλάπʱπζηλ ηʱỖο ςπρʱỖο ὑκ῵λ. 
 
Come to me, all you that are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you rest. 
Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me; for I am gentle and humble in heart, 
and you will find rest for your souls. 
 
It is also replete with Evagrian associations. We have already seen that apatheia is asso-
ciated with gentleness, being ‘the tranquil state of the rational soul, constituted by gen-
tleness and chastity’ (ἐθ  πξʱύηεηνο  θʱη ζσθξνζύλεο ζπληζηʱκέλε),
123 so the gentle 
heart is the apathēs heart. By speaking of apatheia as a ‘throne’ Evagrius alludes to the 
stability it bestows, and also, for those familiar with his scholion on Proverbs 18:16, to 
his exegesis of the verb ‘seats’ as referring to apatheia as ‘the seat (θʱζέδξʱ) of the 
nous…the excellent state which keeps that which is sitting there difficult to move or 
immovable’.
124 Apatheia is the flower (ἄλζνο) of praktikē,
125 and rest is yoked together 
with  wisdom  (ἀλάπʱπζηο  κὲλ  ηῆ  ζνθίᾳ…ζπλέδεπθηʱη).
126  We  also  know  that  for 
Evagrius Christ is associated with wisdom,
127 that apatheia is a necessary condition for 
                                                 
120 Matt. 5:8. 
121 Let. 56.2, trans. Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 157). 
122 AM 31. 
123 Rfl. 3; see above, 3.1. 
124 Sch. 184.3-5 on Prov. 18:16; see above, 3.1. 
125 Prakt. 81.1-2. 
126 Prakt. 73.1. Evagrius also uses the verb ζπδεπγλύλʱη to denote the relation between the pathos and the 
noēma in an empathēs noēma; cf. Disc. 64.1; 165.1-2; see above, 2.2.3. 
127 See above, 1.1.2, n.34.  
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the  contemplation  that  bestows  wisdom,  and  that  Evagrius  associates  praktikē  with 
dying with Christ and resurrection with knowledge. 
 
With all this in mind we can begin with a straightforward reading of the proverb. As 
noted above, when Evagrius uses parallelism he tends to do so in conjunction with the 
rhetorical device of variatio whereby repetition of a word is avoided by replacing its 
second occurrence with a synonym.
128 In this case the ‗gentle heart in which wisdom 
will rest‘ is the ‗throne of apatheia, the soul accomplished in praktikē.‘ So the proverb 
is referring to apatheia in two different ways, each alluding to the stability it bestows, 
the first by the word ‗rest‘, the second by the word ‗throne‘. Second, the implied refer-
ence to Matt. 11:28-29 means that the proverb is an invitation to the ‗weary and heavy-
laden‘ to come to Christ, who will give them rest; to take his yoke upon them and learn 
from him. The way to do so is to imitate him by ‗dying with him‘ in becoming ‗accom-
plished in praktikē‘. The person who does so will be resurrected with him, apathēs, and, 
like him, gentle and humble and therefore able to learn from him; thus the heart be-
comes a resting place for wisdom, that is, for Christ. For those familiar with Evagrius‘ 
use of the verb ζπδεπγλύλʱη at Praktikos 73 to refer to the association between wisdom 
and rest, and at Disciples 64 and 165 to refer to the association between pathos and 
noēmata (and doubtless used in the same ways in his oral teachings) there will also be 
the message that to die the death of Christ and be resurrected with him is to exchange 
the yoking of pathos to the contents of one‘s mind, with all the instability and turmoil it 
brings, for the yoking of wisdom with rest. Here again Evagrius would have expected 
his reader to complete the scriptural passage for herself; in this case she would therefore 
know that unlike the yoke involving pathos, ‗my yoke is easy, and my burden is light (ὁ 
γὰξ δπγόο κνπ ρξεζηὸο θʱὶ ηὸ θνξηίνλ κνπ ἐιʱθξόλ ἐζηηλ)
129 – that is, the yoking of 
wisdom with rest that those resurrected with Christ will enjoy. Finally, the expressly 
subjective and personal associations of the word ‗heart‘ should be recalled, in view of 
which the movement between the two lines of the proverb is a movement from the state 
of the interior self – one of gentleness in which wisdom can rest – to the condition of 
the soul that makes it possible, namely the stability of apatheia. 
 
                                                 
128 Cf. Guillaumont (1970: 436); see above, 1.2.4. 
129 Matt. 11:30.  
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The other way in which Evagrius talks about apatheia that I want to mention before 
returning to the ‗spiritual body‘ relates to his exegesis, in chapter 22 of On Thoughts, of 
the Parable of the Wedding Banquet at Matthew 22:1-14:  
 
Οὐθ ἔζηη δὲ λνῦλ πληγόκελνλ ὑπν η῵λ ηνηνύησλ λνεκάησλ πʱξʱζη῅λʱη ζεῶ θʱὶ 
ηὸλ  η῅ο  δηθʱηνζύλεο  ἀλʱδήζʱζζʱη  ζηέθʱλνλ.  ἖θ  ηνύησλ  γὰξ  η῵λ  ινγηζκ῵λ 
θʱηʱζπώκελνο  θʱὶ  ἐλ  ηνỖο  Δὐʱγγειίνηο  ἐθεỖλνο  ὁ  ηξηζάζιηνο  λνῦο  ηὸ  η῅ο 
γλώζεσο ηνῦ ζενῦ ἄξηζηνλ πʱξῃηήζʱην· θʱὶ πάιηλ ὁ δεζκνύκελνο ρεỖξʱο θʱὶ 
πόδʱο θʱὶ εἰο ηὸ ἐμώηεξνλ ζθόηνο βʱιιόκελνο ἐθ ηνύησλ η῵λ ινγηζκ῵λ εἶρε 
θʱζπθʱζκέλνλ  ηὸ  ἔλδπκʱ,  ὅλπεξ  νὐθ  ἄμηνλ  η῵λ  ηνηνύησλ  γάκσλ  ὁ  θʱιέζʱο 
ἀπεθήλʱην  εἶλʱη·  δηὸ  ἔλδπκά  ἐζηη  γʱκηθὸλ  ἀπάζεηʱ  ςπρ῅ο  ινγηθ῅ο  θνζκηθὰο 
ἀξλεζʱκέλεο ἐπηζπκίʱο.
130 
 
It is not possible for the nous strangled by such [sc. empathē] noēmata to stand 
before God and wear the crown of righteousness.
131 Dragged down by these lo-
gismoi that thrice-wretched nous mentioned in the Gospels refused the feast of 
the knowledge of God;
132 or again the one who was cast into the outer darkness, 
bound hand and foot, had a garment woven of these  logismoi, and the one who 
invited him declared he was not worthy to attend such a wedding.
133 Wherefore, 
the wedding garment is the  apatheia  of  the  rational  soul  that  has  renounced 
worldly desires.
134 
 
In the previous chapter we saw how Evagrius uses the Parable of the Banquet at Luke 
14:16-24 to illustrate the nature of pathos. It is not, he is reported as teaching, the pos-
session of objects that harms us but their impassioned possession, and he cites as exam-
ples the concern of the farmer for his land and the love of the husband for his wife that 
leads them to decline their invitations to the banquet.
135 The banquet symbolises the 
Kingdom of God, to gain entry to which a person must be prepared to sacrifice all else. 
Anything that she is not prepared to sacrifice is revealed thereby to be an object of  pa-
thos, excessive attachment. To put it another way, anything that she values more highly 
than God is an object of idolatry. Here his focus is not directly upon the person‘s at-
tachments but upon their correlate, the empathē noēmata that crowd his nous. The atti-
tude toward God of someone thus preoccupied is like that of the guests who make light 
                                                 
130 Th. 22.10-20. 
131 2 Tim. 4:8. 
132 Cf. Matt. 22:2-7. 
133 Cf. Matt. 22:11-13. 
134 Cf. Titus 2:12. 
135 Cf. Disc. 112; see above, 2.2.2.  
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of or simply ignore their invitation or who seize and kill the host‘s slaves, or like that of 
the guest who presumes to attend the banquet inappropriately dressed.  Evagrius‘ point 
is that if, as we would put it, a person‘s head is full of other concerns – or as we and 
Evagrius could both put it, their heart is full of other concerns - then they have no room 
for God; their nous cannot function as the ‗place of God‘ because it is otherwise occu-
pied. In order for the nous to be able to approach God it must first orientate itself toward 
him, and it is this orientation toward God that Evagrius calls ‗standing before God‘. As 
this passage makes clear, it consists in apatheia. Nonetheless apatheia is not a sufficient 
condition for knowledge of God since, as noted above, it is possible to ‗be among sim-
ple  noēmata  and  be  distracted  by  the  information  they  provide  and  so  be  far  from 
God.
136 It is, however, a necessary condition for knowledge of God, and clearly a suffi-
cient condition for the nous to be able to ‗stand before God‘ since Evagrius equates it 
with the ‗wedding garment‘. It follows that the ‗stand‘, like the ‗wedding garment‘, is 
symbolic of apatheia. The ‗stand of the nous before God‘ requires that the nous be free 
of what Evagrius here refers to as empathē noēmata, which are equivalent to the logis-
moi
137 and therefore equate with both the ‗vain thoughts‘ of Rom. 1:21 and the ‗impure 
desires‘ of Rom. 1:24. Freedom from them is, accordingly, both purity and chastity of 
the soul/nous and ‗death‘ to the values and preoccupations that they express.  
 
Back now to the ‘spiritual’ or ‘resurrection’ body. According to Paul this ‘body’ is 
characterised by ‗incorruptibility‘, along with ‗immortality‘. So what is it for a thing to 
be incorruptible? Essentially of course it is for it to be unchanging, which means for it 
to be apathēs. But this does not mean that apatheia can, without further remark, be 
equated with incorruptibility. In the first place, apatheia can be imperfect and tempo-
rary,
138 meaning that the apathēs is only incorruptible insofar as she remains apathēs. 
Second, while the nous or soul might become incorruptible, the body cannot. The latter, 
however, needs qualifying, since the ‗liberation‘ of the body from its ‗attributes‘ and the 
refinement of its krasis
139 would certainly have been seen as reducing its corruptibility, 
meaning that the body‘s intrinsic corruptibility would have been regarded not as some-
                                                 
136 Pry. 55; see above, 1.2.1.3. 
137 See above, 2.1.1. 
138 See below, 3.4. 
139 See above, 1.2.3.  
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thing simply to be accepted but as something to be overcome as far as possible.
140 In 
other words, that the body could never be wholly incorruptible would  not prevent it 
from participating to some degree in incorruptibility. Moreover, there were profoundly 
important reasons for it to do so. First, given that the body is effectively an aspect of the 
nous, the extension to it of at least partial incorruptibility would have been part of the 
restoration of the nous per se to a condition of incorruptibility. Second, and more spe-
cifically, the body‘s being the most fallen aspect of the nous would have given its par-
ticipation in incorruptibility particular significance since even the most fallen aspect of 
the nous would be showing signs of the ascent of the whole. In Brown‘s words, the 
body‘s ‗drastic physical changes, after years of ascetic discipline, registered with satis-
fying precision the essential, preliminary stages of the long return of the human person, 
body and soul together, to an original, natural and uncorrupted state.‘
141  
 
Something of Evagrius‘ understanding of incorruptibility, along with immortality, the 
other property that Paul associates with the spiritual body, can be gleaned from Kepha-
laia Gnostika 3.33: 
 
The name of ‗immortality‘ makes known the natural unity of the nous and the 
fact that it is eternal  makes known its ‗incorruptibility‘. The first name  - the 
knowledge of the Trinity accompanies it; and the second – the first contempla-
tion of nature.
142 
 
While Evagrius is not altogether clear in the terminology he uses to describe the diffe r-
ent levels of contemplation, the ‗first contemplation of nature‘ seems to be an interme-
diate stage between second natural contemplation and knowledge of God:
143 
 
Virtues cause the nous to see second natural contemplation; and the latter causes 
it to see first [natural contemplation]; and the first in its turn [makes it see] the 
Blessed Unity.
144 
 
                                                 
140 See above, 1.2.3, n.291-2. 
141 Brown (1988: 223). 
142 KG 3.33. 
143 Cf. Dysinger (2005: 41). 
144 KG 3.61.  
Page 202 of 268 
 
So Evagrius associates incorruptibility with the transition from contemplation of corpo-
real creation to knowledge of God, and immortality with knowledge of God, in which 
the unity of the nous is restored. But that the incorruptible nous, has, as we would ex-
pect, also transcended corporeality even though not yet in unity is indicated by its asso-
ciation with eternity, which, according to the Timaeus, cannot be part of the created or-
der.
145 For Evagrius, then, both immortality and incorruptibility involve the transce n-
dence of corporeal nature. Incorruptibility can perhaps be achieved to some extent by 
means of the refinement of the body‘s krasis through fasting, but in any case both it and 
immortality  can  be  achieved  experientially  by  the  incarnate  nous  through  apatheia, 
hence the praktikos is ‗the servant of separation‘:
146  
 
Ψπρὴ δὲ ἟ ηὴλ πξʱθηηθὴλ ζὺλ ʘεῶ θʱηνξζώζʱζʱ θʱὶ ιπζεỖζʱ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο, ἐλ 
ἐθείλνηο γίλεηʱη ηνỖο η῅ο γλώζεσο ηόπνηο, ἐλ νἷο ʱὐηὴλ ηὸ η῅ο ἀπʱζείʱο πηεξὸλ 
θʱηʱπʱύζεη.
147 
 
The soul which with God has triumphed in praktikē and been loosened from the 
body will be in the regions of knowledge where the wings of apatheia will set it 
down. 
 
Even though the incarnate nous does not become fully, metaphysically incorporeal, it 
nonetheless becomes incorporeal in terms of its awareness, and because of the intercon-
nectedness of the epistemic and the metaphysical this must after all mean that in some 
sense it really does become incorporeal, despite the fact that part of it yet remains joined 
to ‗thickened body.‘
148 That the incarnate nous can become functionally incorruptible – 
sufficiently incorruptible, that is, to become, albeit temporarily, the ‗place of God‘ – 
underlines this. Again, 
 
When the noes will have received the contemplation that concerns them, then 
also the entire nature of the body will be withdrawn; and thus the contemplation 
that concerns it will become immaterial.
149 
 
                                                 
145 Cf. Tim. 37d. 
146 KG 5.65. 
147 KG 2.6. 
148 Cf. KG 3.68. 
149 KG 3.62.  
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In other words, apatheia and contemplation work together to enable the nous to be ‗car-
ried off to the intelligible height‘;
150 apatheia makes contemplation possible, then con-
templation in turn further ‗loosens‘ the nous from the body, given that the contemplat-
ing nous is transformed by the participation in the realities perceived.
151  
 
The second and third chapters of the Praktikos shed further light on the relation between 
apatheia and incorruptibility: 
 
Βʱζηιείʱ νὐξʱλ῵λ ἐζηηλ ἀπάζεηʱ ςπρ῅ο κεηὰ γλώζεσο η῵λ ὄλησλ ἀιεζνῦο.
152 
 
Apatheia of the soul, accompanied by true knowledge of beings, is the kingdom 
of heaven.
153  
 
Βʱζηιείʱ ʘενῦ ἐζηη γλ῵ζηο η῅ο ἁγίʱο Τξηάδνο ζπκπʱξεθηεηλνκέλε ηῆ ζπζηάζεη 
ηνῦ λνόο, θʱὶ ὑπεξβάιινπζʱ ηὴλ ἀθζʱξζίʱλ ʱὐηνῦ.
154 
 
The kingdom of God is knowledge of the Holy Trinity co-extensive with the 
sustasis of the nous and surpassing its incorruptibility.
155 
 
Apatheia enables the nous to contemplate created natures, such contemplation being the 
‗kingdom of heaven‘ and in turn enabling the nous to ascend to knowledge of the Holy 
Trinity, the ‗kingdom of God.‘ By affirming the latter to be co-extensive with the susta-
sis of the nous Evagrius affirms it to be the most complete knowledge of which the nous 
is capable, able to involve the whole of its being because in virtue of being the image of 
God the pure nous is entirely receptive to God. In saying that knowledge of the Holy 
Trinity surpasses the incorruptibility of the nous he affirms that although the nous that is 
pure enough to enjoy such knowledge must therefore be incorruptible, it must always 
retain the potential for corruptibility in virtue of its self-determination.  
 
                                                 
150 Cf. Pry. 52. 
151 See above, 1.1.3. 
152 Prakt. 2. 
153 Cf. Sch. Ps. 1:2: ‗Blessedness is apatheia of the soul together with true knowledge of beings‘ 
(κʱθʱξηόηεο δὲ, ςπρ῅ο ἀπάζεηʱ κεηὰ γλώζεσο η῵λ ὄλησλ ἀιεζνῦο). 
154 Prakt. 3. 
155 Cf. KG 4.49: ‗Among all pleasures, there is one co-extensive with the sustasis of the nous, namely the 
[pleasure] accompanying knowledge, for all will pass away in the world to come‘.  
Page 204 of 268 
 
Before leaving the topic of incorruptibility, it will recalled that at Great Letter 46 Eva-
grius gives two lists of movements which we share with corporeal nature and which, 
accordingly, the soul might raise itself above. The transcending of those in the first list 
corresponds to the attainment of apatheia, but what of the second list, namely ‗satisfac-
tion, vigilance, loathing, serenity, fortitude, gladness, love, diligence, quiet, simplicity, 
meekness, humility, joy, consolation and goodness‘? Clearly these are the virtues or 
stable movements corresponding to the vices or ‗unstable movements‘ of the first list, 
but some of its entries are especially surprising. Vigilance, loathing and fortitude are 
plainly only necessary at the level of praktikē, but what of serenity and diligence, quiet, 
simplicity, meekness and humility and joy – all, surely, contemplative virtues?
156 Or 
love, ‗the progeny of apatheia‘ (ἀπʱζείʱο ἔγγνλνλ),
157 or, most surprising of all, ‗good-
ness‘? That Evagrius includes all of these among the movements that we share with the 
wild animals is surprising and perhaps simply reflects their source in the pathētikon part 
of the soul. Apparently even more surprising is that they are to be transcended, along 
with hunger, sleep, lust and so forth; after all, in the Praktikos Evagrius declares that 
‗the  virtues  both  purify  the  soul  and  remain  with  it  once  it  has  been  purified‘ 
(ʱἱ…ἀξεηʱὶ ὁκνῦ ηε θʱζʱίξνπζη ηὴλ ςπρὴλ θʱὶ θʱζʱξζείζῃ ζπκπʱξʱκέλνπζηλ).
158 The 
reason for their inclusion is, however, straightforward: as movements they are all part of 
corporeal creation, to be transcended along with it in the process of restoring the nous to 
incorruptibility.
159 The ‗world to come‘ is clearly to be identified with the ‗kingdom of 
God‘ since all that remains in it is knowledge and the pleasure accompanying it. Lest 
this  ‗passing  away  of  all  pleasures‘,  with  even  joy,  love  and  goodness  being  tran-
scended, seem to paint a bleak picture, it should be remembered that this transcendence 
is not a matter of moving beyond these things per se, but of moving beyond them as in-
dividually differentiated; the virtues regain their unity as the nous regains its unity in 
becoming progressively re-unified with God.
160 Therefore the transcendence is not one 
                                                 
156 E.g. at Rfl. 3 apatheia is said to be a state of tranquility (katastasis hēremea); according to KG 4.73 the 
contemplative virtue of the thumos is humility; Eul. 6.6 speaks of the ‗joy (chara) that enlightens the eye 
of the dianoia for the contemplation of the superior goods‘. 
157 Prakt. 81. 
158 Prakt. 85. 
159 Cf., e.g., KG 4.49, quoted above, n.155. 
160 Prakt. 98.7-10; see above, 1.2.2.  
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of exclusion but of inclusion; as Evagrius might have said, it is like the transcendence of 
the individual colours of the rainbow in the pure light that contains them all.
161  
 
It should by now be clear that Evagrius equates the Pauline  sôma psuchikon with the 
nous that chose to exchange the image of God for the image of animals and became in 
consequence ‗vain in its thinking, darkened in its heart and impure in its desires‘. This is 
the ‗flesh‘ from which the ‗soul derives evil‘; the empathēs nous that, continually beset 
by logismoi and ‗entangled in material concerns‘, finds them more interesting than the 
‗banquet‘ that is knowledge of God; the corruptible, ‗flesh and blood‘ nous that cannot 
inherit the Kingdom of God.  For it to be able to do so it must die with Christ through 
praktikē, that it might be resurrected with him. In being resurrected it will be ‗raised a 
spiritual body (sôma pneumatikon)‘, having ‗put on incorruptibility‘, and the ‗death‘ of 
praktikē will have been ‗swallowed up in victory.‘ So now what is the ‗spiritual body‘? 
It is the re-unified nous, in which ‗body‘ and ‗soul‘ have been ‗raised to the order of the 
nous.‘
162 For the incarnate nous this happens in three clearly identifiable stages.
163 The 
first is the attainment of apatheia, which bestows the first level of unity upon the soul, 
constituted by each of her three parts acting according to nature as described at Prak-
tikos 86. The second is achieved by means of the further transformation of the nous ef-
fected by the interplay of apatheia and contemplation and results in the further unifica-
tion of the soul described at Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73.
164 The third is the return to the 
fuller unity that, transcending corporeal nature, bestows incorruptibility. 
 
Returning now to the concluding line of Ad Monachos 21, ‗your resurrection will glow 
like the sun‘, it has already been noted that ‗resurrection‘ is associated by Evagrius with 
knowledge, specifically the knowledge to which the ‗death‘ of praktikē makes the nous 
                                                 
161 Bob Sharples has pointed out to me that this image appears in stanza 52 of Shelley‘s Adonais (Shelley 
having been a pagan Platonist), and that in Meteorology 3.4 Aristotle attributes the colours of the rainbow 
to differential reflection (not refraction) and is aware that sprinkling water in a semi-darkened room can 
have the same effect as Newton‘s prism. 
162 Cf. Driscoll (2003: 245). 
163 According to KG 2.4 there are more than three: ‗While the transformations are numerous, we have 
received knowledge of only four: the first, the second, the last and that which precedes it. The first, it is 
said, is the passage from vice to virtue; the second is that from apatheia to second natural contemplation; 
the third is from the former to the knowledge that concerns the logikoi, and the fourth is the passage of all 
to knowledge of the Blessed Trinity.‘ 
164 For discussion of these two levels of psychological unity, see above, 1.2.2.  
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receptive. That knowledge is, of course, of God. Consider the following chain of apho-
risms from the Kephalaia Gnostika: 
 
The resurrection of the body is the passage from the bad quality to the superior 
quality.
165 
 
The resurrection of the soul is the return from the order of empatheia to the apa-
thēs state.
166 
 
The resurrection of the nous is the passage from ignorance to true knowledge.
167 
 
These three aphorisms can be interpreted with reference both to the final restoration of 
the nous to unity – in other words, the realisation of the ‗spiritual body‘ - and to the 
foretastes of it experienced by the incarnate nous in prayer. In both of these contexts 
‗the names and numbers of ―body‖, ―soul‖ and ―mind‖…pass away‘ as they are ‗raised 
to the order of the mind‘, and in both contexts each of the three undergoes ‗death‘ and 
‗resurrection‘ in its own way, jointly constituting the ‗death‘ and ‗resurrection‘ of the 
whole person. It is unclear what the resurrection of the body might mean in eschatologi-
cal terms,
168 but the ‗death‘ and ‗resurrection‘ of the living, earthly body consist in its 
passage to ‗health‘ understood in spiritual terms and reflected in a refinement of its kra-
sis
,169 this change ‗from the bad quality to the superior quality‘ being an anticipation of 
its eschatological transformation. In both eschatological terms and for the living person 
the ‗death‘ and ‗resurrection‘ of soul and nous take the same form, namely the passage 
from empatheia to apatheia and from ignorance to knowledge, respectively.  
 
Now, though, it must be remembered that although in one sense the nous is equivalent 
to the logistikon, and so the rational part of the person in contrast with the pathētikon 
part of the soul on the one hand and the body on the other, it is also much more than 
this. In its fuller sense, the nous is the entire person, including thumos, epithumētikon 
and body. So the resurrection of the nous must be understood in both these senses. In 
the first it is the same kind of logical entity as ‗body‘ and ‗soul‘, meaning that these 
                                                 
165 KG 5.19. 
166 KG 5.22. 
167 KG 5.25. 
168 Cf. KG 6.58, quoted at 1.1.3, 1.38.  
169 See above, 1.2.3.  
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three aphorisms can be read sequentially as above. But in the second sense of nous the 
third aphorism is not simply the third member of a linear sequence but includes the 
other two. In other words, the transformation of the body and soul are not only precon-
ditions for the passage from ignorance to knowledge; they are themselves part of that 
transition. Knowledge and ignorance do not pertain to the logistikon alone, but to the 
body and the pathētikon part of the soul as well: knowledge is embodied and ensouled 
and consequently is a property of body and soul as well as of nous. So the passage of 
the body ‗from the bad quality to the superior quality‘ is the passage of the body from 
ignorance to knowledge, and the return of the soul ‗from the order of empatheia to the 
apathēs state‘ is the return of the soul from ignorance to knowledge. Both are partly 
constitutive of the passage of the nous ‗from ignorance to true knowledge‘, and both are 
completed when body and soul are ‗raised to the order of mind.‘ Just as the whole per-
son is a nous, so knowledge involves the whole person. 
 
To imitate Christ by dying his death is to exodus ‗like a star‘ the life of empatheia, ig-
norance, impurity and sin and be resurrected ‗glowing like the sun‘. The ‗sun‘ is Christ, 
the ‗sun of righteousness‘.
170 But also, ‗the intelligible sun is the rational nature which 
contains in itself the first and blessed light‘,
171 so for the resurrected nous to ‗glow like 
the sun‘ is for its ‗own light‘
172 to be revealed, this being the light that, by my analogy, 
contains all the ‗colours‘ of the virtues. 
 
 
3.3  Apatheia as love and knowledge 
 
The ‘spiritual body’ comes into being through the resurrections of body, soul and nous. 
Another way in which Evagrius describes this is with reference to the ‘bond of peace’ of 
Eph. 4:3: 
                                                 
170 Mal. 3:20. Cf. Sch. Ps. 18:5: ‗In the sun he has set his tabernacle‘: ‗Our Lord is the Sun of Justice in 
whom the Father dwells, as he said, ―I am in the Father and the Father is in me‖ (John 14:10). And again, 
―The Father who dwells in me does his works‖ (John 14:10). And the Apostle, ―God was in Christ recon-
ciling the world to himself‖ (2 Cor. 5:19).‘ Also Sch. Ps. 26:4: ‗For in the day of mine afflictions he hid 
me in his tabernacle: he sheltered me in the secret of his tabernacle; he set me up on a rock‘: ‗Christ is a 
tabernacle in whom God dwells. For he said, ―In the sun he placed his tabernacle‖ (Ps. 18:5). And the Sun 
of Justice is the Lord‘; trans. Driscoll. Cf. Driscoll (2003: 247); Sinkewicz (2003: 262, n.4). 
171 KG 3.44. 
172 Cf. Prakt. 64.1-2. On the light of the nous, see above, 1.2.1.3.  
Page 208 of 268 
 
 
Ἀιι’ νὐθ ἐπ’ ἀλζξώπῳ κόλνλ δεηεηένο ὁ η῅ο εἰξήλεο ζύλδεζκνο, ἀιιὰ θʱὶ ἐλ ηῶ 
ζώκʱηί ζνπ θʱἰ ἐλ ηῶ πλεύκʱηί ζνπ θʱὶ ἐλ ηῆ ςπρῆ. ὅηʱλ γὰξ η῅ο ζ῅ο ηξηάδνο 
ηὸλ ζύλδεζκνλ ἑλώζῃο ηῆ εἰξήλῃ, ηόηε  ὡο η῅ο ζείʱο ηξηάδνο ἐληνιῆ ἑλσζεὶο 
ἀθνύζεηο· «Μʱθάξηνη νἱ εἰξελνπνηνί, ὅηη ʱὐηνὶ πἱνὶ ζενῦ θιεζήζνληʱη».
173 
 
But it is not only among people that the bond of peace
174 is to be sought, but also 
in your body and in your spirit and in your soul. When you unify the bond of this 
trinity of yours by means of peace, then, unified by the commandment of the di-
vine Trinity, you will hear: ‗Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called 
sons of God‘.
175 
 
For the noes the Fall was from a state of peace into one of inner turmoil as the rupture 
of the Unity and consequent fragmentation of the created order was reflected within 
their own experience: 
 
In the knowledge of those who are second by their creation various worlds are 
constituted and indescribable battles take place. But in the Unity nothing like this 
occurs: it is unspeakable peace, and there are only the naked noes that constantly 
quench their insatiability.
176 
 
The ‘various worlds constituted within the knowledge’ of the fallen noes I take to be the 
subjective worlds, based upon the external world, that we construct and act within, as 
referred to by Evagrius in the following: 
 
Ἀλʱρσξεηήο ἐζηηλ, ὁ ἐλ ηῶ θʱηὰ δηάλνηʱλ θόζκῳ ζπληζηʱκέλῳ, εὐζεβ῵ο θʱὶ 
δηθʱίσο ἀλʱζηξεθώκελνο.
177 
 
An anchorite is one who conducts himself piously and justly in the world consti-
tuted by his dianoia. 
 
To conduct oneself piously and justly within these inner worlds is to engage with exter-
nal objects, and therefore their internal correlates, without pathos. In this case peace will 
obtain within them, a reflection of its establishment within the body, soul and spirit and 
                                                 
173 Eul. 6.5-6. 
174 Eph. 4:3. 
175 Matt. 5:9. 
176 KG 1.65; John 5:22. 
177 Rfl. 14; cf. Rfl. 38, 39, KG 5.12, quoted below, 3.3.  
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an anticipation of the peace to be enjoyed when our unity with God is restored. Con-
versely, insofar as we are subject to pathos our inner worlds are those of the logismoi, 
constructed in obedience to the imperatives of the pathētikon part of the soul and char-
acterised by conflict and turbulence. Some of the ‘indescribable battles’ that take place 
will be with demons, some between different parts of the soul, and some will be imagi-
nary conflicts with other human beings, as when the nous, ‘seizes the figure of its own 
body…[and gets] involved interiorly in a fight with a brother.
178  
 
That the ‘bond of peace’ is to be sought in the body (ἐλ ηῶ ζώκʱηί), in the spirit (ἐλ ηῶ 
πλεύκʱηί) and in the soul (ἐλ ηῆ ςπρῆ) as well as among all three testifies, as does Eva-
grius’ notion of the three resurrections, to the necessity of the integrity of  each to that 
of the whole, a necessity deriving from all three being, equally, the constituent aspects 
of the nous that is the image of the triune God. To ‘unify the bond’ of the anthropologi-
cal trinity is, therefore, to establish unity within each of its members, and this is to es-
tablish virtue within each. The body will, if allowed to gain strength, ‘rebel and wage 
unrelenting war’ upon the soul, so to seek the ‘bond of peace’ in the body is to render it 
‘docile’ such that it ‘yields to the bit and is compelled by the hand of the one holding 
the reins’.
179 The ‘soul’ here should be understood as her pathētikon part, since ‘spirit’ 
must be understood as synonymous with nous in the latter’s sense of logistikon. While 
the epithumētikon wages its warfare through the body, the thumos does so through incit-
ing us to direct its aggression toward our ‘natural kindred’, meaning that to seek the 
‘bond of peace’ in it is to ‘fight against the serpent…but with gentleness and mildness 
exercise patience with  love toward one‘s brother.‘
180 Finally, the warfare of the  lo-
gistikon or ‗spirit‘ is waged through ignorance, so here the ‗bond of peace‘ is to be 
found in knowledge. In sum, to ‗unify the bond‘ of the anthropological trinity is to es-
tablish virtue in the soul, which means to cultivate the ‗spiritual body‘ through the re-
spective resurrections of its three aspects, which means to attain apatheia. 
 
Just as Evagrius’ use of ζπδεπγλύλʱη at Praktikos 73 in relation to the ‗yoking together‘ 
of wisdom and rest, and at Disciples 64 and 165 in relation to the ‗yoking together‘ of 
                                                 
178 Cf. Th. 25.30-32; see above, 2.1.1. 
179 8Th. 1.34, 35; see above, 1.2.3. 
180 Eul. 11.10; see above, 1.2.2.  
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pathos and noēmata, allows implicit reference to the yoke (δπγόο) of Jesus,
181 so it now 
becomes apparent that his use of ζπλδεζκεύσ at On Thoughts 40 and Reflections 23 and 
of δεζκεύσ in his second scholion on Ps. 145:8 to refer to the binding of the nous, 
through noēmata, to sensible objects‘, allows reference to Paul‘s ‗bond of peace‘ (ὁ η῅ο 
εἰξήλεο ζύλδεζκνο). In both cases our attention is drawn to a stark contrast - the yoking 
of pathos to our mental content as opposed to the yoke of Jesus, and our bondage to the 
world as opposed to the bond of our internal unity and, accordingly, unity with God – 
and the two are closely connected. It is through the yoking of pathos to noēmata that it 
is able, through them, to bind us to their objects and thus to the sensible world.
182 It is 
with these noēmata that we are ‗heavy-laden‘ and therefore because of them that we are 
weary. The result of this bondage is continual fragmentation, instability and the ‗inde-
scribable battles‘ that are waged both within and among us. Conversely, those who, 
‗weary and heavy-laden‘, seek the rest to be found in the yoke of Jesus, will find the 
‗bond of peace‘ and ‗will hear, ―Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called 
sons of God‖.
183  
 
In the third chapter of On Thoughts Evagrius describes the attainment of apatheia in 
terms of Pauline universalism: 
 
ὁ ἰʱηξὸο η῵λ ςπρ῵λ…δηὰ κὲλ η῅ο ἐιεεκνζύλεο ηὸλ ζπκὸλ ζεξʱπεύεη, δηἀ δὲ η῅ο 
πξνζεπρ῅ο  ηὸλ  λνῦλ  θʱζʱξίδεη,  θʱὶ  πάιηλ  δηὰ  η῅ο  λεζηείʱο  ηὴλ  ἐπηζπκίʱλ 
θʱηʱκʱξʱίλεη,  ἐμ  ὧλ  ζπλίζηʱηʱη  ὁ  λένο  ἄλζξσπνο  ὁ  ἀλʱθʱηλνύκελνο  «θʱη’ 
εἰθόλʱ ηνῦ θηίζʱληνο ʱὐηόλ», ἐλ ᾧ «νὐθ ἔλη» δηὰ ηὴλ ἁγίʱλ ἀπάζεηʱλ «ἄξζελ θʱὶ 
ζ῅ιπ», νὐδὲ δηὰ ηὴλ κίʱλ πίζηηλ θʱὶ ἀγάπελ «Ἕιιελ θʱὶ ἸνπδʱỖνο, πεξηηνκὴ θʱὶ 
ἀθξνβπζηίʱ, βάξβʱξνο, Σθύζεο, δνῦινο θʱὶ ἐιεύζεξνο, ἀιιὰ ηὰ πάληʱ θʱὶ ἐλ 
πᾶζη Χξηζηόο.»
184  
 
                                                 
181 Cf. Matt. 11:28-29; see above, 3.2. 
182 See above, 2.2.3. 
183 Matt. 5:9. Evagrius provides further material for meditation on ‗bonds‘ in his third scholion on Ps. 
149:8, ‗to bind their kings (ηνῦ δ῅ζʱη ηνὺο βʱζηιεỖο ʱὐη῵λ) with fetters, and their nobles with manacles 
of iron‘: ‗The noetic bond is apatheia of the rational soul. The noetic bond is fear of the Lord turning 
from evil. The noetic bond is spiritual teaching not allowing the nous to go to evil. The noetic bond is 
spiritual love honouring nothing before knowledge of God. The noetic bond is desire‘ (δεζκόο ἐζηη 
λνεηὸο ἀπάζεηʱ ινγηθ῅ο ςπρ῅ο. δεζκόο ἐζηη λνεηὸο θόβνο Κπξίνπ ἐθθιίλσλ ἀπὸ θʱθίʱο. δεζκόο ἐζηη 
λνεηὸο δηδʱζθʱιίʱ πλεπκʱηηθὴ κὴ ζπγρσξνῦζʱ ηὸλ λνῦλ ἐπὶ ηὴλ θʱθίʱλ ὁδεύεηλ. δεζκόο ἐζηη λνεηὸο 
ἀγάπε πλεπκʱηηθὴ κεδὲλ πξνηηκ῵ζʱ η῅ο γλώζεσο ηνῦ ʘενῦ. δεζκόο ἐζηη λνεηὸο ἐπηζπκίʱ). The last of 
these clearly refers to the epithumētikon acting according to nature, the bond being noetic. 
184 Th. 3.35-40.  
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The physician of souls
185 heals the thumos through almsgiving, purifies the nous 
through prayer and in turn withers the epithumia through fasting. In this way the 
new self is constituted, renewed ‗according to the image of its Creator‘,
186 in 
whom, on account of the holy apatheia, ‗there is no male and female‘; in whom, 
on account of the one faith and love, there is ‗neither Greek nor Jew, circumci-
sion nor uncircumcision, barbarian nor Scythian, slave nor freeman, but Christ is 
all in all.‘
187 
 
Again we see the triple resurrection, now characterised as the healing of the three parts 
of the soul under the auspices of Christ, giving rise to the ‘spiritual body’. This is now 
identified with the ‘new self’ and the latter with the apathēs. The ‘new self’ is brought 
into  being  by  the  healing  of  the  soul,  apatheia  being  ‘the  health  of  the  soul.’
188 
Evagrius’ use of ζπλίζηʱηʱη, ‘constituted’, can be noted: ζπλίζηʱκʱη is cognate with 
histēmi and so has its connotations of stability, and it is also the word that Evagrius uses 
to describe the constitution of apatheia from gentleness and chastity.
189 The ‘new self’ 
is said to be renewed ‘according to the image of its Creator’; Evagrius will expect his 
readers to be familiar with the Pauline text to which he is alluding, Col. 3:9-11: 
 
ἀπεθδπζάκελνη ηὸλ πʱιʱηὸλ ἄλζξσπνλ ζὺλ ηʱỖο πξάμεζηλ ʱὐηνῦ θʱὶ ἐλδπζάκελνη 
ηὸλ λένλ ηὸλ ἀλʱθʱηλνύκελνλ εἰο ἐπίγλσζηλ θʱη’ εἰθόλʱ ηνῦ θηίζʱληνο ʱὐηόλ, 
ὅπνπ νὐθ ἔλη Ἕιιελ θʱὶ ἸνπδʱỖνο… 
 
you have stripped off the old self with its practices and have clothed yourselves 
with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image 
of its Creator. In that renewal there is neither Greek and Jew… 
 
The ‘stripping off of the old self’ is to be equated with praktikē, the means by which the 
‘physician of souls’ heals us. To be ‘clothed in the new self’ is to become apathēs, and 
apatheia  enables  the  nous  to  engage  in  contemplation.  This,  it  will  be  recalled,  is 
defined by Evagrius as ‘spiritual knowledge of things…which causes the nous to ascend 
to its first rank‘ and consists in the progressive re-acquisition of knowledge of God, 
leading the nous ultimately back to union with him by means of successive transforma-
                                                 
185 I.e. Christ. 
186 Cf. Col. 3: 10. 
187 Col. 3:11; Gal. 3:28. Cf. Th. 39 – ‗When the nous has put off the old self and shall put on the one born 
of grace‘ – quoted in full above, 1.2.1.3. 
188 Prakt. 56.3. 
189 Cf. Rfl. 3; see above, 3.1.  
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tions resulting from participation in the realities perceived.
190 Thus apatheia enables the 
nous to be ‗renewed in knowledge‘. The ‗renewal in knowledge‘ is ‗according to the 
image of its creator‘ because the receptivity of the nous to knowledge of God is the im-
age of God, and just as the image, although damaged, retains sufficient efficacy to en-
able the soul to attain apatheia, so it retains sufficient efficacy to enable the apathēs 
nous to re-acquire knowledge of God and by the same token continue the healing of the 
image begun with the attainment of apatheia; in other words, ‗according to‘ means both 
‗through the efficacy of‘ and ‗following the pattern of‘. Evagrius would also expect his 
readers to think of Rom. 12:2: 
 
κὴ ζπζρεκʱηίδεζζε ηῶ ʱἰ῵λη ηνύηῳ, ἀιιὰ κεηʱκνξθνῦζζε ηῆ ἀλʱθʱηλώζεη ηνῦ 
λνὸο. 
 
Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your 
nous. 
 
Likewise, Eph.  4:22-24, which speaks of putting away the old self, ‘which is being 
corrupted according to its treacherous desires’ (ηὸλ θζεηξόκελνλ θʱηὰ ηὰο ἐπηζπκίʱο η῅ο 
ἀπάηεο) in order to be ‘renewed in the spirit (ἀλʱλενῦζζʱη δὲ ηῶ πλεύκʱηη) of your nous, 
and to clothe yourselves with the new self, created by God’s will
191 in true righteousness 
and  holiness  (θʱηὰ  ζεὸλ  θηηζζέληʱ  ἐλ  δηθʱηνζύλῃ  θʱὶ  ὁζηόηεηη  η῅ο  ἀιεζείʱο).  The 
desires of the sickly epithumētikon are treacherous because they seek the sustenance, 
furtherance and pleasure of the entity from somewhere other than God whereas in reality 
they can only come from him. Also to be recalled is chapter 39 of On Thoughts, where 
Evagrius declares that ‘when the nous has put off the old self and shall put on the new 
one born of grace’, it will at the time of prayer experience itself as the ‘place of God’.
192 
That it can do so is a consequence of its ‘renewal in knowledge according to the image 
of its Creator’, since its being the ‘place of God’ is due to its being in his image, but 
requires that the image be - to some extent at least - renewed.   
 
According to On Thoughts 3, the ‘new self’ comes into being both ‘on account of the 
holy apatheia’ and ‘on account of the one faith and love.’ So how do the ‘one faith and 
                                                 
190 See above, 1.1.3. 
191 Literally ‗created according to God.‘ 
192 See above, 1.2.1.3.  
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love’ relate to the ‘holy apatheia’? In the Prologue to the Praktikos Evagrius describes 
the stages of humanity’s return to God as follows: 
 
ηὴλ πίζηηλ…βεβʱηνỖ ὁ θόβνο ὁ ηνῦ ʘενῦ, θʱὶ ηνῦηνλ πάιηλ ἐγθξάηεηʱ, ηʱύηελ δὲ 
ἀθιηλ῅  πνηνῦζηλ  ὑπνκνλὴ  θʱὶ  ἐιπίο,  ἀθ’  ὧλ  ηίθηεηʱη  ἀπάζεηʱ,  ἥο  ἔγγνλνλ  ἟ 
ἀγάπε, ἀγάπε δὲ ζύξʱ γλώζεσο θπζηθ῅ο ἡλ δηʱδέρεηʱη ζενινγίʱ θʱὶ ἟ ἐζράηε 
κʱθʱξηόηεο.
193 
 
The fear of God…strengthens faith, and self-control in turn strengthens fear of 
God, and perseverance and hope render self-control unwavering, and from these 
is  born  apatheia  the  offspring  of  which  is  love;  love  is  the  door  to  natural 
knowledge, which is followed by theology and ultimate blessedness. 
 
And towards the end of the Praktikos Evagrius describes the stages of praktikē: 
 
Ἀπʱζείʱο ἔγγνλνλ ἀγάπε· ἀπάζεηʱ δέ ἐζηηλ ἄλζνο η῅ο πξʱθηηθ῅ο· πξʱθηηθὴλ δὲ 
ζπλίζηεζηλ ἟ ηήξεζηο η῵λ ἐληνι῵λ· ηνύησλ δὲ θύιʱμ ὁ θόβνο ηνῦ ʘενῦ, ὅζηηο 
γέλλεκʱ  η῅ο  ὀξζ῅ο  ἐζηη  πίζηεσο·  πίζηηο  δέ  ἐζηηλ  ἐλδηάζεηνλ  ἀγʱζόλ,  ἣηηο 
ἐλππάξρεηλ πέθπθε θʱὶ ηνỖο κεδέπσ πεπηζηεπθόζη ʘεῶ.
194 
 
Love is the offspring of  apatheia, and apatheia is the flower of praktikē. The 
observance of the commandments establishes praktikē; and their guardian is the 
fear of God, which is a product of upright faith; and faith is an inherent good, 
which exists naturally in those who do not yet believe in God. 
 
Faith, then, is the initial term in the recovery by the nous of knowledge of God. By 
‘those who do not yet believe in God’ Evagrius means pagans, since in having some 
form of religious belief they show themselves to have the concept of God even though 
they  yet  to  find  its  true  object.  Faith  exists  in  such  people  inherently  or  implicitly 
(ἐλδηάζεηνο), in contrast to Christians, whose faith in God, since they believe in the true 
God, is explicit.
195 A similar definition is found at Kephalaia Gnostika 3.83: 
                                                 
193 Prakt. Prol. 8. 
194 Prakt. 81. 
195 Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 671), who notes that the equivalent of ‗explicit‘ would be πξνθνξηθόο, the 
contrast between  it and ἐλδηάζεηνο being part of Stoic terminology. If by ‘those who do not yet believe in 
God’ Evagrius means pagans rather than atheists or agnostics then, given Evagrius’ evident belief in 
universal salvation (e.g., KG 1.40, quoted above, 1.1.3, n.129) the question arises as to how how such 
people might come to a belief in God and so to salvation.  In other words, is there some ‘inherent good’ 
that exists in the soul prior to faith and can develop into it, just as ‘implicit faith’ develops into ‘explicit 
faith’? The Oxford Classical Dictionary notes (1999: 201) that ‘radical atheism is hard to detect [in the  
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Faith is an inherent
196 good which guides us towards the blessedness to come. 
 
Evagrius’ scholion on Ps. 115:10 gives a different definition: ‘faith is the rational assent 
of the self-determining soul’ (πίζηηο ἐζηὶ ςπρ῅ο ʱὐηεμνπζίνπ ινγηθὴ ζπγθʱηάζεζηο).
197 I 
take this to mean that faith is assent to the proposition that God exists, such assent being 
‘rational’ in the sense of ‘according to right reason’, in which case what this definition 
adds to that of Praktikos 81 is the emphasis on faith being an exercise of right reason by 
the soul whose very existence as such derives from its primordial misuse of its self-
determination. Faith ‘guides us towards the blessedness to come’ because it potentially 
contains knowledge of God (἟…γλ῵ζηο ηνῦ ζενῦ [θʱηὰ δύλʱκηλ] ἐλ ηῆ πίζηεη ἐζηίλ),
198 
and is the first step toward the restoration of the nous to its pre-lapsarian condition: 
 
Πίζηεσο δεỖηʱη ὁ λνῦο ἵλʱ ἐπ’ ἐιπίδη ἀγʱζῆ ηὸλ ζεỖνλ δέμεηʱη λόκνλ εἰο θάζʱξζηλ 
ηειείʱλ η῅ο ἐλʱξέηνπ πνιηηείʱο, ὅπσο θʱηʱιάβῃ ηὴλ πξὸ η῅ο θηλήζεσο ἀξρʱίʱλ 
θʱηάζηʱζηλ, ἐλ ᾗ δηὰ η῅ο ηειείʱο ἀγάπεο ἑλσζήζεηʱη ηῶ ἀξρεηύπῳ <ἐλ> ἁγίῳ 
πλεύκʱηη, ὅπνπ ζπλάθεηʱ ὑπνζηάζεσλ θʱὶ ἐμʱινηθὴ ἀξηζκ῵λ θʱὶ ἀπνδξʱζκὸο 
ηξνπ῅ο θʱὶ πʱῦζηο ἐλʱληηώζεσο θʱὶ <…> κεηώζεσο θʱὶ πιήξσκʱ πξνθνπ῅ο η῵λ 
πʱίδσλ  θʱὶ  ἁγίʱο  ηξηάδνο  ἐλ  δπλάκεη  γλ῵ζηο  θʱὶ  ἁγίʱο  κνλάδνο  ʱὐη῅ο 
ἀπνιέκεηνο θʱὶ εἰξεληθὴ βʱζηιείʱ.
199 
 
The nous needs faith in order to receive with good hope the divine law for the 
complete purification of its virtuous constitution, that it might recover its original 
                                                                                                                                               
ancient world] and was never an influential position’, so Evagrius would have had reason not to address 
this question directly. But I think his answer would be that even those who lack any sort of faith have an 
inherent sense of good and evil and right and wrong, along with an inclination towards, and disposition to 
assent to, good/right, and an inclination away from, and disposition to reject, evil/wrong, and that this is 
the ‘seed’ out of which faith arises. His belief that everyone has good in them is underlined by his 
exegesis of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus; see above, 1.1.3, n.129. 
196 The Syriac word is şebyānāitā, ‗voluntary‘, but Guillaumont (1971: 670) takes it as translating 
ἐλδηάζεηνο. 
197 Sch. Ps. 115:1: ‗I believed (ἐπηζηεύζʱ), wherefore I have spoken; but I was greatly afflicted.‘ Cf. 
Strom. 5.13.86.1: ‗Faith, if it is the voluntary assent of the soul, is still the doer of good things, the foun-
dation of right conduct‘ (ἢδε δὲ ἟ πίζηηο εἰ θʱὶ ὲθνύζηνο η῅ο ςπρ῅ο ζπγθʱηάζεζηο, ἀιιὰ ἐξγάηηο ἀγʱζ῵λ 
θʱὶ δηθʱηνπξʱγίʱο ζεκέιηνο). 
198 Disc. 18. Cf. Strom. 7.10.55.2-3: ‘Faith is a certain inherent good, which, without searching for God, 
confesses that he exists and glorifies him for existing. And after the believer increases in faith by the 
grace of God, he must ascend to grasp the knowledge of God, insofar as this is possible’ 
(πίζηηο…ἐλδηάζεηνλ ηί ἐζηηλ ἀγʱζόλ, θʱὶ ἄλεπ ηνῦ δεηεỖλ ηὸλ ζεὸλ ὁκνινγνῦζʱ εἶλʱη ηνῦηνλ θʱὶ 
δνμάδνπζʱ ὡο ὄληʱ. ὅζελ ρξή, ἀπὸ ηʱύηεο ἀλʱγόκελνλ η῅ο πίζηεσο θʱὶ ʱὐμεζέληʱ ἐλ ʱὐηῆ ράξηηη ηνῦ 
ζενῦ, ηὴλ πεξὶ ʱὐηνῦ θνκίζʱζζʱη ὡο νἷόλ ηέ ἐζηηλ γλ῵ζηλ). 
199 Disc. 198.  
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state prior to the movement, in which, through perfect love,
200 it will be united 
with its archetype in the Holy Spirit, in which there is a union of hypostases, 
suppression  of  numbers,  escape  from  change,  cessation  of  opposition  and 
deficiency, completion of the progress of children and knowledge of the Holy 
Trinity in power and the reign of the holy Unity itself, without war, in peace. 
 
Since faith enables even non-Christians to come to a belief in (the true) God, and so, 
perhaps, to knowledge of him, it is clearly one of the ‘seeds of virtue’ implanted in us at 
our creation.
201 And since it potentially contains knowledge of God it must potentially 
contain love, love being a prerequisite for the knowledge of God. The following pro v-
erb, Ad Monachos 3, confirms this to be the case: 
 
Πίζηηο ἀξρὴ ἀγάπεο, 
ηέινο δὲ ἀγάπεο γλ῵ζηο ζενῦ.
202 
 
Faith is the beginning of love. 
The end of love: knowledge of God. 
 
The position of this proverb at the beginning of the  Ad Monachos, a treatise whose 
overall structure reflects that of the return journey of the nous to knowledge of the Holy 
Trinity,
203 reaffirms the role of faith as the starting point of that journey. In addition, as 
Driscoll notes, 
 
The first line of this proverb describes the whole of the life of  praktikē, whose 
beginning is faith and whose goal is love. The second line describes the whole of 
                                                 
200 Cf. 1 John 4:18. 
201 Cf. KG 1.39; see above, 1.1.3. It is as part of this process that faith gives rise to, and is  in turn 
strengthened by, fear of God; cf. Prakt. 81: ‗Fear of God is a product of upright faith‘; AM 69: ‗Faith in 
Christ bestows the fear of God‘; as with apatheia and contemplation, dynamic interaction takes place 
between the two and furthers each. In the context of praktikē faith finds a symbol in the monk’s habit in 
the form of the analabos, according  to Sinkewicz (2003: 248, n.4), ‗a band of woollen cloth worn round 
the neck and crossing at the chest. Its purpose was to keep the tunic out of the way and leave the arms to 
move freely. According to Prakt. Prol. 4: ‗The analabos, which is in the form of a cross and is folded 
over their shoulders is a symbol of faith in Christ which upholds the gentle (cf. Ps. 146:6) and ever 
restrains what hinders them and provides them with an activity that is free of obstacles.’ Faith is not, 
however, an infallible guide to ‘the blessedness to come’ since Evagrius refers at Eul. 31.34 to ‘those who 
having received the faith missed the mark regarding the truth and became mentally deranged‘ (ὧλ ηηλεο 
ηὴλ πίζηηλ δεμάκελνη πεξὶ ηὴλ ἀιήζεηʱλ ἞ζηόρεζʱλ θʱὶ θξελνβιʱβεỖο ἐγελήζεζʱλ) 
202 AM 3. 
203 See Driscoll (2003). As Driscoll points out (2003: 220), it is the actual beginning of the whole text 
since the preceding proverbs are introductory.  
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knowledge, whose beginning is love and whose goal is the knowledge of God 
himself.
204 
 
So it is not only love that faith potentially contains as a consequence of potentially 
containing knowledge of God,  but all the virtues,  apatheia and the various levels of 
contemplation; in other words, the whole of the ascent to God. 
 
Faith, then, relates to ‘the holy apatheia’ by being the beginning of the journey that 
leads to it. What about love? As we have seen, in the Prologue to the Praktikos Evagrius 
describes love as the offspring of apatheia; in other words, apatheia is a prerequisite for 
love. The reason for the dependence of love upon apatheia is well described by Linge: 
 
The free reign of the passions…cuts one off from both God and one’s fellow 
human beings, thus making disinterested love – agapē – impossible. In Evagrius’ 
teaching apatheia is precisely the capacity to experience things as they are  and 
not simply as they affect us by advancing or thwarting our desires and interests. 
Thus apatheia leads the ascetic towards love…The purpose of ascetic discipline 
and the modes of reflection that are peculiar to it must be understood as the 
transcendence of the ego and the partiality of perspective out of which the ego 
experiences and acts so that one can become genuinely open to others.
205 
 
What Linge describes here in terms of the ‘ego’ is what Evagrius characterises in terms 
of bondage to pathos and the logismoi; a self-referential perspective in which the only 
meaning we see in things is their utility to our supposed self-interest and in which, 
consequently, we are isolated from both God and the rest of creation. It is the supersed-
ing of this blinkered outlook – as Linge puts it, ‗the transcendence of the ego‘ - that en-
ables the universalism that Paul identifies with the new creation and Evagrius with apa-
theia, in which categories such as ‗male or female, Greek or Jew, circumcision or uncir-
cumcision, barbarian or Scythian, slave or freeman‘ dissolve, along with all the other 
ways in which we erect barriers between ourselves and others and thereby obscure or 
                                                 
204 Driscoll (2003: 219-20). Cf. Prakt. 84.1-2: ‗The end of praktikē is love, of knowledge theology; they 
have their respective beginnings in faith and natural contemplation‘; AM 67: ‗In front of love, apatheia 
marches; in front of knowledge, love’ (πξὸ ἀγάπεο ἟γεỖηʱη ἀπάζεηʱ πξὸ δὲ γλώζεσο ἀγάπε). 
205 Linge (2000: 564-5); italics in text his. It should, however, be noted that agapē is not the only form of 
disinterested love. Spiritual erôs as Evagrius understands it (see above, 1.2.2) is also ‗disinterested‘ in that 
it presupposes apatheia, and Osborne (1994) argues that Platonic erôs is disinterested.  
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deny our common humanity. Evagrius expresses this even more directly in the follow-
ing teaching from Disciples 163: 
 
νὐ…εἰ  επὶ  ηνῦδε  ηνῦ  πξάγκʱηνο  νὐθ  ὠξγίζζεο  νὐδὲ  ἐιππήζεο  νὐδὲ 
ἐθελνδόμεζʱο, ἢδε ἀόξγεηνο θʱὶ ἄιππνο θʱὶ ἄδνμνο γέγνλʱο, νὐδὲ εἰ πξὸο ηόδε 
θʱὶ ηόδε ἠ πξὸο ηήλδε θʱὶ ηήλδε ἐπηζπκίʱλ νὐθ ἔζρεο, ἢδε θʱὶ πάζεο ἐπηζπκίʱο 
γέγνλʱο ὑπεξάλσ, ἀιι' ὅηʱλ πάληʱο ἀλζξώπνπο ὡο ἀγγέινπο ζενῦ βιέπῃο θʱὶ ὡο 
ζεʱπηὸλ ἀγʱπᾷο, ηόηε ὑπεξάλσ πάλησλ η῵λ πʱζ῵λ γέγνλʱο.
206 
 
It is not when you do not become angry or sad or vain about some object that you 
have become free from anger or distress or vainglory, nor is it when you do not 
desire such and such an object or such and such a woman that you have risen 
above all desire, but it is when you see all people as messengers of God
207 and 
love them like yourself
208 that you have overcome all the pathē. 
 
As this makes clear, apatheia has not truly been attained until it finds expression in 
love; thus Raasch is correct in saying that agapē is the ‗positive aspect‘ of ‗apatheia.
209 
So when Evagrius affirms universalism ‗on account of the holy apatheia‘ and ‗on ac-
count of the one faith and love‘ he is affirming the effective synonymy of apatheia and 
love and the roots of both in faith.  
 
The apathēs, then, is a ‗peacemaker‘ twice over – first, in transcending the causes of 
conflict both within the soul and in our relations with others, and second, in thereby be-
coming free to love others as herself. The ‗bond of peace‘ is love; apatheia is what al-
lows it to come into being within us. And here, as elsewhere, Evagrius would have ex-
pected his readers‘ knowledge of the scriptures first to suggest, and then to reaffirm, this 
to them. Paul‘s reference to the ‗bond of peace‘ comes at Eph. 4:3. Just a few verses be-
fore, at Eph. 3:17-19, he says  
 
θʱηνηθ῅ζʱη  ηὸλ  Χξηζηὸλ  δηὰ  η῅ο  πίζηεσο  ἐλ  ηʱỖο  θʱξδίʱηο  ὑκ῵λ,  ἐλ  ἀγάπῃ 
ἐξξηδσκέλνη θʱὶ ηεζεκειησκέλνη, ἵλʱ ἐμηζρύζεηε θʱηʱιʱβέζζʱη ζὺλ πᾶζηλ ηνỖο 
ἁγίνηο ηὶ ηὸ πιάηνο θʱὶ κ῅θνο θʱὶ ὕςνο θʱὶ βάζνο, γλ῵λʱη ηε ηὴλ ὑπεξβάιινπζʱλ 
η῅ο γλώζεσο ἀγάπελ ηνῦ Χξηζηνῦ, ἵλʱ πιεξσζ῅ηε εἰο πᾶλ ηὸ πιήξσκʱ ηνῦ ζενῦ. 
 
                                                 
206 Disc. 163.3-10. 
207 Cf. Gal. 4:14. 
208 Cf. Lev. 19:18; Matt. 19:19. 
209 Raasch (1970: 32).  
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(17) [I pray] that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith, as you are being 
rooted and grounded in love. (18) I pray that you may have the power to compre-
hend, with all the saints, what is the breadth and length and height and depth, 
(19) and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge, so that you may be 
filled with the fullness of God.
210 
 
On an Evagrian reading this amounts to an expansion of  Ad Monachos 3 – ‗faith is the 
beginning of love. The end of love: knowledge of God‘ – since Evagrius would have 
understood verses 18 and 19 as referring to successive levels of contemplation. He re-
fers to verse 18 in his scholion on Prov. 3:19-20: 
 
(ὁ ζεὸο ηῆ ζνθίᾳ ἐζεκειίσζελ η῅λ γ῅λ· ἟ηνίκʱζελ δὲ νὐξάλνπο ἐλ θξνλήζεη· ἐλ 
ʱἰζζήζεη ἄβπζζνη ἐξξάγεζʱλ· λέθε δὲ ἐξξύεζʱλ δξόζνπο. 
 
God by wisdom founded the earth, and by prudence he prepared the heavens. By 
perception were the abysses broken up, and the clouds dropped water.) 
 
Ἣλ  ἐληʱῦζʱ  γ῅λ  εἶπελ,  Πʱῦινο  ὁ  ἅγηνο  πιάηνο  ὠλόκʱζελ  θʱὶ  ηνὺο  ἐληʱῦζʱ 
νὐξʱλνὺο  ιεγνκέλνπο  ὕςνο  ἐθεỖλνο  ἐλ  ηῆ  πξὸο  ἖θεζίνπο  θʱιεỖ  θʱὶ  ηὰο 
ιεγνκέλʱο ηξνπηθ῵ο ἀβύζζνπο ὀλνκάδεη βάζνο θʱὶ ηὰ δεδξνζσκέλʱ λέθε κ῅θνο 
θʱιεỖ. Τʱῦηʱ δὲ πάληʱ ινγηθ῵λ ἐζηη θύζεσλ ζύκβνιʱ δηʱηξνπκέλσλ θόζκνηο θʱὶ 
ζώκʱζη θʱη’ ἀλʱινγίʱλ η῅ο θʱηʱζηάζεσο.
211 
 
That which here he has called ‗earth‘, the holy Paul names ‗breadth‘, and what 
are here called the ‗heavens‘, that (writer) in his letter to the Ephesians calls 
‗height‘ and that which he figuratively calls ‗abysses‘ (Paul) names ‗depth‘ and 
the ‗clouds dropping water‘ he calls ‗length‘. All these symbolise the rational na-
tures distributed in worlds and bodies according to their state. 
 
The principles underlying the ‗distribution of rational natures in worlds and bodies ac-
cording to their state‘ are what Evagrius calls ‗the logoi of judgment‘,
212 so when he 
wrote this scholion that is what he took Paul to be referring to. Without knowing the 
relative dating of the treatise to Eulogios and the scholia on Proverbs there is, of course, 
no way of knowing whether this was Evagrius‘ interpretation of Eph. 3:18 at the time 
that he composed the Eulogios, but in any case it exemplifies the sort of contemplative 
                                                 
210 The words ‗I pray‘ are not in the Greek, this passage falling within the scope of the phrase ‗I bow my 
knees before the Father‘ (θάκπησ ηὰ γόλʱηά κνπ πξὸο ηὸλ πʱηέξʱ) at Eph. 3:14. 
211 Sch. 33 on Prov. 3:19-20. 
212 Cf. Gnost. 48, ‗you will discover the logoi of judgment in the diversity of worlds and bodies‘ (ηʿὺς μὲν 
περὶ κρίζεως λόγʿσς ἐν ηῆ διʱθʿρᾷ η῵ν ζωμάηων κʱὶ η῵ν κόζμων εὑρήζεις); see above, 1.1.3.  
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insight to which attainment of apatheia and hence of love, the ‗door to natural knowl-
edge‘,  could  be  expected  to  make  Eulogios  receptive.  Likewise  there  is  no  way  of 
knowing how, at the time Evagrius wrote the Eulogios, he construed the relations be-
tween the different levels of contemplation. In the Kephalaia Gnostika, however, he 
lists them as follows: 
 
Five are the principal contemplations under which all contemplation is placed. It 
is said that the first is contemplation of the adorable and holy Trinity; the second 
and third are the contemplations of incorporeal beings and bodies; the fourth and 
fifth are the contemplation of judgment and of providence.
213 
 
Clearly the third term of Paul‘s ‗contemplative progression‘, ‗being filled with the full-
ness of God‘, corresponds to ‗contemplation of the adorable and holy Trinity‘, or, in 
terms of the stages of the graded ascent as stated in the Prologue to the Praktikos, to 
‗theology and ultimate blessedness‘. This leaves the second term, ‗knowing the love of 
Christ that surpasses knowledge‘ to correspond somehow with the contemplations of 
incorporeals, bodies and providence, and indeed it does so in an unproblematic way. 
Since love is the ‗door to natural knowledge‘, which pertains to the corporeal worlds, 
which in turn were created through the mediation of Christ through his ‗manifold wis-
dom‘,
214 and since ‗Christ leads the reasoning nature by [means of] varied worlds to the 
union of the Holy Unity‘,
215 to know the love of Christ is to be vouchsafed the contem-
plations corresponding to the corporeal worlds. These would encompass ‗incorporeals‘ 
– taken to refer to beings, such as angels, with more refined bodies than ours;
216 bodies 
and providence, the contemplation of providence being prior to that of bodies since 
providence is the underlying rationale of corporeal creation; according to  Kephalaia 
Gnostika 6.75 the ‗movement of freedom‘ was followed by the ‗beneficial providence 
and  the  non-abandonment  (that  is,  corporeal  creation)‘,  and  only  then  by  the  judg-
ment.
217 Again, 
 
                                                 
213 KG 1.27. 
214 See above, 1.1.2, n.35. 
215 KG 4.89. 
216 See above, 1.1.2. 
217 Quoted in full above, 1.2.3.  
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The logoi which concern judgment are secondary…in relation to the logoi that 
concern the movement and providence.
218 
 
So far, then, the attentive reader of the Eulogios passage concerning the ‗bond of peace‘ 
will have found in three verses of Paul‘s letter to the Ephesians closely preceding his 
reference to it a concise overview of the entire ascent to God, beginning with faith and 
proceeding, through love (and so apatheia), to being led by Christ through successive 
levels of contemplation to knowledge of God. He then finds, in the ‗bond of peace‘ pas-
sage itself, a description of apatheia itself, the goal of the first part of the ascent and 
foundation for the second: 
 
πʱξʱθʱι῵ νὖλ ὑκᾶο ἐγὼ ὁ δέζκηνο ἐλ θπξίῳ ἀμίσο πεξηπʱη῅ζʱη η῅ο θιήζεσο ἥο 
ἐθιήζεηε,  κεηὰ  πάζεο  ηʱπεηλνθξνζύλεο  θʱὶ  πξʱΰηεηνο,  κεηὰ  κʱθξνζπκίʱο, 
ἀλερόκελνη ἀιιήισλ ἐλ ἀγάπῃ, ζπνπδάδνληεο ηεξεỖλ ηὴλ ἑλόηεηʱ ηνῦ πλεύκʱηνο 
ἐλ ηῶ ζπλδέζκῳ η῅ο εἰξήλεο.
219 
 
And so I, a prisoner (in bonds) in the Lord,
220 beg you to lead a life worthy of the 
calling to which you have been called, with all humility and gentleness, with pa-
tience, bearing with one another in love, making every effort to preserve the 
unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. 
 
Paul‘s description of himself as a ‘prisoner (in bonds) in the Lord’, as well as referring 
to  his  literal  imprisonment,  affirms  his  participation  in  the  ‘bond  of  peace’  and, 
reinforces, from an Evagrian standpoint, the contrast between this ‘spiritual bondage’ 
and the bondage to the world effected by pathos and mediated by empathē noēmata; 
apatheia is a condition of  being ‗in bonds to the Lord‘, and is characterised by humility, 
gentleness, patience, love and unity.  It also reinforces the parallel between this passage 
and Matt. 11:28-29, where Jesus invites the ‘weary and heavy-laden’ to ‘take his yoke 
upon them’, and, by extension, it references  Ad Monachos 31. Taken together, then, 
these  passages  supply  a  whole  list  of  descriptors  for  apatheia  which  in  identifying 
different aspects of it jointly comprise a far more complete definition than any single 
term ever could. To be a ‘throne of apatheia’ is to be ‘a soul accomplished in praktikē, 
which is to be ‘bonded to the Lord’, which is to ‘bear the yoke of Jesus’, which is to 
                                                 
218 KG 5.24. 
219 Eph. 4:1-3. 
220 There is in fact an ambiguity of scope – I presume deliberate – at play here, in that ἐλ θπξίῳ can also 
go with πʱξʱθʱι῵, thus ‘I beg you in the Lord’.  
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have humility and gentleness, which is to be ‘rooted and grounded in love’, which is to 
be a peacemaker, which is to ‘unify the bond of one’s own trinity’ of body, soul and 
spirit, which is to be able to be led by Christ ‘by means of varied worlds’ to ‘the union 
of the Holy Unity’. To this list could be added that to attain apatheia is to have been 
healed by the ‘physician of souls’ and so enabled to ‘put off the old self’ and ‘put on the 
‘new self’, ‘renewed according to the image of its Creator’, in whom there is ‘no male 
and female’, ‘neither Greek nor Jew’. It is  to be cultivating the ‘spiritual body’,
221 to 
have a pure heart
222 and a nous which is chaste, in which ‗Christ dwells‘ and ‗for which 
he suffered the shame of the cross‘
223 ‗for the sake of the joy that was set before him.‘ It 
is to ‗see all people as angels of God and love them like oneself‘,
224 and to have ‗imi-
tated Christ‘ by ‗dying his death, having an exodus like a star and a resurrection that 
glows like the sun.‘
225 Apatheia is the ‗wedding garment‘ of the ‗rational soul that has 
renounced worldly desires‘ and so become worthy of the knowledge of God.
226 
 
Eph. 4:3 makes a further addition to this list in virtue of Paul‘s use of the verb ηεξεỖλ. 
Here it means ‘to preserve’, but it is also the verb used in Prov. 4:23: ‘Keep watch over 
your heart with all vigilance’ (πάζῃ θπιʱθῆ ηεξεỖλ ηὴλ θʱξδίʱλ), an injunction dear to 
Evagrius
227 and, as we shall see in the following section, highly significant in terms of 
praktikē since it is by keeping watch over the heart that apatheia is first attained and 
then preserved. So from an Evagrian standpoint Paul’s use of ηεξεỖλ in this passage 
gives it an added dimension in that as well as describing apatheia it alludes to the 
conditions for its attainment and maintenance.  
 
Paul speaks of the apathēs (as Evagrius would understand him) as being ‗rooted and 
grounded in love‘, and the importance of love in Evagrius‘ spirituality cannot be over-
stated, although it has often been understated; thus Gendle notes that ‗the frequent dis-
missal of Evagrius as a mere ―noetic‖‘ for whom the ascent to knowledge of God is ‗a 
merely intellectual process‘ must be qualified by recognition of the fact that for Eva-
                                                 
221 Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 ff. 
222 E.g. Sch. 199 on Prov. 19:17. 
223 Disc. 58. 
224 Cf. Disc. 163. 
225 AM 31. 
226 Cf. Th. 22.18-20; Matt. 22:1-14. 
227 Cf. Th. 27.24, 36.11; KG 6:52.  
Page 222 of 268 
 
grius love is the sine qua non of knowledge of God.
228 In terms that echo Eph. 4:3, Eva-
grius describes the role of love as follows: 
 
Ἡ  ἀγάπε  ἀπʱζείʱο  ἐζηὶ  ζπλάθεηʱ,  πʱζ῵λ  δὲ  ἀπʱιεηθή,  ηὴλ  κʱθξνζπκίʱλ 
πξνθέξνπζʱ θʱὶ ηὸλ δένληʱ ζπκὸλ θʱθʱςύρνπζʱ, ηὴλ ηʱπείλσζηλ πξνβάιινπζʱ 
θʱὶ ηὴλ ὑπεξεθʱλίʱλ θʱηʱθέξνπζʱ. ἟ ἀγάπε ἔρεη κὲλ ἴδηνλ νὐδὲλ πιὴλ ηνῦ ζενῦ· 
ʱὕηε γάξ ἐζηη θʱὶ ὁ ζεόο.
229 
 
Love is the unifying of apatheia and the expunging of the pathē; it brings pa-
tience to the fore and it has a cooling effect on boiling thumos; it promotes hu-
mility and topples pride. Love possesses nothing of its own apart from God, for 
God is love itself.
230 
 
The final sentence of this passage states directly why love is the sine qua non of knowl-
edge of God: it is because God is love, so to love is to know God and to know God is to 
love, hence Disciples 198, quoted above, describes the pre-lapsarian state of the nous as 
one of unity, ‗through perfect love, with its archetype in the Holy Spirit‘. As 1 John 4:8, 
quoted in full, expresses it (and recalling that Evagrius would have expected his readers 
to complete the quote for themselves), 
 
ὁ κὴ ἀγʱπ῵λ νὐθ ἔγλσ ηὸλ ζεόλ, ὅηη ὁ ζεὸο ἀγάπε ἐζηίλ. 
 
Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love. 
 
Consequently,  to suppose that because the  ultimate  term  in  Evagrius‘ spirituality  is 
knowledge rather than love, and that accordingly he values knowledge more highly than 
love,
231 is to overlook the fact that the knowledge in question is of a God who is love,
232 
and is therefore knowledge of love; that is, it is love consciously recognised, acknow l-
edged and embraced. It is love that, by way of  apatheia, the disentangling of the nous 
                                                 
228 Gendle (1985: 376). 
229 Eul. 21.23. 
230 1 John 4:8. 
231 So, for example, McGinn (1991: 156);  Chitty (1966: 50). While not explicitly stating that Evagrius 
values knowledge more highly than love, both Balthasar (1965: 193) and Konstantinovsky (2009) also 
exemplify this tendency, Balthasar likening Evagrius‘ ‗mystical teaching‘ to the ‗subtle idealism of Ma-
hayana Buddhism [according to which] knowledge is the highest aim of life‘, and Konstantinovsky only 
mentioning  the word ‗love‘ once in her monograph on Evagrius‘ spirituality (in order to note, on p.31, 
that ‗love crowns the life of praxis and opens the door to contemplative knowledge of the universe‘). 
232 Cf. Driscoll (2003: 222-3).  
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from the external world, unifies the three parts of the soul and, accordingly, the anthro-
pological triad and, in so doing, restores the image of God such that the nous can once 
more become what it was created to be: ‗the place of God.‘
233 Linge continues: 
 
With apatheia…comes the love that dispels our separation from other creatures 
and the knowledge that dispels our ignorance of ourselves and of the finite world. 
Beyond this restored relation to world and self, apatheia opens the way to the life 
of pure prayer, which dispels our separation from God.
234 
 
Since God is love and the nous is the image of God, love is integral to the nous. To be 
precise, as we saw above, it derives as agapē from the healthy thumos and as spiritual 
erôs – an integral part of pure prayer
235 - from the healthy epithumētikon.
236 Thus, 
 
Love is the excellent state of the reasoning soul, for in it one cannot love an y-
thing among corruptible things more than the knowledge of God.
237 
 
There is a good love that is eternal, namely that which true knowledge chooses 
for itself and which is said to be inseparable from the nous.
238 
 
Love, then, is for Evagrius integral both to the  nous and to knowledge – where there is 
love there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge, love – and this must be borne in 
mind when considering what he has to say about contemplation and knowledge, in terms 
both of their nature and content: 
 
He who has to see written things has need of the light; and he who has to learn 
the wisdom of beings has need of spiritual love.
239 
 
So, for example, his cosmological teachings such as the assignment of the fallen noes to 
bodies and worlds ‗according to their state‘ (θʱη’ ἀλʱινγίʱλ η῅ο θʱηʱζηάζεσο)
240 must 
be understood not as the products of abstract intellectual speculation but as insights born 
                                                 
233 Th. 39.4; 40.9; Rfl. 25; Let. 39; see  above, 1.2.1; 1.2.1.3. 
234 Linge (2000: 565). 
235 Cf. Pry. 52, quoted above, 1.2.2, n.249. 
236 See above, 1.2.2; it will however be recalled that in one place – Prakt. 89 – Evagrius assigns agapē to 
the epithumētikon. 
237 KG 1.86. 
238 KG 4.50. 
239 KG 3.58. 
240 E.g. Sch. 33 on Prov. 3:19-20.  
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of spiritual love from the context of a life of devotion and prayer, and from ‗the grace of 
God‘: 
 
Τ῅ο ἀιεζείʱο ὁ ζηύινο ὁ θʱππʱδόθεο Βʱζίιεηνο· ηὴλ κὲλ ἀπὸ ἀλζξώπσλ, θεζίλ, 
ἐπηζπκβʱίλνπζʱλ γλ῵ζηλ, πξνζερὴο κειέηε θʱὶ γπκλʱζίʱ θξʱηύλεη· ηὴλ δὲ ἐθ 
ʘενῦ  ράξηηνο  ἐγγηλνκέλελ,  δηθʱηνζύλε  θʱὶ  ἀνξγεζίʱ  θʱὶ  ἔιενο·  θʱὶ  ηὴλ  κὲλ 
πξνηέξʱλ, δπλʱηὸλ θʱὶ ηνὺο ἐκπʱζεỖο ὑπνδέμʱζζʱη· η῅ο δὲ δεπηέξʱο νἱ ἀπʱζεỖο 
κόλνη εἰζἰ δεθηηθνί· νἳ θʱὶ πʱξὰ ηὸλ θʱηξὸλ η῅ο πξνζεπρ῅ο ηὸ νἰθεỖνλ θέγγνο ηνῦ 
λνῦ πεξηιάκπνλ ʱὐηνὺο ζεσξνῦζηλ.
241 
 
The  pillar  of  truth,  Basil  the  Cappadocian,  said  that  while  the  understanding 
which comes from men strengthens through study and assiduous exercise, that 
which comes from the grace of God strengthens through justice, freedom from 
anger, and mercy. And while it is possible for the empatheis to receive the first, 
only the apatheis can receive the second, those who at the time of prayer con-
template the nous‘ own light which illumines them.
242  
 
To put it another way, knowledge, as we saw in relation to the ‗three resurrections‘, is 
not the sole prerogative of the logistikon but involves the entire anthropological triad; it 
is not simply believed intellectually but is embodied in a way of life and presupposes 
apatheia - virtue and love – and this is part of Evagrius‘ meaning when he speaks of 
things ‗being clear to those who have embarked upon the same trail.‘
243  
 
This holistic knowledge that arises from apatheia, as well as involving spiritual insights, 
is immensely practical, as Praktikos 70 shows: 
 
὇  ηὰο  ἀξεηὰο  ἐλ  ἑʱπηῶ  θʱζηδξύζʱο,  θʱὶ  ηʱύηʱηο  ὅινο  ἀλʱθξʱζείο,  νὐθ  ἔηη 
κέκλεηʱη λόκνπ ἠ ἐληνι῵λ ἠ θνιάζεσο, ἀιιὰ ηʱῦηʱ ιέγεη θʱὶ πξάηηεη ὁπόζʱ ἟ 
ἀξίζηε ἕμηο ὑπʱγνξεύεη.
244 
 
                                                 
241 Gnost. 45. 
242 Cf. Gnost. 4: ‗The knowledge which comes to us from outside tries to reveal matters by way of their 
logoi. But that which is born of the grace of God presents objects to the eye of thought, and the nous, 
gazing upon them, approaches their logoi. To the first is opposed error, to the second, anger and thumos 
and those things which follow along with them.‘ (Ἡ κὲλ ἔμσζελ ἟κỖλ ζπκβʱίλνπζʱ γλ῵ζηο, δηὰ η῵λ 
ιόγσλ ὑπνδεηθλύεηλ πεηξᾶηʱη ηὰο ὕιʱο· ἟ δὲ ἐθ ʘενῦ ράξηηνο ἐγγηλνκέλε, ʱὐηνςεη ηῆ δηʱλνίᾳ πʱξίζηεζη 
ηὰ πξάγκʱηʱ, πξὸο ἃ βιέπσλ ὁ λνῦο, ηνὺο ʱὐη῵λ ιόγνπο πξνζίεηʱη· ἀληίθεηηʱη δὲ ηῆ κὲλ πξνηέξᾳ <἟ 
πιάλε· ηῆ δὲ δεπηέξᾳ> ὀξγὴ θʱὶ ζπκόο· <θʱὶ ηὰ ηνύηνηο πʱξʱθνινπζνῦληʱ>. 
243 See above, Introduction. 
244 Prakt. 70.  
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The  person  who  has  established  the  virtues  within  himself  and  has  become 
wholly mixed with them no longer remembers the law or the commandments or 
punishment, but says and does those things which this excellent state dictates to 
him.  
 
First, a couple of points about language. The participle θʱζηδξύζʱο comes from the verb 
θʱζίδξπσ, the causal of θʱζέδνκʱη, ‘to make to sit down’, so in meaning ‘to establish’, it 
does so with strong connotations  of ‘seating’ something ‘in’, and so establishing it in a 
particularly thoroughgoing and stable way. This use of it echoes Evagrius’ description of 
‘a soul accomplished in praktikē’ as a ‘throne of apatheia’,
245 and his reading of the verb 
‘seats’ in Prov. 18:16 as ‘the seat (θʱζέδξʱ) of the  nous…the excellent state which 
keeps  that  which  is  sitting  there  difficult  to  move  or  immovable’.
246  The  participle 
ἀλʱθξʱζείο comes from ἀλʱθεξάλλπκη and is therefore cognate with the verb θεξάλλπκη, 
source of the noun krasis, so bearing in mind Evagrius’ project of refining the physical 
krasis of the body I think the idea of becoming ‘wholly mixed with the virtues’ has a 
literal dimension in addition to its more obvious metaphorical sense, since the person 
who  has  achieved  this  ‘mixing’  has  done  so  partly  through  having  weaned  her 
epithumētikon away from its attachments to food, drink and so forth such that its sole 
desire is for the good, with the consequence that her body has become less ‘thick’ and 
‘earthy’;  the  virtuous  soul  has  as  its  correlate  a  body  that  is  itself  becoming 
progressively more ‘spiritualised’ by becoming progressively ‘less corporeal’.  
 
When Evagrius says that this person, the apathēs, ‘no longer remembers the law or the 
commandments or punishment, but says and does those things which this excellent state 
dictates to him’ echoes can be detected of the Stoic sage, described by Long, on the 
basis of Cicero’s De Finibus 3.20-1, as follows: 
 
The good man is ‘in complete agreement with Nature’…Virtue [is defined by] a 
pattern of behaviour that follows necessarily from a disposition perfectly in tune 
with Nature’s rationality…The right thing to do is that which accords with virtue, 
and this is equivalent to saying that it accords with the nature of a perfectly 
rational being.
247 
 
                                                 
245 Cf. AM 31; see above, 3.2. 
246 See above, 3.1. 
247 Long (1986: 192).  
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Evagrius equates observance of the commandments with the cultivation of virtue: 
 
὇ πʱξὰ θύζηλ βη῵λ, νὑ ηεξεỖ ἐληνιὰο ʘενῦ.
248 
 
One who lives contrary to nature does not keep the commandments of God. 
 
Apatheia  is  constituted  by  the  practical  virtues  (ἐθ  η῵λ  πξʱθηηθ῵λ  ἀξεη῵λ 
ζπλεζη῵ζʱ),
249 and observance of the commandments constitutes  praktikē (πξʱθηηθὴλ 
δὲ  ζπλίζηεζηλ  ἟  ηήξεζηο  η῵λ  ἐληνι῵λ).
250  It  follows  that  observance  of  the 
commandments is essential to the attainment of apatheia;  apatheia, ‘is potentially in 
the  commandments’  (θʱηὰ  δύλʱκηλ  <ἐλ  ηʱỖο>  ἐληνιʱỖο),
251  and  in the  process  of 
attaining it a person will have thoroughly internalised the commandments;  in other 
words, he will have ‘established them within his soul and become wholly mixed with 
them’. He does not need to remember them because they have become part of him and 
will, accordingly, determine his behaviour without any conscious effort on his part. 
Such  a  person  is  ‘in  complete  agreement  with  Nature’  because  his  soul  is  acting 
according to nature, which, for Evagrius as for the Stoics, means ‘according to rational 
nature’. But here Evagrius’ view diverges radically from that of the Stoics since for him 
the rational nature in question is that of the pre-lapsarian incorporeal nous created in the 
image  of  God.  And  as  will  already  have  become  apparent,  whatever  superficial 
similarities might obtain between the Evagrian apathēs and the Stoic apathēs or sage, 
Evagrius’ understanding of apatheia is first and foremost Pauline, and it is his reading 
of Paul that above all underlies Praktikos 70,  in particular, I think, Rom. 7:4-6 and Gal. 
3:23-9: 
 
ὑκεỖο ἐζʱλʱηώζεηε ηῶ λόκῳ δηὰ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο ηνῦ Χξηζηνῦ, εἰο ηὸ γελέζζʱη ὑκᾶο 
ἑηέξῳ, ηῶ ἐθ λεθξ῵λ ἐγεξζέληη, ἵλʱ θʱξπνθνξήζσκελ ηῶ ζεῶ. ὅηε γὰξ ἤκελ ἐλ 
ηῆ ζʱξθί, ηὰ πʱζήκʱηʱ η῵λ ἁκʱξηη῵λ ηὰ δηὰ ηνῦ λόκνπ ἐλεξγεỖην ἐλ ηνỖο κέιεζηλ 
἟κ῵λ, εἰο ηὸ θʱξπνθνξ῅ζʱη ηῶ ζʱλάηῳ· λπλὶ δὲ θʱηεξγήζεκελ ἀπὸ ηνῦ λόκνπ 
ἀπνζʱλόληεο ἐλ ᾧ θʱηεηρόκεζʱ, ὥζηε δνπιεύεηλ ἟κᾶο ἐλ θʱηλόηεηη πλεύκʱηνο 
θʱὶ νὐ πʱιʱηόηεηη γξάκκʱηνο.
252 
                                                 
248 Exh. 2.37. 
249 Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31. 
250 Prakt. 81.2. Regarding the role of the ‗law‘ in the attainment of apatheia, cf. Sch. 12 on Prov. 1:20-21 
and Sch. 343 on Prov. 28:4, both quoted above, 3.2, n.113 and 116 respectively. 
251 Disc. 18.1. 
252 Rom. 7:4-6.  
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You have died to the law through the body of Christ, so that you may belong to 
another, to him who has been raised from the dead in order that we may bear fruit 
for God. While we were living in the flesh, our sinful affections, aroused by the 
law,  were  at  work  in  our  members  to  bear  fruit  for  death.  But  now  we  are 
awakened, dead to the law which held us captive, so that we are slaves not to the 
old written code but in the new life of the spirit. 
 
πξὸ ηνῦ δὲ ἐιζεỖλ ηὴλ πίζηηλ ὑπὸ λόκνλ ἐθξνπξνύκεζʱ ζπγθιεηόκελνη εἰο ηὴλ 
κέιινπζʱλ πίζηηλ ἀπνθʱιπθζ῅λʱη, ὥζηε ὁ λόκνο πʱηδʱγσγὸο ἟κ῵λ γέγνλελ εἰο 
Χξηζηόλ,  ἵλʱ  ἐθ  πίζηεσο  δηθʱησζ῵κελ·  ἐιζνύζεο  δὲ  η῅ο  πίζηεσο  νὐθέηη  ὑπὸ 
πʱηδʱγσγόλ ἐζκελ. πἁληεο γὰξ πἱνὶ ζενῦ ἐζηε δηὰ η῅ο πίζηεσο ἐλ Χξηζηῶ Ἰεζνῦ· 
ὅζνη γὰξ εἰο Χξηζηὸλ ἐβʱπηίζζεηε, Χξηζηὸλ ἐλεδύζʱζζε. νὐθ ἔλη ἸνπδʱỖνο νὐδὲ 
Ἕιιελ…πάληεο γὰξ ὑκεỖο εἷο ἐζηε ἐλ Χξηζηῶ Ἰεζνῦ.
253 
 
Now before faith came, we were imprisoned and guarded under the law until 
faith would be revealed. Therefore the law was our instructor until Christ came, 
so that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith has come, we are no 
longer subject to  an instructor, for in Christ Jesus you are all children of God 
through  faith.  As  many  of  you  as  were  baptised  into  Christ  have  clothed 
yourselves with Christ. There is not longer Jew nor Greek…for you are all one in 
Christ Jesus. 
 
Both of these passages relate the ‘law’ to what Paul elsewhere calls the ‘old self’
254 and 
associates  with  life  in  the  sôma  psuchikon,
255  and what Evagrius calls the life of 
thraldom to  pathos;  in  his  scholion  on  Prov.  25:10a
256  Evagrius quotes Gal. 3:13, 
‘Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law’ (Χξηζηὸο ἟κᾶο ἞ιεπζέξσζελ ἐθ η῅ο 
θʱηάξʱο  ηνῦ  λόκνπ).
257  In  ‘dying  with  Christ’  to  the  life  of  empatheia  and  being 
resurrected with him into ‘the new life of the spirit’ the apathēs has in effect outgrown 
the law.’ This is made explicit in the Chapters of the Disciples: 
 
Τὴλ  δηθʱηνζύλελ  νἱ  ἔμσ  πεξηεθηηθὴλ  πʱζ῵λ  η῵λ  ἀξεη῵λ  πξνέθξηλʱλ· 
ἀπνλεκεηηθὴ γὰξ ἐζηη η῵λ θʱη’ ἀμίʱλ, ηὸ ζπκθνξώηεξνλ πʱηδεύνπζʱ· ηὰο γὰξ 
                                                 
253 Gal. 3:23-8.9. 
254 Col. 3:9;  
255 Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 ff; see above, 3.2. 
256 ‗Favour and friendship set a man free, which do thou keep for thyself, lest thou be made liable to re-
proach; but take heed to thy ways peaceably‘ (ράξηο θʱὶ θηιίʱ ἐιεπζεξνỖ, ἃο ηήξεζνλ ζεʱπηῶ, ἵλʱ κὴ 
ἐπνλείδηζηνο γέλῃ, ἀιιὰ θύιʱμνλ ηὰο ὁδνύο ζνπ εὐζπλʱιιάθησο). 
257 This is how Evagrius quotes Gal. 3:13; my edition of the Greek New Testament has ἐμεγόξʱζελ in-
stead of ἞ιεπζέξσζελ.   
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θʱη' ἐλέξγεηʱλ ἁκʱξηίʱο πεξηʱηξεỖ, ηʱύηελ θʱὶ ὁ λόκνο πξνζηάζζεη. Κʱηὰ δὲ ηὴλ 
ηνῦ Χξηζηνῦ δηδʱζθʱιίʱλ ἟ ἀγάπε πʱζ῵λ η῵λ ἀξεη῵λ ἐζηη πεξηεθηηθή· θʱὶ γὰξ 
ηὸλ ἔζσ ἄλζξσπνλ θʱζʱξίδεη, ηὰο θʱηὰ δηάλνηʱλ ἁκʱξηίʱο ἐθθόπηνπζʱ.
258 
 
The pagans put justice first as embracing all the virtues, for it is the distribution 
to each according to worth, teaching what is more expedient. This eliminates sins 
kat’ energeian and is what the law prescribes. But according to the teachings of 
Christ it is love that embraces all the virtues and purifies the inner self in cutting 
out sins kata dianoian. 
 
Evagrius, then, understands the Pauline sense of ‘law’ to concern the regulation of our 
conduct in the world, and apatheia as going beyond this by ensuring inner purity:
259 
 
Πξʱθηηθόο  ἐζηηλ,  ὁ  ἐλ  ηῶ  θʱηὰ  δηάλνηʱλ  θόζκῳ  ζπληζηʱκέλῳ,  εὐζεβ῵ο  θʱὶ 
δηθʱίσο πνιηηεπόκελνο.
260 
 
The praktikos is one who conducts himself piously and justly in the world consti-
tuted kata dianoian. 
 
ʘεσξεηηθόο ἐζηηλ, ὁ πιάηησλ ηὸλ ʱἰζζεηὸλ θόζκνλ θʱηὰ δηάλνηʱλ η῅ο ʱὐηνῦ 
κόλνλ γλώζεσο ἕλεθελ.
261 
 
The contemplative is one who forms the sensible world kata dianoian solely for 
the sake of knowledge of it. 
 
The apathēs has internalised the prescriptions of the commandments and law, whose 
purpose is to prevent sin kat’ energeian, and in doing purified her actions in both the 
external world and in the worlds she constitutes kata dianoian. Freed from ‘domestic 
disturbance’ (἟…ηʱξʱρὴ η῵λ νἰθείσλ) her nous is able to ‘make that noble emigration 
                                                 
258 Disc. 7. Evagrius would equate the ‗cutting out‘ of sins kata dianoian with the ‗circumcision of the 
heart‘ (πεξηηνκὴ θʱξδίʱο) of Rom. 2:29. 
259 Cf. Sch. 27 on Prov. 3:1: ‗‗My son, forget not my laws; but let thine heart keep my words‘ (πἱέ, ἐκ῵λ 
λνκίκσλ κὴ ἐπηιʱλζάλνπ· ηὰ δὲ ῥήκʱηά κνπ ηεξείησ ζὴ θʱξδίʱ): ‘If a person who does not live by the 
law forgets the law, a person who remembers the law lives by it. And if the one who performs them 
observes the words of God, the one who does not wish to practise them loses them, for it is said, ‘for it is 
not the hearers of the law who are righteous in God’s sight, but the doers of the law who will be justified’ 
(Rom. 2:13). 
260 Rfl. 38. 
261 Rfl. 39.  
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and arrive in the land of the incorporeals’ (ἀπνδεκήζεη ηὴλ θʱιὴλ ἐθείλελ ἀπνδεκίʱλ, 
θʱὶ ἐλ ηῆ ρώξᾳ γέλνηην η῵λ ἀζσκάησλ):
262  
 
Ννῦο ζὺλ ʘεῶ πξʱθηηθὴλ  θʱηνξζώζʱο  θʱὶ πξνζπειʱζʱο ηῆ γλώζεη ὀιίγνλ ἠ 
νὐδ’  ὅισο  ηνῦ  ἀιόγνπ  κέξνπο  ηὴο  ςπρ῅ο  ἐπʱηζζάλεηʱη,  η῅ο  γλώζεσο  ʱὐηὸλ 
ἁξπʱδνύζεο κεηάξζηνλ θʱὶ ρσξηδνύζεο η῵λ ʱἰζζεη῵λ.
263 
 
The nous that has completed the work of praktikē with the help of God and has 
approached knowledge possesses little or no awareness of the irrational part of 
the soul, for knowledge has carried it off to the heights and separated it from sen-
sible things. 
 
This separation of the nous from the world of the senses and from the physical body is, 
as we have seen the aim of praktikē: ‗separating soul from body belongs to one who 
longs for virtue‘,
264 ‗for that which has no part in sensation is also free from pathos‘,
265 
hence the praktikos is ‗the servant of separation‘
266 and the praktikē soul becomes ‗loos-
ened from the body‘ and carried on the ‗wings of apatheia‘ to the ‗regions of knowl-
edge‘:
267  
 
The nous that is divested of the  pathē and sees the logoi of beings does not 
henceforth truly receive the eidola that (arrive) through the senses; but it is as if 
another world is created by its knowledge, attracting to it its thought and reject-
ing far from it the sensible world.
268 
 
This separation is a metaphorical ‗death‘ in which ‗the entire nature of the body is with-
drawn‘;
269 Evagrius, it will be recalled, enjoins Eulogios to ‗strip off the weight of the 
flesh (ηὸλ ὄγθνλ η῵λ ζʱξθ῵λ ἀπόδπζʱη),
270 thus calling to mind Paul‘s  reference at Col. 
3:9 to ‗stripping off (ἀπεθδπζάκελνη) the old self with its practices‘, and at 1 Cor. 15: 
43-4 to the sôma psuchikon which, sown in dishonour and weakness, is raised in glory 
                                                 
262 Prakt. 61; cf. Sch. 377 on Prov. 31:21. 
263 Prakt. 66. 
264 Prakt. 52; see above, 3.2. 
265 Prakt. 4.3-4; see above, 3.2. 
266 KG 5.65; see above, 3.2. 
267 KG 2.6; see above, 3.2. 
268 KG 5.12. 
269 KG 3.62; see above, 3.2. 
270 Eul. 1.1; see above, 1.2.3.  
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and power.
271 As a result the nous, although still incarnate, can experience itself as in-
corporeal and thereby effectively become so, able to participate, through ‗immaterial 
contemplation‘,
272 in the incorporeal worlds.  
 
The stripping off by the nous of corporeality is, as we have seen, a return to its true na-
ture,
273 in the process of which it becomes ever more aware of its own light: 
 
Πξνθόπησλ  ὁ  λνῦο  ἐλ  ηῆ  πξʱθηηθῆ,  θνῦθʱ  ἔρεη  ηὰ  λνήκʱηʱ  η῵λ  ʱἰζζεη῵λ· 
πξνθόπησλ δὲ ἐλ ηῆ γλώζεη, πνηθίιʱ ἕμεη ηὰ ζεσξήκʱηʱ· πξνθόπησλ δὲ ἐλ ηῆ 
πξνζεπρῆ, ιʱκπξόηεξνλ θʱὶ θʱηδξόηεξνλ ὄςεηʱη ηὸ ἴδηνλ θ῵ο.
274 
 
As the nous progresses in praktikê, its noēmata of sensible objects become insub-
stantial; when it is progressing in knowledge its contemplations will be diverse; 
when it is progressing in prayer, it will see its own light become brighter and 
more radiant.
275 
 
The nous that is divested of the pathē becomes completely like light because it is 
illuminated by the contemplation of beings.
276 
 
The progressive detachment from the sensible world for the sake of which the labours of 
praktikē are endured and apatheia attained is succinctly described in terms of its ulti-
mate purpose in the following: 
 
Οὐθ  ἂλ  ἴδνη  ὁ  λνῦο  ηὸλ  ηνῦ  ζενῦ  ηόπνλ  ἐλ  ἑʱπηῶ,  κὴ  πάλησλ  η῵λ  ἐλ  ηνỖο 
πξάγκʱζηλ <λνεκάησλ> ὑςειόηεξνο γεγνλώο· νὐ γελήζεηʱη δὲ ὑςειόηεξνο, κὴ 
ηὰ  πάζε  ἀπεθδπζάκελνο  ηὰ  ζπλδεζκνῦληʱ  ʱὐηὸλ  δηὰ  η῵λ  λνεκάησλ  ηνỖο 
πξάγκʱζη ηνỖο ʱἰζζεηνỖο. Κʱὶ ηὰ κὲλ πάζε ἀπνζήζεηʱη δηὰ η῵λ ἀξεη῵λ, ηνὺο δὲ 
ςηινὺο ινγηζκνὺο δηὰ η῅ο πλεπκʱηηθ῅ο ζεσξίʱο, θʱὶ ηʱύηελ πάιηλ ἐπηθʱλέληνο 
ʱὐηῳ θσηὸο ἐθείλνπ ηνῦ θʱηὰ ηὸλ θʱηξὸλ η῅ο πξνζεπρ῅ο ἐθηππνῦληνο ηὸλ ηόπνλ 
ηὸλ ηνῦ ζενῦ.
277 
 
                                                 
271 See above, 3.2. 
272 KG 3.62; see above, this section and 3.2 respectively. 
273 See above, 1.2.1.3. 
274 Disc. 78. 
275 Cf. KG 1.74: ‗The light of the nous is divided into three: knowledge of the adorable and holy Trinity, 
of the incorporeal nature that has been created by it, and of the contemplation of beings‘. 
276 KG 5.15. 
277 Th. 40.  
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The nous could not see the place of God within itself, unless it has transcended 
all the noēmata associated with objects. Nor will it transcend them, if it has not 
put off the pathē that bind it to sensible objects through noēmata. And it will lay 
aside  the  pathē  through  the  virtues,  and  simple  thoughts  through  spiritual 
contemplation; and this in turn it will lay aside when there appears to it that light 
which at the time of prayer leaves an impress of the place of God. 
 
Apatheia,  then,  is  the  means  by  which  the  nous  is  enabled  to  experience  itself  as 
incorporeal  while  it  is  still  incarnate,  and,  accordingly,  an  anticipation  of  its 
eschatological  return  to  metaphysical  incorporeality.  This  is  an  understanding  of 
humanity’s spiritual goal which has roots in Plato’s Theaetetus: 
 
Ἀιι’ νὔη’ ἀπνιέζζʱη ηὰ θʱθὰ δπλʱηόλ, ὦ ʘεώδνξε· ὑπελʱληίνλ γὰξ ηη ηῶ ἀγʱζῶ 
ἀεὶ εἶλʱη ἀλάγθε· νὔη’ ἐλ ζενỖο ʱὐηὰ ἱδξῦζζʱη, ηὴλ δὲ ζλεηὴλ θύζηλ θʱὶ ηόλδε ηὸλ 
ηόπνλ πεξηπνιεỖ ἐμ ἀλάγθεο. δηὸ θʱὶ πεηξᾶζζʱη ρξὴ ἐλζέλδε ἐθεỖζε θεύγεηλ ὅηη 
ηάρηζηʱ. θπγὴ δὲ ὁκνίσζηο ζεῶ θʱηὰ ηὸ δπλʱηόλ.
278 
 
It is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must 
always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place 
among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth . 
Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as 
quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is 
possible.
279 
 
Evagrius would not agree that evils cannot be done away with, although evil will only 
cease to exist, along with the corporeal worlds, at the  apokatastasis, when the noes are 
fully restored to union with God. Nor would he associate all evils with proximity to the 
earth; as we have seen, while humans are characterised by epithumia and earth, demons, 
who are further from God than we are, are characterised by thumos and air.
280 He does, 
however, associate evil with distance from God, and he certainly believes that it is only 
by escaping from the earth that we can regain our knowledge of God, and that doing so 
means regaining the image of God and in this sense becoming like God, although it is a 
likeness based upon reflection as opposed to natural kinship. 
 
                                                 
278 Theaet. 176a6-b2. 
279 Trans. Fowler. Both Armstrong (2004) and Russell (2004) argue, in my view convincingly, against an 
other-worldly interpretation of Plato‘s ὁκνίσζηο ζεῶ. 
280 See above, 1.1.2.  
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But Evagrian apatheia is more than just experiential detachment from the physical body 
and the world of the senses; it is also love, understood not simply in relational terms but 
as a state of being that is the natural condition of the nous as the image of a God who is 
love. According to Kephalaia Gnostika 5:14,   
 
Just as, when the sun rises, things which are elevated a little from the ground cast 
a shadow, so also to the nous which begins to approach the logoi of beings, ob-
jects appear obscurely.
281 
 
This describes the experience of the nous, as it becomes progressively more detached 
from the sensible world, in epistemic terms. Spiritual knowledge is like the light of the 
sun, so as the epistemic receptivity of the nous becomes gradually re-oriented away 
from the sensible world and back toward God – as, that is, the nous gradually recovers 
his image – so knowledge of him, at first in the form of the logoi of beings, begins to 
shed its light, like the rays of the rising sun, and in so doing makes sensible objects 
appear as shadows in relation to spiritual reality. But since love is inseparable from 
knowledge this aphorism can, and should, be read equally in terms of love. The rising 
sun of spiritual knowledge is the rising sun of love, the door to natural knowledge, 
knowledge of God and ultimate blessedness.
282 
 
 
3.4  Becoming apathēs 
 
Apatheia is the health of the soul, the natural state of the human being and the spiritual 
foundation  for  the  recovery  by  the  nous  of  knowledge  of  God,  culminating  in  its 
eschatological restoration to union with him. It is constituted by the practical virtues and 
characterised by stability and love, enables the nous to become receptive to spiritual 
knowledge  and  bestows  an  inner  purity  that  regulates  our  conduct  in  the  ‘worlds 
constituted kata dianoian’ as well as in the external world. In order to complete this 
picture it remains to discuss how apatheia is attained. 
 
                                                 
281 KG 5.14. 
282 Cf. Prakt. Prol. 8.  
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At the heart of the quest for apatheia is the struggle against the logismoi.
283 Our suscep-
tibility to these resides in the disposition to  pathos, and accordingly the disciplines of 
praktikē aim to reduce, and eventually eliminate, this disposition by healing all three 
parts of the soul: 
 
Ννῦλ κὲλ πιʱλώκελνλ ἵζηεζηλ ἀλάγλσζηο θʱὶ ἀγξππλίʱ θʱὶ πξνζεπρή· ἐπηζπκίʱλ 
δὲ  ἐθθινγνπκέλελ  κʱξʱίλεη  πεỖλʱ  θʱὶ  θόπνο  θʱὶ  ἀλʱρώξεζηο·  ζπκὸλ  δὲ 
θʱηʱπʱύεη θπθώκελνλ ςʱικῳδίʱ θʱὶ κʱθξνζπκίʱ θʱὶ ἔιενο.
284 
 
When the nous wanders, reading, vigils and prayer bring it to a standstill. When 
desire bursts into flame, hunger, toil and anachoresis extinguish it. When the 
thumos becomes agitated, psalmody, patience and mercy calm it. 
 
ηὰ  κὲλ  ηνῦ  ζώκʱηνο  πάζε  πεξηθόπηεη  ἐγθξάηεηʱ,  ηὰ  δὲ  η῅ο  ςπρ῅ο  ἀγάπε 
πλεπκʱηηθή.
285 
 
Self-control cuts away the pathē of the body; spiritual love cuts away those of the 
soul. 
 
As we saw,
286 the disposition to pathos comprises the physiological ‗matter‘ of the lo-
gismoi in the form of excess vital heat, and their psychological ‗matter‘ in the form of 
the ‗natural desires of the flesh‘, the ‗desires of the soul‘,
287 and empatheis memories.
288 
By cultivating, for example,  patience, mercy, compassion and gentleness to heal the 
disposition to anger;
289 self-control to heal the disposition to gluttony and fornication
290 
and perseverance to heal the disposition to acedia,
291 the monk gradually brings his soul 
to health. Praktikē, then, comprises the cultivation of the practical virtues, along with 
manual labour, the keeping of vigils, the reading of scripture and the practice of psalm-
ody and prayer, all of which are indispensable to the attainment of apatheia. Dietary 
self-control has already been discussed at length in relation to Evagrius‘ understanding 
of the body, and the nature of the virtues has been discussed in relation to the nature of 
                                                 
283 See above, 2.1. 
284 Prakt. 15. 
285 Prakt. 35; see above, 3.2. 
286 See above, 3.4. 
287 Eul. 21.23; see above, 3.2. 
288 Cf. Prakt. 34; see above, 3.3. 
289 Cf., e.g., Prakt. 15, 20. 
290 Cf., e.g., Prakt. 15; 8Th. 1.4, 6, 33; 2.1. 
291 Cf., e.g., Prakt. 28.  
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the tripartite soul.
292 The nature of prayer, as Evagrius understands it, has to some extent 
been implicit in discussion of the contemplative ascent,
293 the true nature of the nous
294 
and apatheia as love and knowledge,
295 and is also the subject, along with Evagrius‘ 
understanding of psalmody, of an excellent recent monograph by Luke Dysinger.
296 The 
following, however, is particularly worth noting here: 
 
἖ξγάδεζζʱη  κὲλ  δηὰ  πʱληὸο  θʱὶ  ἀγξππλεỖλ  θʱὶ  λεζηεύεηλ  νὐ  πξνζηεηάγκεζʱ, 
πξνζεύρεζζʱη δὲ ἟κỖλ ἀδηʱιείπησο λελνκνζέηεηʱη· δηόηη ἐθεỖλʱ κὲλ ηὸ πʱζεηηθὸλ 
κέξνο  η῅ο  ςπρ῅ο  ζεξʱπεύνληʱ  θʱὶ  ηνῦ  ζώκʱηνο  ἟κ῵λ  εἰο  ηὴλ  ἐξγʱζίʱλ 
πξνζδεỖηʱη,  ὅπεξ  δη’  νἰθείʱλ  ἀζζέλεηʱλ  πξὸο  ηνὺο  πόλνπο  νὐθ  ἐπʱξθεỖ·  ἟  δὲ 
πξνζεπρὴ  ηὸλ  λνῦλ  ἐξξσκέλνλ  θʱὶ  θʱζʱξὸλ  πξὸο  ηὴλ  πάιελ  πʱξʱζθεπάδεη, 
πεθπθόηʱ πξνζεύρεζζʱη θʱὶ δίρʱ ηνύηνπ ηνῦ ζώκʱηνο θʱὶ ὑπὲξ πʱζ῵λ η῵λ η῅ο 
ςπρ῅ο δπλάκεσλ ηνỖο δʱίκνζη κάρεζζʱη.
297  
 
We have not been commanded to work, to keep vigil, and to fast at all times, but 
the law of unceasing prayer
298 has been handed down to us. In fact, those things 
which heal the pathētikon part of the soul require also the body to put them into 
practice, and the  latter because of  its weakness is not sufficient  for these la-
bours.
299 Prayer, on the other hand, invigorates and purifies the  nous  for  the 
struggle, since it is naturally constituted for prayer, even without this body, and 
for fighting the demons on behalf of all the powers of the soul. 
 
In this passage Evagrius affirms the primacy of prayer within praktikē: important as the 
various ascetic labours are, prayer is more so – more important, even, than the dietary 
self-control that keeps the vital heat at bay and in doing so deprives the pathē of their 
physiological matter.
300 Prayer nourishes the nous by answering directly to its true na-
ture, and also - although Evagrius does not spell this out here - increases the receptivity 
of the nous to grace, without which all of its labours would be in vain.
301 
 
                                                 
292 See above, 1.2.2. 
293 See above, 1.1.3. 
294 See above, 1.2.1.3. 
295 See above, 3.3. 
296 Dysinger (2005). 
297 Prakt. 49. 
298 1 Thess. 5:17. 
299 See above, 1.2.3. 
300 Cf. Eul. 1.1; see above, 1.2.3. 
301 E.g. Eul. 8.8, 14.15, 27.29, 28.39, 29.31; Vices Prol.; 8Th. 8.12; Prakt. Prol. 2; 53; Epil.; AV 25; Th. 8, 
26, 39; Pry. Prol.; 75.   
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There remains one element of praktikē which, although it is of central importance to the 
attainment and preservation of apatheia, and, as such, partly constitutive of it, I have 
not yet mentioned directly, and upon which, I shall, accordingly, now focus. Virtues 
such as self-control, patience, mercy, compassion and gentleness correspond to the pa-
thētikon part of the soul, but integral to their cultivation are the more purely rational 
disciplines of vigilance and discernment. The importance within Evagrius‘ spirituality 
of an attitude of continual introspective watchfulness cannot be overstated and informs 
all of his writings; as Rich notes, ‗the discernment of spirits, logismoi and of spiritual 
and practical matters is at the centre of [Evagrius’] teaching’.
302 Just as the exercise by 
the nous of its self-determination in order to return to God makes good the primal mis-
use of it by which it fell, so the cultivation of inner watchfulness is the means by which 
it remedies the tendency to negligence, inattentiveness or carelessness due to which it 
first turned from God. This watchfulness consists largely in the development of ever 
deeper degrees of a self-awareness, but also involves becoming familiar with the de-
mons, learning to recognise different types of thought, and monitoring, analysing and 
exercising care in respect of one‘s mental content. It is, in other words, the application 
of reason to the cultivation and preservation of purity of heart. Before looking at it in 
more detail, however, a word is in order about the sort of self-awareness it involves.  
 
Sometime during the final years of Evagrius‘ life, Augustine of Hippo wrote his Con-
fessions.
303 From his understanding of the will and of its centrality to our being it fo l-
lows that our motivations are constitutive of our spiritual condition, any action not ult i-
mately rooted in love of God being theref ore sinful. The confession of sin comes, a c-
cordingly, to involve  a relentless quest  to  uncover one‘s  motivations,
304 and,  in  the 
process, gives rise to self-knowledge as the ‗fruit‘ of ‗an activity that centrally involves 
the drawing forth of [the] past through memory‘:
305 It is this understanding that under-
lies the Confessions:  
 
[In aula ingenti memoriae meae] caelum et terra et mare praesto sunt cum om-
nibus quae in eis sentire potui, praeter illa quae oblitus sum. Ibi mihi et ipse oc-
                                                 
302 Rich (2007: 41).  
303 Chadwick (1991), dates the Confessions to the years 397-400. 
304 Cf. Confess. 2.9 ff. 
305 Nussbaum, at Matthews (1999: 68).  
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curro meque recolo, quid, quando et ubi egerim quoque modo, cum agerem, af-
fectus fuerim.
306 
 
[In the vast hall of my memory] sky, land, and sea are available to me together 
with all the sensations I have been able to experience in them, except for those 
which I have forgotten. There also I meet myself and recall what I am, what I 
have done, and when and where and how I was affected when I did it. 
 
Evagrius would agree that any action not ultimately rooted in love of God is therefore 
sinful, and, as we have seen, he understands a pathos to be any affection that comes be-
tween us and our love of God. He would certainly agree with Augustine that, as Nuss-
baum puts it, ‗one can never correct oneself fully enough, watch one‘s impulses care-
fully enough.‘
307 But whereas for Augustine these propositions lead to a focus on the 
person as a particular, unique creature, an ‗I‘ in intimate dialogue with God, for Eva-
grius they lead in the opposite direction; away from the uniquely personal, which for 
him is solely a source of attachments to things other than God; away, even, from the 
human, to awareness of the ‗self‘ as a pure nous. Consequently, although Evagrius‘ 
writings are full of rich personal detail, much of which can only be autobiographical, 
and of searingly honest reports of personal experience, none is owned; Evagrius is un-
wavering in his self-effacement. And while some of his writings are far more ‗personal‘ 
than the Confessions in terms of the experiences that they lay bare, those experiences 
are presented not as constitutive of their subject, but, on the contrary, as detached from 
him;  objects to be observed, examined, learned from and then transcended as obstacles 
to the union of the nous with God. So for Evagrius ‗self-awareness‘, is not awareness of 
a particular individual with a particular history who, as such, engages with God, but, 
rather, a means of diagnosing the current condition and needs of the fragmented nous.  
 
Although discernment is integral to the inner watchfulness prescribed by Evagrius, he 
rarely, as Rich notes, ‘uses the δηάθξηζηο word group’.
308 Instead, his preferred way of 
referring to that watchfulness is by the verb ηήξεηλ, the use of which, as noted above, 
recalls  not  only  Prov.  4:23,  ‗keep  watch  over  thine  heart  with  all  vigilance‘  (πάζῃ 
θπιʱθῆ ηήξεη ζὴλ θʱξδίʱλ), but Eph. 4:3.
309 The following passage, which concludes 
                                                 
306 Conf. 10.14. 
307 Nussbaum, at Matthews (1999: 66).  
308 Rich (2007: 41). 
309 See above, 3.3.  
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the treatise To Eulogios, plays on its different meanings and on its association, as in 
Prov.  4:23,  with  the  verb  θπιάζζσ,  as  well  as  giving  one  example  of  why  such 
watchfulness is a necessary component of asceticism: 
 
Σὺ νὖλ, ὦ ἁγίʱο ηξηάδνο ἱθέηʱ, εἰδὼο ηʱῦηʱ ἐλ νἷο θηινπνλνỖο, πάζῃ θπιʱθῆ 
ηήξεη ζὴλ θʱξδίʱλ, κήπσο ηνỖο ἔμσζελ πόλνηο πξνζέρσλ, ηνỖο ἔζσζελ δειέʱζη 
βξνρηζζῆο. νἱ ἐκνὶ ιόγνη εἴξεληʱη πξὸο ζέ, ηὰ δὲ ῥήκʱηά κνπ ηεξείησ ζὴ θʱξδίʱ· 
κέκλεζν Χξηζηνῦ ηνῦ θπιάμʱληνο ζε θʱὶ κὴ ἐπηιάζῃ η῅ο πξνζθπλεη῅ο θʱὶ ἁγίʱο 
ηξηάδνο.
310 
 
As for you then, suppliant of the Holy Trinity, as you know these matters for 
which you make painstaking efforts, keep watch over your heart with all vigi-
lance for fear that in attending to outward ascetic efforts alone you may choke on 
interior baits. My words were therefore addressed to you, and may your heart 
preserve what I said. Remember Christ who has kept guard over you and do not 
forget the worshipful and Holy Trinity. 
 
The following, again from the Eulogios, describes one sort of ‗interior bait‘: 
 
Μὴ ζηόκʱ κόλνλ, ἀιιὰ θʱὶ θʱξδίʱ ηεξείζζσ. ηόηε γὰξ ἀκʱπξνῦηʱη η῅ο ςπρ῅ο ηὸ 
ὄκκʱ ηῶ η῅ο ἀξεζθείʱο πλεύκʱηη, ηνῦ λνῦ πʱζζνκέλνπ.
311 
 
Let not only the mouth but also the heart maintain its guard. For the eye of the 
soul is blinded by the spirit of complaisance at the moment when the nous is 
sprinkled with dust.  
 
As  Burton-Christie  notes,  the  desert  monks  were  acutely  aware  of  the  power  of 
words;
312 the Apophthegmata Patrum report Makarios the Great as saying that ‗one evil 
word makes even the good evil, while one good word makes even the evil good‘,
313 
while at Matt: 12:36 we are told that on  the day of judgment we will have to give ac-
count  for  every  careless  word  we  utter  (πᾶλ  ῥ῅κʱ  ἀξγὸλ  ὃ 
ιʱιήζνπζηλ…ἀπνδώζνπζηλ).
314 Thus inner watchfulness includes guarding the tongue 
and so the mouth. But in addition, Evagrius notes in his scholion on Prov. 25:26 that the 
                                                 
310 Eul. 32.34. 
311 Eul. 18.19. 
312 Cf. Burton-Christie (1993: 134 ff). 
313 Makarios the Great 39, at Ward (1975: 137). 
314 Cf. also James 3:5 ff.  
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word ‗tongue‘ is used by Scripture to mean ‗soul‘,
315 meaning that, as Driscoll notes, a 
reference to guarding the tongue ‗can suggest to the monk familiar with this use of bib-
lical language that the whole soul is to be guarded.‘
316 So Evagrius‘ warning to Eulogios 
is amplified by this secondary meaning of ‗mouth‘: the literal mouth is to be guarded 
lest a careless word ‗make the good evil‘, and in addition the heart and the soul are to be 
guarded lest the ‗eye‘ of the latter be blinded. By ‗dust‘ Evagrius means the logismoi, 
which, thrown in the ‗eye of the soul‘, obscure its ‗vision‘;
317 his reference is to the ca-
pacity of the pathos associated with the logismoi to undermine our watchfulness, dis-
cernment and resolve. A particularly clear example is the temptation by logismoi of for-
nication described at Eul. 21.22 and discussed above,
318 which begins by warning that 
‗it is a very serious matter for the heart to be tied to a habit of pleasures’ and then 
proceeds to detail how the pleasures in question enlist the monk’s reason to justify their 
indulgence; this is precisely the sort of undermining of reason by pathos that Evagrius 
has  in  mind  in  speaking  of  the  nous  being  ‘sprinkled  with  dust.’  He  attributes  the 
capacity  of  pleasure  to  erode  our  resolve  to  ‘the  spirit  of  complaisance’,  but  it  is 
ourselves and the demons that we choose to please rather than God, and in choosing 
thus we repeat the primordial choice of the nous to turn away from God, and reinforce 
our disposition to pathos and immersion in corporeality. 
 
While lapses in watchfulness imperil the heart, soul and nous, its maintenance conduces 
to spiritual advancement: 
 
὇ θπιάζζσλ γι῵ζζʱλ ʱὐηνῦ ὀξζνηνκεỖ ηὰο ὁδνὺο ʱὐηνῦ, 
θʱὶ ὁ ηεξ῵λ θʱξδίʱλ ʱὐηνῦ πιεζζήζεηʱη γλώζεσο.
319 
 
He who guards his tongue cuts his ways rightly, 
And he who keeps watch over his heart will be filled with knowledge. 
 
The following describes another sort of ‗interior bait‘ upon which one might ‗choke‘: 
 
                                                 
315 Sch. 317.8-14 on Prov. 24:26. 
316 Driscoll (2003: 118-9). 
317 Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 240, n.31). 
318 See above, 2.2.4. 
319 AM 94.  
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Many pathē are hidden in our souls, which are revealed by the sharpness of the 
temptations when these pathē slip out of us. So, it is necessary ‗to keep watch 
over the heart with all vigilance‘ lest when the object [for which we have pathos] 
appears, we be won over to the pathos, carried off suddenly by demons and do 
something abhorrent to God.
320 
 
What Evagrius is referring to here is the level of dispositional pathos that I denoted D3; 
that is, the pathos associated with particular noēmata and memories. Everyone has a 
general disposition to pathos – the level that I denoted D1, and, at the level that I de-
noted D2, the dispositions to particular pathē such as hunger, sexual desire, anger or dis-
tress.
321 But each of us differs in our innate vulnerability to particular pathē, and, in ad-
dition, each of us, as we go through life, becomes primed by our experiences to respond 
to stimuli in particular ways. Something happens to us and, as Evagrius would put it, we 
form an empathēs memory of it, which is then stored in our nous, waiting to be recalled 
to our awareness by some new circumstance. That recollection might simply take the 
form of the resurfacing of the memory, but the stronger the pathos associated with it, the 
more likely it is that the recollection will take the form of an arousal of a fresh episode 
of that pathos, together, as likely as not, with an acting out of it. So to go back to the ex-
ample discussed in section 2.2.3, if someone injures me and I respond with resentment 
then I will form an empathēs memory of their face. Supposing I don‘t see them again for 
a long time, I might forget all about both them and the injury. But then suppose I do see 
them again: before I know what is happening - perhaps before I‘ve even consciously 
recognised them, let alone remembered the nature of our past dealings  – resentment 
surges up within me, flooding my awareness and overwhelming my thought processes. 
At this point my nous has been ‗sprinkled with the dust‘ of the logismoi, but the pathos 
has yet to win me over, meaning that I can still refrain from acting it out; it will be re-
called in relation to Eulogios 21.22-3,
322 that even when a person is in the throes of fresh 
pathos she still has the power to refrain from sinning. But should the ‗spirit of complai-
sance blind the eye of my soul‘ I will proceed to sin, if not kat’ energeian then at least 
kata dianoian; having allowed myself to be ‗carried off by the demons to do something 
                                                 
320 KG 6.52, based on Driscoll‘s translation (2003: 119) from the Greek in Hausherr, ―Nouveaux frag-
ments grecs d‘Évagre le Pontique‖, Orientalia Christiana Periodica 30 (1933), pp.164-75. 
321 See above, 2.2.4. 
322 See above, 3.4.  
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abhorrent to God‘ I have, again, turned away from God and reinforced my disposition to 
pathos. 
 
The praktikos, then, must continually monitor his responses, both cognitive and affec-
tive, to  the circumstances in which he finds himself. He must be constantly on the 
lookout for unexpected thoughts or images appearing in his mind, however fleetingly; 
and for the smallest twinges of unexpected emotion, especially if it seems unwarranted. 
This is what it is needed to guard against the ‗pathē that are hidden in his soul‘ from 
‗slipping out‘ in response to ‗the sharpness of temptation.‘ The pathē in question, as 
noted above, are those specific to him personally, corresponding to D3, the most differ-
entiated level of his disposition to pathos, and they arise in response to cognitive trig-
gers. But we can also find ourselves suddenly overwhelmed by pathē from D2, which 
are less personally specific. The following is an example: 
 
Κἂλ κεηὰ ʘενῦ δνθῆο εἴλʱη, θπιάηηνπ η῅ο πνξλείʱο δʱίκνλʱ. Λίʱλ γάξ ἐζηηλ 
ἀπʱηεὼλ,  θʱὶ  θζνλεξώηʱηνο,  θʱὶ  βνύιεηʱη  ὀμύηεξνο  εἴλʱη  η῅ο  θηλήζεσο  θʱὶ 
λήςεσο  ηνῦ  λνόο  ζνπ,  θʱὶ  ἀπὸ  ʘενῦ  ἀπνζπᾷλ  ʱὐηὸλ  πʱξεζη῵ηʱ  ʱὐηῶ  κεη’ 
εὐιʱβείʱο θʱὶ θόβνπ.
323 
 
Even when you seem to be with God, keep guard against the demon of fornica-
tion, for he is very deceitful and most jealous. He pretends to be swifter than the 
sobriety and movement of your nous so as to distance it from God while it is 
standing before him with reverence and fear. 
 
The ‗deceitfulness‘ of this demon consists, as noted above, in its pretence of being able 
to overwhelm the nous before it realises that it is under attack,
324 while in saying that it 
is ‗jealous‘ Evagrius presumably means that it has a tendency to attack the monk regard-
less of what he is doing. In this case inner watchfulness means maintaining a continual 
awareness that this demon could attack at any time, and, as a result of this awareness, 
being ready to intercept and banish it as soon as it does. It also means continually moni-
toring one‘s state, as different factors can make one more or less susceptible to the de-
mons. For example, the thumos is very rapidly tempted when it has been troubled the 
night before, and the epithumētikon readily welcomes thoughts of fornication when it 
                                                 
323 Pry. 90. 
324 See above, 2.1.3.2.  
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has been agitated in the fantasies of sleep.
325 The monk must never abandon his cell 
during times of temptation since fleeing and circumventing such struggles teaches the 
nous to be unskilled, cowardly and evasive,
326 meaning that in future he would be even 
less able to cope.  
 
The sort of watchfulness described above is a special case of a more general approach 
that Evagrius describes at Praktikos 50: 
 
Δἴ ηηο βνύινηην η῵λ κνλʱρ῵λ ἀγξίσλ πεηξʱζ῅λʱη δʱηκόλσλ θʱὶ η῅ο ʱὐη῵λ ηέρλεο 
ἕμηλ ιʱβεỖλ, ηεξείησ ηνὺο ινγηζκνύο, θʱὶ ηὰο ἐπηηάζεηο ζεκεηνύζζσ ηνύησλ, θʱὶ 
ηὰο ἀλέζεηο, θʱὶ ηὰο κεηεκπινθάο, θʱὶ ηνὺο ρξόλνπο, θʱὶ ηίλεο η῵λ δʱηκόλσλ νἱ 
ηνῦην πνηνῦληεο, θʱὶ πνỖνο πνίῳ δʱίκνλη ἀθνινπζεỖ, θʱὶ ηίο ηίλη νὐρ ἕπεηʱη· θʱὶ 
δεηείησ πʱξὰ Χξηζηνῦ ηνύησλ ηνὺο ιόγνπο.
327 
 
If one of the monks should wish to acquire experience with the cruel demons and 
become familiar with their skill, let him observe the logismoi and note their in-
tensity and their relaxation, their inter-relationships, their occasions, which of the 
demons do this or that particular thing, what sort of demon follows upon another 
and which does not follow upon another; and let him seek from Christ the reason 
for these things. 
 
Evagrius  gives  a  detailed  example  of  this  kind  of  observation  in  chapter  9  of  On 
Thoughts, in relation to the demon of wandering (πιάλνο) who, as the name suggests, 
induces the nous to wander at length and thereby ‘distances it little by little from the 
knowledge  of  God  and  from  virtue  while  it  forgets  even  its  profession’  (κʱθξὰλ 
γηλόκελνλ θʱη’ ὀιίγνλ η῅ο γλώζεσο ηνῦ ζενῦ θʱὶ η῅ο ἀξεη῅ο θʱὶ ηνῦ ἐπʱγγέικʱηνο 
ιήζελ ιʱκβάλνληʱ).
328 Evagrius advises: 
 
ΓεỖ νὖλ ηὸλ ἀλʱρσξνῦληʱ ηνῦηνλ ηεξεỖλ πόζελ ηε ἄξρεηʱη θʱὶ πνῦ θʱηʱιήγεη· νὐ 
γὰξ  εἰθῆ  νὐδὲ  ὡο  ἔηπρε  ηὸλ  κʱθξὸλ  ἐθεỖλνλ  θύθινλ  ἐξγάδεηʱη,  ἀιιὰ  ηὴλ 
θʱηάζηʱζηλ ηνῦ ἀλʱρσξνῦληνο δηʱθζεỖξʱη βνπιόκελνο ηʱῦηʱ πνηεỖ…Ἀιι’ ἟κεỖο, 
εἴπεξ  ἔρνκελ  ζθνπὸλ  ηνῦ  γλ῵λʱη  ζʱθ῵ο  ηὴλ  ηνύηνπ  πʱλνπξγίʱλ,  κὴ  ηʱρέσο 
θιεγμώκεζʱ  πξὸο  ʱὐηὸλ  κεδὲ  κελύζσκελ  ηὰ  γηλόκελʱ…ἀιιὰ  ἄιιελ  κίʱλ 
἟κέξʱλ ἠ θʱὶ δεπηέξʱλ ζπγρσξήζσκελ ʱὐηῶ ηειεη῵ζʱη ηὸ δξᾶκʱ, ἵλʱ ἀθξηβ῵ο 
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κʱζόληεο  ʱὐηνῦ  ηὸ  ζθεπώξεκʱ  ιόγῳ  κεηὰ  ηʱῦηʱ  ἐιέγρνληεο  ʱὐηὸλ 
θπγʱδεύζσκελ.
329 
 
The anchorite must observe this demon, where he starts from and where he ends 
up, for he does not make this long circuit by chance or at random, but rather it is 
with the intention of destroying the anchorite’s state that he does this…But if we 
make it our goal to know clearly the cunning of this demon, let us not be quick to 
speak to him or make known what is happening…Rather, let us allow him, for 
another day or two, to bring his game to completion, so that having learned about 
his deceitfulness in detail, we may put him to flight by exposing him with a 
word. 
 
Rather than simply banish the demon as quickly as possible, Evagrius recommends 
allowing it to linger in order to learn about it,
330 although clearly this strategy will only 
be available to those who are capable of maintaining, at least to some extent, their 
observation of the demon while being tempted by it, and Evagrius acknowledges that 
there will be limits to their ability to do so: 
 
Ἀιι’ ἐπεηδὴ θʱηὰ ηὸλ θʱηξὸλ ηνῦ πεηξʱζκνῦ ζπκβʱίλεη ηεζνισκέλνλ ὄληʱ ηὸλ 
λνῦλ κὴ ἀθξηβ῵ο ἰδεỖλ ηὰ γηλόκελʱ, κεηὰ ηὴλ ἀλʱρώξεζηλ ηνῦ δʱίκνλνο ηνῦην 
γηλέζζσ·  θʱζεζζεὶο  κλεκόλεπζνλ  θʱηὰ  ζεʱπηὸλ  η῵λ  ζπκβεβθόησλ  ζνη 
πξʱγκάησλ…ηʱῦηʱ θʱηάκʱζε θʱὶ  πʱξάδνο ηῆ κλήκῃ ἵλ’  ἔρῃο ἐιέγρεηλ ʱὐηὸλ 
πξνζηόληʱ.
331 
 
But since in time of temptation the nous may happen to be muddled and not see 
accurately what is happening, one should do the following after the withdrawal 
of  the  demon.  Sit  down  and  recall  for  yourself  the  things  that  happened  to 
you…Examine these events carefully and commit them to memory so that you 
may be able to expose him when he approaches. 
 
The mental and emotional stability that allow the monk to observe a demon while being 
tempted by it is  apatheia; to be precise, a monk in this situation has attained what 
Evagrius calls ‘imperfect apatheia’. The fact that he can possess sufficient apatheia to 
be able to allow a demon to linger in order to observe it, but that he might nonetheless 
find that his nous becomes muddled such that he needs to reflect upon his experiences 
afterwards, reveals much about Evagrius‘ understanding of  apatheia, as will be dis-
                                                 
329 Th. 9.9-26. 
330 Cf. Linge (2000: 556). 
331 Th. 9.26-34.  
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cussed below. The epistemic clarity that apatheia bestows in relation to the warfare 
with the demons is summarised at Praktikos 83: 
 
὇ λνῦο ηὸλ ἐκπʱζ῅ πόιεκνλ πνιεκ῵λ νὐ ζεσξήζεη ηνὺο ιόγνπο ηνῦ πνιέκνπ· ηῶ 
γὰξ ἐλ λπθηὶ κʱρνκέλῳ ἔνηθελ· ἀπάζεηʱλ δὲ θηεζάκελνο, ῥᾳδίσο ἐπηγλώζεηʱη ηὰο 
κεζνδείʱο η῵λ πνιεκίσλ.
332 
 
When the nous is engaged in the warfare of the pathē it cannot contemplate the 
logoi of the warfare, for it is like one who fights in the night. But when it has ac-
quired apatheia, it will easily recognise the artifices of the enemy.
333 
 
The treatise On Thoughts consists almost entirely of extended discussions of different 
applications of observation and inner watchfulness. Several examples have already been 
discussed: Chapter 1, which describes the relationship between the demons;
334 Chapter 
8, which describes how to distinguish between thoughts of angelic, human and demonic 
provenance;
335 Chapter 21, which describes how one sort of  logismos can lead to an-
other;
336 Chapter 25, which describes how the  nous receives noēmata and how it as-
sumes agency within the logismoi,
337 and Chapter 41, which discusses the imprinting of 
the nous by noēmata and describes how to discern the spiritual significance of biblical 
imagery.
338 In the latter, as elsewhere, Evagrius makes explicit his reader‘s role as a fel-
low investigator:  
 
δεηήζεηο εἴπεξ ὡο ἔρεη ἐπὶ η῵λ ζσκάησλ θʱὶ η῵λ ιόγσλ ʱὐη῵λ, νὕησο ἔρεη θʱὶ 
ἐπὶ η῵λ ἀζσκάησλ θʱὶ η῵λ ιόγσλ ʱὐη῵λ· θʱὶ ἄιισο κὲλ ηππσζήζεηʱη ὁ λνῦο 
ὁξ῵λ λνῦλ, θʱὶ ἄιισο δηʱηεζήζεηʱη ὁξ῵λ ηὸλ ιόγνλ ʱὐηνῦ.
339 
 
you shall investigate whether it is indeed the same for incorporeals and their 
logoi as it is for bodies and their logoi, and whether the nous will receive impres-
                                                 
332 Prakt. 83. 
333 Cf. Eph. 6:11; Sch. 372 on Prov. 31:11, ‗such a one shall stand in no need of fine spoils‘: ‗When we 
have vanquished the opposing power we ‗despoil‘ her in learning her logoi‘ (ληθήζʱληεο ηὴλ ἀληηθεηκέλελ 
δύλʱκηλ ζθπιεύνκελ ʱὐηὴλ ηνὺο πεξὶ ʱὐη῅ο ιόγνπο κʱλζάλνληεο). 
334 See above, 2.1.4.1, 2. 
335 See above, 2.1.1. 
336 See above, 2.1.4.2. 
337 See above, 2.1.1. 
338 See above, 1.2.1.1. 
339 Th. 41. 20-4; cf., e.g., Th. 25.3-5: ‗My own proof in most cases is the  heart of my reader, especially if 
it possesses understanding and experience in the monastic life‘ (ἐκὴ…ἀπόδεημηο ἐλ ηνỖο πιείνζηλ ἟ ηνῦ 
ἀλʱγηλώζθνληόο ἐζηη θʱξδίʱ, θʱὶ ηνῦην εἰ ζπλεηὴ εἴε θʱὶ ηνῦ κνλʱδηθνῦ βίνπ πεπεηξʱκέλε).   
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sions in one way when it sees a nous and whether it will be disposed in another 
way when it sees its logos.  
 
Chapter 19 of On Thoughts includes a detailed description of the cultivation and appli-
cation of discernment in relation to experiences of logismoi: 
 
Ὅηʱλ η῵λ ἐρζξ῵λ ηξώζῃ ζέ ηηο πʱξʱβʱιὼλ θʱὶ βνύιεη ηὴλ ῥνκθʱίʱλ ʱὐηνῦ 
ζηξέςʱη  θʱηὰ  ηὸ  γεγξʱκκέλνλ  ἐπὶ  ηὴλ  θʱξδίʱλ  ʱὐηνῦ,  πνίεζνλ  νὕησο  ὡο 
ιέγνκελ. Γίειε θʱηὰ ζʱπηὸλ ηὸλ ὑπ’ ʱὐηνῦ βιεζέληʱ ζνη ινγηζκόλ, ὅζηηο πνηέ 
ἐζηη  θʱὶ  ἐθ  πόζσλ  πξʱγκάησλ  ζπλέζηεθε  θʱὶ  πνỖνλ  ηνύησλ  ἐζηὶ  κάιηζηʱ  ηὸ 
ζιίβνλ ηὸλ λνῦλ. Ὀ δὲ ιέγσ ηνηνῦηόλ ἐζηηλ· ἔζησ πεκθζεὶο ὑπ’ ʱὐηνῦ ὁ η῅ο 
θηιʱξγπξίʱο ινγηζκόο, ηνῦηνλ δίειε εἴο ηε ηὸλ ὑπνδεμάκελνλ ʱὺηὸλ λνῦλ θʱὶ εἰο 
ηὸ λόεκʱ ηνῦ ρξπζνῦ θʱὶ εἰο ʱὐηὸλ ηὸλ ρξπζὸλ θʱὶ εἰο ηὸ θηιάξγπξνλ πάζνο· 
ινηπὸλ ἐξώηʱ ηί ηνύησλ ἐζηὶλ ἁκʱξηίʱ· πόηεξνλ ὁ λνῦο θʱὶ πσο; εἰθώλ ἐζηη ηνῦ 
ζενῦ· ἀιιὰ ηὸ λόεκʱ ηνῦ ρξπζνῦ; θʱὶ ηνῦην ηίο ἂλ εἴπνη λνῦλ ἔρσλ πνηέ; ἀιι’ 
ʱὐηὸο  ὁ  ρξπζόο  ἐζηηλ  ἁκʱξηίʱ;  θʱὶ  ηίλνο  ράξηλ  γεγέλεηʱη;  ἕπεηʱη  ηνίλπλ  η῅ο 
ἁκʱξηίʱο ʱἴηηνλ εἶλʱη ηὸ ηέηʱξηνλ, ὅπεξ νὐθ ἔζηη πξᾶγκʱ ὑθεζηὸο θʱη’ νὐζίʱλ 
νὐδὲ λόεκʱ πξάγκʱηνο νὐδὲ λνῦο πάιηλ ἀζώκʱηνο, ἀιι’ ἟δνλή ηηο κηζάλζξσπνο 
ἐθ ηνῦ ʱὐηεμνπζίνπ ηηθηνκέλε θʱὶ θʱθ῵ο θερξ῅ζζʱη ηνỖο ηνῦ ζενῦ θηίζκʱηη ηὸλ 
λνῦλ ἀλʱγθάδνπζʱ, ἣλπεξ πεξηηέκλεηλ ὁ ηνῦ ζενῦ λόκνο πεπίζηεπηʱη. Κʱὶ ηʱῦηά 
ζνπ  δηεξεπλσκέλνπ,  θζʱξήζεηʱη  κὲλ  ὁ  ινγηζκὸο  εἰο  ηὴλ  ἰδίʱλ  ἀλʱιπόκελνο 
ζεσξίʱλ, θεύμεηʱη δὲ ἀπὸ ζνῦ ηὸ δʱηκόληνλ, η῅ο δηʱλνίʱο ζνπ ὑπὸ ηʱύηεο η῅ο 
γλώζεσο εἰο ὕςνο ἀξζείζεο.
340 
 
When one of the enemies approaches and wounds you and you want to ‘turn his 
own sword back against his heart’, according to the scripture text, then do as we 
tell you. Distinguish within yourself the logismos that he has launched against 
you, as to what it is, how many elements it consists of, and among these what 
sort of thing it is that most affects the nous. This is an example of what I am 
talking about. Suppose the logismos of avarice is sent by him; distinguish within 
this logismos the nous that received it, the noēma of gold, the gold itself, and the 
pathos of avarice; then ask which of these elements is a sin. Is it the nous? But 
how? It is the image of God. But how can it be the noēma of gold? And who in 
his right mind would ever say this? Does the gold itself constitute a sin? Then for 
what purpose was it created? It follows therefore that the fourth element is the 
cause of the sin, namely, that which is not an object with substantial subsistence, 
nor the noēma of an object, nor even the incorporeal nous, but a pleasure hostile 
to humanity, born of self-determination, and compelling the nous to make im-
proper use of the creatures of God: it is the law of God that has been entrusted 
with circumcising this pleasure. As you engage in this careful examination, the 
                                                 
340 Th. 19.1-23.  
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logismos will be destroyed and dissipate in its own consideration, and the demon 
will  flee from  you when  your  dianoia has been raised to the heights by this 
knowledge. 
 
This passage comprises a set of clear, step-by-step instructions by which a temptation 
can be dissolved through using reason to deconstruct its constituent logismoi. Instruc-
tions like this can make it possible, even  when the nous is ‗sprinkled with dust‘, to mus-
ter the resources of the logistikon to drive back the encroaching pathos. The monk to 
whom this passage is addressed will, again, already have some experience in dealing 
with the logismoi, and, realising that he is being tempted by a logismos of avarice, will 
wish not merely to banish it but to dissolve it altogether by disentangling its different 
elements and thereby isolating its affective component and revealing it for what it is – an 
illusion, an ‗object without substantial subsistence‘ – that depends for its appearance of 
reality upon his collaboration; specifically, upon his assent to the pleasure that it evokes 
in him. If this promise of pleasure is subtracted from the logismos then, the logismos 
having been defused, the remaining elements – the nous, the noēma of gold and gold it-
self – freed from its obfuscating effects, can, as objects of apathēs cognition, be seen for 
what they are. As Linge explains, 
 
The purpose of discernment is to recognise the temptations and weaken their in-
fluence  by  means  of  an  analytical  understanding  of  what  is  happening  to 
one…detached  observation  of  one‘s  mental  processes  enables  one  to  remain 
tranquil and focused, so that the passions are no longer aroused and one is no 
longer ―drawn into‖ one‘s thoughts as they arise. The ascetic who cultivates the 
art of discernment is thus learning to break the affective power of his mental con-
tent.
341  
 
The examples considered so far have focused upon the application of watchfulness and 
discernment to situations of actual or potential temptation, but basing himself upon John 
10:1-18 he also recommends that we assume the role of shepherd in relation to our  noē-
mata in general: 
 
Τὰ  λνήκʱηʱ  ηνῦ  ʱἰ῵λνο  ηνύηνπ  ὁ  θύξηνο  θʱζάπεξ  πξόβʱηά  ηηλʱ  ηῶ  ἀγʱζῶ 
πνηκέλη  ηῶ  ἀλζξώπῳ  πʱξέδσθε  ...  ζπδεύμʱο  ʱὐηῶ  ζπκὸλ  θʱὶ  ἐπηζπκίʱλ  πξὸο 
βνήζεηʱλ, ἵλʱ δηὰ κὲλ ηνῦ ζπκνῦ θπγʱδεύῃ ηὰ η῵λ ιύθσλ λνήκʱηʱ, δηὰ δὲ η῅ο 
                                                 
341 Linge (2000: 556).  
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ἐπηζπκίʱο  ζηέξγῃ  ηὰ  πξόβʱηʱ,  θʱὶ  ὑπὸ  η῵λ  ὑεη῵λ  θʱὶ  ἀλέκσλ  πνιιάθηο 
βʱιιόκελνο·  ἔδσθε  πξὸο  ηνύηνηο  θʱὶ  λνκόλ,  ὅπσο  πνηκʱίλῃ  ηὰ  πξόβʱηʱ,  θʱὶ 
ηόπνλ ριόεο θʱὶ ὕδσξ ἀλʱπʱύζεσο θʱὶ ςʱιηήξηνλ θʱὶ θηζάξʱλ θʱὶ ῥάβδνλ θʱὶ 
βʱθηεξίʱλ,  ἵλ’  ἐθ  ηʱύηεο  η῅ο  πνίκλεο  θʱὶ  ηξʱθῆ  θʱὶ  ἐλδύζεηʱη  θʱὶ  ρνξηνλ 
ὀξεηλὸλ ζπλʱγάγῃ· «Τίο γάξ, θεζί, πνηκʱίλεη πνίκλελ θʱὶ ἐθ ηνῦ γάιʱθηνο ʱὐη῅ο 
νὐθ ἐζζίεη;» ΓεỖ νὖλ ηὸλ ἀλʱρσξνῦληʱ θπιάηηεηλ λύθησξ θʱὶ κεζ’ ἟κέξʱλ ηνῦην 
ηὸ πνίκληνλ, κή ηη η῵λ λνεκάησλ γέλεηʱη ζεξηάισηνλ ἠ ιῃζηʱỖο πεξηπέζῃ, εἰ δὲ 
ἄξʱ ηη ηνηνῦηνλ ζπκβʱίε θʱηὰ ηὴλ λάπελ, εὐζὺο ἐμʱξπάδεηλ ἐθ ηνῦ ζηόκʱηνο ηνῦ 
ιένληνο θʱὶ η῅ο ἄξθηνπ.
342 
 
The Lord has confided to the human person the noēmata of this age, like sheep to 
a good shepherd
343…For assistance he has yoked to him thumos and epithumia 
so that through the thumos he may put to flight the noēmata that are the wolves 
and through the epithumia he may love the sheep, even if he is often cast about 
by the rains and the winds. In addition to these things he has also given him ‗a 
pasturage‘ so that he may pasture the sheep, and ‗a verdant place and water for 
refreshment‘,
344 ‗a harp and a lyre‘,
345 and ‗a rod and staff‘
346 in order that from 
this flock he may have nourishment and clothing and that ‗he may gather the 
mountain grass‘,
347 for scripture says, ‗Who pastures a flock and does not feed on 
its milk?‘
348 Therefore the anchorite must guard this little flock night and day, 
lest any of the noēmata be taken by a wild beast or fall prey to thieves; and if 
ever something like this should happen in the wooded glen, he must immediately 
snatch it from the mouth of the lion and the bear.
349 
 
Recalling the distinctions of On Thoughts 8, the noēmata that are ‗sheep‘ will comprise, 
firstly, ‗angelic‘ noēmata – namely noēmata of logoi, and, secondly, ‗human‘ noēmata 
– namely, noēmata of objects that, being free of pathos, can form the basis for spiritual 
investigation. The ‗wolves‘ correspond to ‗demonic‘ noēmata, meaning that they are 
empathê,
350 having pathos ‗yoked together with‘ (ζπλεδεπγκέλʱ) them.
351 We are to as-
sume active responsibility for our ‗flock‘ – that is, for our mental content – using dis-
cernment to identify different noēmata and then treating them accordingly. Those that 
are ‗sheep‘ can provide us with nourishment, whether directly, as with angelic noēmata, 
                                                 
342 Th. 17.4-17. 
343 Cf. John 10:1-18. 
344 Cf. Ps. 22:2. 
345 Cf. Ps. 56:9, 107:2. 
346 Cf. Ps. 22:4. 
347 Cf. Prov. 27:25. 
348 1 Cor. 9:7. 
349 Cf. 1 Kings. 17:34-7. 
350 See above, 2.2.3. 
351 Disc. 64.2. Cf. Disc. 165.1-2.  
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or indirectly, as the basis for spiritual investigation, as with human noēmata. By means 
of epithumia we are to love the ‗sheep‘, and by means of thumos, to drive away the 
‗wolves‘. But while this will be the action according to nature of these parts of the soul, 
they will not always maintain it but will sometimes slip back into pathos and so become 
sources of ‗rains and winds‘. The ‗grass and water‘ symbolise  praktikē and knowl-
edge,
352 the ‗food‘ for the ‗sheep‘. The lyre again symbolises praktikē, and the harp, ‗the 
pure nous moved by spiritual knowledge.‘
353 The ‗rod and staff‘ are ‗the chastisements 
that guide the sinner back to goodness‘,
354 and the mountain grass ‗knowledge of the 
holy powers that correspond to the irrational state of souls‘ (ἁξκόδνπζʱ ηῆ ἀινγσηέξᾳ 
η῵λ ςπρ῵λ θʱηʱζηάζεη).
355 This ‘flock’ will nourish the monk, but in return he must 
‘guard (θπιάηηεηλ) it night and day’. 
 
This discussion has revealed the centrality to, and ubiquity within, Evagrius’ spirituality 
of inner watchfulness, and in particular, its relation to apatheia: as noted above, and for 
reasons  which  should  now  be  clear,  continual  vigilance  is  essential  to  both  the 
attainment and the preservation of apatheia.  
 
It was noted in connection with Evagrius’ advice regarding the demon of wandering that 
the mental and emotional stability that allow someone to observe a demon while being 
tempted by it is apatheia. So far so good – we know from Praktikos 6 that it is not up to 
us (ἐθ’ ἟κỖλ) whether or not the logismoi trouble the soul but only whether or not they 
linger and arouse pathos. The monk who feels able to allow a demon to linger in order 
to observe it must have some confidence in his ability to resist the arousal of pathos, 
from which it follows that he has to some extent attained apatheia. But the fact that his 
nous might become ‘muddled’ under the influence of the demon, such that he is unable 
to ‘see accurately what is happening’ reveals that to some extent he remains vulnerable 
to  pathos.  I  stated  above  that  this  shows  that  he  has  attained  what  Evagrius  calls 
‘imperfect apatheia’. This is something he only refers to once, in Chapter 60 of the 
Praktikos: 
 
                                                 
352 Cf. Sch. 1 on Ps.22:1-2; Sinkewicz (2003: 269, n.24). 
353 Cf. Sch. 2 on Ps. 32:2; Sch. 2 on Ps. 91:4; Sinkewicz (2003: 269, n.24). Note that the pure – that is, 
apathēs nous – is said to be ‗moved‘; see above, 1.1.2; 3.1. 
354 Cf. Sch. 3 on Ps. 22:4; Sinkewicz (2003: 269, n.24). 
355 Sch. 341 on Prov. 27:25.  
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Ἡ  κὲλ  ηειείʱ  ηῆ  ςπρῆ  ἀπάζεηʱ  κεηὰ  ηὴλ  λίθελ  ηὴλ  θʱηὰ  πάλησλ  η῵λ 
ἀληηθεηκέλσλ ηῆ πξʱθηηθῆ δʱηκόλσλ ἐγγίλεηʱη· ἟ δὲ ἀηειὴο ἀπάζεηʱ ὡο πξὸο ηὴλ 
δύλʱκηλ ηέσο ηνῦ πʱιʱίνληνο ʱὐηῆ ιέγεηʱη δʱίκνλνο.
356 
 
Perfect apatheia emerges in the soul after the victory over all the demons that 
oppose praktikē. Imperfect apatheia refers to the relative strength of the demon 
still fighting against it. 
 
To be imperfectly apathēs, then, is to have a degree of apatheia, measurable by the ex-
tent to which one remains vulnerable to pathos. If one recalls that apatheia involves not 
just emotional stability, cognitive acuity and complete freedom from sexual desire, but 
also freedom from the desire for food or drink, it becomes clear that perfect apatheia 
will, normally at least, be more or less short-lived,
357 and that accordingly talk about 
apatheia in a dispositional rather than occurrent sense will tend to be about imperfect or 
partial apatheia.
358  
                                                 
356 Prakt. 60. 
357 This will, however, be at least partially dependent upon the physiology of fasting. 
358 Evagrius occasionally uses the term metriopatheia; to be precise, it occurs five times in his writings: 
four in the Scholia on Psalms (Sch. 4 on Ps. 2:12; 8 on Ps. 49:17; 5 on Ps. 93:12; 29 on Ps. 118:65-6) and 
one in the Scholia on Proverbs (Sch. 3 on Prov. 1:2); cf. Géhin (1987: 93). The evidence suggests that he 
associates it with the process of training the soul to become apathēs. To begin with, in each of his uses of 
the term metriopatheia it is modified by pathôn and the resulting expression, metriopatheia pathôn, 
equated with instruction, πʱηδείʱ, or to instruct, πʱηδεύεηλ; Géhin (1987: 93), supposes the association of 
metriopatheia with πʱηδείʱ, which is also found at Strom. 2:8.39.4-5, to have been traditional. This for-
mula is also implied by his sole use of the verb κεηξηνπʱζεỖλ, where it is associated with πʱηδεύεηλ; cf. 
Sch. 3 on Ps. 22:4. The modification of metriopatheia by pathôn implies its co-existence with pathos; 
meaning that to be metriopathēs must be still to have pathē. In addition, the process of training the soul to 
become apathēs consists in the gradual acquisition of control over the pathē. This means that it is a proc-
ess of modifying them under the influence of reason: in other words, of acquiring metriopatheia pathôn. 
There are, therefore, a priori grounds for supposing that for Evagrius metriopatheia is the incomplete 
mastery of the pathē that constitutes an interim stage on the way to attaining apatheia; cf. Géhin (1987: 
93). That Evagrius regards metriopatheia and apatheia as distinct concepts -  pace Suzuki (2009: 605) -  
is clear from the fact that in two places he refers to them both, namely Sch. 5 on Ps. 93:12 and 29 on Ps. 
118:65-6. Both are most naturally read as indicating that metriopatheia pathôn relates to the process that 
leads to apatheia. Sch. 5 on Ps. 93:12 reads: ‗Whoever the Lord loves, he instructs, says the Apostle; and 
if whoever he instructs, he blesses, every person instructed by him will become apathēs, for the Lord 
loves him, for metriopatheia pathôn is instruction.‘ («Ὁλ ἀγʱπᾶ Κύξηνο, πʱηδεύεη, » θεζὶλ ὁ Ἀπόζηνινο· 
εἰ δὲ ὃλ πʱηδεύεη, κʱθʱξίδεη, πᾶο ὁ πʱηδεπόκελνο ὑπ’ ʱὐηνπ ἀπʱζὴο γελήζεηʱη· ηνῦηνλ γὰξ ἀγʱπᾶ Κύξηνο· 
πʱηδείʱ γάξ ἐζηη κεηξηνπάζεηʱ πʱζ῵λ.) Sch. 29 on Ps. 118:65-6 reads: ‗Taste is apatheia of the rational 
soul, accrued through the spiritual law; goodness is (the) true taste of what has come into being under 
God; instruction is metriopatheia pathôn; knowledge is contemplation of the Trinity‘ (ʓεῦζηο δέ ἐζηηλ ἟ 
ἀπάζεηʱ ςπρ῅ο ινγηθ῅ο, δηὰ ηνῦ πλεπκʱηηθνῦ λόκνπ πξνζγηλνκέλε· ρξεζηόηεο δέ ἐζηηλ γεῦζηο ἀιεζὴο 
η῵λ γεγνλόησλ ὑπὸ ʘενῦ· πʱηδείʱ δὲ κεηξηνπάζεηʱ πʱζ῵λ· γλ῵ζηο δέ ἐζηηλ ἟ ζεσξίʱ η῅ο Τξηάδνο). At 
Sch. 8 on Ps. 49:17 we read simply, ‘But you hated instruction…instruction is  metriopatheia pathôn (Σὺ 
δὲ ἐκίζεζʱο πʱηδείʱλ, θ. η. ε. Πʱηδείʱ ἐζηη κεηξηνπάζεηʱ πʱζ῵λ), and at Sch. 4 on Ps. 2:12: ‗Paideia is  
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Attainment of apatheia, then, is a gradual process, and this makes sense if we recall that 
it consists in replacing the disposition to pathos with the disposition to be free from pa-
thos. This replacement will be cumulative, in that the stronger the disposition to apa-
theia becomes, the less likely the person will be to succumb to fresh pathos, meaning 
that the disposition to apatheia will in turn be further strengthened. During this process, 
apatheia  will be attained and  lost again countless times, hence Evagrius warns that 
‗those who have been deemed worthy of apatheia’ remain vulnerable to the ‘spite of the 
devil’
359 whereby they can fall.
360 This explains his reference in relation to our ‗shep-
herding‘ of our noēmata to our using our epithumia and thumos to love the ‗sheep‘ and 
drive away the ‗wolves‘ respectively, but their also being often a source of ‗rains and 
winds‘. When they are loving the ‗sheep‘ and driving away the ‗wolves‘, they are acting 
according to nature, meaning that the soul is apathēs, but when they are a source of 
‗rains and winds‘ then it has fallen back into empatheia. 
 
From the fact that apatheia is for all intents and purposes usually imperfect – in other 
words, that apatheia admits of degrees – it follows that the various conditions that are in 
                                                                                                                                               
metriopatheia, which tends naturally to result from the praktikē.  For the praktikē is spiritual teaching 
purifying the pathētikon part of the soul‘ (Πʱηδείʱ ἐζηη κεηξηνπάζεηʱ πʱζ῵λ· ὅπεξ ζπκβʱίλεηλ πέθπθελ ἐθ 
η῅ο πξʱθηηθ῅ο· ἣ γε πξʱθηηθή ἐζηη δηδʱζθʱιίʱ πλεπκʱηηθὴ, ηὸ πʱζεηηθὸλ κέξνο η῅ο ςπρ῅ο 
ἐθθʱζʱίξνπζʱ). Finally, at Sch. 3 on Prov. 1:2 we read: ‘And wisdom is knowledge of corporeals and 
incorporeals and the contemplation in them of judgment and providence; instruction is metriopatheia 
pathôn seen around the pathētikon and irrational part of the soul. (Κʱὶ ζνθίʱ κέλ ἐζηηλ γλ῵ζηο ζσκάησλ 
θʱὶ ἀζσκάησλ θʱὶ η῅ο ἐλ ηνύηνηο ζεσξνπκέλεο θξίζεσο θʱὶ πξνλνίʱο· πʱηδείʱ ἐζηηλ κεηξηνπάζεηʱ πʱζ῵λ 
πεξὶ ηὸ πʱζεηηθόλ ἠ ἄινγνλ η῅ο ςπρ῅ο κέξνο ζεσξνπκέλε). Although the latter two (indeed, three) could 
be understood as making metriopatheia synonymous with apatheia, they can also be read as supporting 
the two-stage picture. Therefore the most plausible interpretation of the evidence is that for Evagrius as 
for Philo, and also Plotinus, metriopatheia is an interim stage on the way to apatheia, wherein the ten-
dency to pathos is being brought under control but has yet to be fully overcome; cf. Philo of Alexandria, 
Allegorical Interpretation 3.129-44, ed. L. Cohn, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 1 (Ber-
lin,1896); Clement, Strom. 2:8.39.4-5; 6:9.74.2-5; Plotinus, Enn. 1.2.2-6, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. 
Schwyzer, Plotini opera, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1951). In this case metriopatheia is, for Evagrius, the same thing 
as ‗imperfect apatheia‘. However, his reason for preferring the term apatheia to metriopatheia becomes 
clear if we recall that the latter term was used by the Platonists and Peripatetics (cf. Diogenes Laertius 
5.31; Albinus, Isagoge, p.184, 24) with the sense that ‗at least some of the pathē…are natural and appro-
priate‘ (Frede, 1986: 93), such that the aim of the wise man was to ‗moderate his pathē‘ so that he had 
only those that it was reasonable to have; in other words, to become metriopathēs. As we have seen, Eva-
grius regards all pathē as symptoms of the soul‘s fallen estate and distance from God and therefore as 
unnatural and inappropriate by definition, hence a term which could be taken to imply something less 
would have been unacceptable to him. 
359 Cf. Wis. 2:24. 
360 Sch. 46 on Eccl. 6:1-6.  
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dependency relations to it, for example empatheia, psychological health, virtue and love 
– also admit of degrees. So just as a person can be more or less apathēs, she can be 
more or less empathēs, psychologically healthy, virtuous and in a condition of love. In 
turn, it follows that she will be more or less capable of contemplation and knowledge of 
God. On a good day she will be more apathēs, with everything that follows from that, 
and on a bad day, less so. Apatheia and empatheia are, accordingly, best understood as 
termini of a continuum of affectivity, along which one‘s position can change, perhaps 
on a daily basis, perhaps on an hourly one, perhaps less, perhaps more. We can imagine 
a middle point on that continuum, to one side of which are the many degrees of apa-
theia, starting with the most imperfect and leading to the most perfect, and, on the other 
side, the corresponding degrees of empatheia. That there is a point at which apatheia 
and empatheia merge into one another, that both are matters of degree and that we can 
move between them any number of times, are all expressions of the mutability and 
movement that characterise corporeal creation. In particular, since apatheia and empa-
theia are properties of the soul, their fluidity in relation to one another, and the fluidity 
of our experience of them, reflects the fact that movement and change are intrinsic to 
soul.  
 
So can perfect apatheia ever be attained during earthly life; that is, can a person ever 
find herself right at the apatheia end of the continuum of affectivity? I see no reason to 
suppose that it cannot,
361 nor, pace Rasmussen, that in earthly life it can only be attained 
during  prayer.
362  Nor is  there any logical reason why it cannot become permanent 
during earthly life. There is, however, overwhelming metaphysical reason, in that 
sooner or later the body is bound to recall our attention.
363 In any case, it could never be 
assumed that a state of apatheia currently being enjoyed would endure permanently. At 
the apokatastasis, however, perfect apatheia will be permanent, because for the pathē 
there will one day be complete destruction.
364 It follows that imperfect  apatheia can 
never be permanent.
365  
 
                                                 
361 Hence I am in agreement with Bunge (1986: 125); Linge (2000: 563), and Rasmussen (2005: 159),  
pace Guillaumont (1989: 27). 
362 Cf. Rasmussen (2005: 160). 
363 Although again this would depend upon the physiology of fasting. 
364 Cf. Prakt. 87. 
365 Pace Rasmussen (2005: 159).  
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There remains one last aspect to discuss of the gradual nature of the attainment of apa-
theia. We have seen that in both the Prologue to the Praktikos and at Praktikos 81 Eva-
grius describes love as the ‗offspring‘ of apatheia. Yet elsewhere he speaks of love as 
preceding apatheia: 
 
Ἀλʱρώξεζηο ἐλ ἀγάπῃ θʱζʱίξεη θʱξδίʱλ, 
ἀλʱρώξεζηο δὲ κεηὰ κίζνπο ἐθηʱξάζζεη ʱὐηήλ.
366 
 
Anachoresis in love purifies the heart; 
anachoresis in hate agitates it. 
 
Since purity of heart is apatheia, if love purifies the heart then love must come before 
apatheia, so how can it also be its ‘offspring’? The answer should by now be clear. As 
apatheia is gradually attained, so too is love, and just as the attainment of apatheia is 
cumulative, so too is that of love. So the more the anchorite progresses in apatheia, the 
more his anachoresis will be informed by love, which in turn will help him progress 
further in apatheia – in other words, a virtuous circle will operate. The question of 
whether love or apatheia ultimately comes first in the chronology of the spiritual ascent 
is moot, and they are probably best thought of as going hand in hand: 
 
The following passage summarises the relation of love to the virtues and to apatheia 
and reminds us that joy as well as love is intrinsic to Evagrian apatheia. The ‗intelligi-
ble sun‘, it will be recalled, is ‗the  rational nature which contains in itself the first and 
blessed light
367 in which are encompassed knowledge, love and all of the virtues, while 
the sun is also a symbol of Christ, the ‗sun of righteousness‘.
368 The ‗light that shines 
into the heavens‘ is that of the pure nous, the image of God:  
 
Πηζηνὶ  νὖλ  εἶλʱη  ηῆ  ἀιεζείᾳ  ζπνπδάζσκελ,  ἵλʱ  θʱὶ  εἰο  ηὴλ  κεηξόπνιηλ  η῵λ 
ἀξεη῵λ  ἀγάπελ  πξνθόπησκελ,  ὡο  ἣιηνο  ηʱỖο  ρξπζʱπγέζηλ  ἀθηίζηλ  ἁπάζῃ 
πξνζκεηδηᾷ  ηῆ  γῆ,  νὕησο  ἀγάπε  ηʱỖο  θσηʱπγέζη  πξάμεζηλ  ἁπάζῃ  πξνζρʱίξεη 
ςπρῆ·  ἣλπεξ  ἐὰλ  θʱηάζρσκελ,  ηὰ  πάζε  ἐζβέζʱκελ  θʱὶ  εἰο  νὐξʱλνὺο 
ἐιάκςζʱκελ.
369 
 
                                                 
366 AM 8. 
367 KG 3.44; see above, 3.2. 
368 Mal. 3:20; see above, 3.2. 
369 Eul. 30.32.  
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Let us hasten then to be faithful in the truth that we may advance to love, the me-
tropolis of the virtues. As the sun smiles upon the entire earth with its gleaming 
golden rays, so love with its luminescent actions gives joy to the entire soul. If 
we have indeed acquired love, we have extinguished the pathē and have let our 
light shine into the heavens. 
 
 
3.5  Summary: apatheia in the teachings of Evagrius Ponticus 
 
This chapter began by establishing that, strictly speaking, the subject of apatheia is the 
tripartite soul considered as a whole. Section 3.1 then argued for the proposition, first 
noted in Chapter One, that apatheia is the stable movement of the soul;
370 that is, its 
movement  toward  God,  and  also  noted  several  proofs  of  apatheia  mentioned  by 
Evagrius.  
 
Section 3.2 considered apatheia as ‘death and resurrection.’ As virtue and purity of soul 
apatheia is the ‘death’ of the ‘old self’ with its immersion in sensible reality and impure 
desires. Since the purification of the soul involves rising above the body’s ‘nature’, 
‘movements’ and ‘attributes’ apatheia is also the ‘death’ of the ‘corruptible body’, the 
sôma  psuchikon.  As  the  ‘death’  of  the  ‘old  self’  and  ‘corruptible  body’  apatheia 
functions as a fortification by protecting its possessor from the assaults of the logismoi, 
since although she will still experience them, insofar as she is  apathēs  she will be 
immune to their potential attractions; in other words, the soul of the apathēs will ‘derive 
no evil from its flesh.’ As the ‘death’ of the ‘corruptible body’ apatheia is the basis for 
its ‘resurrection’ in the form of the ‘spiritual body’, the sôma pneumatikon, and so of 
incorruptibility. This ‘resurrection’ is jointly constituted by the ‘resurrections’ of the 
body, the soul and the nous as ‘body and soul are raised to the order of the nous’ and the 
nous is thereby re-unified. The re-unified nous or ‘spiritual body’ ‘glows like the sun’ 
since it ‘contains in itself the first and blessed light.’  
 
Section 3.3 began by noting Evagrius‘ characterisation of this ‗triple resurrection‘ with 
reference to the ‗bond of peace‘ which is apatheia in the form of its ‗positive aspect‘, 
love. The apathēs was seen to be the ‗new self‘ in whom the healing of the internal di-
                                                 
370 See above, 1.1.2.  
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visions of the nous by the ‗physician of souls‘ is matched by the healing of external di-
visions, and that accordingly true apatheia consists not in the absence of desire but in 
seeing all people as ‗messengers of God‘ and loving them like oneself. It was then noted 
that through love apatheia makes knowledge possible, not only that of transcendent re-
alities but also practical moral knowledge, the exercise of which extends to our interior 
worlds such that, no longer seeing the world solely in terms of her desires and on their 
basis  constituting  kata dianoian fictional  worlds  in which they can be satisfied, the 
apathēs conducts herself virtuously within as well as without. This means that her nous 
becomes freed from ‗domestic disturbance‘ and so enabled to ascend, by means of con-
templation and prayer, the ‗ladder‘ of corporeal creation back to union with God, in 
which process it becomes ‗completely like light.‘ 
 
To this description of apatheia can now be added the findings of Section 1.2.2 regard-
ing the action according to nature of the three parts of the soul, which, it was noted at 
the time, amounted to a description of the apathēs soul. In the apathēs – that is, healthy 
– soul, the function of the rational part was seen to be contemplation, along with the 
management of practical affairs so as to facilitate it, which can now be seen to include 
the practical moral knowledge bestowed by apatheia, and also inner watchfulness and 
the ‗shepherding‘ of the noēmata. The thumos likewise has a dual function: on the one 
hand to struggle on the soul‘s behalf against the demons using anger along with virtues 
such as courage and perseverance, and on the other hand, to be a source of love, gentle-
ness, patience, mildness and humility. The preserve of the epithumētikon was seen to be 
spiritual desire, together with temperance, self-control and chastity.  
 
Section 3.4 completed the picture of apatheia by summarising how it is attained, noting 
that some aspects of this had already been covered in the course of previous discussions, 
while others would be passed over. It then focused on the cultivation of inner watchful-
ness and discernment, which was seen to be essential both to the attainment of apatheia 
and to its preservation. It noted that this consists not only in various forms of vigilance 
in respect of demonic attack or predispositions to particular pathē, but also in the need 
for the rational part of the soul to assume the role of the ‗good shepherd‘ in respect of 
the noēmata, aided by the epithumētikon and thumos. After this Evagrius‘ distinction 
between ‗perfect‘ and ‗imperfect‘ apatheia was discussed and it was noted that perfect  
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apatheia will tend to be relatively short-lived and that consequently talk about apatheia 
in a dispositional rather than occurrent sense will normally be about imperfect apatheia. 
Then the gradual and cumulative nature of attainment of apatheia was discussed. Fi-
nally it was noted that as well as being a consequence and proof of the attainment of 
apatheia, love is also essential to the process of attaining it, a dual role that reflects the 
gradual nature of that process. 
 
In sum, Evagrian apatheia is, in spiritual terms, the orientation of the soul toward God, 
and in psychological terms, stability. It endows its possessor with peace, spiritual pleas-
ure and joy; is constituted by the virtues, and is manifested above all as spiritual love 
and knowledge. 
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Conclusion 
 
The concept of apatheia is central to the teachings of Evagrius Ponticus. This thesis has 
examined that concept by situating it within its cosmological context as well as by ana-
lysing it in anthropological, psychological and spiritual terms. 
  
The first section focused upon Evagrius‘ cosmology. It began by outlining his vision of 
the creation and fall of the logikoi and of the hierarchical structure and therapeutic na-
ture of corporeal creation. The centrality of movement to his schema was remarked, sta-
ble movement being movement toward God, and unstable movement, movement away 
from him, and it was noted that he construes apatheia as the stable movement of the 
soul. His understanding of corporeal creation as a ‗ladder‘ upon which the fallen noes 
can, by means of transformative contemplation, ascend back to union with God, was 
described, along with his likening of corporeal creation to a ‗letter‘ from God to the 
fallen noes, which is ‗read‘ by means of contemplation. It was noted that apatheia is the 
stable movement of the soul, and the foundation for, and a necessary condition of, the 
contemplative ascent. The anthropology section began by focusing on the nous. It dis-
cussed the origin and scope of its passibility, seeing how this is manifested in both epis-
temic and metaphysical contexts, the causal interdependence of which were noted, and 
also the true nature of the nous as the incorporeal image of the incorporeal God. The 
following section described the three parts of the soul in terms of their action according 
to nature and thereby comprised a de facto description of the apathēs soul. Next Eva-
grius‘ understanding of the body was examined and it was argued that he believes pa-
thos to have a physical foundation in the form of excessive vital heat, and that accord-
ingly the elimination of this by dietary restriction constitutes the physical foundation of 
apatheia and also the means by which the krasis of the body, and so the body itself, is 
transformed, a transformation which is both the foundation for and the correlate of the 
contemplative transformation of the soul. It was remarked that because of the effects of 
this upon the body a distinction between ‗spiritual‘ and ‗profane‘ understandings of 
physical health is implicit in Evagrius‘ thought. The chapter concluded by considering 
what Evagrius means by the term ‗heart‘, since ‗purity of heart‘ is one of his characteri-
sations of apatheia. 
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Chapter  Two  focused  upon  the  psychology  and  phenomenology  of  empatheia,  the 
sickly condition of the soul which, on Evagrius‘ analysis, is our lot until we restore it to 
apatheia, its health and our natural state. It began by looking at the logismoi, asking 
what Evagrius means by this term, noting the broad scope with which he endows it but 
that logismoi always have pathos embedded in them, and proposing a definition of the 
term logismos in his usage, before explaining Evagrius‘ concept of the ‗matter‘ of the 
logismoi. Next came a consideration of his eightfold classification of ‗most generic lo-
gismoi‘. First each logismos was considered in turn, and a number of examples cited 
from the Antirrhētikos. This revealed the sort of phenomena that Evagrius regards as 
pathē and, and also how the logismoi destabilise the movements of the soul, this desta-
bilisation being the psychological expression of excessive vital heat.  Then Evagrius‘ 
rationale for the sequence of the eightfold classification was examined, first in terms of 
the derivation of the logismoi from the parts of the soul, it being concluded that for the 
most part there is no straightforward relation between them and that this reflects the lack 
of a clear boundary between the cognitive and the affective in Evagrius‘ psychology; 
and, second, in terms of the way in which the logismoi are experienced, both day-to-day 
and through a person‘s lifetime, it being concluded that although the sequence is largely 
conventional, it also maps the progression from the most primitive ways of erring in our 
interaction with the external world to the most sophisticated. The second part of the 
chapter focused upon pathos. It began with an overview of how pathos was understood 
within Greek philosophy, in particular orthodox Stoicism, and also by Origen, before 
turning to Evagrius‘ understanding of it. It was seen that for him pathos is the psycho-
logical expression of an excess of vital heat. It involves an attachment to the external 
world that is excessive and therefore idolatrous and makes the nous prey to the multi-
plicity and changeability of the external world, in consequence of which it is the unsta-
ble movement of the soul. It is injurious because it distances us from God, but falls 
within the scope of our self-determination, hence the possibility of our attaining apa-
theia. The wide range of desires, emotions, moods and other phenomena that Evagrius 
considers to be pathē was noted. It then turned to the cognitive ‗building blocks‘ of the 
logismoi, the empathē noēmata, examining what they are, how they are formed and how 
they ‗bind‘ the nous to the sensible world. The following section focused upon Eva-
grius‘ analysis of the arousal of pathos. It was noted that the logismoi arise from a dis-
position to pathos, of which three levels were identified, and that the longer a person  
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allows a logismos to linger in his awareness the more likely it is to arouse a fresh epi-
sode of pathos, but that even if it does so he still retains the capacity to abstain from act-
ing it out; that is, from sin, whether kata dianoian or kat’ energeian. The final section of 
Chapter Two described the empathēs nous from an experiential standpoint, noting the 
affective and cognitive instability and epistemic distortion that characterise empatheia. 
 
The first two chapters having established the cosmological, anthropological and psycho-
logical contexts of apatheia, Chapter Three focused upon apatheia itself. It began by 
establishing that, strictly speaking, the subject of apatheia is the tripartite soul consid-
ered in its entirety. It then established that, as noted in the first chapter, apatheia is the 
stable movement of the nous and as such is characterised by gentleness and tranquillity. 
It also noted some of the proofs of apatheia mentioned by Evagrius. The second section 
then considered apatheia as ‗death‘ and ‗resurrection‘, starting from its consisting in the 
separation of the soul from the body. For Evagrius this means the soul‘s raising itself 
and the body above the attributes of the latter, such that the person ‗dies‘ in respect of 
the corruptible sôma psuchikon - her attachments to the external world and the ‗impure 
desires‘ arising from them; accordingly, apatheia is ‗purity of heart‘. Apatheia was seen 
to protect its possessor from the logismoi, not because she no longer experiences them 
but because they no longer hold any attraction for her. It was also seen to be the starting 
point for the cultivation of the ‗spiritual body‘; since this is the re-unified nous this is in 
fact another way of saying that it is the foundation of the contemplative ascent. Apa-
theia was also seen to bestow phenomenological incorruptibility and immortality – that 
is, detachment from the body – and perhaps also a measure of physical incorruptibility 
through the alteration of the body‘s krasis by means of fasting. Finally, it was noted that 
for Evagrius the cultivation of the ‗spiritual body‘ is constituted by a ‗triple resurrec-
tion‘, namely that of the body, the soul and the nous itself. The third section of Chapter 
Three considered apatheia as love and knowledge. It began by noting that another way 
in which Evagrius characterises the re-unification of the nous is with reference to the 
‗bond of peace‘ of Eph. 4:3, that bond being love, the ‗positive aspect‘ of apatheia. As a 
consequence of love the apathēs was seen to be the ‗new self‘ who no longer sees other 
people in terms of social categorisations but as ‗angels of God‘ whom she ‗loves as her-
self‘. The role of faith in the attainment of apatheia was noted. Via love, apatheia was 
seen to endow its possessor both with knowledge of transcendent realities and with  
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practical moral knowledge. The holistic nature of spiritual knowledge as understood by 
Evagrius was emphasised, a holism consisting partly in love‘s being intrinsic to it and 
partly in its profoundly embodied nature, given that Evagrius‘ talk of detaching the soul 
from the body refers not to the physical body per se but to its corruptible form. The fi-
nal section of the chapter focused on how apatheia is attained, and in particular on the 
cultivation of inner watchfulness and discernment. These were seen to be necessary not 
only in relation to resisting temptation and warding off demonic attack but also in the 
‗shepherding‘ of the contents of the nous. Then Evagrius‘ distinction between ‗perfect‘ 
and ‗imperfect‘ apatheia was discussed and the gradual nature of the acquisition of apa-
theia noted. Finally, it was noted that as well as being an expression of apatheia, love is 
essential to its attainment. 
 
In sum, Evagrian apatheia involves the whole person - body, soul and nous - in a proc-
ess of transformation in which psychological and spiritual instability, fragmentation and 
isolation are replaced by stability and unity, effected by, and manifesting in, love, which 
in turn both enables, and is partly constitutive of, spiritual knowledge. Despite the dep-
redations Evagrian askēsis inflicts upon the physical body, he does not devalue the lat-
ter; he does, though, construe it in terms of a Platonising metaphysics and anthropology 
according to which incorporeality is superior to corporeality, and because of this he 
aims to make the body less ‗corporeal‘. However, since what is essential to Evagrian 
apatheia in respect of the body is the latter‘s ‗spiritualisation‘ through ‗purification‘ 
rather than the specific form of that purification, it should in principle be possible to re-
interpret Evagrian apatheia in terms of a more benign anthropology and a different ac-
count of the relation between physiology and psychology without sacrificing anything 
essential to it. Finally, the profound optimism of Evagrius‘ anthropology, given that he 
believes apatheia to be the natural state of the human being and to be in principle at-
tainable – with God‘s help – by anyone, is worthy of note. 
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Abbreviations  
 
Works by Evagrius   
8Th.  On the Eight Thoughts 
33Ch.  Thirty-Three Ordered Chapters 
AM  To Monks in Monasteries and Communities (Ad Monachos) 
AV  Exhortation to a Virgin (Ad Virginem) 
Ant.  Antirrhêtikos 
Disc.  The Chapters of the Disciples of Evagrius 
Ep.Fid.  Epistula Fidei 
Eul.  To Eulogios: On the Confession of Thoughts and Counsel in 
their Regard 
Exh.  Exhortations to Monks 
Found.  Foundations of the Monastic Life: A Presentation of the 
Practice of Stillness 
Gnost.  Gnostikos 
Gt.Let.  Great Letter (Letter to Melania) 
KG  Kephalaia Gnostika 
Let.  Letters 1-64 
Prakt.  Praktikos 
Pry.  Chapters on Prayer 
Rfl.  Reflections 
Sch. n on Eccl. n:n  Scholion (number in Géhin) on Ecclesiastes (chapter: verse) 
Sch. n on Prov. n:n  Scholion (number in Géhin) on Proverbs (chapter: verse) 
Sch. n on Ps. n:n  Scholion (number) on Psalms (chapter: verse) 
Th.  On Thoughts 
Vices  [To Eulogios] On the Vices opposed to the Virtues 
 
Other Abbreviations 
 
C.Cant.  Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs (Commentarium 
in Cant. Canticorum) 
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C.Matt.  Origen, Commentary on Matthew (Commentarium in evan-
gelium Matthaei) 
Conf.  Cassian, Conferences 
Confess.  Augustine, Confessions 
DA  Aristotle, De Anima 
DM  Aristotle, On the Movement of Animals (De Motu Animal-
ium) 
DP  Origen, On First Principles (De Principiis) 
De Opf.  Gregory of Nyssa, De opificio hominis 
EN  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Ethica Nicomachea) 
Ench.  Epictetus, Enchiridion 
Enn.  Plotinus, Enneads 1-9 
Gorg.  Plato, Gorgias 
HL  Palladius, Historia Lausiaca 
LS  Long & Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers 
Met.  Aristotle, Metaphysics 
Phd.  Plato, Phaedo 
Phdr.  Plato, Phaedrus 
PHP  Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (De pla-
citis Hippocratis et Platonis) 
Rep.  Plato, Republic 
Strom.  Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 
SVF  H von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta 
Symp.  Plato, Symposium 
Theaet.  Plato, Theaetetus 
Tim.  Plato, Timaeus 
TLG  Thesaurus Linguae Grecae 
VA  Athanasius, Life of Antony (Vita Antonii) 
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